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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Lukasiewicz' 3-valued logic can not be expressed in terms of SP3A logic</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jaime D az</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jose Luis Carballido</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mauricio Osorio</string-name>
          <email>osoriomauri@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Claudia Zepeda</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Benemerita Universidad Autonoma de Puebla</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Universidad de las Americas Puebla</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>127</fpage>
      <lpage>137</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>In this work we study some properties and characteristics of Beziau's SP3A logic; by this analysis, we determine that it is possible to express any well formed formula in SP3A in a Disjunctive Normal Form. We determine too that it is not always possible to transform any well formed formula into its Conjunctive Normal Form. Then, we demonstrate that there are only 10 di erent functions that can be obtained in SP3A from expressions of one variable. Finally, we prove that it is not possible to express the negation of Lukasiewicz' 3-valued logic in terms of SP3A, hence, this logic cannot be represented in SP3A.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Classical logic holds the Law of Non Contradiction as one of its main
characteristics; Aristotle stated that it is so obvious that no contradiction can be proved
true, that it is unacceptable to admit any contradiction as true [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. However,
presocratics thought in a di erent way. In 1910, Jan Lukasiewicz determined
that it was not possible to formally prove this Law [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], and this fact started
the resurgence of logics that do not hold the Law of Non Contradiction, in the
western thought.
      </p>
      <p>
        Lukasiewicz is considered one of the main forerunners of Paraconsistent
Logics, understanding that Paraconsistent Logics are those logics in which there is
a connective that does not obey the Law of Non Contradiction [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]; His work was
formerly oriented to the justi cation of the Law of Non Contradiction, but found
out that it was not possible to do it [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ], and as a consequence, he developed a
family of non-classical logics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]; Lukasiewicz' 3 valued logic (L3) is part of this
family. It is de ned by 2 primitive connectives and its domain has 3 values: two
of then behave just as classical logic values do, and the third is interpreted as
"possible" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Besides Beziau's SP3A logic, L3 constitutes one of the objects of
interest in this work.
      </p>
      <p>
        SP3A and SP3B logics were proposed in 2016 by Jean-Yves Beziau [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]; both
of them are 3-valued Paraconsistent logics. In this work we focus on SP3A logic,
and study some of its characteristics, such as the behavior of the Law of Non
Contradiction, Double Negation, de Morgan laws, among others. We determine
that it is possible to transform any well formed formula in SP3A, into a
Disjunctive Normal Formula, and that it is not always possible to perform an analogous
process to transform any formula into a Conjunctive Normal Form. Knowing
that it is possible to transform any formula into its Disjunctive Normal Form,
we determine that there are only 10 di erent functions expressed in a single atom
that can be obtained in SP3A. Finally, we demonstrate that it is not possible
to express L3 negation in terms of SP3A logic. Then, it follows that it is not
possible to express L3 in terms of SP3A.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Background</title>
      <p>In this section we will de ne some preliminary concepts, such as functional
equivalence, Well Formed Formula and negations from Lukasiewicz' 3-valued logic and
from G3 logic. These de nitions will bee needed on further sections.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>De nition 1. Functional equivalence between two formulas occurs when both</title>
        <p>of them include exactly the same variables, and evaluate exactly to the same
value for every interpretation of these variables. We will use the symbol to
represent functional equivalence between two formulas, so that given two well
formed formulas A and B, A B means that truth tables for A and B are
identical to one another.</p>
        <p>Every logic is associated to a domain: a set of values that can be assumed by
the variables; this domain constitutes the values to be considered when
performing calculations; in classical logic, this set is f0; 1g, but in non-classical logics
there can be domains with 3, 4 or more values. There are two kinds of values in
every domain: designated and undesignated.</p>
        <p>When evaluating a well formed formula in a logic, every variable of the
formula can take any of the values of the domain, and a value comes out as a result.
