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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Anticipatory Thinking: A Metacognitive Capability</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Adam Amos-Binks</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Applied Research Associates Raleigh</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>North Carolina 27614</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Navatek LLC Arlington</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Virginia 22203</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Anticipatory thinking is a complex cognitive process for assessing and managing risk in many contexts. Humans use anticipatory thinking to identify potential future issues and proactively take actions to manage their risks. In this paper we define a cognitive systems approach to anticipatory thinking as a metacognitive goal reasoning mechanism. The contributions of this paper include (1) defining anticipatory thinking in the MIDCA cognitive architecture, (2) operationalizing anticipatory thinking as a three step process for managing risk in plans, and (3) a numeric risk assessment calculating an expected cost-benefit ratio for modifying a plan with anticipatory actions.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Anticipatory Thinking (AT) is the deliberate and divergent
analysis of relevant future states that is a critical skill in
medical, military, and intelligence analysis
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Geden et al. 2018)</xref>
        .
It differs from predicting a single correct outcome in that its
goal is to identify key indicators or threatening conditions
so one might proactively mitigate and intervene at critical
points to avoid catastrophic failure. This uniquely human
ability allows us to learn, and act, without actually
experiencing. AI systems with this robust capability would
support the autonomy and contextual reasoning needed for next
generation AI.
      </p>
      <p>
        However, AI systems have yet to adopt this capability.
While agents with a metacognitive architecture can
formulate their own goals or adapt their plans in response to
their environment
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Burns and Ruml 2012; Cox 2016)</xref>
        and
learning-driven goal generation anticipates new goals from
past examples
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20 ref5">(Pozanco, Ferna´ndez, and Borrajo 2018)</xref>
        , they
do not reason prospectively about how their current goals
could potentially fail or become attainable. Expectations
have a similar limitation, they represent an agent’s mental
view of future states and are useful for diagnosing plan
failure and discrepancies in execution
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">(Mun˜ oz et al. 2019)</xref>
        but
do not critically examine a plan or goal for potential
weaknesses or opportunities in advance.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">Duff et al. 2006</xref>
        use an
explicit knowledge representation in the domain to ensure
that maintenance goals do not fail while proactively
achieving maintenance goals when they do not conflict with
existing achievement goals. This is a similar goal to
anticipatory thinking, but its computation of goals is more akin to
prediction than anticipation. At present, agents do not
analyze plans and goals to reveal their unnamed risks (e.g. such
as actions of another agent) and how they might be
proactively mitigated to avoid execution failures. Calls to the AI
community to investigate imagination machines
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Mahadevan 2018)</xref>
        highlight the limitations between current
datadriven advances in AI and matching human performance in
the long term.
      </p>
      <p>To address this limitation, we take a step towards
imagination machines with a contribution that operationalizes the
concept of anticipatory thinking, a cognitive process reliant
on an ample supply of imagination, as a metacognitive
capability. We propose this capability as a kind of solution
formulation method, a post-planning step that analyzes a
solution plan for potential weaknesses and modifies the
solution plan to account for them. This approach is in contrast
to problem formulation, a pre-planning step that analyzes a
problem for efficient search strategies, as well as online
riskaware planning processes (Huang et al. 2019). Our first step
of AT identifies properties of a plan that are prone to
failure. These include concepts such as atoms needed
throughout a plan but are only achieved in the initial state. As a
second step, we extend goal-reasoning agent expectations to
include anticipatory expectations, a kind of expectation
derived from a plan’s relevant states that identifies exogenous
sources that could potentially introduce failures. Finally, we
define anticipatory reasoning to proactively mitigate the
potential failures. An agent reasons over the conditions in the
anticipatory expectations, generating anticipatory actions to
be executed at specific times, foiling an exogenous source
of failure. To exercise this new capability we use a simple
example and define metrics for evaluating an agent’s
anticipatory thinking.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Previous Work</title>
      <p>Our contributions are based on three related areas of work.
