<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Integration of Cyber Security into the Smart Grid Operational Risk Management System*</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Yalta</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Russia alex.olifirov@gmail.com christin</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>@yandex.ru</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Innopolis University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Kazan</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="RU">Russia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0002</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article shows that the transition of the electricity industry to technological innovation based on the new paradigm - Smart Grid - leads to an increase in cyber threats. The dependence of operational risks in the electric power company on information security risks was identified, taking into account direct and indirect losses from the implementation of cyber threats. The classification of cyber risks is carried out, approaches to their assessment are investigated, and the interaction of the structural units of the company in the implementation of cyber threats, the assessment of cyber risks and taking countermeasures is considered. It was proposed that power companies include cybersecurity among strategic priorities and report on cybersecurity risks along with information on operational risks. The study noted that for the smart grid, cybersecurity is a strategic priority, and in this regard, it was proposed to ensure proper internal control of the cyber risk management processes, provide stakeholders with full information on cybersecurity incidents to respond appropriately. The authors have proposed to ensure the filling of a vacuum between the leading link operating in terms of business processes and operational risks, and the technical link operating in terms of cyber risks and technical and organizational means of protection against them.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Smart Grid</kwd>
        <kwd>operational risks</kwd>
        <kwd>cyber risks</kwd>
        <kwd>operational risk management services</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Currently, in Russia, in the conditions of digitalization of the economy, there is a certain
interest in the actively developing worldwide in the last decade, the direction of the
transformation of the electric power industry based on the concept of Smart Grid. Smart
Grid is interpreted as the concept of modernization of the electric power industry, as it
*
is based on the revision of a number of existing basic rules and principles of
modernization of the industry.</p>
      <p>
        The principles of developing smart grids are defined through the Smart Grid
European Technology Platform [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The introduction of the Smart Grid concept provides for the development of smart
grid technology and means a fundamental technological reorganization of the electric
power industry. A network operating on the basis of the Smart Grid concept is capable
of identifying the damaged area itself, de-energizing it and automatically powering
consumers who are briefly left without electricity. Controllers with freely programmable
logic implement algorithms for configuring consumer power circuits in various
emergency situations and provide network automation. However, by providing great
opportunities, a smart energy network carries great risks for consumers and owners, which is
due to the size of the company and the high cost of risk-prone assets.</p>
      <p>
        Energy companies are characterized by both general risks and specific to one or
another type of activity, depending on the scope of their functioning. In the information
systems of network companies, risks can be identified and enhanced at any point in the
life cycle of these systems, from the decision to develop a system to the commissioning
of the system for commercial operation. However, the methods of creating information
systems cannot be separated from the main goals of entrepreneurial activity and cannot
be unrelated to environmental influences and limitations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The purpose of this article:
1. to investigate in the electric power company the processes of integrating information
security (IS) risks (cyber risks) into operational risks (OR);
2. to study the interaction of the departments of the electric power company in the
process of risk management during the implementation of cyber threats;
3. define the management of cyber risks as a priority strategic direction for the
development of the electric power company in its transition to the new paradigm - Smart
Grid.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>The main part of the study</title>
      <p>
        Information systems are created in order to prevent the operational risks of the
electricity company. This risk may be in the form of an increase in the cost of services provided,
a decrease in income. Information systems of electric companies should reduce these
risks, increasing the effectiveness of managers' actions, based on mathematical models
for optimizing risks and methods for managing cyber risks at various levels: enterprise,
regional, federal [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref5 ref6">4, 5, 6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>However, information systems that are designed to prevent operational risks
independently carry the risks of increasing cash costs for the system and the deterioration
of the company’s work associated with putting the system into operation. Figure 1
shows a diagram of the risk flows in various fields that affect the information system
of a network company.</p>
      <p>Operational risk includes information security risk. The risk of information security
includes cyber risk and other risks of information systems.</p>
      <p>
        Cybersecurity should be part of the corporate philosophy, and for this, it should at
least be integrated into the business development strategy and the business risk
management system (operational risks), by analogy with the approach to managing
operational risks in the banking sector (BASEL III) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref16">10, 16</xref>
        ].