Each particular con guration of values of the variables is called an interpretation
of the formula, and the result obtained from the expression is the evaluation.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>De nition 2. A well formed formula that delivers only undesignated values for every possible interpretation of its variables is called a contradiction; a well formed formula that evaluates only to designated values for every possible interpretation of its variables is called a tautology.</title>
        <p>
          Due to the action of inference rules over wfs, new wfs can be generated
any time; if we can assure that a system will never generate two contradictory
expressions x and :x, then we say that the system is consistent, and otherwise
it is said to be Inconsistent (contradictory). Classical logic holds this property
as one of its main characteristics. However, Presocratic philosophers thought
it was legitimate to believe in contradictions since nature of many things is
contradictory. Aristotle, on the other hand, thought that there was nothing more
obvious than contradictions cannot be true. Since the middle ages Aristotle's
stance about the Law of non-contradiction was taken for granted until 20th
Century, with no further analysis [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Up to the current times, classical logic is the most well-known and the most
used logic. Some of its main characteristics are listed below:
{ Double negation: ::x x.
{ Law of non-contradiction (LNC): :(x ^ :x).
{ Explosive behavior: x ^ :x ` y.</p>
        <p>
          In order to be consistent, a logic must obey LNC. Not obeying it leads to an
explosive behavior, where the acceptance of a contradiction trivializes the formal
axiomatic system [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>As a consequence of this orthodoxy, acceptance of Aristotle's authority makes
consistency a mandatory matter when working with logic, and classical logic was
the only one accepted in science until the beginning of 20th Century. But then,
can a formal axiomatic system that accepts some contradictions be considered a
logic? The question arose paralell to the revolution that quantum physics
(nonclassical physics) meant for that discipline. And just as quantum physics did
with physics, paraconsistent logics revolutionized the world of logic.</p>
        <p>
          Jan Lukasiewicz and Nikolai Vasili'ev are considered the forerunners of
paraconsistent ideas; in 1910 and 1911 respectively, and independently of each other,
they re-marked the importance of the revision of some Aristotelian laws [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ]; their
work started a new era in the study of logics, and prepared the eld for those
logics that now we call paraconsistent. According to Beziau, a paraconsistent logic
is a logic that has a connective which does not obey the LNC, and is usually
called Paraconsistent Negation, and it represents a main problem to determine
wether it is legitimate to call it negation [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Lukasiewicz developed a 3-valued logic, denoted as L3. The values in its
domain can be interpreted as true, false and a third value that in this case
will be understood as possible[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ]; we will consider L3 domain to be D = 0; 1; 2,
where 2 is the only designated value, and 1 is the value that represents possible.
Primitive connectives in L3 are ? (bottom) and ! (implication), and they are
de ned as follows [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ]:
        </p>
        <p>? = 0
x ! y = min(2; (2
x) + y)</p>
        <p>
          It is in our interest to show explicitly Table 1 for L3 negation. From now
on, this negation will be denoted by :L. G3 logic, also called \Here and There
logic" (HT) belongs to the Godel's family of multivalued logics. It is a 3-valued,
non-paraconsistent logic, but despite this fact, we will use G3 negation as a
connective that will be de ned later in terms of SP3A logic in order to help
in the development of this work. G3 domain is D = f0; 1; 2g, where 2 is the
only designated value [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ]. We will denote G3 negation as , and it is de ned by
Table 1.
3
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>The paraconsistent logic SP3A</title>
      <p>
        In 2016, Jean-Yves Beziau presents \Two Genuine 3-Valued Paraconsistent
Logics". In this work, Beziau introduces SP3A and SP3B as two logics that hold
characteristics of paraconsistency [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. In this work we will focus on SP3A; our
aim is to demonstrate that L3 logic cannot be properly expressed by SP3A.
      </p>
      <p>
        SP3A is a 3-valued logic, where each variable can take any value x 2 f0; 1; 2g;
in this logic, 1 and 2 are the designated values. Extreme values 0 and 2 behave
just as False (0) and True (1) do in classical logic; intermediate value (1) must
not be understood as the exact middle value between False and True; it must
be understood to be some truth value placed somewhere between 0 and 2 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
There are only 3 primitive connectives de ned in SP3A: negation, conjunction
and disjunction. These connectives are de ned by Table 2.
      </p>
      <p>In SP3A only one of the distributive laws is satis ed; it is the distributivity
of the conjunction over the disjunction, while distributive law of disjunction over
conjunction is not satis ed functionally (Expresions 1, 2). The non-equivalence
of x _ (y ^ z) and (x _ y) ^ (x _ z) is only functional, and appears only when
evaluating 2 speci c interpretations (Table 3).
