=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-2588/paper42 |storemode=property |title=Specificity of Political and Legal Communication in Transitive Societies of the Globalized World |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2588/paper42.pdf |volume=Vol-2588 |authors= Serhii Ordenov, Galina Encheva, Alexandra Alpatova, Oksana Skyba, Olga Veselska |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/cmigin/OrdenovEASV19 }} ==Specificity of Political and Legal Communication in Transitive Societies of the Globalized World== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2588/paper42.pdf
       Specificity of Political and Legal Communication
        in Transitive Societies of the Globalized World

            Serhii Ordenov [0000-0002-2572-8300], Galina Encheva [0000-0003-2002-6761],
            Alexandra Alpatova [0000-0002-8037-3629], Oksana Skyba [0000-0001-5751-0026]
                          and Olga Veselska [0000-0002-4914-2187]

                         National Aviation University, Kyiv, Ukraine
                                     filosof@nau.edu.ua



        Abstract. In the article, in the context of the basic discursive and legal charac-
        teristics of transitional societies of the traditionalist type, the structural compo-
        nents that cause the specificity of policy-legal communication are revealed. It is
        argued that these components determine the respective roles and functions of
        law and are responsible for the political realization of rights and freedoms in
        transitional societies. It is argued that the forms of political and legal communi-
        cation are conditioned by the existing type of society, which in turn influences
        the whole set of relations formed and is reflected in the inextricably linked man-
        ifestations of law and political power. Despite the fact that in the context of
        globalization, the legal systems and legislations of different countries are uni-
        fied in accordance with the rules of international law, and state institutions take
        liberal forms, in transitional societies the regulator of relations are not the liber-
        al legal norms and principles, but the unwritten rules of social actions that have
        formed arbitrarily. On the understanding, that the transition to a liberal system
        of relations in transitional societies has not taken place, the political and legal
        mechanism becomes dysfunctional and the laws do not meet the criteria of jus-
        tice. In this way, instead of the legal one, the legalistic model of the state is
        formed, and the legal consciousness takes on a deviant form. This determines
        the repressive role of law, which in the illiberal system of relations is revealed
        as its opposite, that is, in fact, non-law. Under these circumstances, the simula-
        tion of law is rooted in the political discourse, when the support and production
        of fiction becomes the only possible sociality.

        Keywords: Political and Legal Communication, Legalism, Non-law, Social
        Connections and Relationships, Etatism, Traditionalism.


Introduction

The key feature of legal norms is their obligatory character, as well as the conditional-
ity of the development of society and the real relationships, that have been historically
developed between people in the process of their relations. At the same time, in the
modern world, the legal systems of different countries are unified in accordance with
the rules of international law and, in the integration and communication processes
    Copyright © 2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attrib-
ution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) CMiGIN-2019: International Workshop on Conflict Management in
Global Information Networks.
course of globalization, are implemented at the domestic level, being implemented in
the political form of international legal obligations. In the course of these integration
and communication processes, international political and legal standards are incorpo-
rated into state institutions and national legal systems of countries that are at different
stages of social development. This raises a number of questions: are countries being
integrated into the globalized community politically capable of ensuring the practical
implementation of international legal obligations in their legal systems? And if not, is
each state having national legislation legal in the sense of not only the actual exist-
ence of a legislative framework containing liberal declarations, but also in the context
of the practical assurance of equal access to the rights and freedoms of all citizens, i.e.
in the form of recognized freedom, asserted in the form of their legal capacity and
legal personality? The raised questions actualize this study.


Research and publications analysis
The works of G. Hegel, A. Giddens, I. Ilyin, C. Lévi-Strauss, V. Solovyov,
M. Tsymbalyuk and others were the theoretical basis for the study of the transfor-
mations of law and legal awareness in transitive societies, as well as their essence and
significance in the structure of social relations. Western European philosophy of
Modern times, represented by such thinkers as T. Hobbes, J.J. Rousseau, J. Locke,
S. Montesquieu, a natural-law concept was developed. The most profound general
theoretical and methodological framework for our study were conceptualized in the
works of G. W. Leibnitz, I. Kant, J. G. Fichte and others. M. Berdyaev,
G. Shershenevich made a significant contribution to the development of this topic.
Important for our study was the discursive theory of law and democracy by
J. Habermas.


Research results
In our study, we assume that the functions of law are determined by the existing type of
society, which, in turn, affects the entire set of formed legal relations and is reflected in
the manifestations of law and power, and therefore - political and legal communications.
