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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Anticipatory Intelligence Analysis with Cogent: Current Status and Future Directions</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gheorghe Tecuci</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dorin Marcu</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mihai Boicu</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Chirag Uttamsingh</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Learning Agents Center, Volgenau School of Engineering, George Mason University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Fairfax, VA 22030</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Anticipatory intelligence analysis is the complex task of drawing defensible and persuasive conclusions about future events or states based on current information. This paper presents a systematic approach to anticipatory intelligence analysis with Cogent, a software cognitive assistant that enables a synergistic integration of the analyst's imagination and expertise with the computer's knowledge and critical reasoning. It shows how current, as well as envisioned capabilities of Cogent, help alleviate many of the complexities of this task.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>Anticipatory intelligence analysis is the complex task of
drawing defensible and persuasive conclusions about future
events or states based on current information of all kinds that
come from a variety of different sources. It addresses new
and emerging trends, changing conditions, and
underappreciated developments (ODNI, 2019).</p>
      <p>
        The prevailing approach to anticipatory intelligence
analysis and intelligence analysis in general is the holistic
approach where the analysts, after reviewing large amounts
of information and performing the reasoning in their heads,
reach a conclusion
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">(Marrin, 2011)</xref>
        . A complementary
approach uses structured analytic techniques, such as those
described by
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">Heuer and Pherson (2011)</xref>
        that guide the
hypothesis generation and testing process performed by the
analysts. Some of these methods and more advanced ones
based on Bayesian probabilistic inference networks are
implemented in analytical tools, such as
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">Netica (2019)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        We have developed a sequence of cognitive assistants
based on Wigmorean networks
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">(Wigmore, 1937)</xref>
        . The first
of these systems, Disciple-LTA, integrates capabilities for
analytic assistance, learning, and tutoring (Tecuci et al.,
2008). TIACRITIS and its subsequent version, Disciple-CD
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17">(Tecuci et al, 2016a)</xref>
        , were developed primarily for teaching
intelligence analysis and were experimentally used in many
______________________________________________________________________
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Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
IC and DOD organizations. While praising their theoretical
framework and evidentiary knowledge, the analysts desired
a simplified interface and interaction, which has led to the
development of Cogent
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">(Tecuci et al., 2015; 2018)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        In this paper we discuss how Cogent supports an analyst
in performing anticipatory analysis. We start with a brief
account of the complexity of this task. Then we introduce a
systematic approach to anticipatory analysis which is
grounded in the science of evidence
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref9">(Schum, 2009)</xref>
        .
Following that we present two examples of anticipatory
analysis with Cogent, and discuss how it assists the analysts
in coping with their complexity. Finally we discuss future
developments of Cogent.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Complexity of Anticipatory Analysis</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Evidence-based Reasoning</title>
      <p>
        The evidence upon which the anticipation of possible future
states or events eventually rests has five major
characteristics that make these anticipations necessarily
probabilistic in nature
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17">(Tecuci et al., 2016a, pp.159-167)</xref>
        .
The evidence is always incomplete no matter how much we
have. It is commonly inconclusive in the sense that it is
consistent with more than one future state or event. Further,
the evidence is frequently ambiguous and, in most
situations, dissonant, some of it favoring one future state or
event while other evidence favoring others. Finally, the
evidence comes from sources having different levels of
credibility. Arguments to test the hypothesized future states
or events are necessary in order to establish and defend the
three major credentials of evidence: its relevance, its
credibility, and its inferential force or weight. These
arguments rest upon both imaginative and critical reasoning.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Assessing the Credibility of Evidence</title>
      <p>
        Evidence credibility assessments form the very foundation
for all arguments we make from evidence to possible future
states or events. The different types of tangible, testimonial,
and mixed evidence have many credibility indicators and all
would need to be assessed based on ancillary evidence in
order to have high confidence in the accuracy of our
anticipations
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17">(Tecuci et al., 2016a, pp. 118-133)</xref>
        .