Prospective cognition is a fledgling field in cognitive
psychology the goal of which is to understand human ability
to reason about and imagine the future. We discuss some
prospection modalities. The second area, goal-reasoning
agents, is a type of agent that adapts to and formulates their
own goals in response to their environment. We highlight
some of the overlap between prospection modalities and the
agent’s methods for formulating and achieving goals.
Finally, investigations into metacognition’s role in decision
making and behavior draws a close tie with autonomy. We
detail some of the existing capability to frame anticipatory
thinking’s role.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Anticipatory Thinking</title>
        <p>
          Anticipatory thinking is an emerging concept in
psychology
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Geden et al. 2018)</xref>
          that captures the cognitive processes
in use when preparing for the future. The deliberate
consideration of a diverse set of possible futures which
aggregates imaginative, divergent, and prospective processes and
is more than any of the individual processes alone.
Imagination is a mechanism to reason about what is outside our
immediate sensory inputs. More than an artist’s creative
reservoir, imagination drives the creativity in complex sciences
from engineering to finance. Imagination is used to
reason about details in problem-solving, such as what might
have happened in a mystery novel, as well as generating
novel ideas through methods such as counterfactual
reasoning. Calls to the AI community to investigate imagination
machines
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Mahadevan 2018)</xref>
          highlight the gap between
current data-driven advances in AI and matching human
performance in the long term.
        </p>
        <p>
          Divergent thinking is often used to assess individual
differences in creativity and has been part of scientific studies
on creativity since the 1960’s
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Guilford 1967)</xref>
          . Assessing
divergent thinking asks subjects to perform divergent thinking
tasks, the scores and measures of which are still the focus
of numerous studies (Silvia et al. 2008). Physical
limitations such as working memory and recall from long-term
memory have been the source of inspiration for developing
methodologies to counteract them (e.g. structured analytic
techniques
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">(Heuer 2008)</xref>
          .
        </p>
        <p>
          Lastly, the emerging field of prospection is the ability
to reason about what may happen in the future.
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">Szpunar
et al. 2014</xref>
          provide a taxonomy of prospection that covers
four modalities (planning, intention, simulation, prediction)
in both syntactic and semantic spaces. Several AI research
communities have investigated the methods that, at least in
name, overlap with the modalities but have lacked the
unifying taxonomy to characterize them in prospective cognition.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Goal Reasoning</title>
        <p>One approach to mitigate risks is to encode mappings from
states to goals, such that when an agent is in a state, it
should pursue the corresponding goal. Thus, if risks are
known at design time, an agent can be given mappings from
risky states to mitigating goals. MADBot (Coddington et al.
2005) investigated goal formulation via motivator strategies
within, and external to, the planning process. An example of
a motivator function is the following: a rover robot may have
the motivator function that when its battery level drops
below a threshold, the agent will generate a goal to have a fully
charged battery. This would then be achieved by a plan for
the rover to navigate to the power source and plug itself in.
As shown in Coddington (2005) these motivator functions
can be either (1) encoded into the plan operators as
constraints (i.e. every action has a precondition that the battery
level is above a threshold) or (2) a separate goal formulation
process which runs outside the planner and generates a new
goal when motivator functions trigger.</p>
        <p>
          Other approaches to mitigating risk with planning systems
include rationale-based monitors
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24">(Veloso, Pollack, and Cox
1998)</xref>
          , perceptual-based plan monitors
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">(Dannenhauer and
Cox 2018)</xref>
          , and contingency planning
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref13">(Hoffmann and
Brafman 2005)</xref>
          . Prior work on mitigating risk during plan
execution has considered monitoring rationales for goals
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">(Dannenhauer 2019)</xref>
          . In MADBot and other work on goal motivator
strategies
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">(Mun˜oz-Avila, Wilson, and Aha 2015)</xref>
          , goal
motivator functions are known at the design time of the agent.
The primary difference of the approach presented here is that
goal formulation strategies are identified automatically at
runtime by anticipatory thinking approaches using the plan
solution as a source of information.
