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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. American Psychological Asso-
ciation.</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>The Cognitive Science of the Ranking Game</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Pe´ter E´ rdi</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Center for Complex Systems Studies, Kalamazoo College</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Kalamazoo, Michigan</addr-line>
          ,
          <institution>USA and Institute for Particle and Nuclear Physics Wigner Research Centre for Physics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Budapest</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="HU">Hungary</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Comparison</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>ranking, rating and lists</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <volume>77</volume>
      <issue>6</issue>
      <abstract>
        <p>We like to see who is stronger, richer, better, more clever. Since we humans (1) love lists; (2), are competitive, and (3) are jealous of other people, we like ranking. Students ranked in ascending order based on their heights in a gym reflects objectivity. However, many “Top Ten” (and other) lists are based on subjective categorization and give only the illusion of objectivity. We don't always want to be seen objectively, since we don't mind to have a better image or rank than we deserve. While making objective rankings sounds like an appealing goal, there are at least two different reasons why we may not have objectivity: ignorance and manipulation. Persons with less knowledge suffer from illusory superiority due to their cognitive bias, and this phenomenon is called the ”DunningKruger effect.” Omnipresent in society is not only ignorance but also manipulation. Manipulators have the intention of gaining personal advantage by adopting different tricks. Computer scientists design ranking algorithms, and computers can now process huge datasets with these algorithms. As we have seen, we are not always happy with the results, so we might ask whether, when, and how the results of a ranking algorithm should be controlled by content curators. Recent public debates about the use and misuse of data reinforce the message: we need a combination of human and computational intelligence [1]. The lecture is based on the book: Pe´ter E´rdi: RANKING. The Unwritten Rules of the Social Game We All Play. Oxford University Press (in production), see aboutranking.com We humans are constantly evaluating ourselves and others across a variety of features, such as financial status, intelligence, attractiveness, success, etc. Social comparison theory [2] divides these evaluations into upward social comparison, which occurs when we compare ourselves with someone judged to be better than ourselves (e.g., by having more wealth or material goods, higher social standing, greater physical attractiveness); and downward social comparison, which occurs when we compare ourselves with someone judged to be not as good as we believe ourselves to be. Comparing ourselves to others is an elementary human activity, and we cannot avoid making comparisons and being compared. There is a trade-off: favorable comparisons make us happier (at least in the short term), but unfavorable ones</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        drive us to make things harder. Systematic comparison among many pairs of
elements generates a ranked list. Rating is, in principle, simpler—a score (generally,
but not necessarily, a number) is assigned to the object or subject being rated,
independently of the scores assigned to other objects or subjects. Teachers know
well that it is simply impossible to always be objective: there is some interaction
among the grades of individual students. Ordered lists are based on the rankings
of elements. We simply love to read and prepare lists, since they condense and
organize information. Like it or not, each day we read a good number of ranked
lists, many times in the form of a listicle, a style that bloggers and journalists
recently adopted to convey information via the ranking procedure.
Social psychologists have shown [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] that “when it comes to using social
comparison to boost your own motivation, here is the key rule to keep in mind: Seek
favorable comparisons if you want to feel happier, and seek unfavorable
comparisons if you want to push yourself harder. You may not be able to quit your
social-comparison habit, but you can learn to make it work for you.”
1.1
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Social comparison and our brain</title>
      <p>
        Brain imaging methods have helped identify the regions and neural mechanisms
responsible for upward and downward comparison [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Downward comparison
activates a brain region called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area which
is also activated in the processing of monetary rewards. Upward comparison
correlates with activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Interestingly, this
region is involved in signaling negative events, such as feeling pain or experiencing
a monetary loss. Studies cautiously suggest that neuropsychological bases of
social comparison can be understood in a more general framework of processing
rewards and losses, something we have evolved to keep track of.
