=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-2373/paper-38 |storemode=property |title=Contextual Rational Closure for Defeasible ALC (Extended Abstract) |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2373/paper-38.pdf |volume=Vol-2373 |authors=Arina Britz,Ivan Varzinczak |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/dlog/BritzV19a }} ==Contextual Rational Closure for Defeasible ALC (Extended Abstract)== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2373/paper-38.pdf
  Contextual rational closure for defeasible ALC
              (Extended Abstract)

                     Katarina Britz1 and Ivan Varzinczak2,1
                     1
                       CAIR, Stellenbosch Univ., South Africa
                         2
                        CRIL, Univ. Artois & CNRS, France
                     abritz@sun.ac.za, varzinczak@cril.fr



      Abstract. Description logics have been extended in a number of ways to
      support defeasible reasoning in the KLM tradition. Such features include
      preferential or rational defeasible concept inclusion, and defeasible roles
      in complex concept descriptions. Semantically, defeasible subsumption
      is obtained by means of a preference order on objects, while defeasible
      roles are obtained by adding a preference order to role interpretations. In
      this paper, we address an important limitation in defeasible extensions
      of description logics, namely the restriction in the semantics of defea-
      sible concept inclusion to a single preference order on objects. We do
      this by inducing a modular preference order on objects from each mod-
      ular preference order on roles, and using these to relativise defeasible
      subsumption. This yields a notion of contextual rational defeasible sub-
      sumption, with contexts described by roles. We also provide a semantic
      construction for rational closure and a method for its computation, and
      present a correspondence result between the two.

      Keywords: description logics, non-monotonic reasoning, defeasible sub-
      sumption, preferential semantics, rational closure, context


    Given the special status of concept inclusion in description logics (DLs), and
the historical importance of entailment in logic in general, past research efforts
to extend DLs with non-monotonic reasoning capabilities have focused primar-
ily on accounts of defeasible subsumption and the characterisation of defeasible
entailment. Semantically, the latter usually takes as point of departure an order-
ing on a class of first-order interpretations [16, 18], whereas the former usually
assume a preference order on objects of the domain [5, 14].
    Recently, we proposed a new direction to introduce defeasibility to DLs [6,
7]. This built on previous work to resolve two important ontological limitations
of the preferential approach to defeasible DLs — the assumption of a single pref-
erence order on all objects in the domain of interpretation, and the assumption
that defeasibility is intrinsically linked to arguments or conditionals [8, 9].
    We achieved this by introducing defeasibility in the concept language via
an intuitive notion of normality for roles [6]. This parameterised the idea of
preference while at the same time introducing the notion of defeasible class
membership — defeasible subsumption allows for the expression of statements
2       Britz and Varzinczak

of the form “C is usually subsumed by D”, for example, “Chenin blanc wines are
usually unwooded”. In the extended language, one can also refer directly to, for
example, “Chenin blanc wines that usually have a wood aroma”. These notions
can also be combined seamlessly, as in: “Chenin blanc wines that usually have a
wood aroma are usually wooded”. This cannot be expressed in terms of defea-
sible subsumption alone, nor can it be expressed w.l.o.g. using typicality-based
operators [2, 14, 15, 20] on concepts, because the semantics of the expression is
inextricably tied to the two distinct uses of the term ‘usually’.
    Nevertheless, even this generalisation left open the question of different, pos-
sibly incompatible, semantic characterisations of defeasibility in subsumption. A
single ordering on individuals, as is usually assumed, does not suffice when pref-
erences depend on context. In this paper, we therefore propose to induce multiple
preference orders on objects derived from preference orders on role interpreta-
tions, and use these to relativise defeasible subsumption. This yields a notion of
contextual defeasible subsumption, with contexts indicated by role names.
    Building on previous work in the KLM tradition, we show that restricting the
preferential semantics to a modular semantics allows us to define and compute a
notion of rational entailment from a defeasible knowledge base. Rational closure
is a form of inferential closure studied by Lehmann and Magidor [19], which is
based on modular entailment but it extends its inferential power. Our proposal
is a generalisation of the DL version of propositional rational closure. We present
a proof-theoretic characterisation, based on the work of Casini and Straccia [13],
as well as a semantic characterisation, based on the work of Booth and Paris [3]
in the propositional case, and of Britz et al. [4] and Giordano et al. [17, 18] in
the DL case. We then state and prove a correspondence result which relates the
computation of rational closure to the semantic construction.
    Defeasibility introduces a new facet of contextual reasoning not present in de-
ductive reasoning in that preference orders can be used to indicate context. While
an account of deductive reasoning with contexts in knowledge representation is
not intrinsically linked to defeasible reasoning, its integration with contextual
defeasible description logics warrants further investigation [1]. The present pa-
per [11] is a revised and extended version of a paper presented at FoIKS 2018 [10].
In related work [12], we address another important open question, namely the
creation of a tableau-based proof procedure for defeasible ALC.


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