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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Workshop, Stavropol and Arkhyz, Russian Federation</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Examination of distribution regularities in static RAM microcircuit cells in case of using them as a physically unclonable function in a mutual authentication module</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>George S. Aliev Institute of Information Technologies &amp; Telecommunications North-Caucasus Federal University Oleg V. Malsugenov Institute of Information Technologies &amp; Telecommunications North-Caucasus Federal University</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Oksana S. Mezentseva Institute of Information Technologies &amp; Telecommunications North-Caucasus Federal University</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2019</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <fpage>7</fpage>
      <lpage>09</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The item o ers a view on the outcomes of a study focusing on static memory microcircuits seen as a physically unclonable function for devices with mutual authentication. An experimental units has been developed, as well as a series of measurements has been performed in static memory microcircuit cells at the point of initialization; an analysis has been performed for values distribution in cells for the measurements series. Values have been calculated for auto-correlational functions at various sets of values. An attempt has been made to explain the observed regularities and de ne requirements for static RAM microcircuits when using that as a physically unclonable function.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>The eld of cryptography, based on the structural complexity of optical and electronic physical systems, and
called physical cryptography, is one of the most recent advances in the eld of cryptography and data protection
[Yarm11, Papp02, Papp01, Gass02, Gass03]. Along with quantum cryptography [Eker91, Benn92] and
cryptography based on the use of chaotic dynamic systems [Koca01], physical cryptography uses noise-like behavior of
physical objects and systems [Papp02]. This allows mostly ensuring higher requirements (as compared to classical
algebraic cryptography) for such parameters of cryptographic systems as di usion and confusion [Shan49].</p>
      <p>The major object of physical cryptography is a physically unclonable function (PUF), which is a function
embodied in a physical structure, and which is easy to evaluate, yet di cult to describe, simulate, or reproduce.
A physical structure containing PUF consists of many random components. Such components are introduced
through manufacturing process and are uncontrollable. PUF is a physical system that, when requested, generates
a unique, unpredictable response. The major requirement for PUF is its irreversibility. A PUF has two important
properties absolute impossibility of creating a physical copy of it; impossibility of creating an exact mathematical
model of a PUF, i.e. of calculating a response in case the exact inquiry parameters and other pairs of
inquiryresponses are known. These features taken together make up the concept of unclonability.</p>
      <p>In PUF, randomness can be established by various physical processes and phenomena. Among the PUFs, we
can di erentiate a class where disorder is introduced by external factors, and a class where internal disorder is
used.</p>
      <p>The rst class PUFs include
optical PUFs consisting of a transparent material with randomly distributed light re ecting particles
introduced in it;</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>PUF coatings created on the top layer of integrated circuits.</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>The other PUF class includes:</title>
        <p>silicon PUFs, which employ random variations of delays in the conductors and gates of eld-e ect transistors;
PUFs based on SRAMs, which use deviations existing for the materials used in the equipment manufacture;
magnetic PUFs, which are produced by adding barium ferrite particles to the paste through production.</p>
        <p>The main application areas for PUFs include authentication, data copyprotection on a storage device;
development of cryptographic keys. Static random access memories (SRAM) are widely used in computer technology
for data storage. A direct storage element (cell) of a SRAM consists of four transistors that implement two
inverters with cross-feedback [Oztu08]. Such a cell is always in one of two states, which, in turn, allows using it
for storing one bit of information.</p>
        <p>An example of such a cell can be seen from an RS- ip- op, implemented on two 2AND-NOT logical elements.
When the voltage is supplied, all the cells of the SRAM are set to one of two possible states; besides, due to the
RS- ip- op symmetry, it is not known beforehand which nal state the cell will get, 0 or 1. This state is random
and depends on numerous factors [Holo08]. This is due to the microchips manufacturing technology speci cs
and the multitude of asymmetric elements in each SRAM cell [Yarm11].</p>
        <p>Such elements include the lengths of the connecting conductors, their geometrical dimensions, the
heterogeneity of silicon physical and chemical properties, the signal delay deviation, etc.</p>
        <p>Work [Guaj07] shows that only for a part of an SRAM cells their state after voltage supply is truly random,
while it often approaches a uniform distribution. The remaining cells steadily adopt the value of 0 or 1 state.
