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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Decision Support Systems' Security Model Based on Decentralized Data Platforms</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mykyt</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>liy Tsyg</string-name>
          <email>tsyganok@ipri.kiev.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Institute for Information Recording of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Kiev</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>The Problem of Data Security of Decision Support Systems</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2026</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0003</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Modern information systems, especially high-risk systems which work with important data lack proper security models. Decision support systems and recommendations they produce are extremely dependent on the data they produce recommendations on, hence they require the most secure data platform and transparent history of data input and changes. Many of such systems are centralized and are stored in a single place, like a data center or even a single machine, where important data can be lost easily. Most importantly, it can be tampered without many complications, as for the typical setup there are people who always have access to the system and its data, including people who know for sure how the system is made and who can act unnoticed, being bad actors. Through all of this can be solved by introducing proper monitoring mechanics and implementing best security practices like using secure protocols and encryption, this article describes methods which completely exclude data tampering possibility and add more important properties like data immutability, decentralization and fault tolerance on a platform level.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>security</kwd>
        <kwd>decentralized platforms</kwd>
        <kwd>distributed systems</kwd>
        <kwd>decision support system</kwd>
        <kwd>knowledge base</kwd>
        <kwd>data immutability</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>A structure of DSS knowledge base is shown in Fig. 1. The main elements of
knowledge base are objects and connections between them. Knowledge base objects
can be one of two types: target or project. Each knowledge base object has a name in
short wording form. Semantic meaning of the object is specified by a keyword tuple
with corresponding weights. This object can be quantitative or qualitative, threshold
or quasi-linear. Projects have specific parameters: runtime and resources required. A
connection between knowledge base objects can be positive or negative, it can have a
time delay, compatibility groups. It is also characterized by a relative impact factor.</p>
      <p>Because the recommendations of these systems depends on a data so much, a
proper security model standard must be applied in order to prevent unauthorized or
unexpected changes in the data, which may change the decision made by decision support
system. There are several concepts related to security that should be reviewed.
1.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>The Need to Trust Entire System and Rely on People</title>
      <p>
        In order to trust the recommendations of decision support system, one should trust the
developers of this system, algorithms behind the system, people that control and
maintain the system and those who interact with it and input information [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ].
Furthermore, produced recommendations can be incomprehensible or undesirable, which
raise more questions rather than answers regarding system operation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. As the
result, there are a plenty of cases in which each party have to trust the system in order to
accept produced decision.
      </p>
      <p>Having the decision support system that is fully under the control of one party, or
even multiple parties enable them to make decisions regarding the data they own:</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>1. Which data to input and how to organize an input process.</title>
        <p>2. Which data to filter from the input and which to keep.
3. How to organize a decision support process.
4. How to tune the system for a specific case.
5. How to properly present and explain the recommendations.</p>
        <p>
          All of these processes rely on people who work with the system, not to mention
those who input data and the system itself. In such a scheme there are too many points
of failure, the main of which are people themselves. In case of undesirable results, a
group of people can decide to slightly change the input data achieving the result they
desire on their own. Having a system in which much of the trust relies on people is
not desirable, as people never can be a source of genuine and logical decisions by
their nature [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Instead, it is much desirable to have a system which does not require the trust to its
operators and is trusted on a global level. This eliminates any human errors, as well as
intentional attempts to change something in the system, leaving this change
unnoticed.
1.2</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Data Tampering Risks</title>
      <p>
        Decision support systems are extremely sensitive to any data they store and, most
importantly, take as an input, as even a slight modification in this data could
drastically change the result. People who input data to the system can do errors, both
accidentally or intentionally, and there is always a chance for them to play a bad role and
intentionally harm the output of the system by giving an invalid or ambiguous input.
Different methods can be used to reduce the input error, however, they cannot
eliminate it [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Moreover, the input data can always be reviewed and validated by other people.
