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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Model of client-server information system functioning in the conditions of network reconnaissance</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Maximov Roman Viktorovich</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Krasnodar Higher Military School named after the general of the Army S.M.Shtemenko Krasnodar</institution>
          ,
          <country country="RU">Russia</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Telenga Alexander Pavlovich</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>44</fpage>
      <lpage>51</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>- Expansion of possibilities and increase of efficiency of network reconnaissance on opening of client-server information systems actualize questions of maintenance of their stability to influences of destabilizing factors. Known methods of protection against network reconnaissance, based on the implementation of the principles of spatial security, as well as the formalization and implementation of many prohibitive regulations based on the detection and response to the fact of network reconnaissance or computer attacks, are not able to effectively withstand the modern means of network reconnaissance. Implementation of such protection methods forces the attacker to continue influencing the client-server information systems and (or) change the strategy of impact. The article presents a model that allows to study the processes of client-server information system functioning in the conditions of network reconnaissance at various strategies of interacting parties, as well as management of resource opportunities of network reconnaissance facilities when establishing and maintaining network connections. Interaction of conflicting parties is presented in the form of Markovian process with discrete states and continuous time. Elements of novelty of the developed model is the application of the mathematical apparatus of the theory of Markovian processes and the solution of Kolmogorov's equations for the study and solution of the problem of dynamic management of resource opportunities of the clientserver information system due to the management of parameters of network connections. The practical importance of the developed model consists in finding the probabilistic and temporal characteristics describing the state of the process of functioning of the client-server information system at various strategies of establishment and maintenance of parameters of connections by the interacting parties.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>client-server information attack</kwd>
        <kwd>network connection</kwd>
        <kwd>honeypots</kwd>
        <kwd>protocol</kwd>
        <kwd>network reconnaissance</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        Currently, a large number of computer attacks are of an
intelligence nature used by the attacker with the help of
network reconnaissance tools in order to obtain information
about the topology and typology of the information system that
is the object of the computer attack, as well as the information
system security features. Possibilities of network
reconnaissance are conditioned by openness of architecture of
information systems and protocols of information exchange
(TCP/IP family), providing interaction through the
organization of interfaces of network reconnaissance with
elements of information system. Interfaces allow to carry out
interaction of consistently connected devices and programs of
the received cumulative system realizing the channel of
information leakage [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3 ref4 ref5 ref6">1-6</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The key phases of interaction are software suppression
(denial of service), event control (monitoring) and management
(control interception). The first phase differs from the third in
that it may be declarative in nature, and network
reconnaissance may lose the ability to implement dialogue. If
the information system is isolated, the means of ensuring the
security of information interaction are implemented through
computer attacks and undeclared capabilities, ensuring the
«delivery» of technical means of network reconnaissance in the
infrastructure of the information system (providing contact of
technical means of network reconnaissance with the object of
protection). Dialogue (software, protocol) interaction is carried
out locally from the data link layer of the reference OSI model,
and remotely – from the network layer [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7 ref8 ref9">7-9</xref>
        ]. One of the means
of network protection, functioning with the use of network
strategies aimed at creating illusions of vulnerable targets or
contributing to the appearance of more complex (false)
infrastructure, are network honeypots. Better ways of
misleading include not only providing a plausible target for
network reconnaissance, but also such actions as, for example,
keeping the connection with the sender of the message packets
in two-way order, which causes «exhaustion» of resources of
the sender of the message packets to maintain the state of
connection, slows down the process of automatic scanning of
the information system under attack and, as a result, imposes a
restriction on the computing resource used by the offender,
which leads to the impossibility of performing the following.
