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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Address Fraud: Monkey Typed Address Classification for e-Commerce Applications</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>T. Ravindra Babu</string-name>
          <email>ravindra.bt@flipkart.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vishal Kakkar</string-name>
          <email>vishal.kakkar@flipkart.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>• Address preprocessing</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Flipkart Internet Private Limited</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Bangalore</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IN">India</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Novel way of feature generation</institution>
          , •
          <addr-line>Pattern Classification</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2017</year>
      </pub-date>
      <abstract>
        <p>E-Commerce companies face a wide variety of fraudulent activities. Machine Learning models are continuously built to detect them for their efective mitigation. Randomly typed alphanumeric characters as customer addresses is one peculiar fraud. The orders are placed with such addresses. We refer to them as monkey-typed addresses. Accurate methods of identifying such addresses is important in reducing operational cost. The current work presents machine learning based approaches that classify a given address as normal or monkey-typed with a high accuracy. The approach integrates address preprocessing, novel feature generation and classification.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>
        Online e-commerce companies facilitate its users to order items
online and deliver them to the suggested addresses. Users register
themselves by entering one or more of their addresses that would
ensure that an ordered shipment is positively delivered to them.
Thus the customer addresses form important part of e-commerce
companies. A number of challenges in relation to the addresses,
especially, in developing countries include[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] lack of pre-defined
structure, absence of geolocation information, spell variations in
address components due to different literacy levels in the population
of customers, etc.
      </p>
      <p>In order to avail price discounts or with possible fraudulent
intent, there are occasions where orders are placed with addresses
containing randomly typed alphanumeric characters. We refer to
them as monkey-typed addresses in this work. Early identification of
such addresses in the operations chain is necessary to reduce
operations cost. For example, when such addresses remain undetected,
it would lead to activation of a number of stages in the operations</p>
      <p>
        E-Commerce companies face a wide variety of fraudulent
activities. They include payment frauds, return frauds, delivery frauds,
lost-and-stolen articles, fake reviews and fraudulent ratings. Such
frauds are prevalent in both developing and developed countries.
They are well discussed and many solutions are proposed [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref10 ref15 ref16 ref3">1, 3, 10,
15, 16</xref>
        ]. The nature of fraud, which is the focus of the proposed
work, was not reported earlier. It is interesting explore possible
reasons for such a fraud. Generally, most e-Commerce platforms
ofer a number of attractive discounts. In order to reach a larger
customer base, the discounts ofered are limited to purchase of one
or a small number of units. Fraudulent users, presumably resellers,
would order multiple items beyond the prescribed limit through
false addresses. The resellers are profited by selling those products
in the market at a price higher than the discounted price. Since the
objective of the company is to serve larger customer base, such
fraud defeats this purpose. In this context, they possibly resort to
monkey typed addresses in order not get detected through multiple
orders. With a nexus at later stages, the orders could get delivered
too. The orders that contain monkey typed addresses could also
possibly be created by fraudsters to cause a strain on the system.
When unchecked at the time of order, such addresses, would lead
to mis-utilization of resources. This necessitates a solution to the
problem. The solution should be deployable and trackable. In view
of this, we approach this as a 2-class classification problem.
      </p>
      <p>
        We have not come across any peer-reviewed, published work on
address fraud. Most of the discussions in blogs that relate address
fraud [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ] to false declaration of one’s address linked to credit card
fraud. The problem we propose to solve is unique, but falls in the
broad class of fraudulent activities that e-commerce companies face.
In view of this, we discuss some closely related works.
      </p>
      <p>E-commerce companies face a number of fraudulent activities.
They include frauds caused by buyers, sellers and logistic partners.