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Limits of Individual Probability Views</title>
      <p>
        While anticipatory intelligence analysis is probabilistic in
nature, none of the non-enumerative probability views
known to us (Subjective Bayesian, Belief Functions,
Baconian, and Fuzzy) can optimally cope with all the five
characteristics of evidence mentioned above
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17 ref7 ref8">(Schum,
2001a; Tecuci et al., 2016a, pp.173-208)</xref>
        . For example, the
conventional Subjective Bayesian view cannot cope well
with ambiguities or imprecision in evidence. On the other
hand, the Fuzzy view can naturally cope with such
imprecisions. But neither the Bayesian view nor the Fuzzy
view can account for the incompleteness of the coverage of
evidence. The only view that can account for this is the
Baconian view where the probability of a future state or
event depends on how complete the evidence is, or how
many questions recognized as being relevant remain
unanswered by the evidence we have. This is in contrast
with the Bayesian, Belief Functions, and Fuzzy views that
all rest on how strong is the evidence we have about the
considered future state or event. While on the Bayesian
probability scale “0” means disproof, on the Baconian scale,
“0” simply means lack of proof. A future state/event
currently having “0” Baconian probability can be revised
upward in value as soon as we have some evidence for it.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Time Constraints</title>
      <p>A major objective of anticipatory intelligence analysis is to
help insure that the policies and decisions reached by the
governmental and military leaders, at all levels, are well
informed. In many cases analyses are required to answer
questions that are of immediate interest and that do not allow
analysts time for extensive research and deliberation on
available evidence regarding the questions being asked.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Non-Stationary World</title>
      <p>As outlined above, anticipatory intelligence analysis has
many inherent difficulties, but none seem more difficult
than the fact that analysts must assess future states or events
in a non-stationary world that keeps changing as analysts are
trying to understand it. As a result, we have continuing
streams of new information, some items of which are
relevant evidence regarding our anticipations. An
explanation for some pattern of past events analysts have
previously regarded as correct may now seem incorrect in
light of new evidence just discovered today. A future event
regarded as highly likely today may be overtaken by events
we will learn about tomorrow. In fact, the very questions we
asked yesterday may need to be revised or may even seem
unimportant in light of what we learn today. The
consequence is that the complex process of discovery or
investigation in anticipatory analysis is a ceaseless activity.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Anticipatory Intelligence Analysis in the Framework of the Scientific Method</title>
      <p>
        Following the framework of the scientific method, we
model anticipatory analysis as ceaseless discovery of
evidence, anticipations, and arguments, in a non-stationary
world, involving collaborative computational processes of
evidence in search of anticipations, anticipations in search
of evidence, and evidentiary testing of anticipations, as
represented in Figure 1
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17">(Tecuci et al., 2016a)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        First, through abductive (imaginative) reasoning that
shows that something is possibly true
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7 ref8">(Schum, 2001b)</xref>
        , we
generate alternative future events or states that may explain
an intelligence alert. If, instead of an intelligence alert, the
starting point is an intelligence question, the alternative
anticipations are the possible answers to this question. Next,
through deductive reasoning that shows that something is
necessarily true, we use the hypothesized future
states/events to generate new lines of inquiry and discover
new evidence. After that, through inductive reasoning that
shows that something is probably true
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7 ref8">(Schum, 2001a)</xref>
        , we
test each anticipation by developing an argumentation that
shows how the discovered evidence favors or disfavors it.
      </p>
      <p>As shown at the bottom of Figure 1, these are
collaborative processes that support each other in recursive
calls. For example, the discovery of new evidence may lead
to the modification of the existing hypotheses of future
events/states or the generation of new ones that, in turn, lead
to the search and discovery of new evidence. Also,
inconclusive testing of the considered anticipations requires
the discovery of additional evidence. The next sections
illustrates this process using Cogent in two analyses.</p>
      <p>Alternative Future Events or States Probabilities of Anticipations
Alert or Question
Evidence in search
of anticipations</p>
      <p>Abduction
A or Q  possibly H</p>
      <p>New Evidence
Anticipations in
search of evidence</p>
      <p>Deduction
H  necessarily E</p>
      <p>Evidentiary testing
of anticipations</p>
      <p>Induction
E  probably H</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Alert-Driven Anticipatory Analysis</title>
      <p>The following example of anticipatory analysis with Cogent
shows how evidence about a missing cesium-137 canister
leads to anticipating that a dirty bomb will be set off in the
Washington, D.C., area (Tecuci et al., 1016a). Note that this
scenario and all the entities involved are fictitious.</p>
      <p>Mavis, a counterterrorism analyst, reads in today’s
Washington Post that a canister containing cesium-137 is
missing from the warehouse of the XYZ Company in
Maryland (see E* at the bottom of Figure 2). The question
is: What hypothesis would explain this observation?</p>
      <p>Through abductive (imaginative) reasoning, Mavis infers
that a dirty bomb will be set off in the Washington, D.C.,
area (see H5 at the top of Figure 2). However, no matter how
imaginative or important this future event is, no one will
take it seriously unless Mavis and her cognitive assistant,
Cogent, are able to justify it. So they develop the chain of
abductive inferences shown in the left side of Figure 2:</p>
      <p>We have evidence that the cesium-137 canister is missing.
