=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2588/paper33
|storemode=property
|title=Methods and Algorithms for Performing Separate Operational Tasks for the Protection of the State Information Space
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2588/paper33.pdf
|volume=Vol-2588
|authors=Andriy Peleshchyshyn,Volodymyr Vus,Oleksandr Markovets,Ruslana Pazderska
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/cmigin/PeleshchyshynVM19
}}
==Methods and Algorithms for Performing Separate Operational Tasks for the Protection of the State Information Space==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2588/paper33.pdf
Methods and Algorithms for Performing Separate
Operational Tasks for the Protection of the State
Information Space
Andriy Peleshchyshyn [0000-0002-5022-0410], Volodymyr Vus [0000-0003-4980-5195],
Oleksandr Markovets [0000-0001-8737-5929] and Ruslana Pazderska [0000-0002-0845-5304]
Lviv Polytechnic National University, Lviv, Ukraine
apele@ridne.net1, volodumur.a.vus@lpnu.ua,
oleksandr.v.markovets@lpnu.ua3, pazderskaruslana@gmail.com
Abstract. The proposed methods make it possible to generate generalized indi-
cators of information subjects and to build on base them a common system of
measures to protect the information space of the state. The issues of fulfillment
of separate operational tasks that arise in the process of implementation of such
plan are investigated. In particular, methods are proposed to identify users of
certain roles that are harmful to the state, identifying possible ways of effective
counteraction. The proposed methods will provide the formation of a consoli-
dated system of indicators for the analysis and prioritization of communities
from the point of view of national security. They help to plan and organize
measures to protect the state's information space. These methods ensure the ef-
fective performance of individual operational tasks to protect the information
space of the state.
Keywords: social networks, user activity, socially significant con-tent, roles of
users.
1 Introduction
One of the most effective types of organization of harmful influences in the infor-
mation space of the state is the formation, popularization and resource support of
opinion leaders with appropriate anti-state direction. Leaders of opinion with a certain
level of influence are able to implement a wide range of ideas, carry out psychological
and ideological diversions, and manipulate public opinion.
According to the materials on the investigation of Russian influences on political via
social networks in the USA and EU countries, there is a tendency to form an entire
system of opinion leaders with hidden motivations and tasks.
The identification of such users allows for a number of information and operational
activities, minimizing their impact on the mass consciousness.
Copyright © 2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attrib-
ution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) CMiGIN-2019: International Workshop on Conflict Management in
Global Information Networks.
The paper proposes to apply the term «opinion leader» to a particular class of users
based on behavioral traits. Often, this term is applied to various users with a large
audience of content consumers. However, this approach has several disadvantages:
failure to take into account behavioral characteristics inevitably leads to a decrease
in the effectiveness of communication methods of counteraction;
only individuals with large audiences are identified, which complicates forceful
methods (spreading negativity in society);
much of the adverse effects have already taken place, and society has responded to
them in an undesirable form (a particularly urgent problem in the event of a rapid
escalation of tension).
The behavioral determination of the opinion leader allows us to identify the follow-
ing complementary tasks:
early identification of potential opinion leaders – allows you to achieve opinion
leadership goals with high efficiency and relatively low risks and resources, but
reach a large number of users;
identifying dynamic opinion leaders (with rapid growth in popularity) – covers a
rather narrow set of potential opinion leaders for whom high dynamics of increas-
ing popularity can be traced; accordingly, a wide range of activities can be in-
volved;
identifying popular opinion leaders (of high public importance) – covers only a
small number, but, as stated above, is fraught with additional risks and requires a
comprehensive approach.
Let's take a closer look at these tasks. The distribution between potential, dynamic and
popular will be based on the popularity of the user.
2 Related works
A practical focus that has been actively used in recent years is the impact through
communities. To some extent, it is similar to the previous one, but is different in its
tools and tasks of influence. In addition to spreading opinions on behalf of the indi-
vidual, it is possible to organize more systematic pressure on public opinion by creat-
ing a sense of solidarity between the participants. This impact is characterized by a
certain level of support, because of the feedback mechanisms in the communities the
marketer can expect to attract additional participants without the need to provide them
with rewards. This factor is especially important in political propaganda, as it allows
the use of the resources of indifferent citizens for their own purposes.
There are several ways to exert influence on the community itself, although usually
the support is received from the community administration and several active partici-
pants. Similar approaches are used to collaborate with communities as opinion lead-
ers, and additional areas of work with communities are being actively developed:
• formation of own, fully controlled communities;
• the destruction of underserved communities.