We consider it worth mentioning that such a political and legal organization, which is
consistent with the concept of law, provides for the existence of a well-established tradi-
tion of rights and freedoms in society, which makes them effective subjects of the liber-
al community. It is in the dimension of individualism and the liberal government the
idea of law comes into being. Such human rights and the key principles of law are fun-
damental in the law structure in a liberal society as: justice, equality, freedom and hu-
manism, which are projected into the universal essence of law.
   Thus, in a liberal sense, the concepts of freedom, justice and equality are intercon-
nected, interpenetrating and interdependent. They are verified and adjusted by the
formula: equality in freedom under common law. Therefore, in developed liberal
societies,” justice”, for the most part, implies: a) equal sharing of the burden of citi-
zenship, i.e. those restrictions on freedom necessary for social life; b) equality of citi-
zens before the law, of course, when the laws do not support and condemn individual
citizens, groups or classes; c) impartiality of justice; d) equal use of benefits (and not
only restrictions) that the state can offer to its citizens [18, p. 106]. Such an impera-
tive view of law and legal awareness implies a universalistic and, to some extent, a
privileged way of justification, because in this case law precedes good not only in the
sense that its claims are given priority, but also in that they are a priori.
    That is why, as rightly pointed out in his public lecture on Law and Economics, the
German philosopher H-H. Hoppes, law or ethics should be universal, otherwise they
will not work equally for everyone. But slave ethics, which obviously cannot be uni-
versalized, are the ethics of superhumans and nonhumans. They have different rights
and rules [20]. In our view, the slave ethics of non-liberal societies reveal the con-
cepts of "right", "freedom", "equality", "justice" in their own, specific, way. This is
facilitated by a certain ecstatic state in which the traditionalist consciousness resides,
which eventually finds its manifestation in political and legal communication. Free-
dom is understood, in the most part, in the subjectivist sense, and is revealed as unre-
strained volition, or simply arbitrariness. Non-individualized consciousness does not
distinguish between these concepts and, therefore, the liberal, a negative understand-
ing of freedom, is in no case a question. Therefore, all seemingly liberal movements
in traditionalist societies lead, in fact, either to tyranny (minority dictatorship), or to
anarchy or ochlocracy (majority dictatorship), and never to freedom. After all, the
movement to will is always a movement from freedom, and vice versa.
    Justice is also thought not as a relationship between individuals, but as a syncretic
and indivisible social property based on essentially inter-clan relationships. By inter-
clan relationships, we understand the relationships between closed groups whose ac-
tivities are aimed at personal enrichment and gaining actual power, and the partici-
pants are bound by common interests and mutual obligations. This attitude to justice
is based on the accepted form of clan equality, or "equality in dignity", or so-called
proportional equality, whose task is to justify the hierarchy of statuses established in
the a priori unequal social system. On the basis of proportional equality, there is a
division between citizens of all kinds of honors and benefits, which is supported by
the whole system of political power and is ensured by legislative norms and legal
coercion. This causes a distorted function of law, which in the illiberal system of rela-
tions is revealed as its opposite, that is, in fact, not law.
    In the context of the current dichotomy of the law role in societies of individualist
and traditionalist types, it is appropriate to turn to the binary opposition of “law - non
law” G. Hegel. In the work Philosophy of Law, he describes not law as servileism
rooted in the will of the people: "Slavery belongs to the stage of transition from the
naturalness of human to a truly moral state: it belongs to a world in which the not law
is still law. Here power is non law and just as necessary to be in its place” [6].
M. Abysova notes that in the transition period, "one can see a model of a society that
resists [future] structured and hierarchical social system" [1, p. 37]. In our case, this
model is a rooted in the social consciousness of slave psychology, which condemns
transitive societies to continuous transience.
