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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Towards Enforceable Usage Policies for Industry 4.0</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Sebastian R. Bader</string-name>
          <email>sebastian.bader@iais.fraunhofer.de</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Maria Maleshkova</string-name>
          <email>maleshkova@cs.uni-bonn.de</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Fraunhofer IAIS</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Schloss Birlinghoven, 53757 Sankt Augustin</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Bonn</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Endenicher Allee 19a, 53115 Bonn</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Controlling the usage of business-critical data is essential for every company. While the upcoming age of Industry 4.0 propagates a seamless data exchange between all participating devices, facilities and companies along the production chain, the required data control mechanisms are lacking behind. We claim that for an e ective protection, both access and usage control enforcement is a must-have for organizing Industry 4.0 collaboration networks. Formalized and machine-readable policies are one fundamental building block to achieve the needed trust level for real data-driven collaborations. We explain the current challenges of specifying access and usage control policies and outline respective approaches relying on Semantic Web of Things practices. We analyze the requirements and implications of existing technologies and discuss their shortcomings. Based on our experiences from the speci cation of the International Data Spaces Usage Control Language, the necessary next steps towards automatically monitored and enforced policies are outlined and research needs formulated.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>usage control industry 4</kwd>
        <kwd>0 semantic web of things</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Industry 4.0, the disruptive development arising from new, internet-based
automation and data exchange technologies, has drawn much attention in the
recent times. New solutions become evident in the context of the production
industry, enabling the interconnection of heterogeneous devices, machines, and
facilities but also to link suppliers, manufacturers, and customers along the whole
supply chain. However, current solutions are mostly limited to closed domains
with strictly de ned use cases, which results in isolated silos.</p>
      <p>
        Consequently, only the establishment of secure and e ective data protection
mechanisms will provide the necessary trust level. In this paper, we explicitly do
not focus on methods to establish secure communication channels or to harden
a system against malicious attacks. In contrast, we present our insights in the
Copyright c 2019 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative
Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
aspect of data access and usage control and how Semantic Web technologies can
make a di erence if used on top of secure communication channels. To this end,
we present our experiences in the development of an end-to-end usage control
framework for the International Data Space (IDS) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>In this context we make the following contributions: (1) we present the
current state of the art on formulating usage policies and their implications on usage
enforcement systems, (2) describe our assumptions and the challenges in the
current technology stack, (3) outline feasible solutions by relaying on Semantic Web
of Things practices, and (4) conclude with a description of the existing research
gaps but also depict necessary progress in the attitudes towards the topic from
a business decider and legal view on usage control in Industry 4.0 settings.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Related Work</title>
      <p>
        One of the most in uential usage control models is UCONABC [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ]. The
introduced terminology of authorizations, obligations, and conditions are taken over
by many of the later publications. Together with RFC 2904 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ] and the
introduction of the di erent policy points, these two works form the theoretical
foundation for the later ones in the domain of usage control.
      </p>
      <p>
        Mazzoleni et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] discuss the shortcomings of OASIS eXtensible Access
Control Markup Language (XACML) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Even though XACML was mainly
created for expressing access restrictions, Mazzoleni et al. also discuss usage
control scenarios and their challenges in distributed systems. They propose an
algorithm for integrating and resolving of di erent policies but do not focus on
the various identi cation, integration and organizational aspects.
      </p>
      <p>
        Pretschner and Walter [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] critically discuss the necessity of usage control
negotiations. They argue that hardly any scenario actually requires real negotiation
mechanisms but can be mapped to a simpler provisioning and selection of speci c
options. As this is true for basic o er-accept/reject patterns, we state that for
real-world scenarios the therefore necessary transparency is a crucial obstacle.
Therefore, because of insu cient knowledge of the opposite party, participants
have to repetitively exchange proposals until a suitable solution is found.
      </p>
      <p>
        Speiser [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] proposes a policy language based on rst-order logic and RDF
serializations for expressing data-related speci cations. The combination of
semantic vocabularies simpli es the exchange process but the referencing of data
objects is not directly possible. The approach of Wenning and Kirrane [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ] and
the SPECIAL project goes into a similar direction. They model policies as an
OWL 2 language, enabling existing reasoner for the policy evaluation process.
      </p>
      <p>
        The Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL2.2) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] is further able to express
usage concepts through its RDF vocabulary. Still, only resources identi able by
URIs are regarded which leads to problems when data objects are not exposed
by Web endpoints but also inside local systems. The speci cation allows
expressive statements but the implications of many supported constructs are not yet
su ciently understood.