Hence the only thing bad actors can perform in order to change resulting decisions is
to tamper with data and hide any evidence of it.</p>
      <p>
        Traditional system security models feature many ways to protect data authenticity,
including encryption, data mirroring, backups, monitoring, and logging, but even if
the system is set up properly and is well-maintained, there is always a risk that
something can go wrong or is missing, and more importantly there is no way to ensure that
the data wasn’t changed from the moment of its entry [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Decentralized data platforms solve this problem by introducing immutable public
or permissioned ledger maintained by multiple parties that participate in a process of
validating this ledger. Hence, a single entry must be trusted by all or the majority of
network participants in order to be recorded on a ledger. Data is also recorded in a
cryptographically secure way, excluding the possibility of previous records
modification [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Reliability of Data Storage and Knowledge</title>
      <p>In traditional storage systems, there is a central database which stores all the records.
To prevent possible data losses in case of emergency, these systems can be set to do
regular backups. However, a special care needs to be taken in order to ensure that no
data was lost, damaged or tampered. Usually, the systems which guarantee all these
properties are very expensive to afford and maintain.</p>
      <p>
        In comparison, decentralized data platforms offer storage redundancy, but
eliminate all security and maintenance risks. Additionally, the decentralized system can be
configured in order to consume less storage if required [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
1.4
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Ownership of Information</title>
      <p>While in traditional data platforms data is typically owned by one party, decentralized
platforms are highly focused on the problem of information ownership. Unlike
traditional data platforms, they are designed to not to concentrate all stored information, as
well as computing power on a single party or even in hands of some group.</p>
      <p>But this doesn’t mean that the information is not accessible nor is accessible to all
parties. If we take blockchain as an example, every network participant in a
decentralized system can obtain a copy of all information available, but the
information itself can be both open or encrypted. However, in a properly set up decentralized
system, one can be sure that the information recorded to the decentralized storage is
permanent, and all data that belong to one party won’t change its hands to another,
which is guaranteed by data immutability property of such systems [6].
2</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Decentralized Security Approaches</title>
        <p>In order to protect a typical centralized computer system from all possible intrusions
and attacks, which also applies to decision support systems, a lot of work must be
performed. This, in turn, does not exclude the possibility of a hack and cannot
guarantee that the system is fully protected. In other words, no matter how the system is
protected, there is always a practical way to attack it.</p>
        <p>
          Decentralized platforms, with blockchain technology as a primary example, offer a
solution to above problems: they eliminate risks of tampering with the system and
provide a data platform with a strictly determined way of how different parties can
interact with the platform and rules of any possible data manipulations within the
platform. Also, they offer a highly failure-resistant system, which means that even if
half of all network nodes will crash, the system will still continue to operate normally
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Decentralized data platforms like blockchain guarantee by design that no single
party can interrupt the normal, predictable functioning of the platform, as well as no
data can be changed in an undefined way. In other words, there is no practical way to
make a decentralized program produce a different result from expected, as well as
tamper with any historical data [6].</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Existing Decentralized Data Platforms</title>
      <p>
        The first successful application of a public decentralized platform was released in
2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto, the name used by the unknown person or a group of
people who originally developed Bitcoin – a peer-to-peer electronic cash system,
which is still under a high demand today [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">9</xref>
        ]. At that time it was barely possible to call
Bitcoin a “decentralized platform”, as the only functionality it served is virtual value
transfers between parties. The term “decentralized platform” became well-recognized
almost 7 years later, in 2015, with the release of Ethereum – world’s first practically
successful decentralized applications platform, which allowed people not only to
transfer value over the internet but also to run any programs and computations which
cannot be tampered with [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">10</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>However, there are other emerging technologies that try to address many
blockchain issues. We will briefly describe them below.</p>
      <p>
        Blockchain. Bitcoin and Ethereum, as the most widely adopted decentralized
platforms, are running using blockchain technology, which is one that is practically
proven to be secure and stable. Blockchain’s main disadvantage is its scalability issues,
which other decentralized data platforms try to address. However, blockchain
sharding, as the most recently introduced way to scale traditional blockchain platforms,
offers a way to increase blockchain throughput without compromising security [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">8</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The name “Blockchain” appeared directly from an underlying algorithm meaning –
the chain of blocks. Transactions in a blockchain are organized in blocks, and blocks
reference each other. This structure with cryptographically secured references
between blocks is called blockchain [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">8</xref>
        ] (Fig. 2).