    Considering that the transition to a liberal system of relations has not taken place
(because their modernization has always been superficial and based on profound
changes in the social system) [17] in transitive societies, the functions of the legal
mechanism become dysfunctional and laws do not meet the criteria of justice. The
very notions of legality, equality, liberty become imaginary social values and legal
fictions. The concept of justice, as a peremptory execution of written norms and circu-
lars, which at the ideological level is elevated to a moral obligation, in practice, takes
forms of law enforcement, depending on clan affiliation. Contrary to popular belief
about the stability of relations and the primacy of order, in transitional societies, at the
level of social consciousness, axiological conservatism prevails, which, in the process
of political and legal communication, takes a paradoxical form of moral and legal
relativism. In this connection, Finnish journalist A.L. Lauren rightly stated that living
in a society like this one very important point must be learned, namely: in which situ-
ations one can a) break the rules, b) arbitrarily interpret them, and c) when, on the
contrary, one has to adhere them till the end. And the starting point is this: [there] no
absolute rules exist. Everyone… knows that the rules are not made for the common
good, but are foolish inventions of small bureaucrats. An inherent [western] citizen ...
idea of a moral imperative ... simply does not exist. There are no moral imperatives,
there are only different ways of adapting to life in an unreliable, unjust, unpredictable
society. So ... [people are there] never think about the common good, paving the way
in society. They think only of themselves and of their loved ones” [11, p. 68]. Since,
in traditionalist societies, the moral and legal criteria that allow a distinction to be
made between liberal-individualist understanding of law and not law, justice and
crime have not yet emerged, people are guided, for the most part, by their selfish aspi-
rations and dictates of weakly controlled affects. Their daily lives provide very little
opportunity for humanity, and the very relationship between them is characterized by
hostility. Most human actions in such a society are caused by selfishness and aggres-
sion, self-interest, and short-sighted, primitive utilitarianism. Under these conditions,
the implementation, in accordance with international law, of any liberal-law ideas in
the legislative system of the transiting countries becomes in practice a prohibitive and
repressive character.
   It is known that the Western countries went to the institution of the rule of law in
an evolutionary way. The liberalization of law took place in the process of civiliza-
tion, the formation of social consciousness and the continuous differentiation of social
relations. Against the background of these transformations, the moral formation of a
person changed to being: "from the ethics of duties inherent in the traditional value
system, the transition to the ethics of rights, within which the surrounding reality is
understood as released by the individual solely as the scope of his activity inherent in
his freedom" [9, p. 31]. Freedom itself is the antithesis of the collectivist meaningless
will and begins to be understood by the individual as a conscious need that must be
reconciled with reason.
   As for traditionalist societies, the introduction of the institutions of state law in
them has always resembled not a development but rather a revolution. Thus, compar-
ing Peter's reforms with the communist coup, M. Berdyaev noted that here we see
"the same rudeness, violence, attachment to the people of known principles, the same
fragmentation of organic development, the denial of tradition, the same etatism, hy-
pertrophy of the state, the same dramatically and radically change the type of civiliza-
tion” [5, p. 12]. In our opinion, a similar - legistically based - way of introducing alien
models inevitably leads to horizontal antagonism, the rejection by the transitive socie-
ty of values and norms of liberal concepts at the level of social consciousness.
    The inability to build a state of law in a society where they do not share legal values,
warned B. Kistyakovsky in his work "In Defense of Law". Investigating the problems of
the functioning of law in pre-revolutionary Russia, he concluded that the existence of
laws in the state does not yet make it legal. In his view, in countries with unstable civil
society, there is a lack of will and social practice to live by law. In these countries, a
police state is built in place of the rule of law, and law becomes a bureaucratic tool for
manipulation and arbitrariness of power. Laws turn into circulars, formalism reigns in
legal practice, courts are unprofessional and become an instrument of revenge, law and
rights are despised by both the authorities and the people. B. Kistyakovsky, for example,
quotes O. Herzen as saying: “Complete inequality before the court killed him [russian]
with any respect for law. A Russian, no matter what his rank, bypasses or violates the
law wherever it can be done with impunity; and the government does exactly the same”
[10]. The specific features of the functioning of law in before liberal society, given by
B. Kistyakovsky, remain relevant today. In particular, they remain more than effective
in the so-called, post-Soviet "transitional democracies."