Therefore it is possible that it is indeed missing. It is possible
that it was stolen. It is possible that it was stolen by a
terrorist organization. It is possible that the terrorist
organization will use the cesium-137 canister to build a
dirty bomb. It is possible that the dirty bomb will be set off
in the Washington, D.C., area.</p>
      <p>But these are not the only hypotheses that may explain the
evidence. Just because there is evidence that the cesium-137
canister is missing does not mean that it is indeed missing.
At issue here is the credibility of the source of this
information. Thus an alternative hypothesis is that the
cesium-137 canister is not missing. But let us assume that it
is missing. Then it is possible that it was stolen, but it is also
possible that it was misplaced, or maybe it was used in a
project at the XYZ Company. Now let us assume that the</p>
      <sec id="sec-9-1">
        <title>H”3: stolen</title>
        <p>by employee</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-2">
        <title>H”2: used</title>
        <p>in project</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-3">
        <title>H5: A dirty</title>
        <p>bomb will be</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-4">
        <title>Where? set off in the</title>
        <p>Washington,</p>
        <p>D.C., area</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-5">
        <title>H4: build dirty</title>
        <p>bomb</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-6">
        <title>H3: stolen</title>
        <p>by terrorist
organization
Why?
Who?
How?</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-7">
        <title>H’5: A dirty</title>
        <p>bomb will
be set off in
the New
York area</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-8">
        <title>H’4: build</title>
        <p>unshielded
radiation
sources</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-9">
        <title>H’3: stolen by</title>
        <p>competitor</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-10">
        <title>H2: stolen</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-11">
        <title>H’2:misplaced</title>
        <p>What?</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-12">
        <title>H1: missing</title>
        <p>E*: Article on</p>
        <p>cesium-137
canister missing</p>
        <p>H’1: not
missing
cesium-137 canister was stolen. Then it is possible that it
was stolen by a terrorist organization, or by a competitor of
XYZ, or by an employee. Upper level hypotheses concern
possible future events, such as, the terrorist organization will
use the cesium-137 canister to build a dirty bomb, the dirty
bomb will be set off in the Washington, D.C., area, or it will
be set off in the New York area.</p>
        <p>The analyst and Cogent need to assess each of these
competing hypotheses, and determine which of them are
likely. Starting from bottom-up, each hypothesis is put to
work to guide the collection of additional evidence:</p>
        <p>Assuming that the cesium-137 canister is indeed missing,
what other things should be observable? What are the
necessary conditions for an object to be missing from a
warehouse? It was in the warehouse, it is no longer there,
and no one has checked it out.</p>
        <p>As a result, the analyst contacts Ralph, the supervisor of
the warehouse, who reports that the cesium-137 canister is
registered as being in the warehouse, that no one at the XYZ
Company had checked it out, but it is not located anywhere
in the hazardous materials locker. He also indicates that the
lock on the hazardous materials locker appears to have been
forced. Ralph’s testimony provides several items of relevant
evidence, and the question is: What is the probability that
the cesium-137 canister is missing, based on this evidence?</p>
        <p>
          To answer this question, Mavis and Cogent build the
Wigmorean probabilistic inference network from Figure 3
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref22">(Wigmore, 1937; Tecuci et al., 2018)</xref>
          . It integrates logic and
Baconian probabilities with Fuzzy qualifiers, and uses the
min/max probability combination rules common to the
Baconian and Fuzzy views of probability
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref23">(Cohen, 1977;
1989; Zadeh, 1983)</xref>
          . That is, the probability of a conjunction
of hypotheses is the minimum of their probabilities, and the
probability of a disjunction of hypotheses is the maximum
of their probabilities.
