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    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>An overview of defeasible entailment</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Adam Kaliski</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Thomas Meyer</string-name>
          <email>tmeyer@cs.uct.ac.za</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>CAIR and University of Cape Town</institution>
          ,
          <country country="ZA">South Africa</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>The process of determining whether or not a statement, or query, is inferred by
a knowledge base is entailment. Classical entailment is regular deduction, which
holds that if
1. All humans are mortal
2. Socrates is a human
then logically Socrates is mortal. This form of reasoning is, however, completely
monotonic, which does not allow for exceptions to stated rules, and therefore also
does not allow for the concept of typicality. This inherently limits the expressivity
of a given expert system, since reality often contains exceptions. Consider now
the addition of a defeasible rule (along with a regular rule)
3. Humans are typically not philosophers
4. Socrates is a philosopher
Defeasibility is the introduction of typicality, and the associated concept of
exceptionality. A defeasible rule is one that allows itself to be broken, by stating
that the rule is typically the case, rather than always the case. However, adding
this semantic extension to classical logic raises an important problem regarding
reasoning, because a knowledge base with defeasible rules cannot be reasoned
about in the same way as a classical knowledge base. Furthermore, whereas
classical, monotonic entailment is unique, there are arbitrarily many di erent
defeasible entailments, and therefore what a defeasible entailment relation will
infer from a given defeasible knowledge base is dependent on which entailment
it is. Given the above knowledge base regarding Socrates, the question is can
we conclude that Socrates is mortal? The answer is dependent on whether or
not we are using a prototypical or presumptive entailment. A prototypical
entailment is conservative, and draws fewer inferences, and will therefore conclude
that Socrates is an atypical human, and therefore cannot conclude that he is
mortal. On the other hand, a presumptive entailment, which draws as many
inferences as it reasonably can, will not see any clashes regarding mortality, and
infer as much as possible, including that he is mortal.</p>
      <p>
        There have been a number of approaches to characterizing defeasible reasoning.
Circumscription [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref9">9, 10</xref>
        ] was one of the earliest attempts at reasoning about
typicality and exceptions. Belief revision [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] is another method that allows for a form
of defeasible reasoning. Other approaches to defeasible reasoning include default
logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref12">11, 12</xref>
        ], as well as auto-epistemic logic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4 ref8">8, 4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Kaliski and Meyer</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Problem Statement</title>
      <p>
        The defeasible reasoning framework that this paper uses was de ned by Kraus,
Lehmann, and Magidor [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6 ref7">5, 7, 6</xref>
        ], as well as extensions by Casini et. al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">3, 2</xref>
        ]. The
KLM framework is a very strong candidate for de ning defeasible entailment
relations, because it de nes a number of properties and postulates that isolate a
subset of defeasible entailments as rational. This provides a theoretical bedrock
which further work can use as a foundation to extend or modify the properties
to describe a defeasible entailment useful to them. Another argument in favour
of this framework is that it is computationally well behaved, reducible to
classical entailment. However, there are many defeasible entailments that make little
sense from a human reasoning standpoint that nevertheless satisfy the KLM
properties. This implies that the postulates de ning a rational defeasible
entailment are too permissive to isolate only those entailments that are useful.
Extending the KLM postulates to isolate only those defeasible entailments that
have meaning would allow for far better analysis of entailments, and allow for a
range of extensions and applications using this framework.
      </p>
      <p>The KLM framework is de ned by three foundational papers, and then further
extended by later work. A signi cant barrier of entry to those who wish to either
apply or extend this framework is to understand it. The initial KLM papers are
both dense and also con ict with one another in certain respects. For example,
the meaning of symbols were changed between papers without comment. There
is therefore an argument to be made that an overview that compiles the current
state of the framework in a single document would enable future research groups
to far more easily utilize the KLM framework.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Aims</title>
      <p>
        A main aim of this paper is how best to extend these properties to isolate exactly
the defeasible entailments that infer in a useful, or understandable way. Work
on this has already been done by Casini et. al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ], and is included in this paper.
Further extensions in this paper include methods for de ning any defeasible
entailment relation based on extending or constraining the set of inferences, and
the properties and distinctions between what is termed basic defeasible
entailment, and rational defeasible entailment.
      </p>
      <p>An overarching aim of this work is to provide a single point of reference for any
project that wishes to extend, constrain, or otherwise modify the framework to
de ne a defeasible entailment of interest, or any project that wishes to implement
an already de ned defeasible entailment into an application. In particular, the
paper details the semantics, properties, and the algorithms associated with
various monotonic and nonmonotonic entailments for defeasible knowledge bases,
precise de nitions for defeasibility and non-monotonicity, and syntax-sensitive
entailments.</p>
    </sec>
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