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Metacognition</title>
        <p>
          Metacognition refers to processes that reason about
cognition in some form or another
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">(Cox, Raja, and others 2011)</xref>
          .
We use the Metacognitive Integrated Dual-Cycle
Architecture (MIDCA) to discuss anticipatory thinking processes. A
primary benefit of MIDCA is its explicit separation of
cognitive and metacognitive processes. Cognitive processes (see
Figure 1) are those that are more directly concerned with the
world (goals are world states, plans are sequences of actions
that act on world states, etc). Metacognitive processes (see
Figure 2) are those that are more directly concerned with
cognitive processes and states (identifying and resolving
issues such as impasses that arise in various cognitive
processes). One of the core assumptions here is that the agent’s
mental state is separate from the world state (otherwise
reasoning about world states would also be reasoning about
cognitive states).
        </p>
        <p>At a general level it seems that AT could be considered
a cognitive process since the objective of AT is to prevent
risk that arises from various world states in order to achieve
some goal that is a world state. When considering specific
AT processes (presented in the next section) we argue that
AT is truly a metacognitive process since it is concerned with
meta goals such as achieved(g’) where g’ is a cognitive level
goal. AT is also concerned with decision making on resource
trade-offs (a type of metareasoning) for risk mitigation (i.e.
spending X extra actions to mitigate Y potential risks).
Additionally, if AT processes were to take into account an agent’s
likelihood of succeeding at a task, than AT processes are
making use metacognition self-prediction mechanisms.</p>
        <p>
          MIDCA is currently under active development, and
until recently most work has consisted of implementation at
the cognitive level. Prior work on the metacognitive level
includes monitoring capabilities that maintain a cognitive
trace and control actions capable of switching planning
algorithms at runtime
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">(Cox, Dannenhauer, and Kondrakunta
2017)</xref>
          and domain independent expectations1 of cognitive
processes
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">(Dannenhauer, Cox, and Mun˜oz-Avila 2018)</xref>
          . The
primary contributions from these works have mostly
focused on the Monitor, Interpret2, and Control phases of the
metacognitive layer. The AT process we describe in this
paper proposes additional new methods to the Intrepret, Plan,
and Control phases of the metacognitive level.
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Anticipatory Thinking as Metacognition</title>
      <p>
        Our approach to operationalizing anticipatory thinking
begins with the concept as explained in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Geden et al. 2018)</xref>
        as ”deliberate, divergent exploration and analysis of relevant
futures to avoid surprise”. We define three steps that
operationalize the (i) deliberate, (ii) divergent, and (iii) relevant
components of the above AT concept.
      </p>
      <p>First, in Section 3.1 we identify goal vulnerabilities as an
example method in the deliberation step. This step reasons
over a plan’s structure to identify properties that would be
particularly costly were they not to go according to plan. A
second step, failure anticipation, identifies sources of failure
for the vulnerabilities in Section 3.2. Sources of failure can
range from unknown environment states to other agent’s
interfering goals. Finally, in Section 3.3 we detail a failure
mitigation step that modifies an existing plan, reducing the
exposure to the sources of failure and creating an anticipatory
expectation. We capture these steps as a process in Table 1
1It is worth noting that while expectations at the cognitive and
metacognitive levels have analogous roles, their definitions at each
level are different.</p>
      <p>
        2The Interpret phase generally includes discrepancy detection,
explanation/diagnosis, and goal formulation. Of these, discrepancy
detection is the only one with prior work at the metacognitive layer
of MIDCA.