The main goals of specialized standards and recommendations for managing cyber risks
include [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref18 ref19">17, 18, 19</xref>
        ]:
─ filling a vacuum between the management link, operating terms of business
processes, business continuity and sustainability, and the technical link, operating terms
of vulnerabilities and technical/organizational means of protection against them;
─ identification of organizational and technical measures necessary and sufficient for
the proper provision of cybersecurity.
      </p>
      <p>
        Key terms in this area are [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref13 ref14">12, 13, 14</xref>
        ]:
─ cyber risk (cyber risk) - a combination of the probability of an event and its
consequences; cyber risk in the electric power industry - the risk of deliberate exposure to
employees of the electric power organization, third parties, internal or external
information systems aimed at unauthorized receipt, modification, deletion of data and
other digital information or the data structure, parameters and characteristics of
systems and access modes, through digital infrastructure and technologies
communications, including through the implementation of computer attacks. An additional
classification of IS risk sources by types of computer attacks can be carried out: in the
context of areas of computer attacks; types of computer attacks; by types of attacked
objects;
─ cyber risk management is a set of coordinated measures to manage the organization
(both components of the information infrastructure and resiliency and cybersecurity
tools, and the entire management vertical as a whole) in order to minimize the total
cyber risk;
─ assessment of cyber risk (in this case, the resulting measure of probability and
damage can be expressed either qualitatively - 3/4/5 degrees, or quantitatively - the
probability in the average expected the frequency of occurrence of the event in a given
time interval (month/year) and damage in monetary terms). One of the main results
of the cyber risk assessment process is their prioritization, according to the degree
of the potential impact on the company's assets.
      </p>
      <p>In this case, the assessment of cyber risks is carried out using:
─ expert assessments (directly (explicitly) or indirectly - using special software and
hardware, the logic of which contains some knowledge base about the dependence
of a measure of cyber risk on the observed conditions);
─ historical information about the likelihood of the vulnerability and damage from its
implementation (the disadvantages of the method are the need for a sufficiently large
amount of historical data (and for some threats they may simply not exist) and the
inability to accurately assess the trend in the event of a changing situation, which we
observe in almost all areas of cybersecurity);
─ analytical approaches (which are mostly in academic development), for example,
with the construction of weighted transition graphs to determine the magnitude of
the damage from the implementation of the vulnerability.</p>
      <p>
        Measures aimed at countering cyber risk (reducing the overall risk of an organization)
include:
─ passive actions:
o adoption of cyber risk (decision on the acceptability of the observed level of a
given cyber risk without any countermeasures);
o evasion of cyber risk (decision on the transformation of activities that would
entail a given level of cyber risk);
─ active actions:
o limitation or reduction of a specific cyber risk (consists of a set of
organizational and technical measures that we are used to taking as measures to ensure
information security);
o risk transfer (insurance) is still a rather rare procedure, which gradually gains
recognition;
─ a set of measures for internal audit and internal and external monitoring of the state
of cyber resistance (cybersecurity). First of all, they check the quality of the
implementation of measures to reduce cyber risks, their adequacy, their performance of
the target function in the course of internal changes in the company, and only then
they assess the changing external environment (the emergence of new types of
threats and new ways of implementing the already known). In all cases, if a
significant discrepancy is found between the current situation and the measures taken, the
monitoring subsystem should initiate a partial or full review of the company’s policy
regarding information security measures [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7 ref9">7, 9</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The power company Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System (FGC UES,
PJSC) provides half of Russia's total energy consumption due to the electricity
transmitted through its networks. FGC UES, PJSC is one of the largest enterprises in the
electric power industry, rendering services in the transmission and distribution of
electric energy, in connection to electric networks and in the collection, transmission, and
processing of technological information, including measurement and accounting data.
This company implements certain elements of the Smart Grid concept. This electric
power company has an operational risk management system (hereinafter referred to as
the “ORMS”). The goal of the ORMS is to ensure sustainable continuous operation and
development of the company by timely identification, assessment and effective
management of risks that pose a threat to the effective conduct of business activities and the
company's reputation, the health of employees, the environment, and the property
interests of shareholders and investors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref8">8, 11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        For the initial analysis of cyber risks, the following approaches can be used
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20 ref21 ref23">20, 21, 23</xref>
        ]:
─ calculation of the matrix of consequences and probabilities;
─ structured scenario analysis using the method “What if?” (SWIFT);
─ root cause assessment method (RCA);
─ business impact assessment (BIA);
─ failure mode and impact assessment (FMIA);
─ protection level assessment (LOPA);
─ event tree analysis (ETA);
─ causal analysis;
─ human factor impact assessment (HRA);
─ assessment of latent defects (SA), etc.