Some relate to exploiting discounts ofered by the companies to
resell the products for profit. The activities also include number
of fraudulent claims and counter claims about non-receipt of a
genuine product, claims of receipt of part of shipments as against a
promised list, etc. Some are more subtle and dificult to detect. We
discuss some such frauds and their solutions.</p>
      <p>
        Credit card fraud detection is one important activity. They are
broadly classified into two [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], viz., application fraud, where
fraudsters apply for new cards with false information and behavioural
fraud, which include mail theft, stolen cards, counterfeit card, usage
in the absence of the card holder, etc. In general, models
incorporate binary classification approaches. The work provides a detailed
account of credit card fraud, data mining approaches to solve the
problem, feature identification, and comparative experimental
results. The experiments are conducted on real-life dataset using
logistic regression, support vector machines and random forests.
Trust fraud which relates seller fraud in hiking their own ratings
and reducing competitor’s ratings is rampant in e-commerce
industry [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ]. The work provides interesting insights on its prevalence
in Chinese C2C (customer to customer) e-commerce industry. The
sources of fraud include professional scammers, and nexus between
sellers, scammers, buyers, trust fraud companies and logistic
companies. The work also traces historical evolution of trust models. It
proposes a dynamic trust model that integrates weightage for
transaction amount, time decay to account for recency of transactions,
and trust factors such as quality, service and shipping speed. The
solution is shown to provide reliable trust scores. Anomalous
behaviour indicates potential fraud activity. Anomaly detection with
edge-attributed graphs on complex heterogeneous networks is
explored in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ]. With product ratings by users as data, the proposed
work identifies networks of users that are anomalous. The proposed
approach extends to heterogeneous networks, support independent
edge attributes and has ability to identify and rank anomalies. It
is shown to have high precision and is scalable. Opinion fraud [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]
relates to spamming the reviews either to defame or artificially
hype a target product. User generated reviews play significant role
in e-commerce retail. People with fraud intent spam the reviews
with an intent to distort the perception about the product. Fake
online review detection is studied in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. The work presents a
unsupervised, scalable framework that exploits the correlation of labels
between users and products, in order to detect fraudulent users and
online fake reviews. User profiling is used to detect fraud in mobile
communication networks [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. The fraud in this case relates to
illegal use of services which could cause loss to service provider. The
work provides multiple approaches to solve the problem, such as
feed-forward neural network for normal and fraud classes,
Gaussian mixture model for user behaviour modeling to detect sudden
changes in behaviour, and cost-sensitive classification.
      </p>
      <p>We propose two approaches to classify a given user address as
anomalous or genuine. We discuss them in detail in Section 3.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>3 PROPOSED METHODS</title>
      <p>The problem can be defined as, classification of a given address
into either normal or monkey-typed accurately and eficiently.
Eficiency is required for real time detection of such fraud in customer
on-boarding process. The solution is also useful to clean the
historical database of customer data. A study of monkey-typed and
normal addresses initially indicated that a possible solution can
be obtained through language modeling. We experimented with
standard language models and found as not efective as shown later
in Section 3.3. In view of this, we propose to solve this problem in
the following two ways of pattern representation.</p>
      <p>
        (1) Approach-1: In this approach, we derive text features as
groups of characters. Through machine learning models, we
learn from data of those combinations of characters that are
normal or abnormal and culminate in classification of an
address.
(2) Approach-2: In this approach, we exploit importance of
vowels in English [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. We mark vowels and non-vowels as
binary features. Regularity in the presence of vowel helps to
classify a normal address vis-a-vis an abnormal address.
The motivation for Approach-2 is its possible generality
across a large country like India, where diferent languages
are spoken and the address words would be distinctly
diferent. However, the words even though expressed in English,
do have similar vowel combination. It should be mentioned
that the method would not work if (a) the syllables contain
only consonants or (b) addresses contain only numbers. We,
however, did not come across monkey typed addresses as
numbers alone, possibly because the addresses are expressed
as characters and fraudsters mimic them with jumbled
characters.
      </p>
      <p>We achieve this objective through the following steps of the
proposed methods.</p>
      <p>
        (1) Preprocess the addresses: The addresses at the time of
entry would contain a number of special characters such
as $, ^,%, *,/, etc. Earlier studies [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] show that they are not
helpful in classification of the addresses. Such terms are
eliminated. The addresses also contain mixture of upper and
lower case. They are all converted to lower case.