The first area is characteristic and actively used in the marketing of large corpora-
tions, especially those aimed at the general public. Thanks to these communities, cor-
porations are able to bring together productive consumers, receiving powerful addi-
tional resources to further promote them. In addition to purely promotional tasks,
these communities play an extremely important role for consumer-producer feedback.
Thanks to them, the manufacturer is able to form a large knowledge base on the effi-
cient operation of products (such as Microsoft TechNet) and obtain information on
necessary improvements and changes.
In addition to corporations, the formation of their own communities is an important
tool for the activities of political forces that use them both as a tool of propaganda and
as an information technology to account for supporters and coordinate their actions.
Considering this tendency, the opposite direction of activity is also manifested -
purposeful destruction of useful opponent of communities. In business, this phenome-
non is hardly traced, but it is widespread in political confrontation as a tool to weaken
the enemy.
3 Identification of opinion leaders influencing the
information space of the state
The simplest way to determine the popularity of a opinion leader is by the number of
users of his or her content:
UserPop Useri Count UFi (1)
Other ways of determining this metric, other than those of (1), are possible, including
those that take into account the graph model of social connections and material cita-
tion, but this is not fundamental from the point of view of further approaches. More
complex definitions of popularity are likely to be fully correlated with the above, but
are much more complicated in computing and collecting information.
The popular opinion leader will be considered a user who responds to a strong
sign) and a sign of high popularity:
OL
UserPop Useri С UP (2)
OL
where С UP – constant, determines the minimum number of content consumers for a
popular opinion leader.
We consider a potential opinion leader a user, who meets the strongest sign, the ac-
tivity sign and has the minimum acceptable popularity:
OL
UserPopUseri С UP (3)
OL
where С UP is constant, determines the minimum number of content consumers for a
potential opinion leader.
The dynamic opinion leader is a user, who responds to one of the signs or, the sign (3)
at the end of the period and has a high popularity gain over a certain period:
OL
UserPop Useri , T T UserPop Useri , T CDyn (4)
OL
where C Dyn is the minimum popularity gain over the period, T is the beginning of
the period, T is the defined time period of monitoring (in practice, a month or a
week depending on the dynamics and intensity of the situation in the society).
In most operational tasks, it is advisable to take a running moment of time as the end
of the period. Identification of these types of opinion leaders should be carried out
consistently, taking into account previous results. The following algorithm is pro-
posed.
OL OL OL
С UP , С UP , C Dyn
Counting the number of popular
and dynamic opinion leaders
Select an unmarked user
Useri choice
How many leaders meet a yes
given condition?
no no no
UserPop Useri С UP
OL
UserPopUseri С UP
OL
yes yes Select an unmarked user
Defining a user as a popular Defining the user as a dynamic
no
opinion leader opinion leader UserPop Useri , T T
UserPop Useri , T C Dyn
OL
yes
Counting the number of popular Counting the number of
opinion leaders dynamic opinion leaders Defining a user as a potential
opinion leader
yes
no
no Has the entire user base yes Has the entire user base
been researched? Adding to the leaders group
been researched?
Fig. 1. The algorithm for forming a base of opinion leaders
Searching further to counter potential leaders is advisable in the absence of a good
number of popular and dynamic leaders. This is due not to the low value of potential
leaders, but to the fact that in the case of a large number of real leaders, it is unlikely
that they will be transferred to the “higher” category.
Given the temporary nature of dynamic leadership, it is important that the algo-
T
rithm is practiced often enough, at least (see. (4)).
2
3.1 Opposition to the leaders of opinions that exert harmful influence
in the information space of the state
The opinion leaders can exercise different influences in the state's information space.
In some cases, opinion leaders may intentionally or unintentionally engage in harmful
activities (hostile propaganda, incitement, animosity, etc.). It is critically important to
effectively counteract such sites, taking into account their current characteristics.
The following are considered leaders who have a qualifying influence:
USG
USGi C Enemy (5)
USG
where C Enemy – the constant that determines the threshold of hostility for the USG
«Attitude to the State». In practice, the value of the constant is advisable to choose
from a range [-1,-0.75].
We next define the following methods of counteraction to each of the categories of
opinion leaders engaging in governmental harm according to (5).
It is important to note that it is important to apply methods of counteraction only to
those leaders of opinion, for which ordinary public political debate cannot be applied,
with the possibility of reaching mutual understanding and eliminating anti-state ac-
tions. For this purpose it is advisable to use the proposed indicators of flexibility of
the user's position and attitude to the state.
