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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Safety Measures Optimization for Complex Technological System</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Moshnikov Aleksandr</string-name>
          <email>moshnikov.alex@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>ITMO University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>49 Kronverksky Pr., St. Petersburg</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="RU">Russia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article is devoted to the approach to the development of a process safety system according to IEC 61511 standards. With the development of technologies and increasing the speci c energy stored in the equipment, the issue of safety during operation becomes more urgent Adequacy of the decisions on safety measures made during early stages of planning the facilities and processes contributes to avoiding technological incidents and corresponding losses. The classi cation of safety measures is given, the model of risk reduction based on deterministic analysis of the process is considered. It is shown, that the task of changing the composition of safety measures can be represented as the knapsack discrete optimization problem, solution is based on the Cross entropy Monte-Carlo method. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the approach. The considered example contains a description of failure conditions, an analysis of the types and consequences of failures that could lead to accidents, and a list of safety measures. When solving the optimization problem used real reliability parameters and cost of equipment. Based on the simulation results, the optimal composition of safety measures providing cost minimization is given. This research is relevant to engineering departments, who specialize in planning and designing the technological solution. 1</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Safety measures Safety instrumented system optimization Monte-Carlo method System reliability</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        With the development of technologies and increasing the speci c energy stored
in the equipment, the issue of safety during operation becomes more urgent
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. To ensure safety, emergency protection systems have been widely used. At
the heart of the development of such protection systems is the international
standard IEC 61511 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], which introduces the term "Safety instrument system"
(SIS) and de nes it as a system consisting of sensors, logic solvers and nite
element controls, together they implement one or more functions that provide
1 Copyright c 2019 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative
Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
safety. Such systems may contain a set of safety features that act as layers or
barriers aimed at deeply layered risk reduction
      </p>
      <p>
        As the rst level of protection, we can consider a distributed control system
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], which is designed to ensure the technology of the process and the
formation of control in the normal operation of the equipment. The next barrier is
the emergency shutdown system (implemented on the SIS), which brings the
object to a safe controlled state. The development of the design of the SIS for
industrial facilities is associated with the choice of architecture, nomenclature of
components, aspects related to the discipline of service and additional measures
to guarantee the development [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The purpose of this work is to solve the problem of optimization of the
choice of a set of safety measures used in SIS, with the provision of speci ed
safety requirements and cost [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        A recommended way to classify barrier systems is shown in Figure 1.
However, note that active barrier systems often are based on a combination of
technical and human/operational elements. Even though di erent words are applied,
the classi cation in the fourth level in Figure 1 is similar to the classi cation
suggested by Hale [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. A safety barrier is a physical and/or non-physical means
planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents
      </p>
      <p>As regards the continuous time aspect, some barrier systems are available
(functioning continuously), while some are o -line (need to be activated).
Further, some barriers are permanent, while some are temporary. Permanent barriers
are implemented as an integrated part of the whole operational life cycle, while
temporary barriers only are used in a speci ed time period, often during speci c
activities or conditions.</p>
      <p>
        Authors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] note that identifying technical (physical) safety barriers, usually,
it is quite simple, but in the case where the safety barrier includes an action
for example, the operator's response to an alarm), you should be careful and
distinguish between the action itself, which performs the barrier function, and
the factors that help the operator in making the correct decision (technological
instructions, training, precise information presentation, etc.). [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ] o ers a
somewhat di erent approach classi cation of safety barriers based on evaluating their
e ectiveness in the event of a potentially dangerous situation. In depending on
the degree of e ciency (high, medium, low) distinguish the following types of
safety barriers.Technical (high e ciency). Can prevent the spread of risk
factors, reduce the risk of a situation, mitigate the consequences, or reduce the
likelihood of risk factors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ]. If there is a technical barrier if it doesn't work,
the threat is transferred to another one technical barrier to implementation of
potentially dangerous event (until the triggering event is reached). The same
applies to further escalation from the triggering event to consequences. The
following subcategories are distinguished technical barriers: technical barriers that
are triggered on demand (emergency cut-o valve, drencher system, emergency
tank); technical passive, operate on a permanent basis, perform barrier function
by its mere presence (safety valve, collapse, re-proof and explosion-proof
partitions etc.); technical control barriers that activate other barriers that prevent or
mitigate the consequences of a dangerous event (gas detectors, re alarm system,
accident noti cation system, etc.).