      </p>
      <p>
        For a more in-depth analysis of cyber risks, the following can be used [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23 ref24 ref25 ref26">23-26</xref>
        ]:
─ Delphi method;
─ checklists method;
─ brainstorming method;
─ method of organizing a partially structured or structured interview;
─ preliminary hazard analysis (PHA);
─ analysis methods based on Bayesian networks;
─ Monte Carlo method, etc.
And to develop a model of cyber threats [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref27 ref28 ref29 ref30 ref31 ref32">1, 27-32</xref>
        ] can be used:
─ expert assessment methods,
─ methods of mathematical statistics,
─ Markov methods,
─ methods of event-logic approach,
─ failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA),
─ fault tree analysis (FTA),
─ event tree analysis (ETA)
─ bow-tie method, etc.
      </p>
      <p>Electricity company regarding the assessment of risk indicators:
─ determines quantitative and qualitative indicators of the propensity for OR for the
planned annual period, including IS risk (risk appetite for OR and IS);
─ sets the target levels of these indicators: signal (acceptable) level and control (limit)
level;
─ calculates and substantiates the signal and control values of risk appetite indicators
when approving a risk and capital management strategy.</p>
      <p>The FGC UES approved a register of 19 key operational risks, assesses their impact on
the achievement of the Company's performance targets, annually updates the
materiality level and takes measures to manage risks.</p>
      <p>The company uses three methods of responding to risks: risk avoidance; risk-taking;
reduction or transfer of risk (Fig. 2). The choice of risk response method depends on
the significance of the risks.
Risks of a critical level are unacceptable for the company and are subject to priority
management. Risks with a critical level include “The risk of deviation in the volume of
electricity transmission services compared to the set value in the business plan”, “The
risk of deviation in the volume of overdue receivables from the amount set in the
business plan”.</p>
      <p>Risks with a significant level include “The risk of deviations in volumes of
technological connections compared to the value set in the business plan”, “The risk of not
reaching the level of reliability of electricity transmission services established in tariff
regulation”. Risks of a significant level are not critical, but have a significant impact on
the activities of the company and are subject to management.</p>
      <p>
        Risks of a moderate level do not significantly affect the company's activities but are
subject to periodic monitoring. Risks with a moderate level include “The risk of not
achieving the level of quality of services established by tariff regulation”, “The risk of
deviation from the value of the indicator of labor productivity increase established in
the business plan” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The operational risk management system in an electric power company consists of
the following elements:
1. a specialized unit of the organization that performs operational risk management
procedures - operational risk management services (ORMS);
2. a specialized unit of the organization that performs IS risk management procedures
(IS service);
3. divisions - owners of the company's business processes and divisions providing the
organization's business processes (hereinafter referred to as competence centers),
using information technologies and carrying out risk identification, collecting
information and informing about the identified risk, assessing the identified risks inherent
in the processes of competence centers (in within its competence), the development
and implementation of measures aimed at reducing the negative impact of
operational risks and IS risks, as well as monitoring the level of operational risk and IS
risk in their processes;
4. classifiers used in the operational risk and information security management system;
5. an event database containing information on events of operational risk and IS risk
and losses from all types of risks;
6. benchmarks of the electric power company and a system of measures aimed at
improving the quality of the information security management system and reducing the
negative impact of risks;
7. an automated information system, the volume, and functionality of which is
determined by the nature and scale of the operations and current processes of the
electricity company.</p>
      <p>
        Cyber risk integration processes in the operational risk management system can be
represented as follows:
1. The information security service ensures the identification of IS incidents (IS risk
events) and the identification of sources, threats, and vulnerabilities of the threat
(attack) implementation, the identification of business processes, systems affected
by the incident, produces an immediate response to the incident in accordance with
the procedure established by the company and transmits information about the
incident to the business unit and to the ORMS.
2. Units of the electric power company respond to the incident: they suspend business
processes, block accounts, etc. and transmit the consequences of the incident to the
ORMS.
