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    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>US</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Libor Dostálek</string-name>
          <email>dost@prf.jcu.cz</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Iva Dostálková</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>. Department of Applied Informatics, Faculty of Science, University of South Bohemia, CZECH REPUBLIC</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Ceske Budejovice</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>. Department of Mathematics and Biomathematics, Faculty of Science, University of South Bohemia, CZECH REPUBLIC</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Ceske</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>System and Method for Fraud Monitoring</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Detection</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2018</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>7</volume>
      <issue>908</issue>
      <fpage>1</fpage>
      <lpage>3</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>At present, many authors looking for new and new authentication methods [1] [2], which their authors consider that, are stronger and stronger. Individual one-factor authentication methods combine to other, and thus multi-factor authentication will arise. Today's applications typically allow users to choose from a set of supported authentication methods. Users can choose to use one or a combination of multiple authentication methods. We say that users have available omnifactor authentication. The question is how to quantify the strength of the selected methods in kind of omnifactor authentication. This is important to determine if is the authentication sufficient for the required service (required information). This article offers the answer to this question by quantifying authentication based on knowledge, ownership and inherence factors.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>I. INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>Authentication is the entity's identity verification process.
This process is carried out by a verifier who guarantees that
the entity has a declared identity (Figure 1). The quality of this
warranty depends on the particular authentication process.</p>
      <p>We distinguish entity authentication and message
authentication. The difference is in the time perspective.
Authentication of the message (erg by electronic signature)
gives no guarantee as to when the message was created.
Instead, entity authentication includes proof of identity of the
applicant as a rule through current communication with the
verifier.</p>
      <p>Fig. 1. Fundamental roles in authentication process.</p>
      <p>An example of an authentication process is the process by
which a user logs on to the application using a username and
password.</p>
      <p>The secondary effect of the authentication process may be
the fact that during the authentication of the entity,
cryptographic material will also be generated to serve for
subsequent communication.</p>
      <p>The ways in which someone may be authenticated fall into
three categories, based on what are known as the factors of
authentication:
1. The subject something knows - knowledge factors – e.g.</p>
      <p>password, private or secret key, shared secret, etc.
2. The subject has something - ownership factors – e.g. smart
card, one-time passwords token, etc.
3. Subject something is or does - inherence factors – e.g.
fingerprint dynamic biometric signature, digital footprint,
etc.</p>
      <p>Multi factor authentication grant access only after
successfully presenting two or more factors (Figure 2).</p>
      <p>Fig. 2. Multi factor authentication.</p>
      <p>It is important that different authentication factors are used.
E.g. using two passwords does not improve the authentication
quality. Authentication factors may vary:
- Different cryptographic material.
- Different authentication scheme.
- Different communication protocol.
- Different communication channel.
- Different verifier.</p>
      <p>It is also important that the authentication factors are
intertwined. If they are not, then the attacker makes work
easier because the attacker can first deal with breaking one
authentication factor and then another. However, this cannot
always be achieved. E.g. if an entity is already authenticated
(for example, it has brought authentication from Facebook)
and it turns out that stronger authentication (e.g. smart card) is
required for the operation, then it is usually re-authenticated
only with a stronger chip scheme independent of the original
authentication. The basic disadvantage of biometric person's
characteristics is that they cannot be revoked and subsequently
altered in the case of abuse. E.g. if an attacker obtains a
dynamic biometric signature from the subject, then the subject
can never use a dynamic biometric signature
compromising its misuse.1
without</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>II. RELATE WORKS</title>
      <p>The inherence authentication factors are usually considered
as based on the biometric properties of the subject, i.e.
verification of the person's identity based on measurable
physiological or behavioral characteristics, unique and
relatively unchanging for the subject.</p>
      <p>Authentication takes place based on the input pattern match
pre-stored template e.g. in the database. Matching cannot be
absolute - probably, it may be an attack. Authentication is
confirmed if the matching exceeds a predetermined threshold.</p>
      <p>So far, we have considered authentication as it is used, for
example, when logging in to FTP or Telnet server. However, at
present, logging is part of wider communication, for example,
when a user logs in to a web server. The communication for
displaying the logon page transmits a large amount of data and
the logged-on user leaves the digital footprint. A digital
footprint can be used for authentication itself or can serve as
another authentication factor. Interestingly, the information
extracted from the digital footprint can not only amplify but
also weaken the resulting authentication. Weaken, if are
detected potential attack.</p>
      <p>If we want to use the digital footprint for authentication,
then:
1. From a digital track, we must be able to identify users. The
easiest way to do this is to save the user's identification to
cookies.
2. Upon subsequent authentication, we can determine the
degree of match information in the current digital footprint
with information in the previous digital footprints of the
same user.
3. If we find a mismatch of the current digital footprint with
the previous digital tracks, then we can ask the user for
additional (secondary) authentication.</p>
      <p>The Digital Footprint has similar features to biometric
characteristics. The key is to be able to identify user from the
digital track. However, even when digital footprint are able to
identify users with a certain probability, it can be useful in
practice. It can be used, for example, to distribute a customized
ad.</p>
      <p>Risk based authentication is called authentication based on
the calculation of the likelihood of attack against this
authentication. The patent [1] deals with user authentication in
the kind of an Internet service provider's application. This can
be, for example, an e-shop, electronic banking or
eGovernement application. The client during authentication
and subsequent downstream communication leaves a lot of
information in the communication channel - leaving a digital
footprint. The principle is as follows: the communication flow
between the subject and the verifier is duplicated. The
duplicate of the communication stream is redirected to the Risk
Engine, which then evaluates this information as the input
information for calculating the risk score (Figure 3). The risk
score can then serve as input:
1 In the case of the handwriting signature, it is possible to attach a digit,
picture, etc. to the signature. This de facto revoke the previous signature
without a digit or image.</p>
      <p>For risk-based authentication that is used in this paper.
