=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2540/paper30
|storemode=property
|title=None
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2540/FAIR2019_paper_14.pdf
|volume=Vol-2540
}}
==None==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2540/FAIR2019_paper_14.pdf
Ethical boundaries for android companion robots: a
human perspective
Cindy Friedman1[0000-0002-4901-9680]
1 Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
cindzfriedman@gmail.com
Abstract. Literature on machine ethics tends to position itself on a spectrum where at
one end sits notions about whether machines can be moral patients and, at the other
end, sits notions of whether machines can be moral agents. While majority of the
literature concerns itself with the latter – for example see [1], [2], [3] – my paper fits
into the debate by focusing on the capacity for android companion robots to be moral
patients in relation to their capacity to be phenomenally conscious in the sense of
feeling what it is like [4] to be a moral patient and be morally wronged. It questions
whether these robots should be treated morally well by human interactors and ulti-
mately, whether there should be ethical boundaries established for their utilisation in
the form of granting robots negative rights. As such, it grapples with both the descrip-
tive and normative aspects of the topic, which seems to often be amiss in current ma-
chine ethics literature – an issue that Gunkel [5] has raised.
I start my argument in favour of reflecting on the moral treatment of robots from a
human perspective, by considering Turner’s statement that “protection in law often
follows shortly after society has recognised a moral case for protecting something” [6,
p. 170] and critically analyse the concepts of there being a moral case to consider, as
well as the need for protection, to formulate my argument for why we should establish
ethical boundaries, but that we must, first and foremost, consider establishing ethical
boundaries from a human perspective. Even though social robots of the kind we are
considering here may not actually be conscious, human interactors may anthropomor-
phise them since they are, as Darling [7] and Scheutz [8] note, designed to elicit the
tendency to anthropomorphise in human interactors. This creates the possibility for
the formulation of ‘real bonds’ with these robots, despite robots not having the ca-
pacity to genuinely reciprocate human emotion – at least not currently, nor in the near
future. The possibility for the formulation of ‘real bonds’, however, raises the ques-
tion of whether treating them immorally may lower the moral standards of human
interactors [9], [10]. Taking on a human perspective is thus a relational account in
terms of the moral consideration of robots [11], [7], [12] since what matters is not
whether robots are actually phenomenally conscious and can actually be moral pa-
tients who can feel what it is like to be morally wronged, but whether we view them
as possessing the property of phenomenal consciousness due to the way in which we
relate to them. Given this, and going back to Turner [6], if we take on a human per-
spective, there is a moral case for protecting something – this something being the
human interactors – and the protection is from themselves. Thus, I argue that we must
establish ethical boundaries but that the establishment of ethical boundaries must
Copyright © 2019 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
2
firstly be considered from a human perspective so as to protect human interactors
from their own potential immoral behaviour.
On the other hand, I suggest that in arguing for ethical boundaries from a ‘robot
perspective’, one implies that there is a moral case to consider for the sake of robots,
and that robots need protection from being treated immorally by human interactors –
that they warrant moral consideration because they can be moral patients and can feel
what it is like to be morally wronged. This is problematic. Firstly, if robots are not
actually conscious and cannot then feel what it is like to be morally wronged, from
what are we protecting them? Secondly, even if they were, or could one day be con-
scious, we must still approach the topic at hand from a human perspective first and
foremost, because even if we cannot disprove the possibility of robot consciousness,
or even if robots can mimic consciousness, our misdeeds towards them may still neg-
atively impact our moral standards. Therefore, taking on such a ‘robot perspective’
would mean taking on a property account towards the moral consideration of robots
[11] which pertains to basing moral consideration on whether robots possess particu-
lar properties, such as phenomenal consciousness in this instance. This account, how-
ever, is highly problematic because, firstly, which property do we take into considera-
tion (consciousness, personhood, sentience)? And, secondly, it is difficult to prove
that humans possess such properties, raising the question of how we could even begin
to prove such properties in robots?
I then consider granting rights to robots. Given the overlap between morality and
legality [13, p. 169] I suggest granting negative rights to robots so as to inhibit the
maltreatment of robots by human interactors, thereby preventing negative impact
upon the moral fibre and quality of human societies. In literature on robot rights, few
authors clarify which kind of rights should, or should not, be granted to robots –
something with which Tavani [12] takes issue. Although homing in on the concept of
negative rights remains a broad account of the kind of rights that should be granted, it
is, nonetheless, a distinction I have not yet come across. I draw the distinction be-
tween positive and negative rights from Berlin’s [14] account on positive and nega-
tive liberty. Negative rights are rights that protect us from something. Positive rights,
however, are rights we have to something. Negative rights, therefore, oblige inaction,
since they protect people from being subjected to an immoral action. In this regard, if
we considered granting robots negative rights, this would not be granting them for the
sake of the robot but rather granting them so as to inhibit maltreatment, thereby possi-
bly lessening negative impacts upon their human interactors. This provides a new
perspective regarding the debate surrounding robot rights.
I thus conclude that regardless of the case for treating robots well from their own
perspective, the case from the human perspective is enough to argue that robots
should be treated morally well. Taking on this humanistic perspective will guide the
way as to how we should go about formulating much needed ethical boundaries for
our interaction with social robots, as well as what these ethical boundaries should
ultimately be.
Keywords: android, companion robot, social robot, robot rights, robot ethics, moral
patiency, HRI.
3
References
1. Anderson, M., Anderson, S. L.: Machine Ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
(2011).
2. Bostrom, N.: Superintelligence: Paths, dangers, strategies. Oxford University Press, New
York (2014).
3. Wallach, W., Allen, C.: Moral Machines: Teaching robots right from wrong. Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford (2009).
4. Nagel, T.: What is it like to be a bat?. Philosophical Review 83(October), 435-450 (1974).
5. Gunkel, D. J.: The other question: can and should robots have right?. Ethics and Infor-
mation Technology (2017).
6. Turner, J.: Why Robot Rights?. In: Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence, pp.
145-171. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham (2019).
7. Darling, K.: Extending legal protection to social robots: the effects of anthropomorphism,
empathy, and violent behavior towards robotic objects. In: Kerr, I., Froomkin, M., Calo, R.
M. (eds.) Robot Law. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (2016).
8. Scheutz, M.: The Inherent Dangers of Unidirectional Emotional Bonds. In: Lin, P., Abney,
K., Bekey, G. A. (eds.) Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics, pp.
205-221. MIT Press, Cambridge (2012).
9. Levy, D.: The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious Robots. International Journal of
Social Robotics 1(3), 209-216 (2009).
10. Ramey, C. H.: 'For the sake of others': The 'personal' ethics of human-android interaction.
pp. 137-148. Cognitive Science Society, Stresa (2005).
11. Coeckelbergh, M.: Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consid-
eration. Ethics and Information Technology 12(3), 209–221 (2012).
12. Tavani, H. T.: Can Social Robots Qualify for Moral Consideration? Reframing the Ques-
tion about Robot Rights. Information 9(73), (2018).
13. Asaro, P. M.: A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives. In: Lin, P.,
Abney, K., & Bekey, G. A., (eds.) Robot Ethics: The Ethical and Social Implications of
Robotics, pp. 169-186. MIT Press, Cambridge (2012).
14. Berlin, I.: Two Concepts of Liberty. In: Four Essays on Liberty, pp. 118-172. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, Oxford (1969).