      </p>
      <p>https://www.specialprivacy.eu/</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Challenges</title>
      <p>A formalized usage control language has several advantages. While the most
obvious one is the enabling of e ective enforcement of usage rules, proactively
preventing misuse, an according implementation requires an extensive control
regime with strict demands on the deployed IT landscape but also the related
interaction processes. However, the sole provision of machine-processable
descriptions of contract o ers and requests already allows new search and
discovery services. A commonly understood, semantically de ned language enables the
seamless exchange of contractual constraints, capabilities and applicable actions.
Even though a comprehensive end-to-end usage control framework still has to be
developed, the various enhancements by machine-interpretable policies in
combination with cryptographic veri cation methods and transparent certi cation
processes already increase the trustworthiness through technical approaches.
3.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Identi cation</title>
        <p>In the context of the Web, identi cation of resources is done by URIs and, in
case of locating, URLs. In SWoT, identifying `things' with URIs has the bene t
of globally unique identi ers. Still, the distinction between the actual physical
thing and digital representations providing information about the physical thing
(referred to as data documents in the following) is essential. In the context of
usage control, a policy may (a) refer to either the thing itself or (b) the documents.
In the rst case, the challenge is to reliably and transparently identify all data
documents, in any possible format or appearance, related to the physical thing.
In particular, it is a non-trivial task to connect a potentially anonymous JSON
or XML with a speci c resource in a situation where usually only incomplete
information about its provenance are available. For case (b), any transformation
or multiplication must be controlled. For instance, if an edge gateway processes
and aggregates a sensor stream, the output may not have any explicit
attribution to the facility it origins. Still, an informed expert of a related company can
derive critical insights and may gain a competitive advantage.
3.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Semantic and Syntactic Connectivity</title>
        <p>Connectivity in Industry 4.0 has many aspects. The most prominent view on
connectivity is the ability to connect the heterogeneous devices and systems
of a production plant with each other and further services. In the case of
usage control, we take the general connectivity and interoperability challenges as
solved by SWoT approaches and primarily focus on the exchange of
unambiguous policy formalizations. In this context, a common data format has to be
speci ed, a shared vocabulary with a suitable expressiveness has to be de ned
and standardized APIs and interaction patterns are needed. Similar to proposed
data interoperability by SWoT best practices, policies and contracts need to be
shared and have to be unambiguously understood. Still, respective standards in
particular for vocabularies and their interpretation for the usage control domain
have to be formulated and implemented.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Decidability of Policy Constructs</title>
        <p>The unambiguously interpretability of the e ecting policy patterns must be
guaranteed. Each statement of a policy must allow the unambiguous derivation to
either `true' or `false' for any situation. The resolvement of sequences,
requirements but also negotiations or concatenations must be de ned.</p>
        <p>Several further challenges hinder automatic decision making for usage control
systems. We de ne several stages of increasing complexity in order to structure
the topic and illustrate dependencies. At the rst stage, only feature-value based
comparisons (1) are regarded. Decision factors, for instance number of usages,
have to be unambiguously identi ed and the location and request method
dened. Next, the deciding parameters are provided by an external third party (2).
The trustworthiness of this third party and its provisioning endpoint depends on
its resilience against attacks and manipulations but also on its ability to reliably
provide `the truth'. Examples are scenarios where a payment services con rms
whether or not a payment has been received.</p>
        <p>For the next category, crucial information is only locally available at the
consumer-side (3). In particular, details of the connected back-end systems or
data exchange channels a ect the decision-making. In addition, role-based
restrictions fall into this category as the membership of user accounts is in general
too critical for publication. This is especially demanding as no company is
willing, and in many cases also prohibited by anti-trust regulations, to enable full
transparency of its IT landscape to an external organization.</p>
        <p>Even more demanding are use cases where required events or states are
temporally or spatially separated from the usage control system (4). For instance,
the obligation to pay before using data is a very reasonable constraint for
Industry 4.0 scenarios. Still, the triggering of a payment and the point in time when
the payment nally arrives are usually not the same. Usage control systems must
be able to react accordingly.
