=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-2584/PT-paper2 |storemode=property |title=The AMASS Tool Platform: An Innovative Solution for Assurance and Certication of Cyber-Physical Systems |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2584/PT-paper2.pdf |volume=Vol-2584 |authors=Jose Luis de la Vara,Eugenio Parra,Alejandra Ruiz,Barbara Gallina |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/refsq/VaraPRG20 }} ==The AMASS Tool Platform: An Innovative Solution for Assurance and Certication of Cyber-Physical Systems== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2584/PT-paper2.pdf
 The AMASS Tool Platform: An Innovative Solution for
 Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical Systems

                      Jose Luis de la Vara                                  Eugenio Parra
                University of Castilla-La Mancha                   Carlos III University of Madrid
                         Albacete, Spain                                   Leganes, Spain
                   joseluis.delavara@uclm.es                             eparra@inf.uc3m.es

                              Alejandra Ruiz                                 Barbara Gallina
                     Tecnalia Research and Innovation                     Mälardalen University
                               Derio, Spain                                 Västerås, Sweden
                       alejandra.ruiz@tecnalia.com                       barbara.gallina@mdh.se




                                                       Abstract
                        Cyber-physical systems are usually subject to assurance and certifica-
                        tion processes, including thorough requirements engineering tasks, to
                        ensure that they are acceptably dependable. The underlying activities
                        can be complex and labour-intensive, thus practitioners need tools
                        that facilitate them. We present the AMASS Tool Platform as an
                        example of these tools. This Platform is an open source solution that
                        supports the main activities for assurance and certification. It also
                        provides advanced features such as argument fragment composition
                        and automated assurance evidence generation and collection. In
                        addition, we present the main insights gained from tool usage. Among
                        them, practitioners expect improvement in relation to usability,
                        performance, and ease of configuration. Videos showing tool usage are
                        available online, including general usage scenarios1 .

                        Keywords: cyber-physical systems, assurance, certification, AMASS.




1     Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS), e.g. aircrafts, cars, and trains, are usually subject to rigorous assurance and
certification processes to provide adequate confidence and evidence that the systems satisfy given requirements
and thus are dependable [Nai14], i.e. acceptably safe, secure, reliable, etc. This is typically performed in
compliance with standards. For complex systems, the activities are challenging and labour-intensive because

   Copyright c 2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International
(CC BY 4.0).
   In: M. Sabetzadeh, A. Vogelsang, S. Abualhaija, M. Borg, F. Dalpiaz, M. Daneva, N. Fernández, X. Franch, D. Fucci, V.
Gervasi, E. Groen, R. Guizzardi, A. Herrmann, J. Horkoff, L. Mich, A. Perini, A. Susi (eds.): Joint Proceedings of REFSQ-2020
Workshops, Doctoral Symposium, Live Studies Track, and Poster Track, Pisa, Italy, 24-03-2020, published at http://ceur-ws.org

    1 https://youtu.be/9cEhDcai 9g
of the large set of compliance criteria to fulfil, the amount of evidence to manage, and the need for providing
valid dependability justifications, among other issues [dlV16][Nai15]. Therefore, practitioners need adequate tool
support for assurance and certification. The activities are however usually executed with different tools that are
not integrated, and most often with basic tools such as Excel that provide very limited specific support.
   The AMASS project (Architecture-driven, Multi-concern and Seamless Assurance and Certification of CPS;
[Ama20]) provided innovative tool support for assurance and certification. AMASS was an industry-academia
research project in which 29 partners from eight countries worked on the creation and consolidation of the de-facto
European-wide open tool platform, ecosystem, and self-sustainable community for assurance and certification.
   The ultimate goal of AMASS was to lower certification costs for CPS. To this end, a novel holistic approach was
defined for architecture-driven assurance (compatible with standards such as SysML), multi-concern assurance
(for co-analysis and co-assurance of e.g. security and safety aspects), seamless interoperability between assurance
and engineering activities (including their tool support), and cross- and intra-domain reuse of assurance assets
(e.g. of assurance evidence between projects).
   The tool that supports the approach is referred to as AMASS Tool Platform. It is an open source solution
that has integrated and further developed several existing technologies and toolsets for compliance management,
system modelling, process engineering, traceability, variability management, and tool interoperability. The
Platform includes support for requirements engineering (RE) tasks such as elicitation, specification, and analysis
of dependability requirements. It is managed as an Eclipse project [OpC20].
   The following sections introduce the requirements, architecture, and implementation of the AMASS Tool
Platform and the experience in using it. These aspects have not been introduced in conjunction in any prior
publication. Nonetheless, AMASS deliverables [Ama20] include details about them separately. Prior publications
also provide more information about the motivation [Rui16] and objectives [dlV19a] of the AMASS project, the
process that underlies Platform usage [dlV19b], and the Eclipse open source project [Esp18][Gal19]. Publications
on specific research topics are available, e.g. on artefact quality analysis [Par19].

