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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Tableaux for Murphree's numerical term logic</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>J.-Mart n Castro-Manzano</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Faculty of Philosophy, UPAEP University 21 sur 1103</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Puebla</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="MX">Mexico</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Murphree's Numerical Term Logic is a logic capable of representing and performing inference with numerical quanti ers by modifying Sommers Term Functor Logic: in this contribution we o er a tableaux method for it. In other places we have developed tableaux for Sommers' Term Functor Logic [19,8,21], Intermediate Term Functor Logic a la Thompson [23], and Englebretsen's Modal Term Logic [7]. In this contribution we continue our exploration into the realm of term logics and, by using Murphree's Numerical Term Logic [13], we present tableaux for a family of term logics comprising Term Functor Logic, Intermediate Term Functor Logic, and Numerical Term Logic. Hence, for a more detailed exposition of Term Functor Logic and its tableaux, we refer the reader to our previous work [4]. Meanwhile, in order to achieve our present goal, we rst provide a summary of some preliminary concepts (syllogistic, term functor logic, and term functor logic tableaux), then we explain the basics of Murphree's logic (namely, its syntax and rules) and, nally, we develop tableaux for it (including some metalogical results).</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Semantic trees</kwd>
        <kwd>term logic</kwd>
        <kwd>numerical term logic</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>2.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Preliminaries</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Syllogistic</title>
        <p>
          Syllogistic is a term logic that has its origins in Aristotle's Prior Analytics [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ] and
deals with inference between categorical propositions. A categorical proposition
is a proposition composed by two terms, a quantity, and a quality. The subject
and the predicate of a proposition are called terms: the term-schema S denotes
the subject term of the proposition and the term-schema P denotes the predicate.
The quantity may be either universal (All ) or particular (Some) and the quality
may be either a rmative (is) or negative (is not ). These categorical propositions
have a type denoted by a label (either a (universal a rmative, SaP), e (universal
negative, SeP), i (particular a rmative, SiP), or o (particular negative, SoP))
that allows us to determine a mood, that is, a sequence of three categorical
propositions ordered in such a way that two propositions are premises and the
last one is a conclusion. A categorical syllogism, then, is a mood with three terms
one of which appears in both premises but not in the conclusion. This particular
term, usually denoted with the term-schema M, works as a link between the
remaining terms and is known as the middle term. According to the position of
this middle term, four gures can be set up in order to encode the valid syllogistic
moods (Table 1).1
        </p>
        <p>
          First Second Third Fourth
gure gure gure Figure
aaa
eae
aii
eio
eae
aee
eio
aoo
iai
aii
oao
eio
aee
iai
eio
Term Functor Logic (TFL) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18 ref19 ref21 ref6 ref8 ref9">18,19,21,6,8,9</xref>
          ] is basically a plus-minus algebra that
employs terms rather than rst order language elements such as individual
variables or quanti ers (cf. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref14 ref17 ref19 ref20">17,14,10,19,20,11</xref>
          ]). According to this algebra, the four
categorical propositions can be represented by the following syntax [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]:
a. SaP := S + P
b. SeP := S P
c. SiP := +S + P
d. SoP := +S P
        </p>
        <p>Given this representation, this plus-minus algebra provides a simple rule for
syllogistic inference: a conclusion follows validly from a set of premises if and
only if i) the sum of the premises is algebraically equal to the conclusion and
ii) the number of conclusions with particular quantity (viz., zero or one) is the
same as the number of premises with particular quantity [8, p.167]. Thus, for
instance, if we consider a valid syllogism, say the mood aaa from the rst gure
(i.e. aaa-1), we can see how the application of this method produces the right
conclusion (Table 2).</p>
        <p>In the previous example we can clearly see how the method works:
i) if we add up the premises we obtain the algebraic expression
1 For sake of brevity, but without loss of generality, here we omit the syllogisms that
require existential import.</p>
        <p>TFL</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-1">
          <title>1. All dogs are animals. D + A</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-2">
          <title>2. All German Shepherds are dogs. G + D</title>
          <p>` All German Shepherds are animals. G + A
( D + A) + ( G + D) = D + A G + D = G + A, so that the sum of the
premises is algebraically equal to the conclusion and the conclusion is G + A,
rather than +A G, because ii) the number of conclusions with particular
quantity (zero in this case) is the same as the number of premises with particular
quantity (zero in this case).