The considered methods of protection are implemented in the
form of so-called network tarpits [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11">10, 11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        In turn, information security violators are also actively
developing and improving tools to reduce the effectiveness of
network traps, implementing the following methods of
compromising: detecting the unique identifiers (unmasking
features) of network traps and detailed analysis of network
traffic coming from network traps. Such an unmasking feature
of the network «trap» is the use of the value of the
TCPpackages «window size» service field, which is set to ten bytes
by default [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. As a means of compromising network «traps»
in terms of detecting the fact of using the entire set of
IPaddresses, the intruder can use various utilities (nmap, ethereal,
arping, etc. specialized software) designed to analyze network
traffic and information system topology [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14 ref15 ref16">13-16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The purpose of dynamic configuration of information
system network connection parameters in the conditions of
network reconnaissance is to promptly serve the maximum
number of requests of authorized clients with simultaneous
reduction of the quality of service of network reconnaissance
requests. Since there are no physical level disturbances, it is
advisable to determine the disturbing factors of the
environment as a set of software interferences and software
suppression (computer attacks such as «denial of service»,
socalled DOS- and DDOS- attacks).</p>
      <p>II.</p>
      <p>OBJECT OF STUDY ANALYSIS</p>
      <p>In order to transfer information between remote
information systems, as well as between clients and servers in
the information system with client-server architecture, a logical
connection is established via communication protocols. The
increase in the intensity of incoming information flows from
one IP-address, multiple IP-addresses may lead to the
implementation of an attack such as «Denial of Service»
(DoS), or a distributed attack such as «Distributed Denial of
Service» (DDoS), respectively.</p>
      <p>Information flow management provides the TCP Internet
protocol, it allows you to maintain the reliability of
transmission over the TCP protocol by adjusting the speed of
information flows between the sender and the recipient of
TCP-packages during a particular session. Information flows
are controlled by limiting the number of data segments
transmitted at one time, as well as requesting confirmation of
receipt before sending the next segments.</p>
      <p>The connection is initiated by the sender of the message
packets. If it is necessary to exchange data with the recipient of
message packets, the client application refers to the underlying
TCP protocol, which in response to this sends a
segmentrequest to establish a connection to the TCP protocol, working
on the side of the sender of the message packets, among other
things, the request contains the SYN flag set in «1». After
receiving the request, the server allocates certain system
resources, setting the initial value of the WN field «window
size» (for example, 25 bytes) for the formation of the TCP
header of the response packet of messages, announcing to the
sender of the packets of messages about its readiness to receive
a certain amount of data, as well as other variables of
connection. After all the necessary actions are performed on
the server side, the resources are defined, the TCP module
sends the client a segment with the flags ACK and SYN with
the installed WN to the sender. In response, the client sends a
segment with the ACK flag and switches to the state of the
established logical connection.</p>
      <p>The duration of the delay may increase and then the server
may suspend the information exchange with the client in those
periods of time when the information system or server
resources (the recipient of TCP-packages of messages) are
overloaded. For this purpose the server establishes value of the
TCP-buffer by an establishment of a field «window size» in
TCP-header of a package of messages equal to zero WU = 0,
initiating thereby the mechanism of deduction in the bilateral
order of connection with the sender of packages of messages,
and directs to it corresponding packages of messages. Initiative
reduction of speed of data transmission at each session helps to
reduce the conflict of resources of the sender and the recipient
of TCP-packages of messages in case of initialization of
several sessions of communication. This reduces data loss and
the number of redirection of data.</p>
      <p>After receiving a message packet with WU = 0, according to
the TCP protocol specification, the sender of the message
packets will periodically send test single-byte segments, asking
the recipient to repeat the information about the size of the
window and the expected next byte (the so-called test segment
«zero-window probe») to determine when he will be able to
resume sending data. By implementing a two-way hold
mechanism for the connection with the sender of the message
packets, the server may not enlarge the window, leaving it at
zero, thereby keeping the sender of the message packets
blocked in the long connection for a while until the timeout
expires.</p>
      <p>If the sender of the message packets wants to break the
connection (send a packet of messages with the FIN flag in the
TCP header) or send urgent data (send a packet of messages
with the URG flag in the TCP header), the recipient of the
message packets can ignore these incoming packets of
messages by blocking them. The server, while ignoring these
packets, forces the client operating system to maintain
connection resources until FIN-WAIT-1 expires, waiting for
the TCP segment from the server to confirm that it is ready to
close the connection. The server (the packet recipient) does not
maintain the connection state on its end and does not consume
its computing resources, which allows it to fully implement the
functions of processing of incoming messages packets from
clients with higher priority.</p>
      <p>The server sends ACK messages to the client to confirm
that the client has received a segment of data (or a set of
segments). In the process of information exchange via
communication channels it is possible to disrupt the order of
segment delivery and loss of segments, which makes it
necessary to retransmit them from client to server. In particular,
if there is interference in the communication channel, it is
possible to send three duplicates of ACK confirmation to each
of the received fragments of the TCP-package of messages,
which is the use of the saturation control algorithm - the fast
repetition algorithm (Fast Retransmit) for the TCP protocol.</p>
      <p>
        Thus, the server strategy is to optimize the distribution of its
resources to ensure the timely processing of customer requests,
taking into account their priorities, which can be achieved by
dynamic management of connection parameters [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ].