(2) For Approach-1, generate fixed length features that
are devoid of repititve substrings: The normal as well
as monkey-typed addresses are of non-uniform length. In
order to bring tractability such addresses are reduced to
ifxed length substrings that form features. We consider two
diferent lengths of substrings. Repeated substrings of
characters are identified and removed. This is done so as to avoid
over-representation of repeating substrings.
(3) For Approach-2, we make use of presence of vowels in
an address: In this approach, we transform the address data
into an binary sequence of vowel and non-vowels. Thus
normal and monkey-typed addresses form a sequence of binary
features. The present work is applicable for terms
containing vowels like in Indian languages, although expressed in
English. Some examples are koramangala, an area name in
Banaglore, and dhaula kuan, an area name in Delhi. It may
be noted here that lengths of diferent patterns containing
binary values features are not same. In the given dataset,
the maximum of pattern lengths is noted. It is extended by
another 25% of its length in order to take care of unseen test
patterns, say, l. Each pattern is appended with 0’s in order
till length of pattern reaches common length, l.
(4) Label the patterns as normal or monkey-typed addresses:
In order to classify the addresses using supervised methods,
the addresses are labeled as normal and monkey-typed. This
is a manual activity.
(5) Training, Test and Cross-validation: The dataset is
divided into training and test datasets. We consider multiple
such sets by randomly selecting from those two sets in a
mutually exclusive manner.
(6) Classify the data and record the average performance:
We carry out experiments, with diferent mutually exclusive
train-test combinations. The performance is presented.
      </p>
      <p>For classifying a given address as normal or monkey-typed, it
is not possible to obtain all combinations of monkey-typing
possibilities. We initially place our eforts in understanding the
conventional addresses as well as monkey-typed addresses. Subsequently
we devise methods for efective classification of such addresses. We
discuss about the nuances of the data and its transformation as it
passes through important stages of preprocessing.
3.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Data Description</title>
      <p>The number of addresses is in the order of millions. Monkey-typed
addresses form a very small percentage of the total address set.
Table 2 contains a sample of normal addresses. The table contains
addresses as entered by the registered users. In the table, in order to
maintain privacy of the users, we replaced specific dwelling identity
with x’s. It can be noticed from the data that a number of challenges
exist in processing these addresses. The details that could have been
provided in subsequent stages of address entry, such as city name,
and ZIP code would form part of the main address. It should further
be noted that some city names are inadvertently spelled in diferent
ways. Some examples are BANAGALORE in place of BANGALORE
and Bhubaneswar in place of Bhubaneshwar. The preprocessing
models also need to account for some city names that are renamed
oficially such as { Benguluru, Bangalore} or {Gurgaon, Gurgram}. We
Spell variants of a word apartment as entered by users
apartment apartmenet apartmanet apartmenst
apartmenrt apartmennt apartment appratment
aparatment appratmant aparment apartent
apprment apartement apartament apartnment
apprtement apartmment aparttment apartrment
apartememt apaprtment aparrtment apaertment
apartmt apartme apartmernt apartmeant
apartmemt apartmebt apatrtments apaternments
apasrtments apartmensts apartmenmts aparntments
observe presence of many variants of these words when we study
a large set of customer entered addresses.</p>
      <p>
        For example, in a dataset of about 10000 addresses of Bangalore,
we notice about 18 diferent spell variations of an area name
“koramangala", 61 variants of “Bannerghatta Road", 263 variants of the
word "apartments". The variants are obtained through clustering
the addresses [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. Table 1 contains a sample of spell variants of the
word, “apartments". They occur possibly either due to an oversight
while entering and due to varying literacy levels. In the
preprocessing step, these variants are replaced by a representative term in
order to reduce the vocabulary.
      </p>
      <p>Table 3 contains monkey-typed, and potentially fraudulent
addresses. It can be noted that they contain many combinations of
characters. Interestingly, some intelligent fraud customers, leave
spaces while entering monkey typed addresses, to make them
appear as normal addresses which typically contain multiple words.
