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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Anonymizing clinical and genetic data of patients with minimum information loss</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dimitrios Dimitrios</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Athanasios Mpouras</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>223</fpage>
      <lpage>229</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>While collaboration in research requires the publication of data as well as exchange of them between institutions, these data often contain personal information that according to ethical requirements and existing legislature, are not allowed to be disclosed. Anonymization of these data is therefore mandatory. In previous work we have presented a framework for anonymizing patient data using Data Cubes. Though efficient for anonymization, the Data Cubes approach often lacks in flexibility. In the current work, we present an alternative approach which is based on disclosing a row based anonymized version of the original data set. The methodology is more versatile, while it also preserves the statistical characteristics of the original data set. We demonstrate this by considering an SVM predictor that tries to estimate the value of Breslow's depth, based on the values of another clinical variable, namely Clark's level, and the expression count of a skin cancer related gene (CDKN2A). The predictions are shown to have the same characteristics for both the original and the anonymized data sets.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Data Anonymization</kwd>
        <kwd>Privacy Models</kwd>
        <kwd>ARX framework</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        While publication and exchange of clinical and genetic data is crucial for research, it is
often the case that data contain sensitive information; information that, if disclosed,
may cause harm to the patients. It is therefore mandatory, both in ethical and in legal
terms, to respect and protect the individual’s right to anonymity for the patients whose
data are used for research. With the advent of GDPR[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] in particular, which is binding
for all member states of the EU, the set of rules that govern patient personal data is
clearly defined both for Data Controllers and for Data Processors. GDPR requires that,
except for some specific cases, sensitive and personal data to be anonymized when they
are disclosed to the public. Anonymized, in this sense, means that an attacker cannot
reverse engineer the anonymized data set in order to retrieve the original data
containing the sensitive information.
      </p>
      <p>
        In previous work[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], we have demonstrated a methodology that allowed the
anonymization of data, by using the aggregate structure known as a Data Cube. This
methodology produced completely anonymized data sets, which maintained the statistical
properties of the original data set, thus being effective for the purposes of analysis. It
relied upon identifying attribute combinations of interest, and then aggregating over the
patients that shared the same values for these combinations. If, for example, the
attributes of diabetes and smoking were to be measured, a two-dimensional data cube would
have been created. If the data cube is denoted as DC, then DC[0][0] would contain the
number of patients that had no diabetes and were not smoking, DC[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ][0] the number
of non-smokers who had diabetes, and so on. The above methodology, while producing
sound results, suffers from two main drawbacks
      </p>
      <p>The first one was that of inflexibility. In order to produce a Data Cube, a set of
attributes and a categorization schema for each one of these attributes was chosen. If,
however, other attributes were to be added or removed, the Data Cube needed to be
reconstructed from start.</p>
      <p>
        The second one was the one of performance. When combining clinical and genetic
data, which are typically stored in different files, the amount of join operations led to a
growth of the required amount of time needed to prepare data for processing. This
growth, while polynomial, still poses a limiting factor when producing large Data
Cubes. Although it has been demonstrated that by using High Performance Computing
techniques, this overhead can be reduced by a cubic factor[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], the order of the
polynomial overhead depends on the amount of attributes needed to be included. Thus, after a
point the data pre-processing will become slow even by using HPC techniques.
      </p>
      <p>In this work we introduce a new methodology that performs anonymization directly
in the patient data. The transformation may be applied to the whole data set, which is
then distributed in row format. Since the transformation is applied at the row level, it is
linear in time and attributes of interest can be removed/added in a time efficient manner.
The methodology will be applied in a use case that involves data of patients treated for
melanoma.</p>
      <p>
        This work was funded in the context of the SAGE-CARE[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] and ChildRescue[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]
Project, both funded under the Horizon 2020 Programme.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Theory</title>
      <p>
        In the most direct sense, a set is to be considered anonymized if no personal information
of the data subjects is exposed to potential attacker. In the case of row-based format of
data, this means that an individual cannot be linked to her corresponding entry in the
data set. In a typical case however, especially those involving patient data,
anonymization must be forced in the stricter sense, so that not only personal but also sensitive
information is protected[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. To make this clearer, we consider two more disclosure
cases, against which an anonymization algorithm must protect the data subject.
      </p>
      <p>Membership disclosure, involves the knowledge of whether data regarding an
individual are contained in the dataset or not. Attribute disclosure, involves the knowledge
of whether a specific attribute, has a specific value for an individual. Membership and
attribute disclosure allow an attacker to discern sensitive information regarding
individual(s), even without re-identifying the data set. For example, if an attacker knows
that a subject is part of a double-blind placebo control clinical trial for a new drug
developed for melanoma, then she knows that the subject has melanoma with a
probability ~50%.</p>
      <p>The different disclosure cases force the categorization of subject attributes into four
types:
• Identifying attributes, that contain subject’s personal identifiable
information (PII) and which are, in any case, removed from the set.
• Quasi-identifying (QIA) attributes which though they cannot be used on
their own to identify a subject, they can be used, in combination with other
variables to identify subjects.
• Sensitive attributes (SA), which contain information about subjects with
which the subject should not be associated with. The presence of
melanoma referred to earlier is a typical example of a sensitive attribute.
Genetic information, which can now be linked to existing or potential health
issues, such as predisposition to cancer, is also considered sensitive
information.