      </p>
      <p>In blockchain, each next block must reference its previous block in order for the
whole structure to be valid. This reference isn’t just a link – it’s a hash of a previous
block. If a previous block’s contents changes, its hash changes, and thus the reference
to modified block becomes invalid. Because the whole network in blockchain
validates blocks, every invalid block is just ignored, leaving no chances to someone to
tamper with data and being unnoticed.</p>
      <p>
        The block size in blockchain is intentionally limited, which leads to scalability
issues [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">11</xref>
        ]. If the block size wasn’t limited, then fewer network participants could
participate in forming a consensus because of hardware and network throughput
limitations.
Hashgraph. Unlike blockchain, hashgraph does not pack transactions into blocks.
Instead, transactions have cryptographic references to each other, forming a data
structure which is also called hashgraph [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">12</xref>
        ]. For example, in IOTA project, which is
an early adopter of this approach, the global ledger forms a data structure called
Tangle, which is a direct acyclic graph in which each next transaction reference two
previous [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">13</xref>
        ]. The example of the hashgraph structure is depicted in figure 3.
      </p>
      <p>Hashgraph uses a probabilistic-based consensus algorithm, as an opposite to
blockchain’s deterministic consensus algorithms. For instance, to ensure that the particular
transaction happened in hashgraph, a network participant uses a gossip protocol; it
asks some of its peers about whether or not they have the same transaction recorded,
and the transaction is considered valid when, for example, 2/3 of the peers respond
positively.</p>
      <p>Unlike blockchain, hashgraph doesn’t have a limit of transactions. Its tangle can
theoretically become very big and still be able to handle all incoming transactions.
But, on the other side, hashgraph is less resistant to attacks. By having enough power,
the continuous attack on a hashgraph ledger can create a “parasitic“ hashgraph, which
can prevent new transactions from happening as they might be considered invalid by
more than 1/3 of the network, for example.</p>
      <p>There are many examples where Ethereum and other similar technologies were
adopted by businesses, government and healthcare, as well as many other fields of
study. However, these platforms didn’t get massively adopted yet, as they all suffer
from scalability or security issues. There are many different higher-level solutions
were introduced like sharding, lightning network, plasma, and others, but still, they
are all vulnerable in case of weak algorithms used.
2.2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Existing Consensus Algorithms</title>
      <p>
        A consensus algorithm in a decentralized network is a process used to achieve
agreement on a single data value or a network state among distributed network participants.
In Blockchain, a consensus algorithm is used to agree on the latest state of a ledger,
which is supported by all network participants [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">14</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        There are many consensus algorithms in existence, but there are just a few which
are practically proven to work and are widely used as of 2018: Proof of Work, Proof
of Stake and Delegated Proof of Stake. We will briefly introduce the main idea behind
these algorithms and compare them to each other.
Proof of Work. In a Proof of Work consensus algorithm, the blockchain network
agrees on a rule to accept the valid chain with the highest total complexity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">15</xref>
        ].
Everyone in a network can try to increase the total chain complexity, by adding new
blocks with transactions. Network participants are economically incentivized to add
transactions of other network participants to blocks they produce, as after forging a
valid block they collect all transaction fees plus a block finding reward.
      </p>
      <p>Adding each new block to a chain requires finding such a hash of a block that maps
to a number which is below the given threshold called complexity. Finding this hash
is not a trivial task; this task doesn’t have a known solution due to the pre-image
resistance property of a hash function used. Thus, the only way to find a valid hash of
the block is to try all possible values of a random number nonce which is used in
hashing.</p>
      <p>The first network participant called “miner” who generates a valid hash from a
block broadcasts it to a network, while all other network participants accept this block
because its hash is below the given complexity for a block. The next block’s
complexity is deterministically computed from the complexity of previous blocks and time
required for its mining so that no matter how powerful computers in the network are,
there is always a stable approximate time between new blocks added to the network
(15 seconds for Ethereum).</p>
      <p>Because finding a right hash for a block is time and computational resources
consuming task, network attracts more and more incentivized parties that try to find a
right hash, making network complexity enormously big, which, in turn, makes any
possible attacks to this network impractical.</p>
      <p>
        Proof of Stake. Proof of Work algorithm requires a lot of energy for mining [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref15">14,
16</xref>
        ], and this creates two problems:
 A lot of energy is consumed for a very little amount of useful work (performing
transaction in a blockchain).