and demonstrate these steps through an NBeacons running
example from
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5 ref6">(Dannenhauer, Cox, and Mun˜oz-Avila 2018)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>To illustrate these ideas, it is useful to consider
following example. An agent must generate plans to reach
beacons and activate them. If the agent ever passes through a
sandpit square, they must take three actions to dig out. The
wind may blow in a known direction at a known speed after
every agent action. The wind pushes an agent a number of
squares further (equivalent to the speed) in the wind’s
direction and can result in an agent passing over a sandpit and
getting stuck. In our example, the wind is blowing West at a
speed of five making an agent’s plan vulnerable to any
sandpit that lies within five squares West of their location.</p>
      <p>
        We use the Partial Order Causal Link (POCL)
representation
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">(Penberthy and Weld 1992)</xref>
        for an agent’s plans. The
main advantage to using POCL over other plan
representations is that causal link threats can explicitly represent
potential failures from external events. We use the typical
definitions for the POCL representation from
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">(Penberthy and
Weld 1992)</xref>
        where a POCL plan consists of steps (S) that
are ground actions from the domain model, bindings (B) that
map free variables to literals, step orderings (O) that
constrain when steps must execute relative to one another, and
causal links (L) that connect steps to one another when an
effect of one step instantiates a precondition for a
following step. While the above plain English definitions of the
individual aspects of the POCL representation will suffice
for those who are familiar with planning, we provide a
formal definitions for causal link threats as they are key to our
choice of POCL.
      </p>
      <p>Definition 1 (Causal link threat) A causal link threat
ocp
curs when a causal link s ! u between steps s and u for
literal p, and some other step w has effect :p and could be
executed after s but before u. Executing w in this interval
establishes :p making the precondition p of u no longer
satisfied by the effect p of s and thus u will not execute.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Goal Vulnerabilities</title>
        <p>Identifying a plan’s vulnerable structural properties is the
first step in proactively mitigating its failure. We define a
single vulnerability, precondition strength, of what could
be numerous vulnerable properties of a plan. Precondition
strength, is a measure of how many times a precondition is
established and used in plan. The fewer times a precondition
is established and the more it is used increases the
vulnerability of a plan to failure. It is useful in AT to identify literals
that have a weak precondition strength, as their failure can
require many repairs to a plan or eliminating an area of the
solution space entirely.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Definition 2 (Precondition Strength) Precondition</title>
        <p>strength of a plan , PRESTRENGTH( ), is a set of tuples
ha; k; ei where a is a literal, k is the number of steps in
that use a as a precondition, and e the number of times a is
an effect before it is first used as precondition.</p>
        <p>Our example in Figure 3, A is the agent’s location, ˜ are
the sandpits, and 1 is the beacon location, and the optimal
path from the agent’s location to the beacon is in orange. The
optimal path comprises of eight move actions all of which
have the (canMove) precondition. This precondition is only
established once in the initial state and so its entry in
PRESTRENGTH( ) is hcanM ove(agent); 8; 1i.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Failure Anticipation</title>
        <p>Vulnerabilities are not by themselves indicative that a plan is
at risk of failure. Risk of failure requires some means to
exploit the vulnerability, what we will call conditioning events.
We approach identifying these events as a kind of prefactual
reasoning (future-oriented counterfactual reasoning), where
we take the negation of the most vulnerable preconditions
(identified in Section ) and identify actions with them as
effects.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Definition 3 (Conditioning Event) The conditioning</title>
        <p>events CE( ) of a plan are actions in the domain model
such that one or more effects of each action is the negation
of a precondition of a step in , introducing a causal link
threat.</p>
        <p>In our NBeacons example, wind may blow after each
agent action and gives rise to a conditioning event. If the
wind blows at any point where a sandpit is within five
squares West of the agent, a causal link threat is introduced
by the effect :canMove(agent). This results in four
potential conditioning events, one after each of the agent’s first
four moves, indicated by the red CE notation in Figure 3.
After finding themselves in a sandpit, an agent must spend
three actions digging out of the sand pit in order make
canMove(agent) true and be able move again. We term these
three dig actions as the impact of a conditioning event.
Definition 4 (Impact) The impact of a conditioning event,
impact(CE), is the cost of the actions needed to remove the
causal link threat introduced by the conditioning event.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>Failure Mitigation</title>
        <p>The final step to operationalizing anticipatory thinking is to
define what the relevant property means for a goal-reasoning
agent. We term this step failure mitigation where the agent
reasons over conditioning events to identify actions that
reduce a plan’s risk exposure to these conditioning events.