• Non-sensitive attributes, which are irrelevant for the purposes of
re-identification</p>
      <p>QIA are transformed, while sensitive attributes are transmitted as is, provided that
certain constraints are held. These constraints are enforced to prevent re-identification
and are defined by the so-called privacy models
2.1</p>
      <p>Privacy Models
Privacy models concerning anonymization can be very diverse; for the purposes of the
present work we consider only the ones that are relevant to the use case of melanoma
patients to be presented.</p>
      <p>
        • k-anonymity[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]: This the most basic model; all other models are typically
an extension of k-anonymity. Let a group of entries that shares the same
values of QIA be called an equivalence class. k-anonymity enforces each
equivalence class to have a size of at least k.
• l-diversity[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]: This model demands that each SI has at least l distinct values
in each equivalence class.
• t-closeness[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ]: this model demands that the distribution of the SI in each
equivalence class is similar to the one of the whole dataset.
      </p>
      <p>Figure 1 depicts a simple example demonstrating the meaning of k and l values.
Anonymization with the desired characteristics is achieved with performing
transformation on the QIA; the most typical ones are generalization, where values are grouped
under categories, and suppression, where part of the information is masked.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Application</title>
      <p>In the case of patient data, anonymization needs to be such that no sensitive information
may be attributed to a single patient. The transformed data set however, needs to exhibit
the same statistical characteristics as the original one; otherwise the dataset will lose its
validity and will be of no scientific value to the entities that share the information. For
the purposes of the current work, we considered datasets that contain data of patients
that were treated for melanoma. These data were retrieved in the context of the
SAGECARE project and correspond to real patient data that are stripped from any PII. They
contained both phenotypical information, concerning the clinical picture of the patient
as well as genetic information corresponding to expression counts of the patient’s
genes. Satellite data, contained subject’s information such as height, ethnicity etc. are
also included in the dataset. These satellite data will be considered QIA in our model.</p>
      <p>
        For anonymizing the dataset, we transform the set by requiring a k-value of 5,
lvalue of 2 and t-closeness of 0.2. The transformation is carried out by using the ARX
framework[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]; for each of the QIA a hierarchy was defined that was used for
implementing the generalization strategy. Figure 2 depicts a sample listing of the code used
to anonymize the data set.
      </p>
      <p>
        ARXConfiguration config = ARXConfiguration.create();
config.addPrivacyModel(new KAnonymity(5));
config.setSuppressionLimit(0.02d);
data.getDefinition().setAttributeType("breslow-depth",
Type.SENSITIVE_ATTRIBUTE);
Attributeconfig.addPrivacyModel(new EqualDistanceTCloseness("breslow-depth", 0.2d));
// l-diversity
config.addPrivacyModel(new DistinctLDiversity("breslow-depth ", 2));
To demonstrate that the transformation allows the data set to keep its main predictive
features, we will show how a typical Support Vector Machine [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] (SVM) classification
performs under the two data sets. We consider the original data set and take as an
example the case of three sensitive information, namely the Breslow’s depth, the Clark’s
level and the expression count of the Cyclin-dependent kinase Inhibitor 2A (CDKN2A)
gene. The Clark’s level is a measure of the depth that the melanoma has grown into the
skin and of the levels of the skin that are affected. It is used as a prognosis factor in
melanoma. Breslow’s depth is another prognostic factor that measures the depth of the
tumor using ocular micrometer. Breslow’s depth is a more accurate prognostic factor
that Clark’s level; for bigger values of Breslow’s depth specifically, the Breslow depth
has a significantly better value as a predictor. The CDKN2A gene and its mutations on
the other hand, has been shown to be linked with the appearance of skin cancers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ].
When the weaker predictor (Clark’s level) is combined with the gene count, we expect
the results to have a better predictive value. Figure 3 depicts the results of an SVM
classification for the Breslow’s depth of a patient’s melanoma based on the values of
the Clark’s level and the CDKN2A expression count. The results suggest that for low
expression counts of CDKN2A, the Clark’s value is suggestive of the Breslow value.
When the expression increases however, the Clark’s level is no longer a good predictor
for the Breslow’s depth; indeed, a high expression of CDKN2A seems to be correlated
with low Breslow’s depth.
      </p>
      <p>Figure 4 depicts the same classification when applied in the anonymized data set.
Taking into account the difference in the scaling produced between the two cases, the
classification has the same characteristics. It is to be noted, that the aim of the above
experiment is not to extract any significant medical conclusions; indeed there are far
more elaborate statistical models to demonstrate correlations between various
phenotypical and genetic attributes. The main goal of the experiment is to demonstrate that
the anonymized data set has the same statistical characteristics and that any conclusions
drawn from the original data set, persist to the anonymized one.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusions and further work</title>
      <p>In the present paper we demonstrated that datasets containing phenotypical and genetic
data can be effectively anonymized, with any information loss not leading to a
substantial change to the data’s statistical characteristics. The methodology can be applied to
patient data and these can be shared between parties in a manner that does not
compromise patients’ personal and sensitive information and that is also compliant with the
requirements of GDPR. The transformed data moreover, exhibit the same statistical
characteristics as the original data; their scientific value is therefore not compromised
by the anonymization transformations.</p>
      <p>Further work involves demonstrating the same result by using a model that will be
proven to be applicable to a generic case, involving arbitrary number of attributes; the
model will also provide metrics that will indicate the amount of information loss
imposed by the transformation, thereby quantizing the efficiency of the anonymization.</p>
    </sec>
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