The fact that the number of random values for an SRAM cells states under voltage is limited, has been proven
experimentally in [Maes08]. The result showed that more than 90% of the examined SRAM cells were always
set to state 0, less than 10% of the cells, to state 1 only, and only less than 1% of the cells were set with an equal
probability to 0 or 1 state [Maes08].</p>
        <p>These outcomes suggest that PUF-based SRAMs are very unreliable, especially with respect to programmable
matrices (FPGA). This can be accounted for by the fact that, due to the regular topology of the FPGA,
any symmetric element (e.g., an RS- ip- op) implemented on the FPGA nearly always contains predictable
asymmetry. Therefore, the proposed study presents an attempt to examine the values distribution patterns in
specialized SRAM microcircuit cells during their initialization.
2</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Identifying static features for SRAM cell values</title>
      <p>As samples, ten static HM62256 RAMs from di erent manufacturers (Hynix, Toshiba, Hyundai) were used. The
main goal for this stage was to identify the statistical properties of the values in the static RAM microcircuit cells
when using them as physically unclonable functions. The main objectives for the study included: determining
the number of stable and unstable memory cells, the number of stable and unstable bits, detecting periodic
patterns in the development of the static RAM microcircuit initialization values. Figure 1 o ers a view on the
scheme of the experimental device.</p>
      <p>It consists of a universal Arduino Mega module based on the Atmel 2560 processor, static RAM microcircuits,
a quick-release panel for memory microcircuits, a transistor switch for controlling the device power supply. Each
memory microcircuit was polled 100 times 100 ms after the power was turned on. The most typical outcomes of
the values distribution in the SRAM microcircuit cells can be seen on distribution maps 2-4. An analysis of the
data presented shows that for all the examined samples the following condition was met</p>
      <p>Nstab 8 &lt; nstab
(1)
where Nstab is the number of stable bytes, nstab is the number of stable bits. Expression 1 is valid for all
the examined samples. This con rms that part of the bits in unstable cells maintain stable values. This fact
limits the range of random values generated in the memory cells through initialization. For example, using an
initialization vector of 8 bytes (64 bits), provided that the probability of the occurrence of values in each byte
is distributed uniformly, produces, under brute-force-on, 264 = 18446744073709551616 values, while if it is not
8 but 4 bits change in each byte, the others remaining stable, then under the condition of brute-force-on, the
number of unique combinations shall be reduced down to 232 = 4294967296 values. In the case a static memory
microcircuit is used as a pseudo-random sequence generator, then the probability density function is to be as
close to uniform as possible. If using static RAM as a carrier for the initialization vector and key data, then lack
of stable cells will not allow using them.</p>
      <p>Therefore, an optimization arises concerning reducing the predictability of the initialization vector on the
one hand and, on the other, regarding increasing the reliability of detecting the initialization vector shift in the
memory sculpture.</p>
      <p>The distribution maps for the values in memory cells for the most typical samples (2, 4 6) for 100 measurements
can be seen from Figures 2 through 4. Cell addresses are plotted on the abscissa and the measurement number
can be seen on on the ordinate axis. Each map has a color highlight to shows the value in the memory cell within
the range of 0 to 255. As the maps above show, samples 2 and 4 have a fairly random distribution, while sample
2 features periodically repeating areas with zero and unit values predominating. Sample 6 (and generally, all the
samples 6 to 10) have two distinct areas with the values 0 and 1 predominating.</p>
      <p>Solid vertical lines on the maps indicate stable values; the color indicates the value in a particular cell. Broken
vertical lines denote unstable cells. The pseudo-sound alternation of solid and broken lines, as well as the di erent
color of solid lines, is an important feature of an ideal physically unclonable function proposed for use in a mutual
authentication device.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Identifying autocorrelation for a discrete binary value</title>
      <p>Studying the periodicity, and its quantitative evaluation, was performed through the autocorrelation function
calculation. In general, the following expression is used to calculate the autocorrelation function.