system functioning can be represented as a Markovian process
with discrete states and continuous time.
      </p>
      <p>III.</p>
      <p>CLIENT-SERVER INFORMATION SYSTEM FUNCTIONING</p>
      <p>MODEL</p>
      <p>Let's assume that there is a node of the information system
a server that ensures the functioning of the client-server
system, including in the part of the system of control
(evaluation) of the idle time value. The simulated system S
changes its state over time (passes from one state to another).
Required to study the state of the client-server information
system S1, S2, … can be listed as follows:</p>
      <p>S1 – The client is idle, does not receive and does not
transmit message packets;</p>
      <p>S2 – Initialization of the connection by the client;
S3 – Estimation of the customer downtime;</p>
      <p>S4 – Setting (changing) the data flow rate between the
client and the server by setting (changing) the «window size»
parameter W;</p>
      <p>S5 – Establishing (confirming) the connection by the server
and receiving the «window size» parameter W by the client;</p>
      <p>S6 – Transmission and reception of data flows between
client and server;</p>
      <p>S7 – Confirmation by the server of receiving data stream
parts (acknowledgement).</p>
      <p>Moments of possible transitions of the client-server
information system from the state to the state are uncertain,
random and occur under the action of the event flows
characterized by their intensity λ, presented in Table 1, which
are an important characteristic of the event flows and
characterize the average number of events per unit of time.</p>
      <p>The graph of client-server information system functioning
states is shown in Fig. 1.</p>
      <p>S2
λ12
λ41
S1</p>
      <p>S4
λ45</p>
      <p>The estimation of efficiency of functioning processes of
information system is connected with necessity of modeling of
process in real time that causes expediency of use of the
mathematical apparatus of Markovian processes which
necessary conditions - streams of events are the elementary
(possess properties of stationarity, ordinariness and have no
consequences). So, the process of client-server information
Requests for assessment of idle time after the client initializes
the connection
Request for setting (changing) the data flow rate between the
client and the server by setting (changing) the «window size» W
parameter
Requests for assessment of idle time after setting (changing)
the «window size» W parameter
Request for the server to establish (confirm) a connection and
receive the «window size» W parameter by the client
Request for transmission and reception of data flows between
the client and the server after confirmation of the connection
establishment server (WN and SYN ACK transmission)
Requests for assessment of idle time in the process of data
transmission and reception between the client and the server
Requests for confirmation by the server of the data stream parts
reception (acknowledgement)
Requests for evaluation of idle time after server confirmation
of data stream parts reception (acknowledgement)
Requests for the client to send the next part of the data stream
after the confirmation of the reception of a part of the stream
Requests for maximization of the client idle time (0-speed data
flow parameters) by setting (changing) the «window size»
parameter W = 0
Requests for estimation of the value of the client idle time
a. λ – Intensity of event flows</p>
      <p>Let's consider the scenario of transition of the simulated
system from the Si state to the Sj state under the influence of
event flows with intensities of λij.</p>
      <p>When a client-server information system is functioning,
objective limitations arise on the performance of both the
information system as a whole and its elements. The situation
becomes worse when clients with different priorities appear.