(1)
(2)
(x _ y) ^ (x _ y)</p>
      <p>When analyzing a paraconsistent logic, the properties that are related to
negation use to present a weird behavior; Here, we present Table 4 that describes
x ^ (y _ z)</p>
      <p>(x ^ y) _ (x ^ y)
x _ (y ^ z) 6 (x _ y) ^ (x _ y)
x y z x _ (y ^ z) (x _ y) ^ (x _ y)
1 0 2 1 2
1 2 0 1 2
the behavior of some properties of SP3A; all of them include negation. One of
the most well-known properties of classical logic is the double negation. This
property stands for ::x x, so that when we get an even number of negations
applied to any expression, they can be considered to cancel out pairwise and the
expression will act as if it was free of these negations. This property does not
hold in SP3A logic.</p>
      <p>
        This behavior of negation is the main reason for this logic to be non-classical;
this fact alone changes the behavior of the law of no contradiction (:(x ^ :x)
is tautology). When evaluating the three possible interpretations of the law of
no contradiction, we obtain that when x = 1, :(x ^ :x) = 0, so the law of
non-contradiction is not a tautology. This can be, of course interpreted as: \not
every contradiction is false". There is so much to be said about this
conclusion: in \Why it's irrational to believe in consistency", Graham Priest discusses
the rationality of Aristotelian logic (classical logic), and in "Torn by Reason:
Lukasiewicz on the Principle of Contradiction" Priest remarks that Lukasiewicz
found it impossible to prove Aristotle statement about the unacceptability of
contradictions. According to Lukasiewicz, Aristotle seems to limit the signi
cance of this law to substantial beings and concludes that "it is not the case
that all contradictions are true" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9,10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>In some of the sections to come, we will need G3 negation as an auxiliary
connective. For that reason, in the present section we will de ne this negation
in terms of SP3A logic. Native negation in G3 behaves as Table 1 de nes and
can be modeled in SP3A using Expression 3 Where _, ^ and : are primitive
connectives of SP3A. This equivalence can be easily veri ed.</p>
      <p>x := :(x _ (x ^ :x))</p>
      <p>
        Paraconsistent behavior of SP3A logic makes it necessary to verify if de
Morgan laws hold; in this section we will explore de Morgan laws from the point
of view of two negations: the native SP3A negation and G3 negation, due to the
need of an auxiliary negation for normalization of formulas. As Beziau states,
SP3A logic complies with only one of the two de Morgan Laws: Equations 4,5
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>:(x _ y)</p>
      <p>:x ^ :y
:(x ^ y) 6 :x _ :y</p>
      <p>As we need an expression that helps us to change the negation of a disjunction
into an expression where negation is acting directly over atomic formulas, we
propose Expression 6, which can be easily veri ed. Note that this expression
uses as a connective the G3 negation.</p>
      <p>:(x ^ y)
(
x_</p>
      <p>y) _ ((x ^ :x) ^ (y ^ :y))
Both of de Morgan laws hold for G3 negation (Expressions 7 and 8).
(x _ y)
(x ^ y)
x^
x_
y
y
(6)
(7)
(8)</p>
      <p>Now we are ready to analyze disjunctive normal forms within SP3A logic.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Disjunctive Normal Forms in SP3A Logic</title>
      <p>As a consequence of Expression 2, we can say that there are cases of wfs that
can not be transformed into a Conjunctive Normal Formula. In this section we
prove that any wfs can be transformed into a Disjunctive Normal Formula if we
allow the use of the G3 negation connective. As an initial step, we evaluate seven
cases that correspond to the formulas , c1 , c1c2 , where c1; c2 2 f:; g and
is an atomic formula. From this we obtain the 7 cases shown in Table 5. Note
that : :: and : , and this allows us to reduce the 7 original
results to only 5</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>De nition 3. A na-formula is any expression of the form c1c2c3:::cn where</title>
        <p>ci 2 f:; g and is an atomic formula; An n-formula is a formula that holds