    The attitude to the rules in traditionalist societies has always been distributed in
this way: the representatives of the authorities are above the law, because they identi-
fy with the law, and all others must be guided by the traditional unwritten rules of the
slave piety of interpersonal relations and the rules of law. In addition, the sanctions of
the rules of positive law are the instruments that are applied in case of violation of
unwritten rules. This practically makes it impossible for legal relations and normal
legal practice, because, following unwritten rules, a person inevitably transgresses
written norms, and then enters into force "law", but only as a punishment for "social"
apostasy.
    In addition, the rules in traditionalist societies are designed in such a way as to
make it practically impossible to exercise rights, even if they do have them. For the
most part, the rights there are declarative in nature, are poorly regulated and proce-
durally enshrined, and the rules of law themselves are purely formal [16, p. 64]. Laws
often conflict with the constitution, with each other and with by-laws, and, most im-
portantly, with common sense, so they do not exist to enforce them, but to implicitly
violate and circumvent the support of influential persons, or simply giving a bribe.
"Whoever tries to respect the law is an idiot. [after all] Laws [there] are created not
for the common good, but only for the sake of state and municipal servants to show to
mere mortals that in life you can't have the penny and the bun...” [11, p. 35]. There-
fore, in everyday life, ordinary people should rely solely on themselves and stay away
from the authorities.
    In such circumstances, ordinary people are fostered by a persistent aversion of any
form of law and legitimacy, and legal relations are mostly associated with usurpation
of power and social violence. As a result, all significant social norms of cohabitation
become discredited, and people themselves do not understand neither their social
value in practice nor the general role of law in social life. The only "social" norm
supported by the majority there, because it can lead to success, is marginality, which
acquires the status of a silent but leading philosophy of life.
    It should be noted that the marginal position in such a society is based on existing
asocial relations, the essence of which is well-known, and therefore is always deliber-
ately chosen by the actors. This contributes to the formation of an appropriate form of
marginal social consciousness, which consistently devalues the manifestations of
empathy, morality, logic, common sense, that is, all those levers that contribute to the
formation of personality and individualization of relationships. Marginality is becom-
ing standard communication practice for all segments of the population, social groups
and relationships, because under these conditions it opens the door to opportunities
for power. It will be difficult for you to achieve something there, and even less so if
you do not follow these rules. Conversely, if you reach the top, you will protect the
marginal relationships that have led to success, because they legitimize all your gains
and strengthen your political position.
    These relations sublimate the emergence of marginal forms of political and eco-
nomic institutions, which D. Ajemoglu and D. Robinson called "extractive." In their
view, "extractive political institutions concentrate power in the hands of the narrow
elite and impose weak constraints on their exercise of power. Then economic institu-
tions are structured by this elite for the sake of extracting resources from the rest of
society ... Extractive economic institutions enrich this elite, and their economic
strength and power consolidate political dominance ... The resources created by these
economic institutions enabled the elite to form an army and security forces to protect
their absolutist monopoly power. As a result, extractive political and economic insti-
tutions are mutually supportive and enduring. It shows an even stronger synergy be-
tween extractive economic and political institutions. When in the context of extractive
political institutions real competition arises with the ruling elite, power gained by
competitors is also little limited. Therefore, they have an incentive to support existing
political institutions and to create a similar system of economic institutions…” [2,
p. 74-75]. Thus, the marginalization of relations in society causes the emergence of
extractive institutions that are supported by the authorities and lead to the majority of
the population living in poverty and lawlessness.
    At the same time, the slavery and misery situation of the population majority is not
only a consequence but also a form of existence of such a society. Therefore, all
mechanisms of state, political and economic governance must first and foremost be
aimed at supporting this situation. The principles of Shang Yang legalist school are
quite effective instruments for implementing the institute of total lawlessness, which
is manifested in forms of modern tribalism such as: very poor wages and miserable
social payments for ordinary people; pressure on businesses and harassment of any
type of independent economic activity by government bodies; as a result, the total
dependence of the population on the system of distribution of privileges and prefer-
ences; nepotism, extortions and corruption as key, permanent and irreplaceable char-
acteristics of the state machine; manual justice and biased law enforcement officials;
clan inequality; inaccessibility of social goods, rights and freedoms of the majority of
the population; the introduction of propaganda as the only form of communication
aimed at spreading false ideas prevailing in society. The irrational, antihuman and
antisocial surrogate, which in this case is formed instead of society, is presented in
transitive societies as a requirement of capitalist relations and an example of the mod-
ern state, despite the fact that capitalism is, first and foremost, a form of social rela-
tions, and the sense of the state, in its broadest meaning, is social.