3. The operational risk management system determines the extent and degree of impact
of the incident (IS risk event) on other risks and business processes, classifies the
incident according to the operational risk methodology and reflects it in the event
database.
4. The operational risk management system, together with the business units and the
operational risk management system, determines incident losses (IS risk events);
defines measures to minimize other risks depending on the realized risk of information
security.
5. The business unit provides information on losses in the information security system.
6. The information security system determines the effectiveness of measures to ensure
an immediate response to an incident (IS risk event).
7. The ORMS, structural units and the information security service organize events
aimed at minimizing the consequences of the implementation of IS risk (cyber risk)
and other types of risk.
8. The information security service evaluates the effectiveness of measures to minimize
the risk of information security (cybersecurity risk) and the level of residual risk.
To implement the processes of integrating cybersecurity into the company's operational
risk management system, the bow-tie method can be used [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] (Table 1).
      </p>
      <p>Analysis of the threats and measures to reduce the probability of an event
Danger
and threat</p>
      <p>Measures to reduce the probability of</p>
      <p>an event</p>
      <p>Threat No. 1 (description)
Risk of Measure No. 1. Administrative
mechabreach of nisms to contain, prevent, detect, and
confiden- mitigate risks (staff training, data
entiality, un- cryption, system testing, polygraph
author- testing, knowledge of the Criminal
ized ac- Code)
cess Measure 2. Technical and logical
mechanisms for containing,
preventing, detecting, and neutralizing risks
(password system, system log, public
key infrastructure, secure protocol,
secure OS)
Measure 3. Physical protective
equipment (physical barriers screens and
means of access)
Impact analysis and mitigation measures</p>
      <p>Effects</p>
      <p>Prevention and mitigation measures</p>
      <p>Is the
barrier
new
or
existing?
C
B
B
Barrier
Performance:</p>
      <p>B
high</p>
      <p>The responsible
party for the
reliability of this</p>
      <p>barrier
Department of
Internal Control
and Risk
Management
Department of
Internal Control
and Risk
Management
Department of
Internal Control
and Risk
Management
The responsible
party for the
reliability of this
barrier
Consequence No. 1: (description)
Violation
of the
confidentiality of
the
system,
unauthorized
access to the
system,
the
consequences
of which
is the
implementation of the
operational risk
of
deviation of the
volume of
electricity
transmission
services in
comparison with
the set
value in
the
business plan</p>
      <p>Measure 1. Implementation of
measures aimed at minimizing the
consequences of the implementation of IS
risk (cyber risk): administrative,
technical, logical recovery mechanisms
procedures for the quick recovery of
system files, antivirus tools, etc.</p>
      <p>Measure No. 2 Ensuring the
functioning of the system for responding to a
violation of the confidentiality of the
system, unauthorized access: taking
action against employees who committed
a cybersecurity incident, entering the
incident in the event database
Measure No. 3 Implementation of
measures aimed at minimizing the
consequences of the implementation of a
new IS risk (cyber risk) in the business
unit of the electric power company (the
consequences of deviating the volume
of electricity transmission services
compared to the set value in the
business plan)
or
existing?
C
C
B
Department of
Internal Control
and Risk
Management,
Information Security
Service
Department of
Internal Control
and Risk
Management,
Information Security
Service</p>
      <p>The main advantages of using the “bow-tie” method are the ability to understand the
reasons for the onset of risks and the consequences of their implementation. This
method makes you think of ways to manage operational risk, taking into account the
cyber risks that make up their composition and helps determine the factors for
subsequent mathematical modeling of the company's operational risks. A bow-tie analysis is
used to study risk based on a demonstration of a range of possible causes and
consequences.</p>
      <p>The input to the method is information on the causes of hazardous events, barriers
and controls that can prevent them.</p>
      <p>The output of the method is a table showing the main consequences of dangerous
events and the barriers established to minimize and mitigate undesirable consequences.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>1. Among the sectors of the electric power industry, one of the highest values of the
risk indicator has information security risk (including cyber risk).
2. Electricity companies do not include cybersecurity among strategic priorities.</p>
      <p>There is no information on cybersecurity risks in their reports. In general, the share
of companies that do not consider ensuring cybersecurity a strategic task, according
to the survey, is 82%. And for the smartwatch, cybersecurity is a strategic priority.