      </p>
      <p>
        Risk reduction of Equipment under control (EUC) or technological process
is shown in Figure 2. Barriers of this type cannot prevent the development of
the accident, but can activate other barriers that will do this. Human
(organizational) (average e ciency). Contribute to the control of a process or
activity. This type of barrier can reduce the probability of the triggering event by
strengthening other barriers or preventing them from being weakened, but if a
potentially dangerous event has already been initiated, then this type of barrier,
o en can prevent its development, or reduce the consequences. The following
subcategories are distinguished: types of barriers: procedural (inspections and
observations, control tools, process management, work risk assessment, work
permit system etc.); human (operational) (control by the operator, supervision,
periodic detours, etc.). Fundamental (low e ciency in the immediate vicinity
of the event). Their e ect is divided in time from the occurrence of the threat
to the implementation of the factor risk. However, fundamental barriers make a
huge di erence an important and e ective contribution to the safety of the
system by checks and controls for vulnerabilities system and the original causes of
failures. The following subcategories are distinguished this type of barriers: the
fundamental procedural (analysis of the project, assessment of commissioning,
checking the internal regulations, analysis of operation, con rmation of
qualication); fundamental human (good health of workers, etc.) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. A number of
standards and guidelines have been issued to assist in designing, implementing,
and maintaining reliable SISs. The most important of these is the international
standard IEC 61511 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], which is a generic standard that outlines key
requirements to all phases of the SIS life-cycle.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Problem statement</title>
      <p>
        The problem of optimizing the composition of the SIS is to select the necessary
and su cient set of sensors, logic elements and nal performers, taking into
account the constraints on the budget of the project. IEC 61511 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] suggests that
consideration should be given to the introduction of any safety measures,
applying the principle of risk reduction ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable)
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The level of risk reduction taking into account safety barriers is shown in the
Figure 3.</p>
      <p>The probability of failure of safety measures can be determined by q(t) =
e t, where is the equipment failure rate.</p>
      <p>In general, can introduce
8 n
&gt; min P (Sj bi)
&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt;&gt; n i=1
&gt;&lt; P (qi) Q qlbojckj Q qdbjiagj Q qebmjsj &lt; qreq1</p>
      <p>i=1
&gt;&gt; :::
&gt;&gt;&gt;:&gt;&gt; iP=n1(qi) Q qlbojckj Q qdbjiagj Q qebmjsj &lt; qreqn
(1)
qi - probability of failure of the i-th component of the process system,
Sj { the cost of implementing the j-th safety measure,
qlockj - the probability of failure of the j-th lock;
qemsj { the probability of failure of j-th emergency stop;
qdiagj -probability of failure of the j-th diagnosis, revealing preemergency
conditions;
qreq - the probability of occurrence of a dangerous situation, speci ed in
regulations or determined during the analysis.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Approach to problem solving</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Optimization</title>
        <p>
          The problem of optimization of the choice of safety measures is a modi cation
of the "backpack Problem" [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ], class of combinatorial optimization problems,
which can be formulated as follows:
(2)
(3)
n
maxx P (pj xj ); xj 2 0::1; j 2 1::n
        </p>
        <p>j=1
n
P (!i;j xj ) &lt; cj ; i 2 1::m
j=1
where pj and !i;j are weights, and ci is a cost, and x = (x1; :::; xn).</p>
        <p>
          The backpack problem can be solved in several ways: the method of dynamic
programming [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ]; brute force; the method of branches and boundaries [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ]; the
method of statistical modeling. Consider the application of the statistical
modeling method. In general, the approach can be represented as follows, nd the
maximum of the function S(x) on a given set X. Let's assume that the maximum
is achieved for only one value of the parameter x . Let us denote the maximum
by .
        </p>
        <p>S(x ) =
= max S(x)
x2X</p>
        <p>
          Optimization problem can be related to the calculation of probability l =
P (S(X) ), where X has some probability density f (x; u) on the set X (for
example, having a uniform distribution density) and is close to the unknown
. As is correct, l is the probability of a rare event, so a sampling-by-signi cance
approach can be used. Thus, sampling from such a distribution yields optimal
or nearly optimal values. The last value = is usually unknown, but using
statistical modeling, a sequence ^t is formed at each step of the simulation, which
tends to the optimal , as well as at each step the change of the modeled vector
v^ is xed [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ].
3.2
        </p>
        <p>Algorithm
1. Choose the initial vector of parameters v^0, let N e = [eN ]. Take the counter
t = 1;
2. Generate N random vectors X1; :::; XN with density f ( ; v^t 1), determine the
values of S(Xi) for all i, and arrange them in ascending order from smaller to
larger: S(1) ::: S(N ). Let t be the (1 e) quantile of the obtained values,
thus ^t = S(N Ne+1);
3. Using the same sample of random vectors X1; :::; XN solve the equation
n
maxv N1 P IS(Xk) v^0 ln f (Xk; n) denote the solution as v^t;</p>
        <p>i=1
4. If the stop criterion is reached, then end the algorithm, otherwise change the
counter t = t + 1 and proceed to step 2.
