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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Agency Attribution and Temporal Binding. Towards a New Model of Time Perception.</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>University College Dublin</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Belfield, Dublin 4</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IE">Ireland</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Sense of agency is a concept which represents our ability to attribute actions to ourselves or other people. Studies found that when we perform selfgenerated actions and when we observe other people doing the same, a phenomenon known as temporal binding occurs. It consists of a perception of “temporal attraction” between actions and outcomes [5,8]. Some studies proved that agency and temporal binding rely on multiple top-down and bottom-up mechanisms, such as inferential and sensorimotor processes [18]. However, not many researches considered the impact of experimental factors. For this reason, the present study will focus on this aspect, particularly on the role of the interface and the measure of agency, in order to shed more light on the mechanisms underlying agency attribution and temporal binding. From one side, we found no significant difference in temporal binding in screen and virtual reality conditions, although virtual reality seemed to increase the accuracy of time perception. From the other side, we found that the range of intervals significantly influenced people's estimations, and errors linearly diverged from one specific interval which was estimated with the most accuracy. Our hypothesis is that people use contextual cues and their knowledge of the world to find an optimal interval between actions and outcomes in different circumstances. This not only questions what we know about agency and temporal binding, but it can be also the foundation of a new model of time perception, where long-term memory and context play a fundamental role.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Agency Attribution</kwd>
        <kwd>Virtual Reality</kwd>
        <kwd>Time Perception</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        An important part of our existence is related to the perception of control we have over
our actions and the world around us [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref7">5,7</xref>
        ]: this concept is called sense of agency [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref7">5,7</xref>
        ].
In more detail, we normally experience sense of agency when we perform an action
and we clearly identify that action as initiated by us and no one else [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. Sense of
agency can be divided into two components: “feeling of agency” and “judgment of
agency” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. The former consists of a pre-reflective and implicit feeling of control,
whereas the latter is “conscious” and can be expressed by words [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref16">12,16</xref>
        ]. Thus, from
one side, we immediately and implicitly register whether an action is initiated by us
or not [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ], from the other side, we can consciously evaluate the circumstances and
attribute actions to ourselves [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. Thus, agency seems to be an extremely
multifaceted concept, which arises from various mechanisms. From one side, it is connected to
bottom-up processes based on multi-sensory feedbacks and proprioception [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]: we
feel in control of our actions when we detect congruency between actual and
predicted outcomes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]. From the other side, agency is influenced by inferential top-down
processes based on contextual information, individual experience and personal
knowledge [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]: these processes allow to elaborate “non-conceptual” information
coming from the sensorimotor system, and to explicitly identify ourselves as the
cause of our own actions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A component of sense of agency is called agency attribution, which is our ability to
attribute actions to other people. It turned out that agency for self-generated actions
and agency attribution seem to rely on similar neural and cognitive processes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ].
For example, Poonian and colleagues (2015) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] found that when we perform
selfgenerated actions and when we observe other people, there is no significant difference
in the suppression of the ERP component N1, traditionally associated with
selfgenerated actions which produce auditory or visual outcomes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. This seems to be
consistent also with a behavioral phenomenon known as intentional binding [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ],
often used to measure feeling of agency. Traditionally, intentional binding is
considered as a perceived “temporal attraction” between “voluntary” actions and their
outcomes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref8">5,8</xref>
        ], but it turned out to be present also when we observe other people or
when we participate in joint actions with them [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref12">10,12</xref>
        ]. Methods which have often
been used to measure binding effects are for example the Libet clock (Figure 1a) and
the interval estimation procedure (Figure 1b), where people have to respectively
report when actions and outcomes occur or estimate the interval between them [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref8">3,8</xref>
        ].
participants need to estimate the interval of time elapsed between the action and its auditory
outcome which varies across trials [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. In both methods, people tend to perceive their voluntary
action and its outcome as temporally closer [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. This phenomenon is called temporal binding.