3. Lack of proper internal control over the cyber risk management processes leads to
the fact that cybersecurity incidents are not properly recorded in the cyber risk
events database, stakeholders do not have full information, and appropriate
measures are not taken.
4. For the electricity industry, operating on the basis of the smart grid concept, by
analogy with the banking sector (Basel III), it is necessary to integrate cyber risk
management into the company's operational risk management system.
5. This will make it possible to reflect the share of losses from cyber risks in the smart
grid in the total structure of losses from operational risks in the reports of electric
power companies and to establish the statistical dependence of operational risks on
cyber risks.
6. Integration of cybersecurity will also help to better organize the interaction of
structural units of the company for risk management, taking into account the fact
that cyber risk manifests itself in a computer network, and its economic evaluation
is carried out in a functional unit based on the results of operations.
7. The operational risk management system of the electricity company operates at
strategic, tactical and operational levels. Therefore, cybersecurity should be
integrated into the business development strategy at all levels of management, to make
it part of the corporate philosophy.
8. The integration of cyber risk management into the company's operational risk
management system requires a scientific synthesis of the systematization and
optimization of cyber risk management processes according to internal capital adequacy
assessment procedures (ICAAP) in case of their economic feasibility (Basel II). In
this case, mandatory internal processes are implemented: significant risks are
identified, risk appetite is established, economic capital is calculated, daily, monthly,
quarterly and annual reports are compiled (indicating the volumes of significant
risks), stress testing is carried out and the organization of the functioning of the risk
management service is specified with ensuring the full implementation of the
functions of risk policy and risk reporting.
9. It is necessary to organize proper internal control of the cyber risk management
processes, in which all cybersecurity incidents are properly recorded in the cyber
risk event database, stakeholders receive full information and take appropriate
measures.
10. To implement the processes of integrating cybersecurity into a company’s
operational risk management system, the “bow-tie” method can be used, which makes
you think of ways to manage operational risk taking into account the cyber risks
included in it, and helps determine factors for the subsequent mathematical
modeling of operational and information risks electricity company.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          1.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Sergei</given-names>
            <surname>Petrenko</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>Big Data Technologies for Monitoring of Computer Security: A Case Study of the Russian Federation</article-title>
          , Springer International Publishing AG,
          <source>part of Springer Nature</source>
          <year>2018</year>
          , e-book,
          <volume>271</volume>
          p.
          <source>DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-79036-7</source>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          2. GOST R ISO / IEC 31010-
          <year>2011</year>
          . “
          <article-title>Risk management</article-title>
          .
          <source>Methods of risk assessment”</source>
          . (In Russian).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>
          3.
          <string-name>
            <surname>OlifirovA</surname>
          </string-name>
          .V.
          <article-title>Modeli upravleniya riskami ekonomicheskih informacionnyh sistem // Informacionnye sistemy i tekhnologii v modelirovanii i upravlenii: sbornik materialov vserossijskoj nauchnoprakticheskoj konferencii</article-title>
          .
          <article-title>- YAlta: Gumanitarno-pedagogicheskaya akademiya (filial) FGAOU VO «KFU im</article-title>
          . V.I. Vernadskogo.
          <year>2017</year>
          .- S.
          <fpage>465</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>470</lpage>
          . (In Russian).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          4.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Olifirov</surname>
            <given-names>A.V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Strategicheskoe razvitie regional'nyh finansovyh informacionnyh sistem i tekhnologij // Informacionnye sistemy i tekhnologii v modelirovanii i upravlenii: sbornik materialov vserossijskoj nauchno-prakticheskoj konferencii</article-title>
          (
          <volume>23</volume>
          -
          <fpage>24</fpage>
          maya
          <year>2016</year>
          g.).
          <article-title>Gumanitarno-pedagogicheskaya akademiya (filial) FGAOU VO «KFU im. V.I. Vernadskogo» v g. YAlte; Sankt-Peterburgskij gosudarstvennyj elek-trotekhnicheskij universitet "</article-title>
          <source>LETI"</source>
          .
          <year>2016</year>
          . - S.
          <fpage>238</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>244</lpage>
          . (In Russian).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          5.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kobec</surname>
            <given-names>B. B.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Volkova</surname>
            <given-names>I. O.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Innovacionnoe razvitie elektroenergetiki na baze kon-cepcii Smart Grid</article-title>
          . - M.: IAC Energiya,
          <year>2010</year>
          .