Therefore they use the dispatching of clients' requests to the
server in such information systems. Processing of requests
from users with lower priority is suspended without breaking
the connection with them if necessary. It is rational, as the
repeated establishment of connection causes repetition of the
technological operations connected with it that negatively
influences on information system productivity.</p>
      <p>Let S1 be the initial state of the simulated client-server
information system, in which it does not receive and transmit
data flows, i.e. the state of rest, which is characterized for the
client by a high value of the idle time, which is evaluated in the
state S3 (on request λ13). It is also reasonable to put the clients
to this state of S1, and the requests received from them are able
to overload the server so that they do not have the resource for
switching to the state of S2 by initialization of λ12 requests for
connection to the server. The clients can initialize alternative
requests of λ12 until the system resource is exhausted, which
will occur if the previous data streams are not closed. If there is
still such a resource, the S system switches to the S2 state and
initializes the connection to the server for transmission of
message packets with the SYN flag installed. A similar event</p>
      <p>Initial conditions are set to solve Kolmogorov's differential
equations. The vector of probabilities of initial states of the
Markov chain taking into account absence of influences on the
client-server information system at the initial moment of time
looks like:
occurs in the investigated S system when new (alternative)
authorized clients or new requests from already connected
clients appear in it, but via another protocol (organization of a
new socket). In this case, λ23 requests to estimate the value of S3
idle time after initialization of the connection by the client
appear in the simulated system.</p>
      <p>After evaluation of the value of the idle time indicator in
the system S, λ34 requests to set (change) the data flow rate
between the client and server S4 by setting (change) the
«window size» parameter W. The value of this parameter is
selected in accordance with the value of the idle time indicator
of the information system under study: if the connection is
initialized by clients with low or usual number of requests, and
the server performance has a limited resource, the value of the
«window size» parameter W is set to some non-zero value of
WN, for example, WN = 20 bytes. Otherwise, if the connection is
initialized by clients with a large number of requests that can
overload the server, there is a possibility to set the value of the
«window size» parameter W to zero, WU = 0 bytes. As a result,
λ41 requests for maximizing the idle time value arise in the
investigated S system. λ43 requests for evaluation of the idle
time value after establishing (changing) the «window size»
parameter W allow to dynamically change (regulate) the data
flow rate from clients to the server. If a non-zero value of WN is
set, then λ45 requests to establish (confirm) a connection by
SYN ACK server and to receive the «window size» parameter
W by the clients arise in the investigated system S, after which
the system switches to the state S5. This state causes λ56
requests to transmit and receive data flows between the clients
and the server if the clients (server) have data to be transmitted.
As a result, the S system under study switches to the state of S6
of data transmission and reception between clients and the
server, which leads to λ63 requests for assessment of the idle
time value of data transmission and reception between clients
and the server. In the process of data streams transmission and
reception the clients and the server exchange receipts
(confirmations) – the state of S7 for λ37 requests. The
acknowledgement procedure also affects the value of the idle
time indicator, which is reflected in the column for λ73 requests
for its evaluation.</p>
      <p>After receiving the next λ76 receipt from the server, the
clients transmit the next part of the data stream to the server. If
any parts of the data stream are destroyed in the process of
transmission or come from the clients to the server in the
wrong order as a result of intentional and/or unintentional
interference with the communication channel and the server,
the data transmission speed in the client-server information
system decreases. In this case, it is not advisable to talk about a
S system or clients idle, so there is no corresponding link
between the states of S7 and S1 on the status bar.</p>
      <p>A mathematical model of the client-server information
system functioning - differential equations with unknown
functions pi(t) - is built on the basis of the marked graph of
client-server information system states:
(3)
(4)
(5)
which corresponds to a high downtime value.</p>