These actions are anticipatory actions.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>Definition 5 (Anticipatory Actions) The anticipatory ac</title>
        <p>tions ANT( ) of a plan is a set of tuples hAANT; CEi
where AANT is an action sequence, ai; a2; :::an added to
such that at least one effect reduces the impact of the
conditioning events CE in CE( ).</p>
        <p>To mitigate the unpleasantness of being blown about by
the wind and getting trapped in a sandpit, our agent has the
option to outfit itself with a grappling hook. A grappling
hook allows an agent to move out of a sandpit in a single
action. However, adding the grappling hook adds action costs
of one for the buy and pack steps that need to be executed.
We add these two anticipatory actions to the agent’s plan
before the journey begins, see 0 in Figure 4.</p>
        <p>Adding the grappling hook to the plan creates an
expectation within an agent that risk exposure to the wind
conditioning event has been reduced. We refer to this new type of
expectation as an anticipatory expectation and define it as:</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-7">
        <title>Definition 6 (Anticipatory Expectations) An Anticipa</title>
        <p>tory Expectation is the action cost reductions expected from
introducing anticipatory actions to mitigate conditioning
events.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-8">
        <title>Anticipatory Thinking in MIDCA</title>
        <p>We now put forth an anticipatory thinking approach as a
metacognitive process in MIDCA, highlighting the role of
each phase of the metacognitive layer:
Monitor: Obtain observations of the cognitive level
components, including the current plan and the current goal
g.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-9">
        <title>Interpret (as composed of the following three steps):</title>
        <p>Discrepancy Detection: Flag the current plan from
the cognitive level Plan phase (see Figure 1,
cognitive layer, left side) as potentially risky, risk level( ,
HIGH).</p>
        <p>Explanation / Diagnosis: Assess the risks associated
with the plan using anticipatory thinking approaches,
such as those described in Section using the notions of
prestrength. The results of the analysis would be
vulnerabilities V of the plan .</p>
        <p>Goal Formulation: Formulate the goal to transform
into a new plan 0 with a safer risk level, while
maintaining that the current goal of is achieved.
The new goal would then be frisk level( 0, LOW) ^
achieves( 0; g)g.</p>
        <p>Evaluate: Drop any meta goals if they have been achieved.
Intend: Commit to achieving the newly formulated meta
goal frisk level( 0, LOW) ^ achieves( 0; g)g.</p>
        <p>Plan: Take current mental state containing
risk level( ,HIGH) and vulnerabilities V and search
for a set of new actions, meta plan mp, consisting of add
or delete edits from plan in order to achieve 0 such
that frisk level( 0, LOW) ^ achieves( 0; g)g.</p>
        <p>Control: Carry out the sequence of plan edits in mp
resulting in a new 0 such that risk level( 0,LOW) and 0 j= g
where g is the original goal of .</p>
        <p>The primary effort occurs in the Plan phase which we
speculate could be modeled as a search process such that
nodes are plans and their associated risk levels and edges
between nodes are anticipatory actions that are added to (or
possibly removed from) the plan. The search process would
terminate when a goal node is reached that meets a low
risk level for the plan inside the node. This example through
the metacognitive phases serves as one possible realization
of AT in MIDCA. We leave more concrete implementation
details for future work.
Anticipatory thinking is concerned with identifying
possible worlds that affect desirable outcomes and taking action
to mitigate them. This differs from typical future-oriented
analysis centered around prediction that is focused on
identifying a single likely outcome. As such, to appropriately
evaluate anticipatory thinking we require alternative
measures than those used in prediction.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-10">
        <title>Successful Anticipatory Thinking</title>
        <p>Conceptually, anticipatory thinking’s goal is to have a high
recall rate. More specifically, it is to ensure that the events
that ultimately occur are accounted for in a set of possible
futures. However, calculating recall does not capture the cost
of adding anticipatory actions or the cost of identifying
conditioning events. To address this limitation we develop an
assessment of anticipatory thinking that accounts for the cost
in relation to the potential benefits.</p>
        <p>An additional challenge is to avoid coupling anticipated
outcomes to the actual outcomes. AT mitigates, rather than
predicts, failure. Therefore AT assessment should only
assess the potential payoff from mitigating, not whether any
individual future comes to pass.</p>
        <p>In Figure 5, we represent anticipatory thinking as a
plan’s identified conditioning events in the green
circle. Before anticipatory thinking, conditioning events
are unknown to our agent and reside in the blue area.