        </p>
        <p>
          First Mavis and Cogent have to assess the probabilities of
the bottom hypotheses in Figure 3, based on the
corresponding relevant evidence. Then these probabilities
are composed to produce the probability of the top
hypothesis. The probability of a hypothesis, like the one
from the bottom left of Figure 3, shown also at the top of
Figure 4, is assessed based on the three credentials of
evidence: credibility, relevance, and inferential force
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref17">(Tecuci et al., 2016a, pp. 62-73)</xref>
          . They are assessed by using
the ordered symbolic probability scale from the upper right
of Figure 3. As in the Baconian system, “lacking support”
for a hypothesis means that we currently have no basis to
consider that the hypothesis might be true. However, we
may later find evidence to infer that the hypothesis is, for
instance, “likely.” Figure 3 shows a favoring argument for
the top hypothesis and therefore it appears under the left
(green) square. Disfavoring arguments (if any) appear under
the right (pink) square.
        </p>
        <p>The credibility of the evidence item E2 in Figure 4 is
assessed as very likely because its source, Ralph, has access
to the reported information and has a reputation for honesty.
The relevance of E2 is assessed as almost certain because
the records of the XYZ Company are almost certainly
correct. Consistent with both the Baconian and the Fuzzy
min/max probability combination rules, the inferential force
of E2 on the hypothesis H is determined as the minimum
between the credibility of E2 (very likely) and the relevance
of E2 (almost certain). Thus, the inferential force of E2 on
H is very likely. Obviously, an irrelevant item of evidence
will have no inferential force, and will not convince us that
the hypothesis is true. An item of evidence that is not
credible will have no inferential force either. Only an item
of evidence that is both relevant and credible supports the
truthfulness of a hypothesis.</p>
        <p>Because in the argumentation from Figure 4 there is only
one item of favoring evidence, E2, its inferential force on
the hypothesis is also the probability of the hypothesis. In
general, however, the probability of the hypothesis would be
the result of the balance of probabilities between the
combined inferential force of the favoring evidence items
and the combined inferential force of the disfavoring items.</p>
        <p>As shown at the top of Figure 3, it is very likely that the
cesium-137 canister is missing, this being the minimum
between the probabilities of the three sub-hypotheses and
the relevance of their conjunctive argument.</p>
        <p>Some of the newly discovered evidence may trigger new
hypotheses or the refinement of the current hypotheses. For
example, during her initial investigation, Mavis discovered
a video segment from a security camera at the warehouse
showing a person loading a container into a U-Haul truck,
leading her to refine the “stolen” hypothesis to indicate that
the cesium-137 canister was stolen with a U-Haul truck.</p>
        <p>Having concluded that the cesium-137 canister is
missing, Mavis and Cogent have now to establish whether it
was stolen with a truck, it was misplaced, or it was used in
a project at the XYZ Company. Each of these hypotheses is
put to work to guide the collection of evidence for assessing
it: If the cesium-137 canister was stolen with a truck, what
other things should be observable?</p>
        <p>Based on the current evidence, Mavis imagines the
following scenario on how the cesium-137 canister might
have been stolen: The truck entered the company, the
canister was stolen from the locker, the canister was loaded
into the truck, and the truck left with the canister.</p>
        <p>Such scenarios have enormous heuristic value in
advancing the investigation because they consist of mixtures
of what is taken to be factual and what is conjectural.
Conjecture is necessary in order to fill in natural gaps left by
the absence of existing evidence. Each such conjecture,
however, opens up new avenues of investigation, and the
very likely Probability of H</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-13">
        <title>H: The canister was in the warehouse</title>
        <p>very likely Inferential force: Probability of H based
only on E2
almost certain</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-14">
        <title>Relevance: Probability of H2 assuming</title>
        <p>that E2 is true
very likely Credibility: Probability that E2 is true
E2 Canister registered: Ralph, who has
a reputation for honesty, reports that
the cesium-137 canister is registered as
being in the warehouse.