      <p>The system of linear differential equations (3) with constant
coefficients (homogeneous markov process) is solved by
setting numerical values of intensities λ, presented in Table 2,
and passing to continuous time t   . For any moment t the
sum of all probabilities of states is equal to one:
i1
n
 pi t   1</p>
      <p>The nature of the selected intensity values is determined in
accordance with the strategies of the clients and the server - the
parties to the resource conflict.</p>
      <p>The client-server information system model takes into
account the impact on the server of authorized clients with
different request priorities and the number of requests.</p>
      <p>The use of the model involves the search for strategies for
interaction between the server and the information system
clients, and will allow to proceed to the probabilistic
assessment of the downtime of the information system and the
means of network reconnaissance. Taking into account in the
Markov model the time of stay of the information system in
each of the states depending on the strategies of the interacting
parties allows to study the dynamics of the client-server
information system functioning.</p>
      <p>The initial data for modeling are the following: the system
of linear differential equations (3); the vector of probabilities of
initial states (4); the values of the event flows intensity
presented in Table 1; the standardization condition (5).</p>
      <p>The classical method of the fourth order (the Runge-Kutta
method with a fixed integration step which is given to the
vector representation) is applied as a method of solving the
system of linear differential equations, where each element
corresponds to the right side of a certain differential equation in
the system.</p>
      <p>The use of the known order of solution of the system of
linear differential equations by the Runge-Kutta method allows
to receive the numerical table of approximate values pi of the
sought solutions p(t) on some interval t [t0 , t1] .</p>
      <p>Thus, the probabilistic and temporal characteristics
describing the states of the client-server information system
functioning process are obtained, which, in their turn, form the
basis for the research of this process at various strategies of
interacting parties, as shown in Table 3, which allows to
evaluate the state of the client-server information system.</p>
      <p>Let's evaluate the model's stability to the variations of the
initial data, setting the boundary values in the strategies of the
interacting parties, while considering the following variants of
strategies:</p>
      <p>C1 is a strategy without confirmation and with a queue, in
this case, the connection of clients to the server is carried out
via the UDP protocol, where reliable data transfer and
confirmation of their receipt, in case of need, must be
implemented by the user application, the server receives a
significant number of requests for connection from clients and
builds them in the queue and then processes them consistently;</p>
      <p>C2 is a strategy without confirmation and without queue, in
this case the connection of clients to the server is carried out
via the UDP protocol, where reliable data transfer and
confirmation of their receipt, in case of need, must be
implemented by the user application, the server receives
connection requests from clients and manages to process them
without delay (without the need to create a queue from the
requests) or rejects them;</p>
      <p>C3 is a strategy with the confirmation and with the queue, in
this case the connection of clients to the server is carried out
via the TCP protocol, where the server receives a significant
number of connection requests from clients, builds them in the
queue and then sequentially processes them;</p>
      <p>C4 is a strategy with confirmation and without queue, in
this case clients with the server is carried out through the TCP
protocol, where the server receives connection requests from
clients and manages to process them without delay (without the
need to create a queue from the requests) or rejects them.</p>
      <p>Values of event flows intensity are set as constant
according to the chosen strategy of client-server interaction.</p>
      <p>The graphs of the probabilities of the client-server
information system functioning process states depending on the
time p1(t), p2(t), …, p7(t) for the values of event intensities
corresponding to the strategy С1, according to Table 3, are
presented in Fig. 2.</p>
      <p>At the time interval [0; 0,09] the information system is in
the transient mode of functioning, where a spike in the
probability values of the state of p2(t) and p3(t) is observed, that
corresponds to the finding of the information system in the
state of initialization of the connection by clients and
evaluation of the value of the clients' idle time.