1.2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Ranking</title>
      <p>We need a population of items in order to make a ranking based on pairwise
comparisons. We should be able to make clear statements for any two items A
and B, such as item A is ”ranked higher than,” ”ranked lower than,” or ”ranked
equal to” item B. Continuing this procedure with every possible pair, a ranked
list is formed. People, goods, and products have multiple features, so they can
be ranked by multiple criteria. Often, different criteria are in conflict with one
another: for example, price (or cost) and quality are often in conflict. We cannot
expect to buy a cheaper and more comfortable car. Multiple-criteria
decisionmaking thus encompasses mathematical techniques to help create ordered
rankings of possible choices when many factors need to be taken into account. For
example, if a student is going to college, the decision-makers (she and her
parents) have to rank the alternatives (colleges). Candidate colleges can be ranked by
multiple criteria (tuition, academic status, distance from home, qualities of
facilities, etc.) Finally, to prepare a ranking we need an algorithm. The trick is that in
order for an algorithm to work, the individual criteria should be characterized by a
specific number, a weight, which specifies the relative importance of a criterion.
Weights are subjectively determined. We live in a world where decision-making
is a combination of subjective and objective factors.
1.3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Rating</title>
      <p>Rating assigns a score, generally a number, to each item. The chess player’s Elo
rating, for example, is a generally accepted system for rating and ranking chess
players. Each player’s strength is characterized by a number. This number is
subject to change after each game—if you win against a higher-rated player it matters
more than winning against a lower-rated player.
1.4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Remembering lists</title>
      <p>The human brain generally does not have the ability to remember long lists of
unstructured items. We aren’t very good at remembering a series of numbers, of
nonsense words, or of goods to purchase in the supermarket. One of the pioneers
of memory research, Hermann Ebbinghaus (1850 1909), made memory
studies around 1885 on himself and tried to memorize nonsense syllables. Time and
again, he tested his memory and realized that the quality of his memories decayed
exponentially, and he theorized that the performance of his memory was
quantitatively characterized by what is called the ”forgetting curve.” He also found that
his performance depended on the number of items, and it was more difficult to
memorize long lists of items as opposed to short lists.</p>
      <p>
        There are big exceptions to these generalities. Some people are able to
remember lists of nonsense items for literally decades. Alexander Luria (1902 1977),
a Soviet neuropsychologist, studied a journalist named Solomon Shereshevski
(1886 1958), who apparently had a basically infinite memory. He was able to
memorize long lists, mathematical formulae, speeches, and poems, even in
foreign languages, and recall these lists 14 years later as well as he had on the day he
learned them. His performance did not depend on the length of the items,
deviating from the theory suggested by Ebbinghaus’ observations. Shereshevski was
diagnosed with synaesthesia, which is a neurological condition, in which different
senses are coupled. When he realized his ability, he performed as a mnemonist.
Despite the allure of having a perfect memory, his abilities also created disorders
in his everyday life, as it was difficult to him to discriminate between events that
happened minutes or years ago [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. Luria had a strong influence on the famous
neurologist and writer Oliver Sacks (1933 2015).
2
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>The evolution of social ranking</title>
        <p>
          Hierarchy is the very general organizational principle that characterizes our
physical, biological and social systems [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ]. Hierarchies are structured in layers or
levels. An excellent example from the field of interdisciplinary science, the evolution
of complex, hierarchical human societies has been explored through combining
the collection and analysis of traditional historical data with mathematical
modeling. The hypothesis at the core of this research deals with two main governing
factors: warfare and what is called “multi-level selection,” both of which have
propelled human evolution for centuries [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>Linear dominance hierarchies proved to be very efficient for community resource
management among a wide variety of social animals, from insects to fish and
from birds to primates. Since more and more data has been accumulated, it has
become possible to test hypotheses in contemporary animal behavior studies about
the mechanisms behind the formation of evolutionary hierarchies. There are two
distinct mechanisms for navigating the social ladder: dominance and prestige.
Dominance is an evolutionarily more ancient strategy and is based on the
ability to intimidate other members in the group by physical size and strength. In
dominance hierarchies, group members don’t accept social rank freely, only by
coercion. Members of a colony fight, and the winners of these fights will be
accepted as “superiors,” and the losers as “subordinates.” The hierarchy formed
naturally serves as a way of preventing superfluous fighting and injuries within a
colony.</p>
        <p>Prestige, as a strategy, is evolutionarily younger, and is based on skills and
knowledge as appraised by the community.</p>
        <p>
          Modern neuroscience has combined brain imaging devices and computational
techniques to uncover some mechanisms related to how our brains process
information on social hierarchy [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]. An exciting field, social neuroscience uncovers the
brain regions and neural mechanisms related to reflecting ranks and dominance.