2.3</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>TFL tableaux</title>
        <p>
          As in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
          ], we say a tableau is an acyclic connected graph determined by nodes
and vertices [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16 ref5">5,16</xref>
          ]. The node at the top is called root. The nodes at the bottom
are called tips. Any path from the root down a series of vertices is a branch. To
test an inference for validity we construct a tableau which begins with a single
branch at whose nodes occur the premises and the rejection of the conclusion:
this is the initial list. We then apply the rules that allow us to extend the initial
list (Diagram 1.1).
        </p>
        <p>A
Ai</p>
        <p>B
Bi
+A</p>
        <p>B
+Ai</p>
        <p>Bi</p>
        <p>Diagram 1.1: TFL tableaux rules</p>
        <p>In Diagram 1.1, from left to right, the rst rule is the rule for a (e)
propositions, and the second rule is the rule for i (o) propositions. Notice that, after
applying a rule, we introduce some index i 2 f1; 2; 3; : : :g. For propositions a and
e, the index may be any number; for propositions i and o, the index has to be a
new number if they do not already have an index. Also, following TFL tenets,
we assume the followings rules of rejection: ( A) = A, ( A B) = A B,
and ( A A) = +( A) + ( A).</p>
        <p>As usual, a tableau is complete if and only if every rule that can be applied
has been applied. A branch is closed if and only if there are terms of the form Ai
and Ai on two of its nodes; otherwise it is open. A closed branch is indicated
by writing a ? at the end of it; an open branch is indicated by writing 1. A
tableau is closed if and only if every branch is closed; otherwise it is open. So,
again as usual, A is a logical consequence of the set of terms (i.e. ` A) if and
only if there is a complete closed tableau whose initial list includes the terms of
and the rejection of A (i.e. [ f Ag ` ?). Accordingly, up next we provide
some examples for basic syllogistic (Diagram 1.2).</p>
        <p>M + P</p>
        <p>S + M
` S + P
( S + P)
+S P
+S1</p>
        <p>P1
M1
?
M P</p>
        <p>S + M
` S
( S
+S + P</p>
        <p>P</p>
        <p>P)
+S1
+P1
S1
?
S1
?
+M1
+P1</p>
        <p>?
M1
?
+M1</p>
        <p>P1
?</p>
        <p>M + P
+S + M
` +S + P
(+S + P)</p>
        <p>S P
+S1
+M1</p>
        <p>S1
?</p>
        <p>M P
+S + M
` +S
(+S</p>
        <p>S + P</p>
        <p>P</p>
        <p>P)
+S1
+M1
M1
?
M1
?
+P1</p>
        <p>P1
?
S1
?</p>
        <p>P1
+P1
?</p>
        <p>Diagram 1.2: Moods aaa-1, eae-1, aii-1, and eio-1
3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Murphree's Numerical Term Logic</title>
      <p>
        In Szabolcsi's view [22, p.3], quanti cation within rst order logic systems is
\extremist" in the sense that it is limited to represent two extremes: either
everything or something.2 Indeed, it is usual to nd logical treatments that assume
that intermediate or subjective quanti ers [22, p.26 ] such as \many", \most",
2 This is not completely true because, for example, we have the proposals developed
by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref24">12,24</xref>
        ] (however, since these are not part of rst order logic prima facie and
or \few" (cf. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15 ref23">15,23</xref>
        ]) have to be treated as simple cases of existential quanti ers,
and numerical or objetive quanti ers usually su er the same fate. However, such
a treatment is far from being justi ed. There are several reasons to support this
claim, but in the interest of time, consider that reasoning in natural language
includes more quanti ers than the usual \all" or \some". For instance, regard
that both \most" and \some" are particular (i.e. non-universal) quanti ers, but
they do not express the same meaning: the former implies the latter, but the
converse is false; and the same occurs when reasoning with numerical quanti ers.
