=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-2397/short11 |storemode=property |title=None |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2397/short11.pdf |volume=Vol-2397 |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/wirtschaftsinformatik/KleinKR19 }} ==None== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2397/short11.pdf
    Cryptocurrency Crashes: A Dataset for Measuring the
         Effect of Regulatory News in Online Media

                 Achim Klein1, Lyubomir Kirilov1, and Martin Riekert1
1 University of Hohenheim,
                           Information Systems 2, Schwerzstr. 35, 70599 Stuttgart, Germany
                          achim.klein@uni-hohenheim.de



       Abstract. Cryptocurrencies are novel means for transacting value, promising
       lower transaction costs and a complete transaction history, which cannot be ma-
       nipulated. Systematic risks to such transaction systems are posed by regulatory
       actions that put strong restrictions on usage – up to complete bans of cryptocur-
       rencies. Prior research has studied the effect of regulatory news on cryptocur-
       rency pricing and found price effects of news of regulatory actions of authorities.
       We propose a novel dataset of news from online media that loosely relates to
       cryptocurrency regulation, but includes also opinions and rumors. The proposed
       dataset allows to study drivers of crashes and risks in cryptocurrency markets.

       Keywords: Cryptocurrencies, Regulatory News, Online Media, Flash Crashes,
       Transaction System Risks.


1      Introduction

A potentially large systematic risk for financial transaction systems provided by cryp-
tocurrencies arises from price flash crashes because they might result in a strong de-
crease in real world adoption as a store of value. Cryptocurrencies are novel, still mostly
unregulated digital currencies and financial assets that have been increasingly subject
to public attention and research (e.g., Corbet et al., 2018, Auer and Claessens, 2018).
The most well-known and oldest digital currency is Bitcoin, founded in 2009 (Naka-
moto, 2009). These digital currencies are organized decentrally by a computational net-
work and a shared digital ledger. Potential benefits of digital currencies include almost
zero transactions costs, worldwide availability, and near-instantaneous execution. Fur-
thermore, due to the shared ledger, the full history of transactions can be looked up by
anyone – and due to technical mechanisms, the manipulation of transactions is unlikely.
   Despite promising advantages of cryptocurrencies, the real world adoption is still
quite low. That is, these currencies are not yet used for everyday consumption transac-
tions by retail users on a large scale. However, cryptocurrencies are subject to quite
extensive speculation and the exchange rate to real world currencies (e.g., EUR, USD)
has been fluctuating wildly. The price of Bitcoin decreased to almost a fifth of its value
from more than 19,000 USD in December 2017 to less than 4,000 USD in November
2018 – with extensive up- and down-swings in between. An abrupt version of a down-
swing is commonly known as a flash crash, i.e., a substantial price decrease in a short




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period of time. An example of such a flash crash is provided by the Bitcoin price drop
of 12% in only 24h, starting September 5, 2018. This flash crash was caused by a report
that the investment firm Goldman Sachs had dropped its plan for a Bitcoin trading desk
(Cryptovest, 2018). Beside news about real-world adoption of cryptocurrencies, regu-
latory news has been found by recent research to be a major driver of such flash crashes
(Auer and Claessens, 2018). Regulatory news includes easing adoption or even bans of
usage of cryptocurrencies.
    Against this backdrop, our research addresses data engineering to help studying the
effects of regulatory news on cryptocurrency prices, causing potentially large price
drops. Specifically, the objective of our research is to propose a new dataset of regula-
tory news from online media that includes also rumors and opinionated content. Re-
garding systematic market risks, especially price decreases are interesting because they
mean that Bitcoin miners receive less real world currency compensation for running
computational nodes in the Bitcoin network. In case the number of nodes decreases
(like in November 2018), the transactional capacity decreases and eventually, the whole
network is at stake. To the extent, the network is used for transferring real world value,
such events pose substantial real world implications. Therefore, price crashes in cryp-
tocurrencies represent a systematic risk.
    The paper proceeds as follows: We first discuss related work. Then, we describe our
dataset. Finally, we conclude.