The study of such addresses provide interesting insights. It is
noticed that such customers also write random characters with a mix
of upper and lower case characters. Thus the proposed solution
should overcome the issues of inter-word spaces, and mixed case
letters. Further, in such randomly typed letters, either vowels are
extremely rare or completely dominate and remain repetitive.</p>
      <p>Figure 1 contains a word-cloud of a sample of such addresses after
splitting them into 4-character long strings. We can observe from
the figure that frequently used substrings predominantly match
with successive letters on qwerty keyboard although there exist
other combinations too.</p>
      <p>We will further discuss challenges in the data and preprocessing
methods that are necessary for working with the proposed approach
in the following section.
3.2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Address Data Preprocessing</title>
      <p>Both the classes of addresses of normal and monkey-typed have
many specific observations. Normal address data have the following
challenges.</p>
      <p>(1) Control and special characters, that are inadvertently
introduced during data entry, storage and retrieval.
(2) Upper and lower case letters
(3) Many spell variants of a given word
(4) Missing spaces, such as, IndustrialLayout in place of
Industrial Layout
Sl. No.</p>
      <p>1
2
3
4
5</p>
      <p>(5) Undesirable spaces such as, Industrial Lay out in place of</p>
      <p>
        Industrial Layout
(6) Terms that do not help classification[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] with the proposed
solution framework, such as, ZIP codes, city names, time
stamp, direction to reach address, landmarks, etc.
(7) Repeated terms such as those which are accidentally typed
twice while entering the addresses
(8) Lack of structure where address-words appear at diferent
locations by diferent users while writing an address of a
location. For example, 3rd Stage, BTM Layout is also written
as BTM Layout, 3rd Stage.
      </p>
      <p>The monkey-typed addresses data have the following challenges.
(1) Variable length strings with maximum number reaching
nearly 100 characters.
(2) Many of them have repeated substrings such as asdfasdfgij
etc.
(3) Some addresses are provided as multiple monkey-typed
strings so as to mimic a normal address.
(4) Combination of upper and lower case characters</p>
      <p>The above discussion presents a list of all the challenges present
in addresses. For the problem under consideration, some challenges
like accidental merging or separation of words is not important
since we ultimately remove the spaces in the address while
generating features as we present in the following discussion.</p>
      <p>We take following preprocessing or data preparation steps
while generating features.</p>
      <p>
        (1) Removing control and special characters, such as, $, ^,%, *,/,
(2) Reducing all data to lower case
(3) Generating equivalent set of words with the help of
clustering of empirical data [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]
(4) After incorporating these changes, identifying unique
addresses among the datasets
(5) Further steps for Approach-1
• Remove spaces between address words to convert it into
a single string without spaces
• Split the strings into k-character substrings to form
features, for k=4 and 8.
• Blank spaces remain in the last string when the address
string length is not divisible by substring length ‘k’.
Replace those blanks that remain after “n modulo k” split,
with *’s, where n and k are lengths of full string and
substring respectively.
(6) Further steps for Approach-2
• Identify vowels.
• Place ‘1’ for vowel and ‘0’ for the rest. For example, for
the word anjaneyacomplex, highlighting vowels, it forms
the word, anjaneyacomplex. The corresponding features
are 100101010100010.
• Append 0’s to arrive at common pattern length, as
discussed earlier.
      </p>
      <p>Table 4 illustrates processing of the addresses for Approach-1. It
contains addresses in three stages such as (a) raw form as entered
by customers, (b) preprocessed and (c) feature form. We provide
illustrations for both 8-character and 4-character long features.
Different feature subsequence lengths are studied through experiments
and reported in Section 4. In the table, we consider two normally
written addresses and three monkey-typed addresses. It is
interesting to note the variety of letter combinations and word spaces
that fraudsters use in writing monkey-typed address. The ‘*’s at
the end of a word indicate blanks that are necessary to complete
8character bound. It should however be noted here that as discussed
in Section 3.2, repeat substrings are removed.</p>
      <p>
        Table 5 contains features for the preprocessed addresses for
Approach-2. The preprocessed addresses are taken from Table 4.