Studies have shown that a brain region called the dorsolatereal prefrontal
cortex might play a significant role in the prevalence of employment discrimination
against women or ethnic minorities, which is directly related to the conservative
and hierarchy-enhancing attitudes indexed by the social dominance orientation
scale.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-5-2">
        <title>3 Cognitive architectures for individual and institutional ranking</title>
        <p>3.1</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Against the myth of rationality:Cognitive bias</title>
      <p>
        Neoclassical economic theories are based on the concept that we are rational in
the sense that during decision-making, humans are concerned with maximizing
our expected gain (say, pleasure or profit), which can be expressed by a utility
function. If we want to undertake a quantitative analysis, say one that maximizes
the utility function for our dessert selection, we should be able to assign numerical
values to our desires to consume pie, cheesecake, or mousse. The development
of rational choice theory in social sciences [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] made it possible to represent and
solve problems of choice in a formal manner and has since served as the basis of
many results in decision theory, game theory, and microeconomics.
3.2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Social choice</title>
      <p>Social choice theory provides a general theory of the aggregation of individual
opinions into a single collective decision. Nicolas de Caritat and the legendary
economist Kenneth Arrow were two major contributors to the field.
Nicolas de Caritat (1743 1794), often known as the Marquis de Condorcet,
pioneered a particular voting system, called pairwise majority voting, that has
remained influential even in contemporary voting studies and systems. Condorcet
analyzed the behavior of juries and developed his celebrated jury theorem from
these studies. As always, when mathematical models are used to describe
social phenomena, we should carefully discuss the assumptions underlying these
models. In this case, assuming that each member of a jury has an equal and
independent chance (which is better than random (i.e. greater than fifty percent) but
worse than perfect (less than 100 percent)) of making the correct conclusion, the
jury theorem holds that increasing the number of members of the jury increases
the probability of the group as a whole making the correct decision. Importantly,
the relevance of the jury theorem is restricted to situations in which there really
is a correct decision. It works, for example, when the members of a jury should
decide whether or not a defendant is guilty. Consequently, under certain
conditions, majority rules is appropriate at ”tracking the truth.” Of course, in real life
the opinions of the voters are not independent of one another. In addition, the
theorem cannot be applied to situations in which there is no “objective truth,”
but only individual preferences. This is the situation we encounter when we must
choose among political candidates. Kenneth Arrow (1921 2017) published his
famous impossibility theorem in 1950 (for which he received a Nobel prize in
1972), which showed that when voters rank candidates, some failures may occur.
Arrow’s studies and the subsequent work of scores of economists and
mathematicians have generated debates and comparative mathematical analyses about
voting systems.</p>
      <p>
        From the perspective of cognitive architectures, distributed cognition seem to be
relevant to implement social choices [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. Distributed cognition can be identified
with cognitive processes distributed across multiple agents (as opposed to a
single agent). Distributed cognition has attracted interest from those engaged in the
philosophy of science to computer science to sociology to political science.
Under a certain aggregation algorithm, distributed cognitive systems leads to some
type of “rational” ranking of options.
3.3
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Cyclic ranking: the violation of transitivity</title>
      <p>Condorcet realized that even when individual preferences are ”rational” (i.e.,
transitive), the resulting collective decision might be “irrational” (i.e., intransitive).
The game ”rock-paper-scissors” is an interesting game since the mathematical
feature called transitivity is violated. The violation of transitivity leads to a
cycle, in which we are not in a position to generate a ranked list.</p>
      <p>Cycling ranking occurs in the legal systems, and in the book there are examples
from the Talmud to the modern times. My understanding is that the US
governmental system was intentionally constructed to violate transitivity, since the goal
was to avoid any ordered ranking among the three branches.
4</p>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>Ignorance and manipulation</title>
        <p>There are at least two different reasons why we may not have objectivity in a
ranking procedure. In principle, ranking agents should be objective, but, more
often than not, they are ignorant or manipulative. The ignorant lacks the knowledge
of some facts or objects or the skills to do something. However, they (it is never
we who) are not necessarily uninformed; rather, they are misinformed.