However, researchers interpret the mechanisms underlying temporal binding very
differently. Particularly, some studies about agency attribution conducted in the field
of Human Computer Interaction leaded to two different approaches. From one side,
researchers believe that temporal binding and agency are related to intentionality. One
of the most famous studies in this area was conducted by Obhi &amp; Hall (2011) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ],
who found that intentional binding was present only in human-human interactions and
not in joint actions with computers. To obtain these results, it was sufficient to
manipulate people’s belief and tell them that they were interacting either with a person or
a computer [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. According to the authors, simply knowing that we are interacting
with other humans gives rise to a “pre-reflective we agentic identity” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]: in fact, we
can attribute agency to other people, predict and represent their actions and their
intentions as they were our own, because we biologically share similar ways of thinking
and behaving, [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref14 ref15">11,14,15</xref>
        ]. Probably, mirror neurons are involved, as they are active
not only when we perform certain tasks but also when we observe other people [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        From the other side, other researchers found that temporal binding is present also
in human-machine interactions, and believe that this phenomenon reflects causal
effects rather than intentionality [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. For example, Buehner (2012) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] found temporal
binding not only when participants observed other people performing actions, but also
when they observed a mere “mechanical causation”. Thus, according to the author,
temporal binding is mainly connected to causation between actions and their effects
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. In this case, temporal binding can be explained by the “theory of Bayesian
ambiguity reduction” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]: when two events are causally linked, they are also more likely to
be temporally close to each other [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. For this reason we may experience a temporal
attraction between causal events when we are uncertain about the interval which
elapses between them [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A model which seems to explain these inconsistent findings is the Optimal Cue
Integration model proposed by Synofzik and colleagues (2013) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. According to these
authors, cues such as sensorimotor causal effects, predictions, feedbacks, beliefs,
knowledge about context, previous experience, or even “affective” components,
interact between each other, and are weighted and used differently depending on the
“availability” and “reliability” of the information [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. Thus, agency and temporal
binding cannot be explained by a single mechanism such as intentionality or
causality, but rather by a complex interconnection of bottom-up and top-down processes,
where different cues are relevant in different situations. Although some researches
proved that multiple processes and cues influence sense of agency [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], there are some
factors which have not been investigated yet. Particularly, we think that specific
experimental conditions can dramatically influence sense of agency and binding effects.
      </p>
      <p>The aim of this project is to explore some of these aspects and question the
traditional means and procedures used in the study of agency. The present experiment is
based on more ecological and perceptually complex stimuli, compared to traditional
agency attribution tasks. In fact, participants will be presented with an archery
scenario and they will need to estimate the interval between the time when the archer shoots
the arrow and when the arrows reaches the target. There will be two agent conditions:
in one case, participants will be told that the archer is controlled by a computer, in the
other case, they will be told that it is controlled by another person. In this scenario,
two different interfaces will be directly compared for the first time in this field: a
traditional computer screen and virtual reality. In addition to that, it will be investigated
whether time perception and binding effects are influenced by changes in the measure
of agency, in this case the interval estimation procedure. Particularly, it will be used a
wider range of intervals compared to previous studies. In the next sections, the
experiment will be outlined and all these aspects will be addressed in order to shed more
light on the mechanisms underlying agency attribution and temporal binding.
2.
2.1.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Methods</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Participants</title>
        <p>28 participants (16 females and 12 males) took part in the experiment and were
selected by following these selection criteria: normal or corrected to normal vision and
no self-reported auditory or motor impairments. Participants were aged between 21
and 36 years old, with a general mean of 25 years old. Most of the participants were
students or employees at University College Dublin and were invited to reach the
Visualization Cave in the Insight Centre for Data Analytics located in the same
university. The project received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics
Committee - Sciences (HREC-LS) of University College Dublin.
2.2.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Experimental design</title>
        <p>
          The experiment had a 2x2 matrix design, where interface and type of agent were the
two independent variables with two levels each. The interfaces taken in consideration
were virtual reality (HTC Vive headset) and a traditional screen (13-inch MacBook
Pro). For what concerns the type of agent, participants were told that the virtual agent
was controlled either by a computer or a person, similarly to the experiment
conducted by Obhi and Hall (2011) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ]. Temporal binding was the dependent variable, and
was calculated by finding the error means related to the perceived interval of time
between the action performed by the agent and its outcome. The experiment had a
between-subject experimental design as the sample was divided into two main groups
of the same size depending on the agent condition (computer vs human). Each
participant performed the same task by interacting with both interfaces (virtual reality and
screen). All the conditions were counterbalanced. The experiment was conducted in
the same laboratory for each subject, and in a similar time of the day, in order to
control environmental influences and tiredness effects.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Apparatus and Procedure</title>
        <p>
          Before starting the experiment, each participant read and signed the ethical consent.