any of the following structures: a1 := , a2 := : , a3 := , a4 := :: ,
a5 := , where is an atomic formula.</p>
        <p>De nition 4. Let be A = fa1; a2; a3; a4; a5g. Then we say that A is the set of
n-formulas</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Lemma 1. Every na-formula is functionally equivalent to a n-formula.</title>
        <p>Proof: Let be c 2 f:; g. Then: ca1 2 fa2; a3g, ca2 a4, ca3 a5, ca4 a2
and ca5 a3; It is not hard to verify that for any permutation of any
number of negation connectives arranged before an atomic formula, an n-formula is
obtained by equivalence.</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-2-1">
          <title>De nition 5. A cd-formula is a formula that uses only ^ and _ as connectives</title>
          <p>that operate over atomic formulas. An cdn-formula is a formula obtained from
a cd-formula by replacing its atomic formulas by n-formulas.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Lemma 2. Every formula in SP3A is functionally equivalent to a cdn-formula. Proof: The only case to be treated is when there are negation connectives acting over a conjunction or a disjunction, counting on the fact that conjunction and disjunction are binary operators. In this case we apply the following equivalences:</title>
        <p>{ :(x _ y)
{ :(x ^ y)
{ (x _ y)
{ (x ^ y)
:x ^ :y
( x_
x^
x_
y) _ ((x ^ :x) ^ (y ^ :y))
y
y</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>De nition 6. A sdn-formula is a formula that only contains disjunctions of conjunctions, where the conjunctions operate exclusively over n-formulas. A sdnformula will also be called a Disjunctive Normal Formula. The following two expressions are sdn-formulas:</title>
        <p>{ ((a2 ^ a4) ^ a5) _ (a1 ^ a3) _ (a3 ^ a5)
{ a3 _ (a2 ^ a3) _ (a1 ^ a5) _ (a1 ^ a2 ^ a5) _ (a1 ^ a3) _ a5</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>The following two expressions are not sdn-formulas:</title>
        <p>{ ((a3 _ a4) ^ a5) _ (a4 ^ a5)
{ (a1 ^ a2)_ (a2 ^ a4)</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>Theorem 1. Every formula in SP3A is equivalent to a sdn-formula.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-7">
        <title>Proof: According to Lemma 2 every formula in SP3A can be transformed into a cdn-formula. Applying commutativity, associativity, distributivity of conjunction over disjunction, every cdn-formula can be transformed into a sdn-formula</title>
        <p>Example: Let us have expression 9 in SP3A. It can be transformed into a
sdn-formula as shown below:
(x ^ :y) ^ :x ^ (
x_
y)
(9)
{ ( x_ :y) ^ (:x ^ (
{ ( x _ ::y) ^ (:x ^ (
{ ( x _ ::y) ^ ((:x^
{ (( x ^ ::y) ^ (:x^
{ (:x^ x^ x) _ (:x^
x_ y))
x_ y))
x) _ (:x^ y))
x)) _ (( x _ ::y) ^ (:x^
x ^ ::y) _ (:x^ y^
y))
x) _ (:x^
y ^ ::y)
4.1</p>
        <p>Functions of one variable that can be obtained from Disjunctive
Normal Forms in SP3A
Up to this point, we have demonstrated that it is possible to write any formula
in SP3A as a disjunctive normal formula. Now we will analyze these normal
formulas in order to characterize their behavior. Lukasiewicz' negation is a function
that requires only one variable, and if there was a SP3A formula able to behave
just as this negation does, it would be an expression with only one variable.
Our nal goal is to demonstrate that it is impossible to express this negation in
SP3A, so from now on all the analysis will be about expressions with only one
variable.</p>
        <p>Considering Lemma 1 and De nition 4, we can say that the structure of the
disjunctive normal forms is that shown in Expression 10 where ax 2 A.
(af ^ ag ^ ::: ^ ah) _ (ai ^ aj ^ ::: ^ ak) _ ::: _ (al ^ am ^ ::: ^ an)
(10)</p>
        <p>When we have conjunction of n-formulas (am ^ an), there is a nite number
of possible results; it is a characteristic behavior of SP3A that x ^ x x, so that
an ^an an, leaving only 10 conjunctions to be revised. Table 6 is obtained from
the evaluation of conjunctions of n-formulas, where b1; b2 62 A are new results;
these new results are operated under conjunctions too. Finally, the table speci es
the truth tables of b1 and b2. Going further, we cannot obtain new results via
conjunctions. For convenience, we de ne the set = A Sfb1; b2g.