Manipulators change, control, or influence something (or someone) cleverly, skilfully, and
generally for their own advantage. The actions of the ignorant and the
manipulative construct a deviation from “true ranking,” and they give the illusion of reality
while producing artificial changes in reality.</p>
        <p>
          The non-monotonic relationship between self-confidence and expertise is called
the Dunning-Kruger effect [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ]. The Dunning-Kruger effect reflects a very
important psychological mechanism underpinning biased ranking. It is well-known
that competent students underestimate themselves, while incompetent students
overestimate themselves regarding their class standing. Similarly, young drivers
grossly overestimate their skills and response times while operating a vehicle.
Literary and movie characters often embody the Dunning-Kruger effect, so their
ranking ability is biased. Simply put, they cannot correctly estimate their places
in their communities.
        </p>
        <p>There are a number of manipulation techniques used motivate people to take a
specific action or support specific decisions:
– Appeal to fear
– Black-or-white fallacy
– Selective truth
– Repetition
– Appeal to authority
Manipulation of digital reputation has become a big industry and emerged with
the goal of making websites more visible. There are search engine optimization
(SEO) companies that perform this task. Even Reputation Management
Companies are subject to ranking. As in Western movies, there are characters with white
hats and with black hats. There are heroes and villains. Some SEOs, referred to as
ethical hackers wear the white hat, but others manipulate information and wear a
black hat.</p>
        <p>Black-hat optimizers attempt to game search engine algorithms. As always, in
democratic societies, first the community promulgates rules. Then, some people
try to evade these rules. We cannot do anything but attempt to identify and
neutralize the effects of these troublemakers. Here is a warning you may find useful:
a black-hat optimizer can take you to the top of a website ranking in a very short
period of time. But strictly speaking, it is totally illegal. If you don’t want to get
penalized and kill your Google ranking forever, it is strongly recommended that
you avoid black-hat optimizers.
5
5.1</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-2">
        <title>How to combine human and machine intelligence?</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Recommendation systems</title>
      <p>Recommendation systems are ubiquitous in our lives. It is difficult to make any
purchase without being somehow influenced by large electronic commerce
(ecommerce) systems. Recommendation systems are key elements of any e-commerce
system. Nobody can force us to use them: we do if we trust them. While any such
system can be gamed, fake reviews and other tricks can be filtered, and
recommendation systems can help us make better choices.</p>
      <p>
        Modern recommendation systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] combine several strategies by nudging
users to specify preferences like these:
– Show me stuff that my friends like (collaborative filtering)
– Show me stuff that I liked in the past (content-based filtering)
– Show me stuff that fits my needs (knowledge-based recommendation)
5.2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Metrics and algorithms</title>
      <p>The process of measurement has a major role in any civilization. According to
the optimistic perspective of positivism, measurement is the first step in making
improvements. The social demand for accountability and transparency has made
quantitative metrics a major tool for characterizing the performances of social
institutions.</p>
      <p>Computer scientists design ranking algorithms, and of course, computers can now
process huge datasets with these algorithms. We also know that models and
algorithms are based on human’s assumptions. Probably we don’t have better options
but to trust in the power of the combination of human and computational
intelligence.</p>
      <p>Campbell’s law, however, states: “The more any quantitative social indicator is
used for social decision-making, the more subject it will be to corruption
pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social processes it is
intended to monitor.” It is a warning signal, that metrics can be (and often are)
gamed. Still, we should not abandon algorithms in favor of our previous
subjective and verbal evaluations. Instead, social scientists and computer scientists
should cooperate to generate “ethical algorithms.”
6</p>
      <sec id="sec-10-1">
        <title>Conclusion</title>
        <p>We are in the process of understanding the cognitive architectures behind
individual and institutional decision-making, in general, and related to ranking, in
particular. In the age of the date deluge, public debates about the use and
misuse of data and algorithms imply a message: we need to develop methods for
combining human and computational intelligence.
7</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-10-2">
        <title>Acknowledgments</title>
        <p>The author thanks the Henry R. Luce Foundation for letting him serve as a Henry
R. Luce Professor. He also thanks Natalie Thompson for useful discussions.
Comments from the participants of AIC 2019 were very useful.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
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