Given this situation, Murphree [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], and Szabolcsi [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ] developed numerical
extensions of Sommers' Term Functor Logic: in this work, however, we focus only
on Murphree's [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Murphree's Numerical Term Logic (NTL) is a term logic capable of
representing and performing inference with numerical quanti ers by modifying TFL's
syntax and rule of inference. Thus, NTL o ers the following syntax for
numerically quanti ed propositions:
e. All but n S are P := nS + P
f. At most n S are P := nS P
g. At least n S are P := +nS + P
h. At least n S are not P := +nS</p>
      <p>P</p>
      <p>To better explain this representation, consider the next examples:
1. At least 15 Americans are republicans := +15A + R
2. All but 120 students understand logic := 120S + U
3. At most 150,000 Europeans are male := 150;000E
4. There are at least 33 mathematicians := +33M + M
5. At least 66 logicians are not democrats := +66L D
A</p>
      <p>Now, at this point it is important to notice that when n = 0 (n = 1), the
traditional universal (particular) categorical propositions are included within
NTL:
6. All S is P = All but 0 S are P := 0S + P
7. No S is P = At most 0 S are P := 0S P
8. Some S are P = At least 1 S is P := +1S + P
9. Some S are not P = At least 1 S is not P := +1S
P</p>
      <p>Also, by adapting some ideas by Szabolcsi, in NTL we can represent exact
(10), fractionary (12), and subjective (13) quanti ers. This last example shows
in what sense the intermediate propositions of Intermediate Term Functor Logic
(TFL+) are included within NTL:
10. Exactly n S are P := +(+n 1S + P) + ( nS
11. At most r=q of S are P := r=qS P
P)
they are developed by and for rst order languages, we omit their treatment in this
contribution) and, in all fairness, we can charge TFL with the same o ense.
12. Many S are P := +mS + P</p>
      <p>Given these syntactical tweaks, NTL modi es TFL's rule of inference as
follows: a conclusion follows validly from a set of premises if and only if i) the
sum of the premises is algebraically equal to the conclusion, ii) the number of
conclusions with particular quantity (viz., zero or one) is the same as the number
of premises with particular quantity, and iii) either (a) the value of a universal
conclusion is equal to the sum of the values of the universal premises, or (b)
the value of a particular conclusion is equal to the di erence of the universal
premise minus the particular.3 Hence, TFL and TFL+ are sublogics of NTL. To
exemplify NTL, let us consider some valid inferences (Tables 3-6).</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Proposition NTL</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>1. All but 6 philosophers are logical. 6P + L</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>2. All but 20 smart people are philosophers. 20S + P</title>
        <p>` All but 26 smart people are logical. 26S + L</p>
        <p>Before we move on, and in order to reach our goal, we need to make a little
syntax modi cation that will come in handy in due time: we add the predicate
term of a proposition an arbitrary natural number e &gt; n for any other natural
n. This results in the following syntax for NTL:
e'. All but n S are P := nS +e P
f'. At most n S are P := nS e P
g'. At least n S are P := +nS +e P
h'. At least n S are not P := +nS</p>
        <p>e P</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Proposition NTL</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>1. All but 11 anarchists are logicians. 11A +e L</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>2. At least 30 Mexicans are anarchists. +30M +e A</title>
        <p>` At least 19 Mexicans are logicians. +19M +e L
3 This last condition is di erent from Szabolcsi's, who considers that the value of the
premises need be equal or greater than the value of the conclusion (cf. [22, p.45].</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-7">
        <title>1. Most guys are friendly. mG +e F</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-8">
        <title>2. All those who are friendly are tolerant. 0F +e T</title>
        <p>` Most guys are tolerant. mG +e T
NTL</p>
        <p>With these elements, we now introduce the tableaux rules for NTL in
Diagram 1.3: from left to right, the rst rule is for universal propositions, the second
rule is for particular propositions. Notice that after applying a rule we introduce
some index i 2 f1; 2; 3; : : :g just as in TFL tableaux; but also, notice that after
applying a rule we create a vector v by keeping track of the numerical value n
of the proposition. The third diagram, on the other hand, is a rule for ordering
atomic terms with a \+" attached. Now, given these rules, we say A is a
logical consequence of the set of terms if and only if there is a complete closed
tableau whose initial list includes the terms of and the rejection of A, and
v = 0. Accordingly, up next we show some examples of valid inferences
(Diagrams 1.4 and 1.5) and then we argue that a valid inference in NTL produces a
closed complete tree with v = 0 and vice versa.</p>
        <p>nA e B
nAi eBi
v = n
+nA e B
+nAi</p>
        <p>eBi
v = n
Diagram 1.3: NTL tableux rules
+nA
+k nA
6C +e L
20S +e C
` 26S +e L
( 26S +e L)
+26S e L
+26S1</p>
        <p>eL1
+20S1
20S1
?