          <article-title>- 208 s. (In Russian)</article-title>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          6. Risk-menedzhment. Metody ocenki riska: uchebnoe posobie / V. M.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kartvelishvili</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>O. A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sviridova</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>- Moskva: FGBOU VO «REU im</article-title>
          . G. V. Plekhanova»,
          <year>2017</year>
          .
          <article-title>- 120 s. (In Russian)</article-title>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          7.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Barabanov</surname>
            <given-names>A. V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Dorofeev</surname>
            <given-names>A. V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Markov</surname>
            <given-names>A. S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Cirlov</surname>
            <given-names>V. L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Sem</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>' bezopasnyh informacionnyh tekhnologij [Tekst] / Pod red.</article-title>
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A. S.</given-names>
            <surname>Markova</surname>
          </string-name>
          . - Moskva: DMK,
          <year>2017</year>
          .
          <article-title>- 221 s. (In Russian)</article-title>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          8.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Ghansah</surname>
            <given-names>I.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Smart grid cybersecurity potential threats, vulnerabilities</article-title>
          and risks // Public Interest Energy Research, Prepared for California Energy Commission,
          <year>2012</year>
          . DOI:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1016 / j.jesit.
          <year>2018</year>
          .
          <volume>01</volume>
          .001
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          9.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Olifirov</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Makoveichuk</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Zhytnyy</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>P.Y.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Filimonenkova</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>T.N.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Petrenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Models of Processes for Governance of Enterprise IT and Personnel Training for Digital Economy / 2019 Proceedings of 2018 17th Russian Scientific and Practical Conference on Planning and Teaching Engineering Staff for the Industrial and Economic Complex of the Region</article-title>
          ,
          <source>PTES 2018 с. 216-219 DOI: 10.1109/PTES</source>
          .
          <year>2018</year>
          .8604166
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          10.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Petrenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Makoveichuk</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Ontology of cybersecurity of self-recovering smart</article-title>
          <source>Grid / CEUR Workshop Proceedings 8th All-Russian Scientific and Technical Conference on Secure Information Technologies</source>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>BIT</surname>
          </string-name>
          <year>2017</year>
          ; Moscow; Russian Federation;
          <fpage>6</fpage>
          -
          <issue>7</issue>
          <year>December 2017</year>
          . - Volume
          <year>2081</year>
          ,
          <year>2017</year>
          , Pages
          <fpage>98</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>106</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          11.
          <article-title>Integrirovannyj godovoj otchyot Publichnogo akcionernogo obshchestva «Federal'naya setevaya kompaniya Edinoj energeticheskoj sistemy» za 2018 god [Elektronnyj resurs]</article-title>
          . - Rezhim dostupa: &lt; https://report2018.fsk-ees.ru/?/ru/59-information-on
          <source>-the-report &gt;. Data obrashcheniya: 11</source>
          oktyabrya
          <year>2019</year>
          .
          <article-title>(In Russian)</article-title>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          12.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Homeland Security Presidential</surname>
          </string-name>
          Directive -
          <volume>7</volume>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Critical</given-names>
            <surname>Infrastructure</surname>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Identification</given-names>
            , Prioritization, and
            <surname>Protection</surname>
          </string-name>
          , December
          <volume>17</volume>
          ,
          <year>2003</year>
          . Available at: https://www.dhs.gov/homelandsecurity-presidential-directive-7
          <source>(Accessed 07 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          13.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Homeland Security Presidential</surname>
          </string-name>
          Directive -
          <volume>20</volume>
          /National Security Presidential Directive -
          <volume>51</volume>
          , National Continuity Policy, May 9,
          <year>2007</year>
          . Available at: https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-51.
          <source>htm (Accessed 07 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          14.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hughes. R. B. (2009) Atlantisch</surname>
            <given-names>Perspectief</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,.
          <source>Ap:2009 Nr. 1/4</source>
          , NATO and
          <string-name>
            <surname>Cyber-Defense: Mission Accomplished</surname>
          </string-name>
          , Netherlands, Netherlands Atlantic Committee. Available at: https://www.atlcom.nl/site/english/nieuws/wp-content/Hughes.pdf
          <source>(Accessed 07 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          15.