 A risk that parties which have supercomputers and computational data centers can
break the network by addressing all their computational capabilities to it.
      </p>
      <p>
        Proof of stake algorithm solves this problem by introducing virtual mining – a
pseudo-random deterministic way of identifying which party can produce the next
block, based on numerous factors. The primary factor which Proof of Stake takes into
account is the party’s stake – the number of virtual currency the party owns. In
Ethereum, for example, this currency is Ether. This means the more currency the party
has, the more blocks it can produce [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">17</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Proof of Stake doesn’t solve the problem of one party owning almost all currency,
as well as Proof of Work doesn’t solve the problem of one party owning all
computational powers. However, it is more efficient as it requires a very few computing
resources when compared to Proof of Work.</p>
      <p>
        Delegated Proof of Stake is one of the most complex consensus algorithms widely
used today. It works similar to Proof of Stake with the difference in the next block
producer selection algorithm. Delegated Proof of Stake block producer mechanism
works more like an election, where all network participants can vote for block
producers using their in-network currency, thus, increasing their chances to become
actual block producers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">18</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Unlike Proof of Stake, there isa limited number of block producer involved, which
allows higher scalability comparing to Proof of Work and Proof of Stake, as only a
limited number of network participants do actual computations, while others just
consume them as is.
2.3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Typical Access Control Models</title>
      <p>
        Because there are tasks that one particular decentralized data platform cannot handle,
such as heavy computations or high throughput and reliability at the same time, there
are several different approaches of how the decentralized network can be set up in
order to fit the needs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        Public Decentralized Data Platforms. Public decentralized data platform is a
decentralized data platform intended for a public use, meaning that any party can
transact in its network. Just like the internet, but immutable, predictable and
censorshipresistant. Because the network of a decentralized data platform is public, any network
participant can transparently see and verify each transaction in it, ensuring that the
data was not corrupted or changed [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref19">19, 20</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Ethereum is one of the most well-known public decentralized data platforms,
which is able to handle a maximum of 15 transactions per second. Handling more
transactions per second makes the system more centralized, as more resourced is
required to support the network, while not every network participant can afford to have
this resources available.</p>
      <p>Public decentralized data platforms like Ethereum allow providing a maximal trust
to a software solution based on them. However, sometimes, these platforms are not
scalable enough, and for some cases, there is a point in using private or permissioned
platforms.</p>
      <p>
        Private Decentralized Data Platforms. Because public decentralized data
platforms cannot afford big throughput due to security reasons, there is an option to
launch a private network, which will be only accessible to a particular number of
parties [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">20</xref>
        ]. Making the decentralized network private means that it eventually loses
one of its properties – decentralization, because it is being controlled by one party
which keeps it private. However, several approaches could help to preserve trust in
the system:
 Occasionally publishing a network state on a regular basis to another decentralized
public ledger, which can be used to validate the state of a private network in the
future.
 Allowing external provisioners to validate the network state on-demand, by
introducing a public registry of backups made by a system regularly.
      </p>
      <p>While private networks are closer to traditional centralized platforms, they borrow
some useful properties from decentralized ones, like immutable network history and
fault tolerance.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Permissioned Decentralized Data Platforms combine the properties of public</title>
      <p>
        and private decentralized data platforms, finding the golden mean between two. These
platforms are often referenced as consortium platforms (for example, consortium
blockchain). They function just like public platforms but have more restrictions on
who can access the platform and, more importantly, who can perform which
transactions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref19">19, 20</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Speaking of the blockchain technology, in a permissioned decentralized system
there may be a pre-defined set of parties who can assemble blocks. For instance, in a
bank system where more than 10 banks are involved, each bank as a network
participant can have an equal weight, leading to everyone have the same influence on
the network. The rules are strictly defined in a system, and once one instance does not
follow these rules it exists to the chain which is considered invalid by all other parties,
thus leaving the network.</p>
      <p>The biggest example of permissioned blockchain today is Hyperledger Fabric,
providing a flexible blockchain-based platform that can be set up for almost any
needs. While it is highly configurable, there is still no possible configuration in which
the blockchain will be scalable, highly available and secure at the same time.