Afterwards, they were told to sit on a chair and wait for instructions. After being
assigned to a specific agent condition, they were provided with detailed information
about the task. They had to watch a pre-recorded animation, realized on Blender and
Adobe Premiere, where a virtual archer threw arrows towards a target. The video was
accompanied also by sound effects: the first one lasted 150 ms and occurred when the
arrow was shot (Figure 2a), whereas the second one lasted 250 ms and occurred when
the arrow reached the target (Figure 2b). The two events were separated by a
pseudorandom interval ranging between 200 and 1400 ms. Particularly, there were 7 possible
intervals. Their sequence was random, and each interval occurred the same number of
times. After each trial, a black screen with the text “Recreate the interval” appeared
and lasted for 2000 ms (Figure 2c). Participants had to recreate the interval between
action and auditory outcome by pressing the space bar of a keyboard twice, which
was connected to a stopwatch (Figure 2d). This procedure was inspired by the
technique used by Poonian et al. (2015) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ]. The experiment had two blocks, one for
both interfaces. Blocks had 35 trials each divided into 4 breaks of 10 seconds. Each
person had a total of 70 trials, plus 2 training trials per condition. After terminating
the task with the first interface, participants had 2 minutes break before staring the
second half of the experiment with the other interface. At the end of the experiment, a
debriefing about the real purposes of the study followed.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>Data analysis</title>
        <p>For each individual trial, it was calculated the error related to the estimation of the
interval of time between action and auditory outcome. To do so, the perceived
interval of time was subtracted from the actual interval: positive errors indicate shorter
perceived intervals, whereas negative errors represent longer estimations. After that,
the outliers were found by calculating average and standard deviation (SD) for each
person: all the errors which exceeded 2.5 SD from the individual mean were
discarded. Subjects with a number of missing values and/or outliers greater than 10% of the
total trials (7 out of 70), were eliminated from the analysis. Only two subjects had to
be discarded by following these criteria. Afterwards, individual and total error means
were calculated without outliers and used for the statistical analysis. First of all, some
descriptive statistics were conducted to test the normality of the distribution.
Afterwards, a 2-way ANOVA was ran to analyze the interaction between interface and
type of agent and their effects on temporal binding. Subsequently, a Kruskal-Wallis
Test was performed to test the influence of different intervals on time perception.
3.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Results</title>
      <p>
        Some trends emerged from a simple analysis of the general means of all conditions
(Figure 3). Computer agent condition had the highest levels of temporal binding in
both interface conditions (error mean in virtual reality = 72.752 ms, error mean in
screen condition = 28.128 ms), whereas the error mean in human condition was very
close to zero (error mean in virtual reality = 1.258 ms, error mean in the screen
condition = -0.445 ms) as we can see from Figure 3a. Virtual reality was associated with
less temporal binding (total error mean = 14.691 ms) and more accuracy compared to
a traditional computer screen (total error mean = 36.153) as it is shown in Figure 3b.
In fact, 17 people out of 26 estimated intervals more accurately in virtual reality.
Finally, human condition leaded to lower temporal binding (total error mean = 50.438)
compared to computer condition (total error mean = 0.406) as we can see from Figure
3c. The last finding is inconsistent with previous studies [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref20">11,20</xref>
        ].
However, these trends were not supported by the statistical analysis. In fact, a 2-way
ANOVA with a significance level of .05 (two-tailed), found no significant main
effects of interface and type of agent on temporal binding (F(1,48) = .301, p = .586 and
F(1,48) = 1.636, p = .207, respectively), as well as their interaction (F(1,48) = . 351, p
= .556). Thus, the test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the error means are the
same in all conditions, and the alternative hypothesis could not be accepted. A reason
for that, could be that the variance in the sample was high. This might be due to the
insufficient size of the sample, but also to the differences in the error means related to
specific intervals of time. In fact, we conducted a Kruskal-Wallis Test, to check
whether the type of interval affects temporal estimation. We found a significant
difference between error means in different interval conditions (χ2(6) = 132.968, p = .
000). Particularly, people tended to perceive intervals between 200 and 600 ms as
longer, and intervals between 1000 and 1400 ms as increasingly shorter (Figure 4).
On the other hand, estimation of intervals of 800 ms were very accurate.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Discussion</title>
      <p>
        As we said, sense of agency and agency attribution are related to our ability to
identify ourselves or other people as the cause of an action. These concepts are often
correlated with temporal binding and rely on multiple top-down and bottom-up
mechanisms and cues such as sensorimotor feedbacks, predictions, knowledge of the world
and previous experience [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. Some studies proved the existence of these multiple
mechanisms underlying agency and temporal binding [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], however, not many of them
focused on the influence of experimental factors. This study aimed to shed more light
on these mechanisms, by focusing on the interface and the measure of agency. We
also analyzed the role played by the type of agent similarly to previous studies in
Human Computer Interaction [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref4">4,11</xref>
        ]. In general, we found no significant effects of
type of agent, interface and their interaction, on people’s interval estimations. A
reason for that, could be that the variance in the sample was high and its size was
insufficient. Nevertheless, it is possible to comment some interesting trends in the data.
      </p>
      <p>
        For what concerns the type of agent, we found inconsistent results with previous
studies [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref20">11,20</xref>
        ], as computer condition elicited higher rates of temporal binding,
compared to human condition, where the interval estimation seemed to be more accurate
and error means were very close to zero. A possible explanation for this unexpected
result is that people thought that this specific archer was more likely to be controlled
by a computer rather than a person. To reach this conclusion, they used different
contextual, perceptual and inferential cues. Another explanation is that people were more
accurate in the interval estimation when they thought that the archer was controlled
by a person, as it is easier to predict and feel connection with human behavior.