2   Workflow and Requirements
The AMASS Tool Platform provides a collaborative tool environment that supports the main activities for CPS
assurance and certification, including activities dealing with product requirements and with process requirements.
The general assurance project stages supported, as high-level features, are Standards Compliance Definition,
Process Reusability Definition, Assurance Project Definition, System Design Analysis and V&V, Assurance Case
Management, and Evidence Management [Ama18b]. Not all stages need to be performed for each project; e.g.
the first two stages are project independent and the outcome could be re-used for multiple projects.
   Three categories of user roles exist [Ama18a]: Manager, such as Project, Assurance, and IT Managers; Engi-
neer, such as Development Engineer (including Process Engineer) and Assurance Engineer (including Safety and
Security Engineers), and; Assessor, such as Assurance Assessor (including Independent and Internal Assessors).
   For Standards Compliance Definition, the Assurance Manager and the Process Engineer capture and retrieve
compliance knowledge from standards about requirements and other compliance criteria. The Assurance Manager
and the Process and Assurance Engineers participate in Process Reusability Definition to manage reusable
compliant process elements. During Assurance Project Definition, the Assurance Manager and the Process
Engineer define the compliance needs, reuse possibilities, and compliance means for a project. For System
Design Analysis and V&V, the Development and the Assurance Engineers elicit and specify system requirements,
define the system architecture, define and validate component contracts, and execute dependability analyses.
Assurance Case Management addresses argumentation using compliance and product arguments, resolution of
safety-security trade-offs, and the link to system architecture, involving the Assurance Manager and the Process,
Assurance, and Development Engineers. The Assurance Manager and the Assurance and Process Engineers
perform Evidence Management by collecting and specifying data about project artefacts, traceability, process
execution, and compliance.
   The analysis and specification of these high-level features, users, and workflow was conducted in parallel to the
elicitation and documentation of 151 high-level requirements [Ama17] (e.g. “The AMASS Tool Platform shall
be able to validate formal requirements” and “The AMASS Tool Platform shall allow an assurance engineer to
specify the characteristics of assurance evidence”) and 73 use cases [Ama18a] (e.g. “Analyse requirements” and
“Characterise evidence artefact”) for the main overall functional areas of the Platform: platform infrastructure,
architecture-driven assurance, multi-concern assurance, seamless interoperability, and cross- and intra-domain
reuse. The requirements and use cases were also grouped by finer-grain architectural building blocks (Section 3).
3     Architecture and Implementation
The logical architecture of the AMASS Tool Platform is referred to as AMASS Reference Tool Architecture
(Figure 1; [Ama18a]). The Architecture provides a conceptual framework for architecture-driven assurance,
multi-concern assurance, seamless interoperability, and cross- and intra-domain reuse of assurance assets. It
contains both technological building blocks, e.g. System architecture modelling for assurance, and the Common
Assurance & Certification Metamodel. The metamodel provides an information model for CPS assurance and
certification, e.g. for Compliance management and for Assurance case specification. Basic application services
such as Access and Data management are also considered. The main stakeholder groups of the architecture are
Manufacturer, Supplier, Assessor & Authorities, and Tool Vendors.




                                 Figure 1: AMASS Reference Tool Architecture

   All the building blocks relate to RE, as CPS assurance and certification deals with the determination of
dependability requirements for the systems, both for products and for processes and both from standards and
from system analyses, as well as with the justification of requirement satisfaction. The most RE-focused building
block is arguably Requirements support, which addresses requirements derivation from dependability analyses,
formalisation, quality analysis, and verification.
   The AMASS Tool Platform is a concrete implementation of the AMASS Reference Tool Architecture with
capability for evolution and adaptation (Figure 2). Eclipse is the main environment for Platform usage, but
web-based support also exists for some functionality. The Platform has integrated and further developed:
    • OpenCert for compliance management, evidence management, assurance case specification, and dependabil-
      ity assurance modelling.
    • Papyrus and CHESS for system modelling, system analysis, contract modelling, contract-based multi-
      concern assurance, contract-based trade-off analysis, and design verification.
    • EPF-Composer for assurance process modelling, compliance, and tailoring.
    • Capra for traceability management for requirements and other system artefacts.
    • BVR for orthogonal variability management, also in relation to assets created with EPF-Composer, CHESS,
      and OpenCert.
  • OSLC for tool interoperability features.