Successful anticipatory thinking is the set of
identified conditioning events where anticipatory actions are
taken to mitigate their impact and reside in the
yellow area. We assess successful anticipatory thinking as
AT assess( ) = jCE(AN T )j
jCEj
0
impact(CEj )
1</p>
        <p>C
! CCC ;</p>
        <p>A
(1)
where jCEj is the number of conditioning events
identified and jCE(AN T )j are the mitigated conditioning events.
Their ratio represents how many conditioning events were
mitigated. A second ratio calculates the potential benefit of
mitigation. In the numerator, we calculate the cost of all
anticipatory actions with AANT(ANT) where we assume an
action cost to one. For each anticipatory action set, ANT,
we sum the impact of each mitigated conditioning event
mitigated, impact(CEj ).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-11">
        <title>Example</title>
        <p>Applying equation 1 to our NBeacons conditioning events,
we have four wind conditioning events, jCEj = 4, and each
one is mitigated, jCE(AN T )j = 4. This ratio of 1.0 (4=4) is
best possible case in that every identified conditioning event
was mitigated. Conversely, plans where many identified
conditioning events that have few mitigations would have a ratio
closer to zero and may benefit from the use of robust search
algorithms. Our next ratio assesses the potential mitigation
benefit. Mitigating the wind event requires buying and
packing the grappling hook, each with an action cost of one for a
total of two, jAA(ANTi)j = 2. The sole anticipatory action
sequence, i = 1, is expected to save the agent three dig
actions for each of the four wind events, j = 4, resulting in a
potential mitigation of twelve actions, and a resulting
mitigation ratio of 0.83 (1 0:17). Again, plans with not so
favorable benefits from mitigations would have a lower expected
payoff from their actions and would have a ratio closer to
zero. Together these two ratios result in an AT assess( 0) of
0.83 (1:0 0:83), this calculation is reflected in Equation 2.</p>
        <p>AT assess( 0) = 4
4
0
P1 (3 + 3 + 3 + 3) ACC ; (2)
i</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusion and Future Work</title>
      <p>Anticipatory thinking is a complex cognitive process for
assessing and managing risk in many contexts. It allows
humans to identify potential future issues and proactively take
actions in the present that will manage their risks. We have
defined how an artificial agent may perform anticipatory
thinking at a goal reasoning level, so they may receive the
same benefits and enable further autonomous capability.</p>
      <p>Our approach made three contributions. First we defined
anticipatory thinking in the MIDCA cognitive architecture
as a goal reasoning process at the metacognitive layer.
Specifically, Section highlights the role of AT in each phase
of the metacognitive layer of MIDCA shown in Figure 2.
Second, we operationalized the anticipatory thinking
concept as a three step process for managing risk in plans. Goal
vulnerabilities, failure anticipations and failure mitigation
identify weakness of a plan, their potential failure sources
(conditioning events), and failure mitigations (anticipatory
actions) to reduce the impact of the failure sources. Finally,
we proposed a numeric assessment for successful
anticipatory thinking. Key to the assessment are a ratio of identified
conditioning events to mitigated ones and an expected
costbenefit ratio for the anticipatory actions.</p>
      <p>We expect two immediate areas of future work. First, we
are planning to integrate our anticipatory thinking
definitions into an existing MIDCA implementation. From there,
we will be able to perform experiments on existing domains.
A second area is to develop more methodologies for each
of the three anticipatory thinking steps. Expanding the
failure sources beyond the failure inducing step (e.g. an
action sequence) to identify the most parsimonious mitigation
and extracting some benefit from unmitigated conditioning
events are promising avenues of investigation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
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