p5(t)
0
p6(t)
0
p7(t)
0
…
…</p>
      <p>…
.0.9
t) P1
(
,pi P2
ttae P3
s
a P4
n
ig P5
n
ieb P6
fo P7
y
t
i
l
i
b
a
b
o
r
e . 0
p
h
T
0.9
0.81
0.72
0.63
0.54
0.45
0.36
0.27
0.18
0.09
pi(t)
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
.0 T.itme t.0,.s1ec
Fig. 2. Results of calculating the dependence of probabilities of states on
time for the values of event intensities corresponding to the strategy C1
In the case of t   , a stationary mode is established in
the information system when it randomly changes its states and
its probabilities p1(t), p2(t), …, p7(t) no longer depend on time
and are equal to the final (limiting) probabilities.</p>
      <p>The final probabilities p1 = 0,513, p2 = 0,051, p3 = 0,348,
p4 = 0,053, p5 = 0,023, p6 = 9,069·10-3, p7 = 2,547·10-3 show
how long the information system stays in different states in
average.</p>
      <p>In order to study the process of functioning and protection
of the information system at the listed strategies of functioning
of the client-server information system, and the corresponding
values of the intensity of events, the calculation of probabilistic
and temporal characteristics is made according to the above
example.</p>
      <p>
        We obtain a numerical table of approximate pi values on
the interval t [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">0, 10</xref>
        ] with a fixed integration step of 10,3
which is presented in Table 4, for the values of event flows of
strategy С2.
      </p>
      <p>
        Approximate pi(t) values on the interval t [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">0, 10</xref>
        ] with a
fixed integration step of 103 for the values of intensity of the
event flows of the strategy С3 are presented in numerical
Table 5.
      </p>
      <p>Approximate pi(t) values for the values of intensity of the
event flows of the strategy С4 are presented in numerical
Table 6.</p>
      <p>The developed model for the functioning of the
clientserver information system takes into account the influence and
the nature of the influence of the event flows from customers
with low and high priority services, as well as the normal and
large number of requests from clients to a server that can
overload it. The process of protecting the server from overload
in accordance with this model is to minimize the likelihood
(and average time) of downtime for clients with a high priority
of service or a large number of requests, and, therefore,
minimize the likelihood of a server overload. Protection of the
information system from event flows from clients with a high
priority of service or a large number of requests involves the
search for strategies for the functioning of the client-server
information system depending on the changing options for
interaction between the parties due to limited server resources
in time. The model makes it possible to identify the
dependences of the functioning of the client-server information
system on the impact flows, evaluate the effectiveness of the
client service, select algorithms for protecting the server from
overload, and optimally use the server resources. The increase
in the intensity of requests, both from the server and from the
clients' side, corresponds to the change of strategies of
interacting parties, are presented in Fig. 3.</p>
      <p>0.9 pi(t)
/0.9
0.81
0.72
0.63
0.54
0.45
0.36
0.27
0.18
t)( P1
,pi P2
e
ttsa P3
an P4
ing P5
ieb P6
foy P7
iitl
b
a
b
o
eh / 0 0.09
r
p
T</p>
      <p>With the increase of λ12 (to 1751 on Fig. 3) the client-server
information system is in a difficult mode of operation, the
probability of its being in the state of S1 is Р1=0,294, and the
probability of server overload tends to minimize. The
probability of transition of the system to the state S2 will be
maximal and equal to Р2=0,611 for the given values of
intensities from the table for strategy С3. It is possible to reduce
the load on this state of the server by increasing its resource by
creating a queue of applications between the client and the
server by changing the data flow rate by setting the «window
size» parameter W, regulating the values of the intensity λ34 и
λ41, as well as by confirming the reception of the data flow
parts (acknowledgement) by the server by regulating the values
of the intensity λ37 и λ56. The diagrams of the probabilities of
states versus time for fixed values of event intensities and at
λ12=2619 are presented on Fig. 4. If this threshold value
(λ12=2619) is exceeded that corresponds to the system state in
which the server has received the maximum number of
requests, which it can process without overfilling the clipboard
or reducing the quality of request servicing, the process of
exhausting the system resource due to unfinished connections
occurs.</p>
      <p>/0.9
t) P1
(i
,p P2
e
tta P3
s
a P4
n
i
g P5
n
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pi(t)</p>
      <p>The scientific novelty of the model consists in the
application of the mathematical apparatus of the Markov
random processes theory and the solution of Kolmogorov
equations for the study and solution of the problem of dynamic
management of the resource potential of the client-server
information system due to the management of network
connection parameters.</p>
      <p>The practical importance lies in finding the probabilistic
and temporal characteristics describing the states of the process
of functioning of the client-server information system at
various strategies of establishment and maintenance of
parameters of connections by interacting parties.</p>
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