  • CDO for data storage management.

   An integrated usage workflow could be as follows. OpenCert would be used to specify and analyse the com-
pliance criteria for a project such as the requirements to satisfy from applicable standards, and EPF-Composer
to define a project-specific assurance process according to process requirements. BVR would help a user study
their variants, e.g. for compliance. Papyrus and CHESS would then support system modelling and automated
analysis, including requirements needs. The results could be traced with Capra and used in evidence manage-
ment. If data had to be imported from or exported to an external tool, OSLC would enable it. Finally, assurance
cases could be managed throughout the workflow to justify requirement satisfaction, updating them according
to design decisions and the available evidence, and generating fragments.
   In addition, the AMASS Tool Platform interacts with over a dozen tools that provide additional features,
typically commercial ones, e.g.:

  • MORETO [Ama18d] for security analysis and generation of security requirements.

  • Medini Analyze [ANS20] for workflow support and for safety and security analyses.

  • SAVONA [Exp20] for contract modelling.

  • SafetyArchitect and CyberArchitect [RiO20] for dependability co-analysis.

  • OCRA [OCR20] for system V&V.

  • RQA - Quality Studio [TRC20] for requirements quality analysis.

   The resulting open source ecosystem and community are managed as an Eclipse project [OpC20]. The
community deals with the maintenance, evolution, and industrialization of the AMASS Tool Platform and
is supported by a governance board and by rules, policies, and quality models. Last but not least, the
documentation of the AMASS Tool Platform includes a detailed developers’ guide [Ama18b] for those interested
in implementing new functionality for or on top of the Platform.




                   Figure 2: General view of the AMASS Tool Platform and its ecosystem
4   Experience and Lessons Learned
The main experience and lessons learned from using the AMASS Tool Platform are a result of three different
activities during the AMASS project.
   Validation [Ama18c][Ama19c]. Three versions of the Platform were released during the AMASS project.
Each version underwent validation tasks. The execution of 141 test cases confirmed the implementation of 93% of
the high-level requirements specified for the Platform. The usability analysis results suggest that EPF-Composer
and Papyrus provide a good user experience and that the rest of tools have larger potential for improvement.
The documentation of the Platform could also be enhanced, as inconsistency was found because of insufficient
homogeneity in the documentation style by all the contributors and for all the features. Finally, it appeared that
the main data storage technology could impact performance under certain configurations.
   Application [Ama19a]. The AMASS Tool Platform was used in 11 industrial case studies from air traffic
management, automotive, avionics, industrial automation, railway, and space. Each case study selected a subset
of the functionality of the AMASS Tool Platform for its application, and each piece of functionality was applied
in at least one case study. For example, requirements were modelled, analysed, and verified and their satisfaction
was justified, among other activities, in the scope of safety assessment of multi-modal interactions in cockpits
for the avionics domain. Practitioners in the AMASS consortium reported achievements, benefits, improvement
opportunities, and recommendations from the application of the Platform. Suggestions were made on user
interaction (e.g. to further guide the users), the value of the new features was stated (e.g. modelling of standards),
and easier configuration was expected for the Platform. It is a large tool with many sub-tools, but an organisation
would typically be interested only in a subset of the functionality. The selection, configuration, and tailoring of
the subset could be better supported, e.g. with a dashboard for feature selection.
   Benchmarking [Ama19b]. The industrial case studies were used to compare how assurance and certification
could be executed with the Platform and how they were executed before. Quantitative evaluations were performed
to study the reduction of effort in assurance and certification (initial target: 50%), reduction of risks (35%),
reduction of costs in (re)certification (40%), and increase in technology harmonisation and interoperability (60%).
These goals were achieved in general, but to a varying extent among the case studies. The use of different features
is one of the reasons.
   The above-mentioned activities also allowed the AMASS consortium to estimate the Technology Readiness
Level of its components [Ama19c]. Such a level differs among them. EPF-Composer and Papyrus can be regarded
as the most mature technologies. Tool qualification considerations of the AMASS Tool Platform have also been
analysed [Ama19c]. Although the Platform itself cannot directly introduce errors in a system, the specific aspects
to consider will depend on how the Platform is used, e.g. regarding the verification of its automatic actions and
the toolchain deployed.