De nition 7. A formula of the type 1 ^ 2 ^ 3 ^ : : : ^ n, with i 2
called an and-n-formula.</p>
        <sec id="sec-4-7-1">
          <title>Lemma 3. Any and-n-formula will evaluate to i, i 2</title>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-8">
        <title>Proof: As shown in Table 6. .</title>
        <p>Note that Any formula consisting in disjunctions of and-n-formulas is what
we call a sdn-formula (De nition 6).</p>
        <p>When applying disjunctions over and-n-formulas we get the results shown
in Table 11, where c1; c2; c3 62 are new results; if we evaluate disjunctions
that include c1, c2 and c3, there are no new results.We will de ne the set =</p>
        <p>Sfc1; c2; c3g; elements of are the 10 only possible results to be obtained
from a Disjunctive Normal Formula de ned in terms of one single variable .</p>
        <p>As a conclusion for this section, we have determined that any sdn-formula
with one variable in SP3A will evaluate to 2 ; therefore, there are only 10
functions that can be obtained from such a sdn-formula. These functions are
shown in Table 8</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Lukasiewicz' logic cannot be expressed in terms of</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>SP3A logic</title>
      <p>Lukasiewicz' negation is de ned by Table 1. Reviewing the analysis performed,
up to this point, we know that:
{ Every formula in SP3A can be expressed as a disjunctive normal form
{ Any normal form evaluates to a 2
{ There is no 2 that satis es :Lx de nition</p>
      <p>The nal conclusion is stated in Theorems 2 and 3.</p>
      <sec id="sec-6-1">
        <title>Theorem 2. Lukasiewicz' 3-valued logic negation cannot be expressed in terms of SP3A logic.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-2">
        <title>Proof: Development in section 4.</title>
        <p>Theorem 3 follows from Theorem 2:</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-6-3">
        <title>Theorem 3. Lukasiewicz' 3-valued logic cannot be expressed in terms of SP3A logic.</title>
        <sec id="sec-6-3-1">
          <title>Proof: As Theorem 2 states, it is impossible to express :L in terms of SP3A</title>
          <p>logic. Therefore, it follows that it is not possible to express L3 in terms of SP3A
logic.</p>
          <p>Theorems 1, 2 and 3 constitute the main contribution of this work.
6</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>We have performed an analysis of the structure of formulas of SP3A logic; we
determined that any well formed formula in SP3A can be transformed to a
Disjunctive Normal Form. If the formula is written in terms of only one atom,
there are only 10 di erent functions that can be achieved. From here we could
prove that L3 negation cannot be expressed in terms of SP3A connectives. Hence
L3 logic cannot be expressed in terms of SP3A either.</p>
      <p>
        In propositional classical logic, every formula is equivalent to a Conjunctive
and to a Disjunctive normal forms [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]; normal forms are useful in the solution of
satis ability problems (SAT) which consists in determining wether there exits
an interpretation for the variables of a logic formula that cause this formula to
be evaluated as true [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. SAT for Conjunctive Normal Forms is the rst known
NP-Complete problem, is usually di cult to solve; on the other hand, SAT for
Disjunctive Normal Forms is not hard to solve. However, transforming a
Conjunctive Normal Form into a Disjunctive Normal Form requires an exponential
time [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. As shown previously, every wfs in SP3A can be written as a formula
in a Disjunctive Normal Form, which we think that can be useful in the
satis ability problem for SP3A logic. A drawback that follows from the fact that
not every wfs in SP3A can be expressed in a Conjunctive Normal Form, is that
we cannot use the Horn algorithm of satis ability. This algorithm constitutes a
\quick" way to prove satis ability for Conjunctive Normal Formulas written as
a Horn formula; Horn formulas are Conjunctive Normal Formulas where every
disjunction contains at most one positive literal [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        As for the fact that it is impossible to express L3 logic in terms of SP3A,
we must be concerned with the possible interpretations of the third truth-value
of SP3A: in 3-valued logics, extreme values are interpreted classically (as true
and false), but the interpretation of the third value depends on the behavior
of the connectives when operating over it. In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], the author reviews some of
the main interpretations for this third value; Dubois identi es two main groups
of interpretations: ontological (intrinsic to the de nition of the propositions)
and epistemic (Their state of truth or falsity has not been yet established but
eventually can be so in a future moment) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. Some ontological interpretations
could be: unde ned, half-true, irrelevant, inconsistent. Possible and unknown are
epistemic interpretations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. As Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic cannot be expressed
in SP3A logic, we must understand that the interpretation of the third truth
value proposed by Lukasiewicz (possible) cannot be adopted by SP3A.
According to our research, Beziau has not proposed any interpretation for the third
value of SP3A and therefore we still have to deal with the problem of giving an
interpretation for it.
      </p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
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