Dynamic leaders are just users who move from the lower to the highest category.
At this stage, they are quite vulnerable (as potential leaders), but their value is ap-
proaching popular. In this case, dealing with harmful dynamic leaders is one of the
most important tasks in terms of process efficiency.
USG
C Enemy
Choosing a community
Finding a leader in the social
community
yes
USG
USG i C Enemy
no
Determining the proportion
of messages a leader has in
the social community
yes How many messages
are smaller than
constants?
no
CSCV >0,8, і no
CCMod*CCCtrl close
to 0
yes
yes UserFlex>0,5
no
Administrative action is
Forming a team of "hard Forming a leader's opponent-
being taken on the social
opponent" + trolls user (soft)
community
Fig. 2. The algorithm of communication counteraction to the potential opinion leader
The main communication tools to counteract dynamic and potential leaders are to use
skilled opponents and reduce the popularity of the communities in which they operate.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding algorithm.
For dynamic leaders, the algorithm presented is completely up-to-date, only the re-
quirements for the actions of opponents differ. Opponents should be more active and
proactive, given the dynamics of the leader. It is also advisable to attract trolls to re-
duce the status and motivation of broadcasters of the dynamic opinion leader. The
community actions mentioned in the algorithm are explored further in the paper.
In addition to communicating opposition to potential and dynamic leaders, other
forms of influence are also effective, primarily organizational and legal. Leaders who
do not yet have significant public influence often engage in ill-advised or other-
minded activities and are not fully aware of the consequences of the activity. As a
result, interviews, warnings, and legal instruments can be effective, but their applica-
tion is beyond the scope of this work.
Neutralizing the influence of popular opinion leaders is a more difficult task, but is
imperative to address in the event of a real threat to national security. Regardless of
other tools, the aspect of communicative counteraction is important. Popular opinion
leaders are characterized by:
the authorial nature of the material;
the high popularity;
the sufficient material preparation activity.
In general, the content of the set of characteristics boils down to the fact that, in to-
day's competitive environment, the opinion leader needs significant resources, which
makes him vulnerable. This opens up the possibility of counteraction, which is sum-
marized below in table 1.
Table 1. Directions to counter popular harmful opinion leaders
Characteristic Vulnerability of Possibilities of use
leader
The Unreliable Opponent's criticism of information transfer
data
Author
Subjectivity Opponent's criticism of information transfer
material
Lack of culture Criticism of opponent, trolling
Bad linguistics Trolling
The broad spec- Dissemination of own information in the
trum of reader comments, counter-narratives
High Low criticality Conducting special operations of communica-
popularity tive and psychological nature
Competition with Using a platform to compromise other harm-
other leaders ful leaders
Active Lack of content Possibility to influence the theme and content
preparation Financial support of messages of the opinion leader
For some leaders, as a result, individual positions in the table may be more or less
relevant, which accordingly influences the leader's engagement strategy.
3.2 Detection of trolls and opponents operating according to a defined
plan and task
A common element of social media confrontation is engaging users with specific
communication skills in destructive activities toward opinion leaders and communi-
ties. Formally, such users rarely violate the law, but in practice can offset the positive
influence of authoritative individuals in society. Such a phenomenon could destroy
the patriotic community, thus eliminating a certain public resource available to sup-
port public interests. The large social communities involving tens and hundreds of
thousands of citizens can be destroyed. The result is either the degradation of the so-
cial community or the loss of motivation to engage in socially beneficial actions (vol-
unteering, mutual assistance, information support, etc.).
The methods for detecting trolls are based on the hypothesis that the troll is, to a
certain extent, “attached” to individual users with “opinion leader” roles opinions,
«moderator», «translator».
In addition, identifying malicious trolls, as opposed to detecting malicious opinion
leaders, only makes sense in the context of protecting predefined communities and
users that are important to the protection of the state.
Thus, we obtain the following algorithm for detecting harmful trolls (see fig. 3).
Like opinion leaders, trolls can have varying degrees of popularity among users,
but at a psychological level, users understand the technical importance of trolls, lead-
ing to low public authority. Thus, the entire range of communication and legal
measures can be applied to counteract trolls. The vulnerability of trolls to communica-
tion activities is usually increased due to their anonymity or the inaccuracy of person-
al data.