4</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Numerical example</title>
      <p>4.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-4-1">
        <title>Brief description of the model</title>
        <p>As an example, we will consider the fuel supply subsystem shown at g. 1, it
includes a xed volume tank (Tank), a level sensor (LV), a pumping valve to the
next section of the process (V1) and a feed pump (PD) with a control system
implemented on the control unit (CU). During the preliminary analysis, it was
revealed that two dangerous conditions are possible at this site: the occurrence
of a re and its propagation, as well as tank over ow. Assume that the required
probability of preventing the development of re and exceeding the level in the
tank should be less than 1 10 5 and 1 10 4 per year, respectively.</p>
        <p>
          Modeling of safety-related systems is based on the theory of reliability. IEC
61511 [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ] o ers the following methods for assessing reliability: quantitative
evaluation using simpli ed equations based on block diagrams of reliability and
analysis of failure trees. In some cases, Markov analysis can be used, a more complex
approach allows working with dynamic models that take into account the
development of failure over time. The qualitative analysis as Failure Mode and E ect
Analysis (FMEA) in accordance [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ] is given in Table 1.
        </p>
        <p>Taking into account various variants of implementation of safety measures it
is possible to receive the following optimization problem:
8 9
&gt;&gt; min P (Sj bj )
&lt; j=1
&gt;&gt; (qtank)qDb11 qDb22 qSb61 qSb83 + (qP D:H )qDb33 qDb44 qSb61 &lt; qfire = 10 5
: (qLV:F )qDb65 qDb22 qSb83 + (qP D:F )qSb72 qSb83 + (qCU:F )qSb72 qSb83 qLb91 &lt; qo:l: = 10 4
(4)</p>
        <p>It is needed to nd the vector B = fb1; b2::b9g, at which (1) is executed, on a
set of initial data from table. 2-3. For example, the vector B = f1; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0g
means that as part of the safety instrument system, safety measures are used:
monitoring the condition of the tank body by the ultrasonic method (D1),
monitoring the condition of the feed pump windings (D3), emergency opening of the
drain valve (Z3). The total number of combinations 29 = 512.
4.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-2">
        <title>Initial data</title>
        <p>The initial data on the reliability of the equipment of the production line and
safety measures are presented in tab. 2. and tab. 3, respectively.
m
Where = P pj . In this case, S(x) &lt; 0 if one of the inequalities fails and
j=1
S (x)= if satis ed. Since the vector x is binary, the multivariate Bernoulli
distribution with density f(x,v)= is chosen as the initial distribution. As initial
parameters we will accept the following N = 102 and N e = 10, and v^0 = (1=2; :::; 1=2).
# safety measures
qD1 Control of the body condition by ultrasonic</p>
        <p>method
qD2 Magneto resistive monitoring device
qD3 Control condition of winding
qD4 Housing temperature control
qD5 Monitoring of the sensor status by initial test
qS1 The inclusion of the re pump and water ow
qS2 Emergency stop of process equipment (pump)
qS3 Emergency opening of the discharge valve
qL1 Pump control limitation at 70 % of tank volume
We will not use the mixing parameter to de ne v^0(
v^t will be as follows:
= 1), so at each iteration
m
v^t;j = kP=1 IS(X^k) ^0 Xk;j
m
kP=1 IS(X^k) ^0
; j = 1; ::; n
(6)
Where Xk;j is the j-th component of the k-th random vector X^ . The expression is
used as a stop criterion dt = 1mjaxnfmin fv^t; 1 v^tgg 0:01 . For each population
t of generated values, calculate the threshold ^0 and the largest value S(Xk) and
the value of the stop criterion dt.
4.4</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-4-3">
        <title>Modeling results</title>
        <p>To demonstrate the convergence of the method, 100 independent modeling cycles
were performed. In each cycle, changes in the density of the vector v^t were
recorded after calculation using the formula (6). Fig. 4 present average change
value of the parameter vector while 100 independent iteration.</p>
        <p>The nal decision, the value of the vector v^t corresponds to the following
composition of equipment and measures: the application of monitoring the
condition of the pump winding's, and the emergency opening of the drain valve.
Vector B = f0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0g is optimal, with total cost S=210, and qfire =
4:99 10 07 and qo:f: = 7:43 10 07.</p>
        <p>The results of the dynamics of the vector v^t is presented in g. 5.
5</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>The paper presents a method of bringing the problem of optimization of a set
of safety measures provided in the SIS to the problem of discrete optimization.
The method of statistical modeling with signi cance sampling was used as a
solution method. The obtained solution corresponds to the solution obtained
by brute force. The obtained result can serve as a basis for the development of
the requirements speci cation in accordance with the requirements for the life
cycle of the system. Development of a risk model including safety barriers that
may prevent, control, or mitigate accident scenarios with in-depth modeling of
barrier performance allows explicit modeling of functional common cause
failures (e.g., failures due to functional dependencies on a support system). The
classi cation of safety measures is given, the model of risk reduction based on
deterministic analysis of the process is considered. It is shown, that the task of
changing the composition of safety measures can be represented as the knapsack
discrete optimization problem, solution is based on the Cross entropy
MonteCarlo method. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the approach. The
considered example contains a description of failure conditions, an analysis of
the types and consequences of failures that could lead to accidents, and a list
of safety measures. When solving the optimization problem used real reliability
parameters and cost of equipment. Based on the simulation results, the optimal
composition of safety measures providing cost minimization is given.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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