    Under the described conditions, any universal and general social guarantees that meet
the basic principles of social construction in the antisocial state threaten the existing
system. Although the rights there are only formally defined and do not have a place in
real life, the fact that they are expressed in a positive form creates some inconvenience
for the authorities. After all, people can appeal to them, demand their implementation,
apply to international institutions for the protection of violated rights and freedoms, etc.
In addition, the positive decisions of the international courts on such an appeal are
grounds for considering the activity of public authorities as unlawful, and therefore
criminal, which generally discredits the state power and deprive it of legitimacy. It
should be noted that in many non-western countries, the inability to effectively enforce
social guarantees and rights competes with the unwillingness and outright sabotage of
the authorities. And if we add here the underdeveloped civil society institute, the low
level of legal consciousness and the lack of liberal practices, then the securing of rights
and freedoms in such countries becomes a completely impossible task.
    In particular, under the auspices of the struggle against the communist system, as a
rudiment, a number of "reforms" are carried out in various social spheres, the purpose
of which is, in fact, to neutralize the social functions of the state, and therefore to
dismantle and destroy the social and legal institutions that must ensure the stability of
society. For example, in Ukraine, it has long been the tradition, under the pretext of
legal and institutional reform, to pursue anti-liberal and antisocial legislative initia-
tives that contravene the constitution, as well as neutralize universal rights and free-
doms, legitimizing the clan distribution of public goods, one of which is law.
    Thus, according to lawyer and political expert O. Bunchuk, if we analyze the on-
rush of changes to the Ukrainian legislation in recent years, it will become clear that
the authorities are turning the strategies of reforming the judiciary, the jurisdiction
and related legal institutions "into a" document of literacy "and do not pay too much
attention to the requirements of the Constitution (especially its second chapter on
human rights and freedoms)” [3]. At the same time, there is a distortion of ideological
doctrines and the formation of various memes that would justify such actions. In par-
ticular, in the mass consciousness they try to identify the concept of freedom and
material wealth. As a result, Ukrainians confuse "human rights" with the opportunity
to live securely, and perceive the European development path mostly through the lens
of personal income. According to polls, 48.5% of the population in the western region
is generally ready to exchange rights and freedoms for their own well-being [15].
    In Ukraine, the onslaught of rights has also recently taken place in scientific and
theoretical discourse, in particular in the sphere of public administration. In particular,
it is proposed to remove the Constitution from social reality by bringing its norms in
line with the existing state of rights in the country: “The approximation of the Consti-
tution to reality, by limiting the list of constitutional rights, is not allowed by [the
Constitution itself], so state-makers remain the only way out - to build an effective
institution and the legal mechanism for ensuring the norms of the Constitution, in
other words, to bring reality closer to the provisions of the Constitution. Or another
way is to amend the Constitution for this purpose [bringing the Constitution closer to
reality]…” [12, p. 210]. In other words, the lack of desire and political will to enforce
the provisions of the Constitution is rhetorically replaced by a meme about the need to
bring the Constitution into conformity with the existing disorder and wrong in the
country. Although the author proposes to carry out the operation of "circumcision" of
constitutional rights "with the mandatory participation of citizens through a referen-
dum, which will automatically contribute to greater legitimacy of the Basic Law" [12,
p. 210], the very idea is, in essence, legitimation and "legitimization" of wrongs, pub-
lished in a solid scientific journal, is frightening. Moreover, its implementation can be
a matter of time, given the low level of legal consciousness and the general misunder-
standing of the public (obviously its part involved in public administration) of the role
and function of law in public life.
   The above points are supported by the large number of complaints pending before
the European Court of Human Rights. In particular, in 2017, Ukraine became the
undisputed “leader” in this anti-rating [14] (see Fig. 1).