Proof. Consider that a valid inference in NTL may be of two basic general forms
(Table 7).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-9">
        <title>Form 1</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-10">
        <title>Form 2</title>
        <p>Now, besides these two general forms, we must consider two cases. For the
base case let us consider each basic form. For form 1, take n = m = 0, and for
form 2 take n = 0 and m = 1. Hence, NTL collapses with TFL, in which case
we just obtain closed complete trees in TFL. For the inductive case, take n = k
and m = j. Such a replacement yields a valid inference in NTL, since all the
conditions of a valid inference in NTL are preserved. Now, suppose that each
form is also valid in NTL for n = k + 1 and m = j + 1 for k; j &gt; 0, then the trees
would look as follows:
3T + (+(+eG +4 B) 5 S)
2T +e U
0B +e E
7S +e I
+50S +e S
+10T +e T
` +5U + (+(+eG +4 E) +38 I
(+5U + (+(+eG +4 E) +38 I)
5U (+(+eG +4 E) +38 I
+50S1
+eS1
+10T2
+eT2
+2T2
7S1
?
2T2
?
+eU2
+7S1
+eI1
+38I1
+3T2
0B2
?
3T2 +(+eG +4 B) 5 S2
?
+eG2
+4B2</p>
        <p>5S2
+0B2
+eE2
+4E2
+5U2
38I1
?
v = +50 + 10 2 7 3 + 4 ? 5 0 5 ? 38 4 = 0
Diagram 1.5: Tableau for Table 6
eG2
4E2
+k+j+2&gt;j+1;8k;j&gt;0Z1
Proof. Suppose there is a closed complete tree with v = 0 that is not a valid
inference in NTL. Then there is a closed complete tree whose initial list includes
a set of terms , the rejection of the conclusion and v = 0, but from we cannot
develop a proof of the conclusion by following the rules of NTL. Without loss of
generality, consider the trees corresponding to the valid basic forms of Table 7.
aTnhden+wmeXhaveeYt.wNooawlt,ersninacteiveeascwhhtorseeeciosnccolumsipolnestea,rteh,erersupleecstifvoerlyg,enen+ramtXing ethYe,
trees have been applied; and since each tree is closed, each tree has to have the
following forms:
` n+mX e Y
( n+mX e Y)
+n+mX e Y
+n+mXi
eYi</p>
        <p>Suppose, then, that we have an instance of the rst tree but that the
resulting proof is not valid, that is to say, where + = [ f+n+mX e Yg,
+ ` ?, but the application of the rule of inference to does not allow us
to produce n+mX e Y. Now, since the tree of the diagram is complete, all the
tips are closed, hence the previous nodes have to include something of the form
m+nX e Y or mZ e Y and nX +e Z, that is to say, = f m+nX e Yg
or = f: : : ; mZ e Y; nX +e Z; : : :g. But then, in any case, if we apply
condition i) to we obtain something of the form X e Y, and not the other
way around due to condition ii); and last, by condition iii)(a), the conclusion
has to be of the form m+nX e Y. But that contradicts the assumption that
we cannot develop a proof of such conclusion by using the rule of NTL. The
same occurs, mutatis mutandis, for the second tree. Thus, = f+mX e Yg or
= f: : : ; nZ e Y; +m+nX +e Z; : : :g. In any case, if we apply condition i) to
we obtain something of the form +mX e Y, and not the other way around
due to condition ii); and last, by the condition iii)(b), the conclusion has to be
something of the form +mX e Y. But that contradicts the assumption that we
cannot develop a proof of such conclusion.
4</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>
        In this contribution we have attempted to o er a tableaux method for a family of
term logics comprising Term Functor Logic, Intermediate Term Functor Logic,
and Numerical Term Logic by using and adapting Murphree's system. This is
possible because TFL and TFL+ are sublogics of NTL and so, in some sense,
the method we have developed for NTL represents this family of Sommersian
term logics. Now, we have to mention that for the purposes of this paper we
have focused only on the terministic features of NTL, but further comparison
is required with the algebraic proof systems introduced by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3">3,2</xref>
        ]; and
alternative term logics like Szabolcsi's [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ], for they may have more or less the same
motivation but not the same rules.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their precise corrections
and useful comments. Financial support given by UPAEP Research Grant.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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