2      Related work

Empirical research found the ban for Chinese financial institutions to use Bitcoin in
2013 to have caused a negative price reaction (Fry & Cheah, 2016). A recent study
supports this finding by identifying 151 regulatory news relating “to actions and state-
ments made by authorities” in the period from beginning of 2015 until end of June 2018
(Auer & Claessens, 2018, p.54). Auer and Claessens found negative price impacts for
Bitcoin (in USD) for general bans, treatments under securities law (possibly expecting
a too tight regulation), and resistance to treat Bitcoin as currency. These price reactions
were found to stretch over a 10-day period after the news release. Furthermore, they
found positive price impacts for news regarding increasing legality and introduction of
a defined legal status for cryptocurrencies and initial coin offerings. Interestingly,
Bitcoin price reactions with respect to a collection of news from monetary policy mak-
ers of the Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, and Bank of Eng-
land regarding regular currency were not found in an event study (Vidal-Tomas and
Ibanez, 2018). This finding implies that there is no spillover from policy events regard-
ing real economy to Bitcoin pricing. However, Vidal-Tomas and Ibanez also studied
effects of news events that relate directly to Bitcoin such as the introduction of crypto-
currency financial instruments in established markets such as futures and options mar-
kets. They found negative Bitcoin-related news to have an effect on Bitcoin pricing but
did find only limited evidence for effects of positive news.
   In contrast to Auer and Claessens, our dataset covers a one year longer time span
from November 2013 until end of May 2018 and has a different scope. Contrary to




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Auer & Claessens we did not include official regulatory statements from authorities but
rather price-relevant news from online media filed under “Bitcoin Regulation News”
(Cointelegraph, 2018). Thus, our dataset includes information relating to actual regula-
tion measures. Additionally, our dataset includes news about planned regulations, in-
vestigations, rumors, and opinions – potentially allowing to anticipate regulation
measures and subsequent systematic price risks or transaction system risks.


3      Dataset

We describe the proposed dataset of regulatory news for identifying effects of such
news on cryptocurrency returns.
    The dataset consists of 69 unique regulatory news articles from online media
(Cointelegraph, 2018; Figure 1) from November 2013 until end of May 2018. The ar-
ticles refer to regulation in the following countries: Australia (4), Canada (1), China
(14), EU (5), France (1), Germany (1), India (5), Japan (3), Philippines (1), Russia (9),
South Korea (7), Taiwan (1), Turkey (1), UK (3), USA (11), and news without specific
country (2). Articles were selected by one of the authors to be relevant for Bitcoin pric-
ing and were categorized in a positive vs. negative price reaction expectation. 37 news
were categorized as positive regarding the expected price impact and 32 news were
categorized as negative regarding the expected price impact. The distribution of posi-
tive vs. negative news per year is displayed in Table 1.

                  Table 1. Distribution of news over years in our dataset.

                        Year              Number of    Number of
                                          positive     negative
                                          news         news
                        2013              2            2
                        2014              2            2
                        2015              6            4
                        2016              10           4
                        2017              12           12
                        2018              5            8
                        Total             37           32


   An example for positive regulation news is “Canadian Senate Rules in Favor of ‘An
Almost Hands-Off Approach’ to Bitcoin” (Cointelegraph, Jun. 19, 2015), referring to
a report by the Canadian Senate. The report clearly shows the positive stance of the
Canadian government on cryptocurrencies, by recognizing the benefits of the block-
chain technology and by committing to policies, which promote a wider adoption. An
example for negative news is “BREAKING: China May Cut Off Cheap Power To
Bitcoin Miners?” (Cointelegraph, Nov. 14, 2017). According to the article one of Chi-
na's state owned hydro based power companies was about to cut off its cheap power




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supply to bitcoin mining farms, calling into question the legal status of the cryptocur-
rency.
   Using regression, we plan to analyze the effect of positive vs. negative news in our
dataset on Bitcoin prices.


4      Conclusion

Prior research has studied price effects of regulatory news referring to actions and state-
ments of authorities with respect to cryptocurrencies (Auer and Claessens, 2018). Also
price effects of policy making news events of central banks and general Bitcoin-related
news were studied (Vidal-Tomas and Ibanez, 2018). Price effects can be very substan-
tial in case of news relating to the ban of cryptocurrencies. In case of (rumors of) bans,
market crashes can be induced. Considering that cryptocurrencies pose means for trans-
acting value in a decentralized manner, such crashes can be seen as systematic risk. Our
work contributes towards understanding the driver of such crashes and systematic risks.
We constructed a unique dataset of regulatory news to help to empirically study the
effects on Bitcoin pricing. In contrast to prior work of Auer and Claessens, our dataset
was sourced from online media that may only loosely refer to actual regulatory actions
of authorities, but also includes rumors and opinions related to such actions.


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