3.4</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Trusted Context Provision</title>
        <p>Beginning with stage (2), the usage control system needs to integrate external
information. Information on made payments or other relevant events cannot be
trusted if coming from an operator with related, own business interests. In order
to stay independent of manipulations by either the provider- or the
consumerside, the usage control system must rely on an independent, trustworthy
component. The identity of this trusted context provider must be technically veri able
and the interaction channel must be secured against manipulation attempts.
Most importantly, the provided attributes have to be deployed in a transparent
and reliable manner.
3.5</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>Policy Negotiation</title>
        <p>Integration of systems and facilities across company boundaries is at the heart
of Industry 4.0. Interactions need to be established and revoked on the y in
order to gain the necessary exibility in the creation of work ows. We claim
that manually negotiated, designed, and maintained connections are not e cient
enough for such use cases. Consequently, systems need to become autonomous
to some degree.</p>
        <p>Still, the sovereignty and protection of its IT landscape is vital for every
participant in an Industry 4.0 network. However, the non-resolvable
information asymmetry between di erent companies requires bidirectional negotiations
on the level of abilities and requirements. For instance, a data provider cannot
reasonably restrict data usage down to the level of used software. It would
require complete transparency and control other the consumers IT network. In
a typical, decentralized Industry 4.0 setting, with several equally empowered
companies, such requirements are unacceptable for the other companies. On the
other hand, requesting certain system abilities, like e.g. protected data access or
non-proliferation of information, is certainly reasonable and gives the opposite
party the necessary options to adjust its systems accordingly.
3.6</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>Legal Impact</title>
        <p>Formalized policies currently do not have the same legal quality as typical,
fulltext contracts. Currently, policies only describe the willing to cooperate in certain
manners without any legally enforceable consequences. Even though data-driven
developments and business models have a high priority and visibility for politics,
the required legal blurriness of contract formulations. As stated before, no usage
control system can work with fuzzy or vague constructs, the requirements and
obligations of a contract must allow as little interpretation as possible.
4</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Semantic Web-enabled Usage Control</title>
      <p>The Web of Things comprises several conventions and best practices to target
the challenges of the upcoming Industry 4.0. While its core advantages might be
seen in its ability to reliably operate decentralized networks and to scale nearly
without limits. Still, especially when combined with Semantic Web technologies,
the Web of Things provides noteworthy propositions for the previously outlined
challenges.
4.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Identi cation</title>
        <p>URIs have proven their value as global identi ers throughout the internet. They
are especially useful when pointing at the corresponding data endpoint. In such
cases, there the identi er actually also serves as an URL, location and identi
cation can be solved at the same time. In the context of usage control, URIs and
URLs are well suited for distant resources. That are, for instance, stable
endpoints for requesting Linked Data but also remote attributes to make decisions
upon. Remote attributes are necessary to formulate constraints on events and
states which information upon are provided by a third party. Information about
a (not) executed payment for instance might be accessible via a URL.</p>
        <p>Another category of referents consists of pointers to information, which are
only accessible inside a company network. For instance, user roles and a liation
data is usually not opened to external validation. In such scenarios, the
restriction to URIs is typically not feasible. Shorter identi ers might be su cient as
long as the deployed usage control system can interpret them. Still, a respective
trust level can be achieved by either additional contractual agreements or a third
party certifying the correctness of the delivered information.</p>
        <p>Sets and collections are another challenge which can be solved by a
Webbased approach. Again, using URIs can allow a usage control system to
dynamically request information on members. However, a recognized information
provider (either external for uncritical data or internal for e.g. user permission
management) needs to be operated in a long-term fashion.</p>
        <p>In addition, an identi cation throughout the attributes of data objects can be
feasible. Patterns de ning required attribute manifestations can enable a
membership assignment, similar to the identi cation through path patterns approach
described above. For instance, a policy construct can express its applicability to
a set of data assets by requiring an ID attribute in a certain value range.
However, indirect assignments like this are more error-prone than explicit meta data
as its adaptability to unpredicted changes of data formats or modeling schemes
is lower and hard to track down.
4.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Semantic and Syntactic Connectivity</title>
        <p>Connectivity in the context of Industry 4.0 can be examined through several
views. For this paper, connectivity is related to the unambiguous exchange of
contracts, policies and the additional information resources necessary to
interpret and enforce them. The Semantic Web of Things has several contributions
to this challenge. First, the ability to dereference resources enables the direct
linkage to context information and further descriptions. The application of RDF
integrates di erent data formats and API requirements. Widely used
conventions, like RESTful interactions, are standardized in combination with Linked
Data by the Linked Data Platform recommendations.</p>
        <p>The main advantage for a semantically de ned usage control language is its
self-descriptive nature. As such, it can contribute best when used as an
intermediator between local languages or con gurations. As such, the full expressiveness
of the whole language is not necessarily supported by every local systems. Still,
every participating component must be able to at least specify non-conformance
when requested.