             Fig. 1. The number of applications submitted to the ECtHR in 2017

It should be noted that in the post-soviet territories, in the scientific and humanitarian
discourse, there has been a certain tradition - to consider the public consciousness
and, consequently, the consciousness as objects of influence. This tradition is based
on an even more ancient tradition associated with the hegemony of dominant groups,
whose power directly correlates with the degree of conviction of other people in the
dominant ideas. In this case, hegemony itself has to do with values, namely, “the
struggle for whose means of sensemaking will dominate the relevant sphere of social
life. Therefore, language and other symbolic systems in the context of power are cen-
tral” [13, p. 20]. Hence - the desire of the power structures at any cost to form the
required patterns and to develop new meanings.
    It should be noted that in the context of globalization, manipulative technologies
have become the most popular in transitional societies. It is caused by the very nature
of these societies and is conditioned by the paternalistic system of governance adopt-
ed in them, fully in line with their traditions and collective ideas, is woven into the
structure of social relations and so on.
    Due to the fact that reality itself and its interpretation appear only as some means of
manipulative influence, the absence of correlation between them has always been con-
sidered the norm there. Therefore, in the traditionalist-type societies, there is a gap be-
tween reality and its ideological explanation. In the nineteenth century, when German
society became ill with this disease, I. Herder, in order to somehow justify this destruc-
tive trait, stated: "After all, no one will believe that there is a significant relationship
between language and thought, not even mentioning things" [7, p. 237]. It seems that the
lack of connection between part of being and the content of the concept that characteriz-
es it is in itself understandable and entirely natural. More than a hundred years later, the
Soviet researcher V. Shchegortsov continued this view, noting that "justice, law and
legal relations do not coincide in their content or in the forms of expression" [19, p. 26].
Therefore, a common characteristic of worldview, which is inherent in traditionalist
societies at all times, is the artificially created gap between reality and its interpretation,
which, above all, has an ideological foundation.
    According to the ideologists of science, legal awareness, as well as social con-
sciousness, must be artificially constructed, formed in isolation from real social rela-
tions. This causes the semantic field of law and law to be blurred. As a result, the
sign, disconnected from reality, is deprived of the opportunity to abstract and begins
to denote sense, not meaning, representing not the mental world, but the mental form.
Therefore, in traditionalist societies, legal messages deviate from the normal structure
of syllogism, whereby the subject receives mutually contradictory instructions that
belong to different levels of communication: at the cognitive level - calls for the re-
quirement of legal behavior, and at the level of being - the leveling of the written
norms rules for all subjects of social relations. Hence, deviant behavior and the de-
formation of consciousness, total corruption and neglect of rules and law.
    Under these conditions, citizens become deprived of all rights, and the right be-
comes purely formal. Despite empty declarations, the function of law in transitional
societies remains prohibitively distributive, that is, completely marginal, and is to
reduce social mobility and restrict access to the benefits of representatives of different
stratified groups, and thus requires additional legitimization through propaganda. In
general, they are the following:
    - manipulation of signs by marking certain political and legal phenomena with cer-
tain signs that have already formed connotations, semantic meanings or emotional
color in the mass consciousness. For example, the negative attitude to law and legiti-
macy that has arisen in traditionalist society is explained by the people's desire for
freedom, or by its mental or cultural characteristics, thereby offsetting the universalist
idea of law;
   - actions with meanings, by substituting and using particular concepts in such a
way that they acquire a meaning that does not coincide with the original and some-
times directly contradicts it. For example, they name: poorly structured chaos of och-
locracy - democracy; existing stateless office in the country - the rule of law; the cir-
culars - norms of law adopted in favor of oligarchic groups; freedom by will; a society
in which no rights (including property) are absent - capitalist; primitive caste distribu-
tion of material goods among the ruling elite - economic relations, etc.;
   - manipulation of the message structure, by hiding events, distorting information,
direct lies and so on. For example, in 2015, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights
Union, analyzing human rights trends in Ukraine, analyzed the National Human
Rights Strategy, which was approved by Presidential Decree No. 2015/2015 of 25
August 2015. In their report, they stated that the strategy was "too declarative and
eclectic. It does not cover public policy on human rights as a whole, does not read
these antagonistic trends, but only examines the development of individual rights and
freedoms, leaving aside such important aspects as the human rights system and fun-
damental freedoms… There remain large gaps in the consideration of individual
rights and freedoms. Thus, property rights are not considered at all… [In general] The
strategy is devoid of internal logic: it mixes three generations of rights that are of
different nature and therefore should be considered separately and according to a
different line of requirements” [8].