We consider each of these binary digits as features.
Initial approach to solve this problem is by using statistical
language models, where a probability is assigned to a character
sequence, {w1, w2, . . . , wn }. It is expected that the scores for monkey
typed addresses such as
gtysfkjhjuhkjkeraladjuhgjdhiidjidjidkgj will be distinctly diferent from that of a normal address. We
conducted experiments with kylm language modeling toolkit [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]
and generated scores for all the addresses. We notice that the scores
overlap. We experimented with diferent values of n. Table 6
contains scores for a sample set of addresses for n=3 and 7. In the table,
we present 2 examples each of normal and monkey typed addresses
for n=3 and n=7. For n=3, it can observed that score for the monkey
typed address kjnlknmlmklnmklnm is closer to normal address
placed in sl no.1. The score for the second monkey typed address
falls within the range of normal addresses, viz., {0.0091,0.042}. For
n=7, the range for monkey typed and normal addresses are {0.0104,
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>4 EXPERIMENTATION AND RESULTS</title>
      <p>Monkey typed addresses occur very rarely in a given dataset. But
they are present and need to be located through a model. The ratio
of normal addresses to monkey typed addresses leads to severe class
imbalance. Here we consider equal number of patterns for each
of the classes to demonstrate working of our proposed methods.
We consider 30,000 addresses with nearly equal number of normal
and monkey-typed addresses. We present case studies and their
corresponding datasets in Table 7. For cases 1-3, we consider 23 : 13
division between training and test datasets. As a first step, the data
is randomly shufled. Each time an exclusive set of training dataset
of size 23 , is chosen and the remaining data is considered as test data,
thus resulting in three distinct cases. For cases 4-5, the training and
test data are considered as 12 : 12 .</p>
      <p>Table 7 contains serial number of case studies and corresponding
datasets. The pattern numbers presented in Column 2 and 3 of the
table correspond to training and test datasets of each of the classes.
For example, Case-3 indicates that from randomly shufled training
data corresponding to class-1 and class-2, {1 to 5000} and {10001
to 15000} patterns each are considered for training and the rest
as test data. The training data and their corresponding labels are
considered accordingly.</p>
      <p>The data is subjected to 2-class classification using linear SVM
and Naive Bayes classifier. The performance is comparable. For
the sake of brevity, we present the results of the exercises using
linear SVM alone for both the methods. Table 8 contains results
corresponding to Approach-1. The precision, recall and F-score
numbers are presented in columns 2,3 and 4 for the cases considered
in Table 7.</p>
      <p>Experiments are carried out with diferent character lengths for
the features such as 4,8, and 16. We observe that the performance is
better for 4 and 8. Further, the results with 4-character long features
show better performance as evident from the table.</p>
      <p>Performance of 4-character long features perform nearly the
same for both the data splits of 23 : 13 and 12 : 12 . The best and average
classification accuracy of 98% is obtained for features of length 4
and training-test data split of 12 : 12 .</p>
      <p>Table 9 contains results with Approach-2 for the same cases as
listed in Table 7. The performance of all the five cases is nearly the
same. Approach-1 shows superior performance to Approach-2, in
general.</p>
      <p>The true positive rate and false negative rates for Case-4 of
Table 7 for diferent proportion of monkey-typed and normal
addresses are provided in Table 10. This is provided in order to
indicate performance under varying natural rates of monkey typed
addresses ranging from 5% to 75%.</p>
      <p>Although Approach-1 outperforms the other approach,
deploying the solution across the country requires training of diferent
combination of k-char groups, since the language spoken, names of
locality, and ethnic words are distinct in diferent regions.
Approach2 is immune to basic nuances of words and focus on
pronounceability of words. Thus, it is a more generic pattern representation.</p>
      <p>The classification time per pattern is 38 microsec on Intel i3,
2.6Ghz, 4-core, 8GB RAM machine. This is well within the single
digit millisec latency requirement of the operational system.</p>
      <p>It is interesting to see how some failures have happened in the
classification. We look at an example of a normal address that is
classified as monkey typed. The address ’microwave lab Dept: ECEE,
C04, IISC’, when split into 4-char features, amounts to ’micr owav
elab dept ecee c04i isc*’. Such combination of characters, such as
‘elab’, ‘isc*’, ’owav’, etc., occur in monkey typed addresses as well.