1
In the event of a discreet signal, expression (2) shall be modi ed in the following way
Subject to [Blah86] for a discreet binary sequence expression (3) shall be modi ed like follows
C( ) = (x; x ) =
x(t) x(t</p>
      <p>) dt
Z +1
+1
X
where N k is the total number of bits in the SRAM cells, is the shift in bytes respective the zero address, aj
is the j-th bit value.</p>
      <p>The meaning of function C(n) = 1 points at the correlation between the discreet sequence bits or the
location of the signals in phase opposition. The value C(n) = 0 shows that there is no correlation between the
binary sequence and its copy shifted bits respective the original. From the point of ensuring the initialization
vector safety, the detection of a correlation indicates a decrease in the number of unique combinations and, as
a consequence, a decrease in resistance to brute force attacks. The calculation results for the autocorrelation
function for samples 2, 4, and 6 are shown in Figures 5-7.
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)</p>
      <p>As can be seen from the graphs, all the autocorrelation function values have a clearly observed periodicity.
An analysis of the static RAM microcircuit design shows that most manufacturers use a modular layout, where
the microcircuit consists of several memory banks placed on a single chip, yet spaced apart spatially.</p>
      <p>Common to memory banks are power buses, the data/address multiplexer. Therefore, samples 1, 2, 4, 6-10
contain two banks of 16 kB each, whereas the remaining samples are built of 4-kilobyte blocks. Without getting
deeper into the details of the microcircuit solution, we can mention the implementation feature associated with
the mirror image of the microcircuits semiconductor layers mask.</p>
      <p>The analysis of numerical values in view of the recommendations made in the literature and in article [Bohm10,
Blah86] result in the following similarity criteria: at 0 Cn 0:25 the autocorrelation is absent or poorly
expressed; 0:25 &lt; Cn 0:7 the autocorrelation is moderately expressed, i.e. insu cient for clear identi cation
of periodic patterns; Cn &gt; 0:7 prominent autocorrelation.</p>
      <p>Therefore, in case of the given dependencies, only sample 4 has a weak autocorrelation, i.e. has low
selfsimilarity. The use of this criterion can be accounted for by the need to use, for the initialization vector, sequences,
which are poorly similar to each other with a slight di erence in the initial shift. Given the insigni cance of
the total unique sequence value for the considered samples 215 = 32768, it is rather important not to create an
additional possibility for a successful attack on unauthorized access to the transmitted initialization vector. This
vulnerability can be implemented by repeated intercepting and analyzing the transmitted initialization vector
and restoring the static RAM card.</p>
      <p>Therefore, ensuring protection of a mutual authentication module against unauthorized cloning, will take
ensuring the closest to uniform distribution of values in stable and unstable cells.
4</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Examination of PUF cell values distribution based on the static RAM</title>
      <p>The study included an analysis of the stable and unstable cells values for static RAM samples. Figures 8-10
show the frequency graphs for the values appearance of stable cells in the SRAM samples 2, 4 and 6.</p>
      <p>As can be seen from the above dependencies, for the majority of the samples involved the frequency distribution
graph is signi cantly di erent from uniform distribution. This means that in most cases stable cells di er from
cells containing all zeros or all ones in one or two bits. Filtered from the maximum values, the graphs (Fig. 8b
and 10b) show prominent bursts at values that are multiples of 2n (4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 192, 224, 240, 252, 254).
Closer to the uniform distribution are the repetition frequency values for sample 4. For the same sample, there
was the minimum autocorrelation function value observed. In addition, the Hamming distance was determined
for unstable cells in all the samples under investigation. For samples 1,2,4,5, the average distance was 2-3 bits;
for sample 3 the distance was 5-8 bits, for samples 6-10 1-2 bits. The indicated distances show the number of
bits in the unstable cells, which changed their value through repeated measurements.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>An analysis of the study outcomes indicates the need for further testing of microcircuits or crystals of static
RAM when using them as PUFs, since the choice of a short initialization vector in mutual authentication
systems implies a high collision value probability for di erent areas of SRAMs.</p>
      <p>As a criterion for possible use of SRAMs as PUFs, the autocorrelation functions can be used for values
in memory cells. In this case, the criterion for potential use will be the autocorrelation function minimum
value (00.25) in the whole range at the maximum similarity period. Additionally, in view of comprehensive
examination, there can be certain interest taken in studying changes in the number of stable and unstable cells
in the SARM silicone through the life cycle of the microcircuit.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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