However, according to previous studies, this condition should elicit higher intentional
binding levels rather than greater accuracy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref14 ref15">11,14,15</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        For what concerns the interface, we found that screen condition was associated
with higher levels of temporal binding than virtual reality. This may be due to the fact
that people are generally less familiar with virtual reality. However, another possible
interpretation is that virtual reality reduces external world’s distractions and increases
accuracy of time perception and interval estimation. If future studies proved it right,
virtual reality could be reasonably used in the healthcare, for example, to increase the
chances of successful medical surgeries, or it could be beneficial for education in
schools or distant learning. The fact that we did not find significant results in this case
could be also due to the fact that the task mainly relied on auditory cues rather than
visual. Thus, future studies could introduce new tasks where visual stimuli are more
relevant, but in this case we suggest to avoid using measures of agency based on high
visual load such as the Libet clock as they can distract from the main task [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>In addition to the interface, the other experimental factor which we took in
consideration was the measure of agency. We investigated whether temporal binding effects
and time perception in general are influenced by changes in the measure of agency.
Particularly, we used the interval estimation procedure and we decided to use a wider
range of intervals compared to previous studies. We found that time estimations
varied significantly according to specific intervals which had to be estimated. From one
side, when the auditory outcome occurred 200-600 ms after the arrow was shot,
intervals were perceived as longer. From the other side, when the outcome occurred
10001400 ms after the action, intervals were perceived as increasingly shorter. Our
hypothesis is that people used both sensorimotor cues and inferential processes to
elaborate context and stimuli, and estimate an optimal interval between action and
outcome. As the archery scenario was realistic and familiar to people, they could extract
information from their previous experience and predict the most likely interval
between events: for example, they could use the distance between the archer and the
target or the speed of the arrow, which did not vary over the trials. In this case, 800
ms seemed to be the most plausible interval, and the more intervals stepped away
from the optimal value, the more errors tended to linearly increase.</p>
      <p>
        These results not only question what we know about agency, temporal binding, and
interval estimations, but are also fundamental to develop and improve existing
computational models of time perception. A type of models which is more suitable in this
case are cognitive architectures such as ACT-R, where different aspects of cognition
are integrated and interact between each other in order to understand human
functioning [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. In general, in these models memory is not explicitly taken in consideration,
except for some models which focus on working memory [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. For example, in the
Pool Model [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ] there is a “temporal reference memory” which stores representations
of each new interval of time based on a “pool of recent experiences”. When the actual
interval corresponds to a “learned standard”, the system can recognize it [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ].
Intervals can be learnt and compared thanks to a pacemaker-accumulator system which
detects pulses and attributes a certain number of pulses to each interval [191]. The
model takes in consideration that our estimations are always approximate by adding
noise to every pulse. The equation which represents these processes (Figure 5) says
that when an interval is recalled at a certain time, its value depends on the time when
it has been created and on the match with the actual interval (mismatch-penalty = 0
when there is match, negative value when there is mismatch) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>A(t) = log(t - tcreation)-d + mismatchpenalty
However, this model is mainly focused on recently-formed memories and how they
degrade over the time. Our suggestion for future studies is to implement a similar
model which takes in consideration also long-term and non-declarative memory. In
more detail, the model would need a pool of long-lasting memories which represents
our knowledge of the world. Each memory of an interval is associated also to a
memory of a specific context. In this way, every time the system recognizes a certain
context and detects a specific interval, it can estimate its plausibility and likelihood by
comparing it with a related memory.</p>
      <p>
        In conclusion, this study aimed to investigate the influence of some experimental
factors such as interface and measure of agency on temporal binding. We found that
both traditional screen and virtual reality elicited temporal binding but there were no
significant differences, even though screen seemed to bring higher rates of temporal
binding and virtual reality seemed to elicit higher accuracy. For what concerns the
measure of agency, we found significant differences in the estimation of intervals
depending on the intervals which had to be estimated. Particularly, we think that in
each context and circumstance, people tend to predict an optimal interval between
specific actions and outcomes, by using sensorimotor cues, contextual information
and inferential processes. The farther actual intervals are from the optimal one, the
higher estimation errors are. From one side, these results questioned what we know
about agency and proved that methods such as interval estimation procedure are not
always robust [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. Thus, we hope this study can prompt researchers to be more aware
of their experimental choices and careful when they interpret their results. From the
other side, these findings shed more light on the mechanisms of time perception and
hopefully will be beneficial for future studies for the implementation of new
computational models.
      </p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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