This is the possible reason for its misclassification. Consider the
address which is monkey typed but classified as normal address, viz.,
’figb irds igjr educ tion sjfk kuit ebgo b*** . It has mix of monkey-typed
4-char features, such as, ‘igjr’,‘sjfk’, and ‘edgo’ and few features that
occur in normal addresses, such as, ‘educ’, and ‘tion’. This possibly
resulted in its classification as a normal address.</p>
      <p>An important aspect of the deployment is dealing with class
imbalance. We provide a discussion in Section 5 on various approaches
to tackle imbalance.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>5 CLASS IMBALANCE AND MITIGATION</title>
      <p>
        Like in many fraud or spam classification problems, monkey-typed
addresses form a very small percentage of combined class dataset
leading to severe class imbalance [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref14 ref4 ref9">4, 9, 11, 14</xref>
        ]. The problem
formulation, feature selection, approaches to solve the problem and the
experimental results indicate that the chosen approaches lead to
efective solution to the problem. As a next step, we need to make
it operational under class imbalance too. The costs of
misclassification [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref8">8, 12</xref>
        ] of a monkey typed address and normal address are
not same. We discuss class imbalance problem and some important
approaches to mitigate this problem.
      </p>
      <p>
        Consider a 2-class classification scenario, where the number
of patterns belonging to one class far exceeds those belonging to
second class. Such data is termed imbalanced between the classes.
Finding an efective classification model in such a scenario is
challenging, since many classification models favour the majority class.
In many practical problems, the minority class represents
fraudulent patterns. Misclassification of fraudulent patterns as genuine
ones is expensive. Some conventional approaches to solve the
problem are under-sampling majority class till balance is obtained,
oversampling the minority class in similar manner and choice of unequal
classification costs. In case of under-sampling, when
representative patterns intra-class variations are eliminated, the classification
accuracy sufers. In case of over-sampling of existing patterns of
minority class, it is not guaranteed to arrive at inter-class
discriminative boundary. In the last 15 years, a number of intelligent sampling
methods, boosting and combination of sampling and boosting, are
studied to efectively overcome these issues [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref4">4, 14</xref>
        ]. Synthetic
Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] marks intelligent
sampling approach where a combination of over-sampling and
under-sampling is resorted to, to demonstrate its superior
performance using area under Receiver Operating Characterstic (ROC)
curve. Subsequent extensions of SMOTE and many variants of
boosting are outlined in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ], where RusBoost is shown to
outperform the rest of the approaches.
      </p>
      <p>Adapting the above discussed approaches would help mitigating
class imbalance problem for monkey-typed address classification.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>6 SUMMARY AND FURTHER WORK</title>
      <p>We consider a practical problem that afects e-commerce companies
where potentially fraudulent addresses containing a single or
multiple strings of randomly typed addresses occur. We refer to them as
monkey-typed addresses. When such addresses remain undetected,
they would amount to loss of revenue and cause strain on resources
at various stages of processing, starting from order checkout to
logistics. The problem is challenging. Through an initial study, we
observed that conventional language modeling approaches do not
generalise well. We present two novel solutions (a) by forming
ifxed-length features and (b) by exploiting inter-vowel distance,
after subjecting the addresses to a number of preprocessing steps.
We present the data challenges, preprocessing steps, proposed
approaches and feature generation. We carry out experiments for
feature lengths of 4 and 8 for Approach-1 and features marking
vowels for Approach-2. The performance is similar in both the
approaches.</p>
      <p>Further work includes reducing the number of features through
optimal feature selection approaches, experimenting with models
that could work across diferent geographical regions within a large
country and adapting to class imbalance.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
      <p>The authors would like to thank Aditya Rachakonda for his helpful
comments.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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