5   Conclusion
The AMASS project developed innovative tool support for CPS assurance and certification, and thus for certain
RE needs of CPS, focusing on architecture-driven assurance, multi-concern assurance, seamless interoperabil-
ity, and cross- and intra-domain reuse of assurance assets. The resulting AMASS Tool Platform is an open
source solution that facilitates system modelling and analysis, compliance management, argumentation, process
engineering, variability management, and traceability. The Platform is also integrated with external tools for
additional features, e.g. for requirements quality analysis. Although the Platform needs to further mature, we
argue that its finalisation and its public release are initial, major milestones. It is the first integrated environment
for assurance and certification and benefits from its use have been demonstrated.
   The development of the AMASS Tool Platform focused on supporting assurance and certification for CPS,
but the Platform can be used for any system or project having to deal with e.g. system modelling or compliance.
Nonetheless, Platform usage would in principle have to be tailored.
   We plan to continue working on the development of tool support that improves assurance and certification.
This includes the development of novel solutions for traceability, assurance case management, and privacy as-
surance.

Acknowledgements
The research leading to this paper has received funding from the AMASS (H2020-ECSEL grant agreement
no 692474), iRel4.0 (H2020-ECSEL grant agreement no 876659), VALU3S (H2020-ECSEL grant agreement no
876852), and Treasure (JCCM ref. SBPLY/19/180501/000270) projects, and from the Ramon y Cajal Program
(MICINN ref. RYC-2017-22836; European Social Fund). We are also grateful to all the people that have
contributed to the development of the AMASS Tool Platform.

References
[Ama17] AMASS Project: Deliverable 2.1 - Business cases and high-level requirements. 2017.
[Ama18a] AMASS Project: Deliverable 2.4 - AMASS reference architecture (c). 2018.
[Ama18b] AMASS Project: Deliverable 2.5 - AMASS user guidance and methodological framework. 2018.
[Ama18c] AMASS Project: Deliverable 2.8 - Integrated AMASS platform (c). 2018.
[Ama18d] AMASS Project: Deliverable 4.6 - Prototype for multi-concern assurance (c). 2018.
[Ama19a] AMASS Project. Deliverable 1.6 - AMASS demonstrators (c). 2019.
[Ama19b] AMASS Project: Deliverable 1.7 - AMASS solution benchmarking. 2019.
[Ama19c] AMASS Project: Deliverable 2.9 - AMASS platform validation. 2019.
[Ama20] AMASS Project (online) https://www.amass-ecsel.eu/ (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[ANS20] ANSYS. Ansys medini analyze (online) https://www.ansys.com/products/systems/ansys-medini-
  analyze (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[dlV16] J.L. de la Vara, et al. An Industrial Survey on Safety Evidence Change Impact Analysis Practice. IEEE
   Transactions on Software Engineering, 42(12): 1095-1117, 2016.
[dlV19a] J.L. de la Vara, et al. AMASS: A Large-Scale European Project to Improve the Assurance and Certi-
   fication of Cyber-Physical Systems. PROFES 2019.
[dlV19b] J.L. de la Vara, et al. The AMASS Approach for Assurance and Certification of Critical Systems.
   embedded world Conference 2019.
[Esp18] H. Espinoza, et al. Meet the new Eclipse-based tools for Assurance and Certification of Cyber-Physical
  Systems. Eclipse Newsletter, July 2018.
[Exp20] Expleo. SAVONA: Design, Specification & Verification of Embedded                        Systems    (online)
  https://www.expleo-germany.com/en/products/savona/ (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[Gal19] G. Gallina, et al. AMASS: Call for Users and Contributors. Eclipse Newsletter, July 2019.
[Nai14] S. Nair, et al. An extended systematic literature review on provision of evidence for safety certification.
  Information and Software Technology, 56(7): 689-717, 2014.
[Nai15] S. Nair, et al. Evidence management for compliance of critical systems with safety standards: A survey
  on the state of practice. Information and Software Technology 60: 1-15, 2015.
[OCR20] OCRA (online) https://ocra.fbk.eu/ (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[OpC20] OpenCert (online) https://www.polarsys.org/opencert/ (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[Par19] E. Parra, et al. Advances in Artefact Quality Analysis for Critical Systems. ISSRE 2019.
[RiO20] RiskOversee (online) https://www.riskoversee.com/en/home/ (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[Rui16] A. Ruiz, et al. Architecture-driven, Multi-concern, Seamless, Reuse-Oriented Assurance and Certification
  of Cyber-Physical Systems. SAFECOMP Workshops 2016.
[TRC20] The REUSE Company. RQA - Quality Studio (online) https://www.reusecompany.com/rqa-quality-
  studio (Accessed Feb 17, 2020)
[You20] Youtube. AMASS Prototype P1 Architecture-driven (online) https://youtu.be/9cEhDcai 9g (Accessed
  Feb 17, 2020)