discovery of additional evidence, if the scenario turns out to
be true. This scenario, for instance, leads Mavis to check the
records of the security guard and they show that a panel
truck bearing Maryland license plate number MDC-578 was
in the XYZ parking area on the day before the discovery that
the cesium-137 canister was missing.</p>
        <p>Fusing all the discovered evidence, Mavis and Cogent
conclude that it is very likely that the cesium-137 canister
was stolen with the MDC-578 truck. After further
investigation, they also conclude that the two competing
hypotheses, “misplaced” and “used in a project,” lack
evidentiary support.</p>
        <p>Continuing the investigation with the rental company
owning the truck, it is discovered that Omar al-Massari
rented the MDC-578 truck giving his alias, Omer Riley, and
a false address, and that the truck is now contaminated
because cesium-137 is radioactive. These lead to the
conclusion that Omar used the truck to steal the cesium-137
canister. It is further discovered that Omar al-Massari has
ties with terrorist organizations, and that he has given the
cesium-137 canister to Saeed al-Nami, alias Kenny
Derwish, who is a member of the terrorist organization Jihad
Bis Sayf. These discoveries lead to the specializations of the
hypotheses from Figure 2 as shown in Figure 5.</p>
        <p>Figure 6 shows the analysis of the top anticipatory
hypothesis “Jihad Bis Sayf will set off a dirty bomb in the
Washington, DC, area.” It shows that Jihad Bis Sayf has
reasons, desire, and capability to set off the dirty bomb. It
has reasons because it is a terrorist organization opposed to
the United States, it has a presence in the Washington, DC,
area, and a dirty bomb in this area would have a very high
impact. Furthermore, Jihad Bis Sayf has both the ability to
build the bomb and to set it off. In particular, it has the
radioactive material from the stolen cesium-137 canister,
and further investigation has determined that it has both the
necessary explosive material (Saeed al-Nami has stolen 2
pounds of RDX explosive) and expertise to build the bomb
(Saeed al-Nami has expertise in explosives and has received
training in the building of dirty bombs).</p>
        <p>Where?</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-15">
        <title>H5: Jihad Bis Sayf will set off a dirty</title>
        <p>bomb in the Washington, D.C., area</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-16">
        <title>Why? H4: Jihad Bis Sayf will build a dirty bomb</title>
        <p>Who?
How?
What?</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-17">
        <title>H3: cesium-137 canister stolen by</title>
        <p>Jihad Bis Sayf, a terrorist organization</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-18">
        <title>H2: cesium-137 canister stolen by</title>
        <p>Omar al-Massari with MDC-578 truck</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-9-19">
        <title>H1: cesium-137 canister missing</title>
        <p>E*: Article on cesium-137 canister missing</p>
        <p>Through such spiral hybrid reasoning, where abductions,
deductions, and inductions feed on each other in recursive
calls, Mavis and Cogent continuously generate and update
intermediate alternative hypotheses, use these hypotheses to
guide the collection of relevant evidence, and use the
evidence to test these hypotheses, until the probability of the
top-level hypotheses are assessed, ultimately anticipating
that Jihad Bis Sayf will likely set off a dirty bomb in the
Washington, D.C., area.</p>
        <p>Note, however, that performing this analysis is not as
simple as one may infer from this presentation. It is the
methodology from Figure 1 and Cogent that guide the
analyst and simplify it. Many things can and will indeed go
wrong. But Cogent provides the means to deal with them.
Based on evidence, you come up with some hypotheses, but
then you cannot find more evidence to support any of them.
So you need to come up with other hypotheses, and you
should always consider alternative hypotheses. The
deduction-based decomposition approach guides you on
how to look for evidence, but your knowledge and
imagination also play a crucial role. As illustrated here,
Mavis imagined a scenario where the cesium-137 canister
was stolen with a truck. But let us now assume that she did
not find supporting evidence for this scenario. Therefore,
capability</p>
        <p>&amp;
ability to ability to set off
obtain a its dirty bomb in
dirty bomb the Washington,</p>
        <p>D.C., area.</p>
        <p>…
has secure
place to build
a dirty bomb
…
Mavis has to imagine other scenarios. Maybe the cesium
canister was stolen by someone working at the XYZ
Company, or maybe it was stolen by Ralph, the
administrator of the warehouse. The important thing is that
each such scenario opens up a new line of investigation.
(likely). They combine into an overall desire of likely.
Finally, almost certainly the United States have the required
capabilities that consist of required homegrown scientific
knowledge, technical knowledge, economic resources, and
natural resources.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Question-Driven Anticipatory Analysis</title>
      <p>The previous section illustrated a situation where the
anticipatory analysis was driven by an intelligence alert.