An effective method of counteraction is also to enhance communication skills and
introduce specific communication strategies for opinion leaders and communities
valuable for national security. In this case, the efforts of harmful trolls can be spent
intentionally or at all to act in the public interest, there is a possibility of exploitation
of hostile users in the interests of the state.
Choosing a community
Selection of opinion leader in
the community
Identifying negative
comments on leader's posts
no
The commenter's
compliance with the no
Have all opinion leaders
properties of the troll been researched?
yes
yes
Fixing the commentator as a Have all social no
troll communities been
explored?
yes
no yes
Have all commentators Formation of results on troll
been researched? detection
Fig. 3. Detection algorithm for malicious trolls
A key element of such strategies is the hypothesis of a material or other interest in
the troll and its accountability to management. This is based on the method of indirect
counteraction, as follows:
1. bringing the troll to the brink of breaking the rules of communication – communi-
cation rules should be strengthened if necessary;
2. putting it in the face of virtually inevitable blocking – there is a threat of the troll's
failure to fulfill its tasks;
3. not blocking him, but revealing his behavior as a troll, – the troll is forced to for-
mally adjust behavior and act within the social community.
When done properly, the resources of the troll are directed to intensive communica-
tion within the community. These actions address one of the key problems in most
communities – low user engagement in content creation. In addition, there are other,
additional, benefits (the possibility of a «live» demonstration of caricature behavior of
harmful trolls in social communities, etc.).
Note that today in the social media of the Internet there is a certain division of
trolls into «thick» and «thin». The first category includes users of this role with low
communication skills and quality of the material, the second – with high. The above
method of indirect counteraction is advisable to use only against «thin» trolls. In addi-
tion, this approach should also be applied to harmful users of the role of «opponent»,
given the fact that the «thin troll» and «opponent» are quite close and differ only in
nature of influence (psychological and informational).
3.3 Identification of moderators performing resource support for
harmful influences
Identifying moderators that are harmful to the information security of the state is
based on an analysis of impact actions (see section 2.1.4 “Formal description of user
activity”), taking into account the nature of changes in visibility and the nature of the
content to which it applies. Identify the following types to identify the moderator as
harmful:
property of controlled resources;
austerity towards patriotic opinion leaders;
condescension to hostile opinion leaders.
The simplest is the property of controlled resources. That is, the moderator who man-
ages the social community defined as harmful (see. section 2.2.6 «Characteristics of
State Security»), so at least one of two conditions must be fulfilled:
CmL is harmful on the basis of loyalty or
CmLi CEnemy
CmA
CmAi C Enemy is harmful on the basis of communicative direction for at least one
community in which the user acts as a moderator.
This property allows identifying moderators who explicitly support the development
of communities harmful to the state. However, in practice, harmful activity can be
carried out in a less obvious way. The moderator can formally administer a politically
neutral community with a broad spectrum of opinions (the indicator is close to zero),
but implement a policy of moderation in such a way that leaders of patriotic thinking
are in a losing situation. In particular, the following steps may be taken:
The overly strict application of the rules to patriotic opinion leaders, that is, the in-
dicator of his personal comfort is much lower than the general:
CmComf i CmComf i* (6)
*
where CmComf i is a measure of comfort for patriotic opinion leaders.
Not strict enough to apply rules to harmful users, to create them comfortable condi-
tions
CmComf i CmComf i** (7)
where CmComf i** is a measure of comfort for harmful opinion leaders, opponents,
and trolls.
Performing at least one of the following attributes makes it possible to attribute a
community moderator to such users who carry out activities harmful to the security of
the state.
Conclusion
Methods and algorithms of planning of measures for counteraction to propaganda are
developed and the general distributed information and technological algorithm of
organization of actions in web communities. One of the key tasks of the early stage of
the state's information space protection activities is to establish a catalog of significant
personalities that are in the CSI. To solve it, an algorithm for personalization of in-
formation subjects was created. To detail one of its stages, an algorithm for individual
user processing has been developed, which provides for the collection and systemati-
zation of user data according to the proposed formal model. The fulfillment of indi-
vidual operational tasks that arise during the implementation of such a plan is investi-
gated. Methods are identified for identifying users who perform roles that are harmful
to the state, identifying possible ways to effectively counteract them. A method of
identifying thought leaders influential in the information space of the state has been
developed. It is suggested to use the term "opinion leaders" for a particular class of
users based on behavioral traits. The behavioral determination of the thought leader
makes it possible to solve the complementary tasks of identifying thought leaders:
potential, dynamic, popular, based on given thresholds.
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