   In traditionalist society, there are constant actions with images through the creation
of artificial synergetic-sensory non-reflexive patterns of phenomena, events and oper-
ations with them. For example, the masses are strongly inclined to believe that the
Ukrainian legal system is unable to cope with its constitutional obligations. With the
help of unspeakable memes that are spread in society, such as: "Every law has a loop-
hole..."; "Why are we stupid? Because we are poor… ”; "Who wants - he has"; "We
are not such a thing, the life is", etc., in the mass consciousness there are formed sta-
ble patterns of depreciation of law, its artificiality, subordination and dependence on
caste distribution, impunity of power holders, general irresponsibility, meaningless-
ness of life under the rules of law and lawlessness as norms etc.
   In such circumstances, there is a rooting of simulation in the social space, when the
support and production of fiction becomes the only possible social. In this case, lying
means maintaining a socio-ideological homeostasis and, accordingly, a certain form
of sociality. In the mass consciousness, which is predominantly in an ecstatic state of
collective experience, through outlined operations, new chains of cause-and-effect
relationships are created, in which conformity with artificially formed mental forms
and propagandistic cliques is decisive.
   In a social structure based on the principles of simulacrum, rational signals can, on
the contrary, cause a pathogenic process and, accordingly, must be denied in the name
of the "good" of the system. In the case of ideological forms of consciousness ration-
alization, there will be a confusion of connections between the primary state created
by manipulation, the new rational information, which is revealed by the content and
the result within the part of the system that receives the new information. According-
ly, it threatens the integrity of the social system built on lies.
   In this context, G. Bateson noted that in cases of threat to the system, we forbid our
feelings and feelings for each other. And those people who feel that it is their duty to
pass on information that may be harmful to the system creates an entree that seeks to
go where even angels are afraid to go [4]. So, paradoxically, in the information age,
being in the depths of a transitive society and trying to shed light on the processes of
globalization of law and the degree of influence of these processes on consciousness,
we are where angels are afraid to step.
   The above provisions lead us to conclude that until there will not happen number
of structural changes related to the individualization, rationalization and liberalization
of relations in all spheres of existence in transitional societies, legal relations will be
realized either through the legalistic tyranny of the absolutist state, or by the absolutist
state, lawlessness - a formally existing "right" that no one fulfills there. By the way,
such a poorly structured chaos of ochlocracy is considered to be the only possible
manifestation of freedom and democracy in a transitional society of the traditionalist
type. But in any case, until now, instead of law, there will be a non-law, which, in the
form of inequality, combined with explicit or hidden structural violence reduced to
the properties of the entire state apparatus, is a cutting edge form of slavery.


Conclusions
The study of the phenomena of political and legal communication in the system of
social relations has revealed their determination of the existing types of societies,
which determines the practical level of protection of rights and freedoms, as well as
the corresponding roles and functions of law in societies of the individualist and tradi-
tionalist type.
    Despite the unification of the legal systems of different countries in accordance
with the requirements of international law and the liberalization of state institutions
on formal grounds, people in most transitional societies of the traditionalist type con-
tinue to be held captive by the tribalism of interpersonal relations. In such circum-
stances, the implementation of any liberal law ideas in the legislative system of the
transiting countries becomes in practice prohibitive and repressive. The real regulator
of relations are not legal rules, but unwritten rules of their social actions, which have
been formed historically. The rules of positive law themselves are largely based on
the principles of statism and clan distribution, and therefore serve as a means of regu-
lated access to the benefits of representatives of different stratified groups. The func-
tion of law there is prohibitive and distributive, and is to reduce social mobility,
which leads to a marginalized form of political and legal communication. This deter-
mines the perverse role of law, which in the illiberal system of relations is revealed as
its opposite, that is, in fact, non-law. The expansion of normative foundations and the
spread of their prescriptive and disciplinary influence on the ever-expanding social
space in such societies is combined with the “war of all against all” rule and the in-
herent practice of permissiveness and the power of the strongest.
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