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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A Semantic-based Approach for Compliance Management of Internal Controls in Business Processes</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Kioumars Namiri</string-name>
          <email>Kioumars.Namiri@sap.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nenad Stojanovic</string-name>
          <email>Nenad.Stojanovic@fzi.de</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>FZI Karlsruhe</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Haid-und-Neu-Str. 10-14 76131 Karlsruhe</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>SAP Research Center CEC Karlsruhe, SAP AG</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Vincenz-Prießnitz-Str.1 76131 Karlsruhe</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2002</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>61</fpage>
      <lpage>64</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Enterprises require mechanisms to ensure that their business processes implement and fulfill internal controls in context of regulatory compliance such as Sarbanes Oxley Act. In this paper we propose an approach for the modeling and implementation of internal controls in business processes. The approach is based on the formal modeling of internal controls, thus it can serve as the basis for usage of logic mechanisms in the compliance verification process. The advent of regulatory compliance requirements such as Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX)1 requires the implementation of an effective internal controls system in enterprises. COSO2 defines the internal controls as a process designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives in effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and regulations. We focus on the Application Controls (AC) controlling business processes and propose the introduction of an abstraction layer above a business process, in which these controls are formally modeled and evaluated against existing process models and instances. We see several advantages of such an approach: - It enables usage of formal methods for the verification of a business process's compliance. - Consequently the compliance can be performed automatically based on the current state of a process - The changes of the controls will not affect the design and execution of the original business processes - Non-experts can built on top of the domain model provided to design controls for business processes The internal controls compliance of a purchase ordering process (PO) depends on enterprise specific risk assessment carried out by auditing consultants (see Table 1)</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1 Introduction</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2 Motivating Scenario</title>
      <p>Control Objective
Prevent unauthorized
use of PO Process</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Risk Unauthorized creation of POs and payments for not existing suppliers</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Application Control</title>
        <p>Double Approvals of POs higher
than $5000
(Double-CheckControl).</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3 Domain Model for Internal Controls Compliance</title>
      <p>The design of a control should control the way a business process is executed. A (re)design of a
business process causes an update of risk assessment on a business process, which may lead to a new
or updated set of the controls incl. new tests. The business process monitoring and verification
techniques may be used to assess the design of controls and serve as an input to the compliance
certification (See Figure 1).
The main entities for the process of internal controls compliance is described in following and
illustrated in Figure 2a: Identify all significant accounts in the company. Identify for those accounts
all business processes affecting them. Define for each relevant business process a set of control
objectives specific to the enterprise. Assess the risks for the enterprise by their identification for each
control objective. Design and implement based on the risk assessment a set of controls in order to
prevent or detect the occurrence of the identified risks.</p>
      <p>An Application Control (AC) controls different dimensions of the way a business process is
enacted, namely the execution of its activities, the Business Documents involved and the agents
performing an activity including their authorities (See Figure 2b).</p>
      <p>For each AC at least one Recovery Action must have been designed, which reacts on the violation
of a control. It does not change the designed business process logic; it rather blocks the transaction
and may send a notification to an assigned responsible agent.</p>
      <p>2a
Figure 2a - The upper domain model of the Internal Controls Compliance
Figure 2b - Relationship between an Application Control and a Business Process</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Application Control Strategy Model</title>
        <p>
          An Application Control Strategy defines the way a control monitors the behavior of one or more
activities inside a business process (Figure 3). In order to become active an AC requires to be
triggered according to the state of the process parameters in a scope. We define further two elements
of an AC strategy: scope and pattern based conceptually on the work done by Dwyer et al [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ].
Although their patterns are mainly used for defining formal requirements on program specifications,
they can be applied to internal controls compliance and the monitoring requirements there. For a
detailed description of the scopes and patterns and their semantics please refer to [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ].
The abstraction layer above business process model we call the “Semantic Process Mirror”
(SemanticMirror). According to assessed risks, a set of ACs is defined in this layer. During execution
of a business process, this layer will be updated with information needed for the evaluation of defined
controls in order to ensure that compliance checks will pass. The approach spans over there phases:
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Phase 1: Semantic process mirror design phase</title>
        <p>SemanticMirror represents a semantic layer placed on the top of the (usual) syntactical description of
a business process (i.e. workflow). In this phase a model of the business process according to Figure
2b will be stored in the SemanticMirror. It will be used later during the phase 2 and 3 to infer whether
the process is designed and executed according to a set of declaratively designed ACs in phase 2.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Phase 2: Application control design phase</title>
        <p>In the following we present a set of formalizations needed for the automatic evaluation of ACs.
Control statement CS is a logical statement that describes how to carry out an AC ac in a business
process bp:</p>
        <p>O(ct) ∧ V(bp, ac(x, cp), GS(bp, scope))
CS(ct, bp, ac(x, cp),GS(bp, scope(M)), action R ) :=</p>
        <p>Activity(bp, action R ),
where the formula for CS expresses that if a violation V for the given ac occurs (is true) after
occurrence O of a ControlTrigger ct on a Guarded Sequence GS, then the corresponding recovery
action action R will be instantiated and executed on current instance of bp (the instance that generated
the violation). We describe the parameters mentioned above: Guarded Sequence is a sequence of
activities, which are along the scope of the AC strategy of an ac in a bp. The values for the violation
of a control are calculated by evaluating the statement ac on the SemanticMirror, i.e. if the statement
ac can be inferred from the set of facts contained in the SemanticMirror.</p>
        <p>An AC ac expresses that a control pattern cp (See Figure 3) must hold if the logical
condition on an entity x holds:</p>
        <p>ac(x, cp) := condition(x) cp, x ∈ {BusinessDocument, Agent)</p>
        <p>We show the formalization of the control pattern (cp) BoundedExistence of n (see Figure 3) for an
activity C in the scope of activities defined by GS(bp,scope):</p>
        <p>BoundedExistence(n, C, GS (bp,scope) :=
( ∧
i=0,..,n
n
∃Ci | InstanceOf(Ci , C)) ∧ (i, j=∀0,..,n Ci , C j | Ci!= C j ) ∧ (i=0∀,..,n Ci | Ci ∈ GS (bp,scope))</p>
        <p>Example: Applied on the Double-check control in the PO-Process (see scenario) the statement ac
looks as follows:
∀PO | BusinssDocument(PO) ∧ Amount(PO,amount) ∧ greater(amout,5000) →
BoundedExistence(2, ApprovePO,GSDoubleCheck (P2P, Between(SelectSupplier,SendPO)))</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Phase 3: Business process execution phase</title>
        <p>This phase enables the bidirectional interaction between BPM and internal controls management (see
Figure 1): The SemanticMirror will be updated by information about the current instance of the
business process enacted and if an AC is violated, the recovery action defined in the control statement
will be executed. KBAs represent conceptual abstraction of a log channel, which maybe used to
update the SemanticMirror.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>5 Related work and conclusion</title>
      <p>
        In this paper we introduced a semantic based approach for conceptual modeling of internal
controls required by regulations such as SOX. The controls are captured declaratively and checked
during execution-time of business processes. On a conceptual level our work is related to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], where a
taxonomy of risks for business processes is provided. In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] the logic behind the obligations and
permissions on a business process and contracts is made using temporal deontic logic. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ] gives an
overview and discusses the current industrial software products in this area and their limitations.
      </p>
    </sec>
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