3</p>
      <sec id="sec-9-1">
        <title>Security Model for High-Risk Systems</title>
        <p>Decentralized data platform application can bring the following properties to the
highrisk systems:</p>
        <sec id="sec-9-1-1">
          <title>1. Data security and integrity. 2. Data immutability and transparent history of changes. 3. Reliable and fault-resistant storage. 4. Reliable and predictable data processing.</title>
          <p>Regarding decision support systems, there are several possible applications. We
describe 2 of them, based on a fully public access control model and semi-public
permissioned model.</p>
          <p>Private and consortium security models of decentralized data platforms are quite
challenging to set up properly, so we do not recommend setting them up for
individual organizations, rather than joining to already existing private or consortium
decentralized data platforms.
3.1</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>System Security Model Based on Public Decentralized Data Platforms</title>
      <p>One of the main applications is to build a system fully on top of a decentralized
platform. This is always the most desirable scenario, however, it has two disadvantages:
1. It requires developing a solution which doesn’t have functional bugs or special
method development which allows updating the solution without further
centralization risks.
2. The reliable public decentralized platform which solves a scalability problem does
not exist yet, which limits the number of operations that can be performed in a
decentralized ledger.</p>
      <p>In a case of the full decentralization, regarding decision support system, experts
are using the client which is connected to a decentralized data platform directly,
making the direct contributions to a global public ledger of a decentralized data platform.
The entered data becomes immutable immediately after the entry, and all its possible
future changes are practically excluded. The diagram demonstrating the process of
information entry, processing and verifying is depicted in figure 4.</p>
      <p>The client used for the data entry by experts uses the decentralized identity – an
account in terms of the decentralized data platform. These accounts are registered before
the data entry</p>
      <p>Thus, after the result is processed by the decision support system, each
recommendation given by the system is compared and verified against input data, which is
100% legit. Moreover, in case of decentralized data platform can handle the load and
computing resources required to process the input data and produce a decision, the
whole decision support system can be built on top of the decentralized data platform.
3.2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>System Security Model Based on Unscalable Public Decentralized Data</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>Platforms</title>
      <p>Taking into account that the public security model currently does not fit all the needs
of a scalable and, as a result, reliable system, we suggest another approach to creating
a reliable and secure trustless system for high-risk decision support systems based on
permissioned decentralized data platforms.</p>
      <p>This security model decreases the required space of stored data within the
decentralized platform, making it cheaper to use. For example, it can reduce the cost
of each complete decision support process to $0.03 in equivalent, when using
Ethereum decentralized platform usage (the average cost of one transaction in the main
Ethereum network, as of 11/8/2018).</p>
      <p>In this security model, the data is entered into the system using a regular
centralized database. After the data is entered by all experts, this data is cryptographically
hashed with a strong hashing algorithm and is published to a public decentralized data
platform as a proof of the data state. Later, the input information is disclosed and
experts confirm that the resulting hash corresponds to an input data indeed. This data
can be confirmed by any provisioning expert and saved for further proof that the
output was produced from the legit input. This procedure is somehow similar to
obtaining a digital signature for every information entered to the system, but without a
practical way to change the signature itself.</p>
      <p>Figure 5 demonstrates this approach. The only information that goes to a
decentralized secure ledger is a hashed information, which stands as a proof of legit input data
that is compared to the original input after the decision support process is finished.
In this scenario it is important to mention that the original data can be lost, resulting in
having a hash that does not correspond to any data. But at least, for the consumer, this
will mean that the process of decision support was not organized properly and the
produced decision can be forged.</p>
      <sec id="sec-12-1">
        <title>Conclusion</title>
        <p>High-risk systems, including decision support systems, require the most secure
program and infrastructure environment to function. Decentralized data platforms, which
is an emerging technology nowadays, is the only way for systems and applications to
practically exclude any tampering risks and intrusion possibility. By utilizing the
decentralized security model proposed in this article high-risk systems can expect
their data and processing to be safe and predictable regardless of how the internal
system is developed and maintained.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
  </body>
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