This section illustrates a situation where the analysis is
driven by the intelligence question: Who will be the world
leader in wind power within the next decade?</p>
      <p>The top level of the corresponding anticipatory analysis
is shown in Figure 7. It is likely that the United States will
be the world leader in wind power within the next decade
because almost certainly they have reasons, likely they have
the desire, and almost certainly they have the necessary
capability. A reason is that significant production of wind
power will reduce the current need of the United States to
consume huge quantities of oil that represent a danger to the
environment. The desire of the United States, which is a
representative democracy, is determined by the desire of the
people (almost certain), the desire of the major political
parties (very likely), and the desire of the energy industries</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>Current Cognitive Assistance</title>
      <p>Consider again the process described in Figure 1. With the
current version of Cogent, the analyst has to imagine the
possible future states or events. However, Cogent helps with
developing argumentations that lay out the underlying
analytical framework for every anticipation, including the
connection between the evidence and various intermediate
hypotheses in the analysis, the evaluation of the credibility
of evidence and its strength in supporting a hypothesis, and
the role of assumptions in addressing missing information.</p>
      <p>Anticipatory analysis may be affected by the analyst’s
biases. Cogent can detect several of them, such as the
confirmation bias (building an argumentation and/or only
searching for evidence that confirms the analyst’s beliefs
while dismissing or ignoring evidence to the contrary), the
satisficing bias (choosing the first hypothesis that appears
good enough, rather than carefully identifying all possible
hypotheses and determining which one is the most
consistent with the evidence), and potential absence of
evidence bias (failure to consider the degree of
completeness of the available evidence). Many other biases
are avoided because explicit argumentations are developed
that employ an intuitive system of symbolic probabilities.</p>
      <p>Additionally, Cogent facilitates the analysis of what-if
scenarios, where the analyst may make various assumptions
and Cogent automatically determines their influence on the
analytic conclusion. It also automatically updates the
computed probabilities based on new or revised evidence.</p>
      <p>Once the analysis is finalized, Cogent generates a
structured report that the analyst then transforms into a more
understandable and persuasive report that includes
argumentation fragments and evidence, can be shared with
other analysts, subjected to critical analysis, and
correspondingly improved.</p>
      <p>The hierarchical structure of the Wigmorean
argumentation enables the analyst and Cogent to perform
the analysis at different levels of abstraction. Moreover, the
analyst may drill down on selected sub-hypotheses as much
as allowed by the available time and evidence. Consider, for
example, the dirty bomb anticipated event from Figure 6. In
time-limiting situations the analyst may assume that Jihad
Bis Sayf has the reasons and desire to set off the dirty bomb,
and focus the investigation on its capability.</p>
      <p>Note that an anticipated future state made at a given
moment in time may change afterwards because many of its
indicators are dynamic, such as those that determine the
desire of the United States in the wind power
scenario (see Figure 7). Therefore evidence of
these indicators needs to be continuously
monitored and updated. In the current version of
Cogent, this monitoring has to be done by the
analyst who also needs to insert the new
evidence in the analysis. After that Cogent
automatically updates the analysis. However, as
discussed in the next section, continuous
monitoring and updating of evidence can also be
automated.</p>
      <p>
        Cogent has a knowledge base that includes an
ontology of evidence and rules for assessing its
credibility. Figure 8 shows a fragment of this
ontology
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref9">(Schum et al., 2009)</xref>
        . For each type of
evidence from this ontology, Cogent has a
procedure for assessing its credibility. For
example, as illustrated in the left hand side of
Figure 8, the credibility of an item of
demonstrative tangible evidence (e.g., a map, a sound
recording, or a satellite image) depends on its authenticity,
its accuracy, and the reliability of the instrument the
produced it. The credibility of a human source depends on
the source’s competence, veracity, and accuracy. These
indicators depend on lower level indicators. For example,
the competence depends on the source’s access and
expertise, while the accuracy depends on the source’s
objectivity and observational sensitivity.