          <string-name>
            <surname>European Technology Platform (ETP) SmartGrids</surname>
          </string-name>
          Available at https://www.edsoforsmartgrids.eu/policy/eu
          <article-title>-steering-initiatives/smart-grids-european-technology-platform/ (Accessed 07 November</article-title>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          16. Basel III Available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.
          <source>htm (Accessed 07 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref17">
        <mixed-citation>
          17.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
            <surname>Cam</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>P.</given-names>
            <surname>Mouallem</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"Mission-Aware Time-Dependent Cyber Asset Criticality and Resilience,"</article-title>
          <source>in Proceedings of the 8th CSIIRW Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop</source>
          , Oak Ridge National Lab, Oak Ridge,
          <string-name>
            <surname>TN</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>2013</year>
          . DOI:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1145/2459976.2459989
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref18">
        <mixed-citation>
          18.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H. H.</given-names>
            <surname>Willis</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
            <surname>Loa</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"Measuring the Resilience of Energy Distribution Systems</article-title>
          , RAND Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment, PR-1293
          <string-name>
            <surname>-DOE</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,"
          <year>July 2014</year>
          . [Online]. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR883/RAND_RR883.pdf.
          <source>(Accessed 07 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref19">
        <mixed-citation>
          19.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hollnagel</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>E.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Woods</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D. D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , &amp;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Leveson</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>N. C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2006</year>
          ).
          <article-title>Resilience engineering: Concepts and precepts</article-title>
          . Aldershot: Ashgate. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/50232053_Resilience_Engineering_
          <article-title>Concepts_and_Precepts (Accessed 07 November</article-title>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref20">
        <mixed-citation>
          20.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Petrenko</given-names>
            <surname>Sergei</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Cyber Security Innovation for the Digital Economy: A Case Study of the Russian Federation</article-title>
          , ISBN:
          <fpage>978</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>87</lpage>
          -7022-022-4 (Hardback) and
          <fpage>978</fpage>
          -87-7022-021-7 (Ebook) © 2018 River Publishers, River Publishers Series in Security and Digital Forensics, 1st ed.
          <year>2018</year>
          ,
          <volume>490</volume>
          p.
          <volume>198</volume>
          <fpage>illus</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref21">
        <mixed-citation>
          21.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Petrenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A.S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Petrenko</surname>
            <given-names>S.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Makoveichuk</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Chetyrbok</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>P.V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>The IIoT/IoT device control model based on narrow-band IoT (NB-IoT</article-title>
          ),
          <source>2018 IEEE Conference of Russian Young Researchers in Electrical and Electronic Engineering (EIConRus)</source>
          ,
          <year>2018</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>950</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>953</lpage>
          . DOI:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1109/EIConRus.
          <year>2018</year>
          .8317246
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref22">
        <mixed-citation>
          22. J.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Park</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>T. P.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Seager</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>P. S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Rao</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Convertino and I. Linkov, "Integrating risk and resilience approaches to catastrophe management in engineering systems,"</article-title>
          <source>Risk Analysis</source>
          , vol.
          <volume>33</volume>
          , no.
          <issue>3</issue>
          , pp.
          <fpage>356</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>367</lpage>
          ,
          <year>2013</year>
          . DOI:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .1111/j.1539-
          <fpage>6924</fpage>
          .
          <year>2012</year>
          .
          <year>01885</year>
          .x
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref23">
        <mixed-citation>
          23.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Petrenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Stupin</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D.D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>2018</year>
          ).
          <article-title>National Early Warning System on Cyberattack: a scientific monograph [under the general editorship of SF Boev] "Publishing House" Athena "</article-title>
          , University of Innopolis; Innopolis, Russia, p.
          <fpage>440</fpage>
          . Available at: https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?
          <source>id=36378643 (Accessed 08 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          , in Russian).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref24">
        <mixed-citation>
          24.
          <string-name>
            <surname>J. Zalewski</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Drager</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>W.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>McKeever</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>A. J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kornecki</surname>
            and
            <given-names>B.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Czejdo</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"Modeling Resiliency and Its Essential Components for Cyberphysical Systems,"</article-title>
          <source>in Position Papers of the Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems (FedCSIS)</source>
          .