4.3</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Decidability of Constructs</title>
        <p>Depicting attributes by URLs and providing respective information on their
current and past manifestation is an obvious approach for category (1). Linked
Data promotes a proliferation in such a way.</p>
        <p>Comparison operators have to be standardized. While the semantics of
commonly used mathematical operators, like equals, lower than, or greater than, is
trivially clear, the application of operators on more complex datatypes requires
signi cantly more e ort.</p>
        <p>Furthermore for the Semantic Web, the issue of datatype comparison has not
been solved yet. In order to implement a usage control system working with RDF
data, the inability of comparisons like \2"^^xsd:integer == \2.00"^^xsd:double
== \2"^^xsd:string is a major obstacle. The further propagation of RDF and
Linked Data in this context requires standardized methods to solve this issue.</p>
        <p>In cases of integrating additional resources or endpoints (see category (2)),
the SWoT approaches give direct guidelines. Interacting with remote data by
Linked Data or Linked Data Platform speci cations standardizes the interactions
and gives mature and well-known patterns. These approaches are also applicable
when decision factors are only accessible at certain locations (3). Still, there is
the risk that the semantics and structure of URIs or other identi ers already
exposes protected information. A URI for instance might give hints to back-end
components, which existence would not have been recognizable otherwise. More
generally, the indirect but necessary outlining of abilities and requirements in
the form of policies (or other exchanged meta data) may already constitute a
risk for one of the participants.</p>
        <p>If such actions are unavoidable through the nature of the necessary
decisions, a framing contract between the respective organizations must specify the
allowed interactions. In that case, one can argue that the policy formalizations
are overruled by the framing contract in any case as this contract must act as
the source of trust. Consequently, the necessity of human interactions limits the
usability of usage control systems to the current state of explicitly regulated
company-to-company interactions backed by extensive, textual contracts.
4.4</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-4">
        <title>Trusted Context Provision</title>
        <p>In a typical usage control setting, decision factors that are not observable to one
party always reduce the level of trust. In order to avoid such situations, as much
as possible should be hosted by a trusted party, which might also be the data
provider but does not need to. Such a trusted Policy Information Point (PIP)
serves as a source of truth, accepted by both parties.</p>
        <p>As a result, we consider a trusted PIP as a necessary technical component
with high requirements related to the acquiring of context information but also
as an important business role in the usage control environment. One can think of
several models to reimburse the provisioning of trustworthy information, similar
to other infrastructure service providers like an identity provider, a certi cation
authority and so on.
4.5</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-5">
        <title>Policy Negotiation</title>
        <p>The di ering requirements and conditions of the involved parties necessarily lead
to a process of aligning the respective o ers, prohibitions and constraints. For
long-term scenarios, the time-consuming dialog between human actors is still
su cient. However, in scenarios with data requests and consumption on the y,
(semi)autonomic agents have the potential to quickly reach agreements in
dened ranges. In order to do so, the problem of agreeing on usage contracts needs
a mathematical formalization with suitable utility functions and formalized
constraints. To the best of our knowledge, no current system is able to translate
contracts and contractual clauses into suitable equation systems.</p>
        <p>Even though several approaches have been made to tackle the resolution
of con icting policies, we claim that there is still signi cant research potential.
One exemplary fact contributing to this issue is that, regarding the ODRL 2.2
recommendation, prioritization of policies cannot be su ciently modeled.</p>
        <p>
          Furthermore, an automated negotiation of usage contracts requires a high
degree of situation-awareness at all involved components. Even though many
papers discuss steps to assign agents with this task ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ] or [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ]), neither the
necessary technical capability nor the willingness to grant the necessary autonomy
to non-human actors can be stated in current implementations.