      </p>
      <p>As discussed in the next section, future research will
address the problem of learning general analysis rules from
an expert analyst, which will speed-up and improve the
development of new analyses. Note, for example, that the
analyses from the previous sections, although very different,
both make use of the following reasoning pattern: An actor
will perform a certain action or achieve a certain state if it
has reasons, desire, and capability. The rules learned from
the analysis in Figure 7 will enable Cogent to automatically
generate analyses of future states such as: China will be the
world leader in solar energy within the next decade.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>Mixed-Initiative and Automatic</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>Anticipatory Analysis</title>
      <p>
        We plan to significantly extend Cogent with
knowledge-based reasoning and learning capabilities,
effectively evolving it into the multi-agent architecture
from Figure 9, similar to that described in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">(Tecuci et al.,
2019)</xref>
        . It will have two complementary functions:
(1) Analysis and Learning, shown in the upper part
of Figure 9, where the Analyst and Cogent (through its
Mixed-Initiative Learning and Reasoning component)
will rapidly develop complex, logical, and compelling
argumentations in a transparent manner. At the same
Anticipations
      </p>
      <p>Learning to
discover and
monitor evidence</p>
      <p>Probabilities
Legaernneirnagteto Leartneisntg to
hypotheses Collection Requests/Evidence hypotheses
real
tangible
evidence
unequivocal
testimonial
evidence
equivocal
testimonial
evidence
testimonial
evidence based
on opinion</p>
      <p>
        probabilistically
equivocal testimonial
evidence
unequivocal testimonial
evidence obtained at
second hand
completely equivocal
testimonial evidence
time, Cogent will learn domain analysis rules from the
contributions of the Analyst, through the employment of the
Disciple-EBR multistrategy learning approach, which
integrates learning from examples, learning from
explanations, and learning by analogy and experimentation,
in a mixed-initiative interaction with the expert. Successive
versions of this learning approach are presented in
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11">(Tecuci
1998; Tecuci et al. 2002; 2005; 2008; 2016b)</xref>
        . Cogent will
also facilitate the development of analyses in collaboration
with other analysts, each contributing sub-arguments based
on their expertise, reviewing and commenting on
eachother’s contributions, and sharing previously learned
domain analysis rules, sources, and evidence.
      </p>
      <p>(2) Automatic Analysis Updating, shown in the bottom
part of Figure 9, where Cogent (through its collaborative
autonomous agents) continuously monitors the Multi-INT
Environment and updates the performed analysis based on
the newly discovered evidence. These agents are copies of
the corresponding modules of the Learning and Reasoning
credibility of image
authenticity reliability
accuracy
demonstrative
tangible
evidence
credibility of human source
unequivocal testimonial
evidence based upon
direct observation
competence
veracity
accuracy</p>
      <p>evidence
tangible
evidence
testimonial
evidence
missing
evidence
authoritative
record
Mixed-Initiative</p>
      <p>Learning and
Reasoning Assistant</p>
      <p>Alert or Question</p>
      <p>Reference
Knowledge Base (KB)</p>
      <p>Hypothesis
Generation KB Queue
Hypothesis Analysis</p>
      <p>KB Queue
Evidence Collection</p>
      <p>KB Queue
User Review
KB Queue
Assistant except that they are configured to run
autonomously and communicate by developing and
exchanging Knowledge Bases. The component agents of
Cogent will be connected to the application environment
through a Surveillance Manager and a Collection and
Monitoring Manager, the latter continuously monitoring the
results returned by the Collection Agents that operate on the
Multi-INT Environment. Once a new or updated evidence
item is detected, it is introduced in the analysis by the
Evidence Agent, and the analysis is updated by the
Hypothesis Analysis Agent.</p>
      <p>The automatic hypothesis generation is performed by the
Alert Agent in collaboration with the Hypothesis Generation
Agent. Next, the hypothesis-driven evidence discovery is
performed by Hypothesis Analysis Agents in collaboration
with the Evidence Agent. Then evidence requests are issued
to collection agents through the Collection and Monitoring
Manager. After that, evidence-based hypothesis testing is
performed by the Evidence Agent in collaboration with the
Hypothesis Analysis Agents.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-14">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>After reviewing several of the complexities of anticipatory
intelligence analysis, this paper illustrated how they can be
alleviated through the use of the Cogent cognitive assistant
within a systematic approach based on the science of
evidence and the scientific method. Key to overcoming
these complexities and performing more accurate
anticipatory analyses based on imperfect information in a
dynamic world, is the synergistic integration of the analyst’s
imagination and expertise with the computer’s knowledge
and critical reasoning.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-15">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>David Schum has significantly influenced this research that
was supported in part by NSF under grant number 1611742,
by AFRL under contract number FA8750-17-C-0002, by
IARPA under contract number 2017-16112300009, and by
George Mason University. The views and conclusions
contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies,
either expressed or implied, of any organization of the U.S.
Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to
reproduce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes
notwithstanding any copyright annotation therein.</p>
    </sec>
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