          <year>2015</year>
          . DOI:
          <volume>10</volume>
          .15439/2015F414
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref25">
        <mixed-citation>
          25.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
            <surname>Allen</surname>
          </string-name>
          and
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Davis</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"Measuring Operational Resilience Using the CERT® Resilience Management Model, "</article-title>
          <source>September</source>
          <year>2010</year>
          . Available at: https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.
          <source>cfm?assetid=9401. (Accessed 08 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref26">
        <mixed-citation>
          26.
          <string-name>
            <surname>J. H. Kahan</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"Resilience Redux: Buzzword or Basis for Homeland Security,"</article-title>
          <source>Homeland Security Affairs Journal</source>
          , vol.
          <volume>11</volume>
          , no.
          <issue>2</issue>
          ,
          <year>February 2015</year>
          . Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/292162477_Resilience_Redux_
          <article-title>Buzzword_or_Basis_for_Homeland_Security (Accessed 08 November</article-title>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref27">
        <mixed-citation>
          27.
          <string-name>
            <surname>J. King</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"</article-title>
          <source>DTCC's Bodson Discusses Cyber Resilience at World Economic Forum," Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation</source>
          , 3
          <article-title>February 2016</article-title>
          . Available at: http://www.dtcc.com/news/2016/february/03/dtccs-bodson
          <article-title>-discusses-cyber-resilience</article-title>
          .
          <source>(Accessed 08 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref28">
        <mixed-citation>
          28.
          <string-name>
            <surname>J.-P. Watson</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Guttromson</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Silva-Monroy</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>R.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jeffers</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>K.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jones</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Ellison</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Rath</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Gearhart</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>D.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Jones</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>T.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Corbet</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hanley</surname>
            and
            <given-names>L. T.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Walker</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <article-title>"Conceptual Framework for Developing Resilience Metrics for US Electricity</article-title>
          , Oil, and Gas Sectors,
          <fpage>SAND2014</fpage>
          -
          <volume>18019</volume>
          ,"
          <year>September 2015</year>
          . Available at: http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/09/f26/ EnergyResilienceReport_%28Final%
          <fpage>29</fpage>
          _
          <fpage>SAND2015</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>18019</lpage>
          .pdf.
          <source>(Accessed 08 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref29">
        <mixed-citation>
          29.
          <string-name>
            <surname>John R. Davis</surname>
          </string-name>
          Jr. Major, (
          <year>2015</year>
          )
          <article-title>Joined Warfare Center, “Continued Evolution of Hybrid Threats”</article-title>
          ,
          <source>Three Sword Magazine</source>
          ,
          <volume>28</volume>
          /2015, Available at http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/CONTINUED_EVOLUTION _
          <article-title>OF_HYBRID_THREATS</article-title>
          .
          <source>pdf (Accessed 08 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref30">
        <mixed-citation>
          30.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Johnson</surname>
          </string-name>
          , P.
          <year>2017</year>
          .
          <article-title>“With The Public Clouds Of Amazon, Microsoft, And Google, Big Data Is The Proverbial Big Deal</article-title>
          .” Forbes, Jun 15. Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnsonpierr/2017/06/15/
          <article-title>with-the-public-clouds-of-amazonmicrosoft-and-google-big-data-is-the-proverbial-big-deal/#2a37a76b2ac3 (Accessed 08 November</article-title>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref31">
        <mixed-citation>
          31.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kaplan</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , &amp;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Garrick</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>B. J.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          (
          <year>1981</year>
          ).
          <article-title>On the quantitative definition of risk</article-title>
          .
          <source>Risk Analysis</source>
          ,
          <volume>1</volume>
          (
          <issue>1</issue>
          ),
          <fpage>11</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>27</lpage>
          . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1539-
          <fpage>6924</fpage>
          .
          <year>1981</year>
          .tb01350.x
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref32">
        <mixed-citation>
          32.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kang</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>C.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <year>2017</year>
          . “
          <article-title>Pittsburgh Welcomed Uber's Driverless Car Experiment</article-title>
          . Not Anymore.” New York Times. Technology, May 21. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/
          <year>2017</year>
          /05/21/technology/pittsburgh-ubers
          <article-title>-driverless-car-experiment</article-title>
          .
          <source>html?searchResultPosition=1 (Accessed 08 November</source>
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>