Fraud detection system, which is used to detect
cyberattacks. The goal is to launch an action based on a
voluminous score that either warns of a potential attack
(generates risk alerts) or attempts to directly prevent a
potential attack (generates risk action).</p>
      <p>Risk scores can be calculated on the basis of several
considerations:
- Risk Engine can accurately monitor the authentication
process and detect even minor deviations from this
process. These deviations can be caused, for example, by
the fact that instead of human authentication the robot
(program) trying authentication.
- Comparing the current digital footprint with the history
of digital footprint stored in the database. For example,
autonomous system (set of IP addresses) from which the
user logs in. The version of the software the user uses,
etc. This option is being used by the patent [3] and is
mentioned in the following text.
- Blacklists.
- Whitelists.</p>
      <p>Patent [3] introduces terms:
- “Pre-authentication” as a manner demined both by the
identity of the device from which the authentication
request originates as well as by available information
concerning the identity of the requesting user.
- “Post-authentication” using a user’s transaction history.</p>
      <p>Patent [1] gives an interesting example using decision Table
1, table 2 and Table 3. The primary decision table is Table 1
and table 2. Under certain conditions, Table 3 is considered.
Score 10 is a likelihood attack, score 0 indicated a low
likelihood of attack (fraud).</p>
      <p>Patent [1] is tributary for the period in which it was
incurred. Currently, users are mainly using mobile
applications. For mobile applications, risk-based
authentication is even more advantageous. Mobile apps run
on a mobile device, so they can read the hardware and
software identification of mobile devices and provide risk
based authentication. It can therefore provide more
information than a web browser.</p>
      <p>It is also very important to provide localization data. If the
client is authenticated at a short time from two very remote
PreX/M
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      <p>T
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X=Missing, M=present and mismatched, * = present and matched
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      <p>S
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 =
  


T=TRUE, F=FALSE, X=Missing</p>
      <p>IV. KNOWLEDGE RISK BASED AUTHENTICATION
For the category of authentication as knowledge is practical
to use the set of security features. Example of security features
in on Table 4.
case of adding new security features, we assume:
  of security features number i. To avoid big differences in</p>
      <p>For the k-th authentication mechanism shows the security
features as the Risk coefficient  
whether or not the security features are met. Quality (strength)
of authentication mechanism k can be expressed as:
 gets 1 or 0 depending on
In the example given in Table 4, the result is the value is 0.2.</p>
      <p>For the category of authentication categorized as possession
we can define the set of security features. For example:</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Cryptographic</title>
        <p>material does not stored in secured
environment (data bearer)
Access to cryptographic material without password or
model more accurate.</p>
        <p>PIN
Cryptographic material is exportable
Cryptographic material does not physically protected
against unauthorized access</p>
        <p>For each of this security features we express the risk weight
  . And similarly assume that:</p>
        <p>V. POSSESSION RISK BASED AUTHENTICATION</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-1">
          <title>Classical</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-2">
          <title>Password authentication</title>
          <p>Weight
 
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
⅒
1
2
3
4</p>
          <p>For the k-th authentication mechanism we define the Risk
coefficient   , Quality (strength) of authentication mechanism
characteristics of the person. However, the use of biometric
characteristics of persons has many disadvantages. Biometric
features cannot be revoked, so have many common features
with
traditional
passwords.</p>
          <p>In
addition,
biometric
authentication brings complications with the protection of
personal data.</p>
          <p>In this category of authentication, we will mainly consider
digital footprint. We will evaluate the correlation between the
information from previous communications and the currently</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>The result quality</title>
      <p>identified footprint. The correlation coefficient ρ is from the
interval of &lt;-1,1&gt;. Negative values are important when
detecting abnormalities in digital track.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>With them it is</title>
        <p>possible e.g. when detecting certain abnormal or decrease the
overall weight of authorization. We can use method described
in [3] but we need to transform the score to match the ρ
definition domain &lt;-1,1&gt;.</p>
        <p>OMNIFACTOR AUTHENTICATION</p>
        <p>In kind of omnifactor authentication we assume that a user
from a set of authentication methods has chosen the method k.</p>
        <p>is weighted sum of individual</p>
        <p>=  1   +  2   +  3 ρ +</p>
        <p>Wight   we choose zero in the case that the category is
not used and non-zero in case of categories in terms of
technology,
algorithms
and
increasing quality of authentication. Item 
which</p>
        <p>ensure</p>
        <p>Using weights</p>
        <p>Wight</p>
        <p>can be taken into account</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>VIII.</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>It may seem that the problem is to determine the weights  
and   . However, at the beginning, it can determine the same
weight   , respectively   . Based on the evaluation of security
incidents, we can modify individual weight. This will make the</p>
      <p>Similarly, we evaluate provided information (services), i.e.
assets. If we appreciate an asset, for example, the value of X,
then for providing this asset we allow only authentication
methods k with</p>
      <p>≥</p>
      <p>It should also be noted that risk-based authentication could
also have drawbacks. Can generate False Positives in the usual
cases e.g.: the client purchases a new mobile device; the client
will forget to make a payment order prior to the holiday and
make it out of an exotic country etc.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>IX. FURTHER WORK</title>
      <p>Further work I'll focus on more precise definition of risk
weight and simulation of examples. Next problem is
reauthentication. It is situation when authenticated does not have
sufficient rights and needs to increase score of authentication.</p>
      <p>2011.
16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security,</p>
    </sec>
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