4.6
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-6">
        <title>Legal Impact</title>
        <p>As stated, currently policies are not su cient to replace textual contracts. While
the unambiguous description of their content has advantages for assisted
searching or matchmaking, no existing system can reasonably state whether a
formalized policy passes an examination at court or not. However, we identify a
number of core obstacles in the related (EU-wide) legislation: The prohibition
of automized decision making, the primacy of textual contracts, the necessity
of interpretation of contractual clauses and the privacy regulations framed by
GDPR. It is not the scope of this paper to discuss the necessary evolution of
these principles but to make aware of their implications.</p>
        <p>The prohibition of automized decision making reserves the nal decision
making to a human. This restriction is hard to accomplish when decisions are
necessary on the y and with high frequency. Framework agreements might help
to describe general patterns but cannot be speci c enough for in situ
decisionmaking. The primacy of textual contracts refers to the fact that the nal
escalation stage in any business context is always a court trial. For now, legal experts
will only decide on the textual version of a contract. In contrast to that, the
usage control system can only decide based on the formalized policy. The crucial
assumption herein is the consistency of the textual and formalized versions. If
that cannot be guaranteed { and no system known to the authors is able to do
so { unpredictable consequences arise.
5</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>The IDS Usage Control Language</title>
      <p>
        The International Data Space [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] enables data sovereignty in a decentralized
network of companies. As such, trustworthy data exchange and control of its
usages are essential building blocks. The IDS usage control speci cation [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]
therefore de nes requirements, con gurations and interactions for data exchange and
collaborations between its members. In this context, the IDS Usage Control
Language is a RDF vocabulary comprising an ODRL 2.2 pro le for the
representation of usage o ers, requests and agreements. In particular, three security
pro les have been de ned as basic Service Level Agreements, determining both
minimal requirements for the protected data exchange but also the security level
of the technical IDS infrastructure in place. For instance, Level 0 requires only
the compliance to the IDS connectivity speci cations whereas Security Level 2
demands enhanced capabilities like active usage control engines, integrity
protection mechanisms and a veri able certi cation process.
      </p>
      <p>While the proposals of the previous section were mainly also introduced into
the IDS Usage Control Language, at several points stricter restrictions had to be
made in order to avoid currently unsolved problems. The trade-o in the form
of a decreased expressiveness was made on purpose in order to avoid some of the
outlined pitfalls. For instance, currently no sequences of activities are supported.
Even though that may change in the near future, we claim that currently the
implicit and explicit consequences are not su ciently understood.</p>
      <p>This results in a very limited amount of supported constructs. We
deliberately decided to select this strategy in order to establish a stable foundation for
future extensions. For now, only rules with one possible action type and
primitive, not nested constraints. Further re nement constructs as introduced by the
ODLR 2.2 speci cation are not supported in order to restrict the complexity
of the policies. In order to control these restrictions and to support users with
testing and validation capabilities of their policies, SHACL constraint shapes are
supplied for all major classes.</p>
      <p>The IDS approach sets white-listing as its default behaviour. We state that
this is the only reasonable way as otherwise the consequences of allowing usages
that should have been restricted result in unforeseeable consequences.
Restricting too many events on the other hand may break work ows but is better
manageable as the a ected environment is still limited. A contrary approach would
drastically increase the risk of non-allowed usages and thereby unintentionally
made obligations.
6</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Conclusion and Outlook</title>
      <p>The presented list of challenges depicts the obstacles we faced during the
development of the IDS Usage Control Language. This process was driven by the
speci c requirements of the IDS and therefore can only constitute an incomplete
list. However, we think that most of the drawn conclusions are relevant for usage
control languages in general.</p>
      <p>Choosing RDF vocabularies for a usage control language has many
advantages (e.g. self-descriptive, information linking, clear semantics, etc.), especially
for sharing and integrating policies in a Web-powered environment. However,
The IDS Usage Control Language is part of the IDS Information Model and can be
accessed at https://github.com/IndustrialDataSpace/InformationModel/
the inability to directly specify property links, for instance with priorities or
provenance information, hampers the formal representation of usage contracts.</p>
      <p>Several of the outlined challenges are still open and require future research.
These inabilities, from which we only examined the ones in the context of the
usage control language, currently prevent a complete, end-to-end usage control
system. Still, we want to strengthen the fact that an iterative approach already
has signi cant bene ts at every step. The ability to describe o ers and requests,
capabilities to automatically interpret and derive conclusions and, nally, a
gradual increase of control and autonomy of the usage control systems enables new
business models at each stage.</p>
      <p>While at rst proper search engines for actually usable data can be created, a
more and more enforced usage control will reduce the concerns regarding misuse
and fraud. We see this development as a necessary process to realizable,
datadriven business cases for and beyond Industry 4.0.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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