=Paper= {{Paper |id=Vol-2638/paper2 |storemode=property |title=Computationally secure threshold secret sharing scheme with minimal redundancy |pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2638/paper2.pdf |volume=Vol-2638 |authors=Mikhail Babenko,Andrei Tchernykh,Elena Golimblevskaia,Nguyen Viet Hung,Vijay Chaurasiya |dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/iccs-de/BabenkoTGHC20 }} ==Computationally secure threshold secret sharing scheme with minimal redundancy== https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2638/paper2.pdf
Computationally secure threshold secret sharing scheme with
minimal redundancy

                M Babenko1, A Tchernykh2,3,4, E Golimblevskaia1, Nguyen Viet Hung5 and
                V K Chaurasiya5
                1
                  North-Caucasus Federal University, Stavropol, Russia
                2
                  CICESE Research Center, Ensenada, BC, Mรฉxico
                3
                  South Ural State University, Chelyabinsk, Russia
                4
                  Ivannikov Institute for System Programming, Moscow, Russia
                5
                  LeQuyDon Technical University, Hanoi, Vietnam
                6
                  Indian Institute of Information Technology, Allahabad, India
                E-mail: chernykh@cicese.mx


                Abstract. When designing and using distributed storage systems with cloud technology, the
                security issues become crucial. One of the promising mechanisms is the computationally
                secure threshold secret sharing scheme. We propose a computationally secure secret sharing
                scheme based on the minimally redundant modular code. It reduces the computational
                complexity of data encoding and decoding and reduce data redundancy. We show that it is
                computationally secure and provides data redundancy equivalent to the redundancy of the
                Rabin system. We demonstrate that the minimally redundant modular code does not satisfy the
                criterion of compactness of a sequence, but it can be used as an asymptotically ideal secret
                sharing scheme.


1. Introduction
The cloud technologies require users to take into account the increased risks of data security and
reliability. To reduce the likelihood of theft, loss or distortion of data stored in clouds, two
mechanisms can be used: secret sharing schemes and hash functions. Residue Number System (RNS)
as the basis for the design of distributed storage systems combines these two mechanisms into one,
since RNS on the one hand is a secret sharing scheme, and, on the other hand, it has properties of error
detection and correction.
    Secret sharing schemes on RNS provide the same level of security as schemes built on Lagrange
interpolation, however, have higher redundancy. To solve this problem, compact sequences as RNS
moduli that satisfy the condition p" < p$ < โ‹ฏ < p& < 2p& are proposed [1].
    Compact sequences highlight a class of asymptotically ideal Asmuth-Bloom secret sharing
schemes [2, 3], which ensure a high level of data reliability and security. But this approach is not
applicable in practice for storing big data, since data redundancy is higher than data replication and
symmetric encryption.
    AC-RRNS [4] modification of the Asmuth-Bloom scheme uses compact sequences to reduce data
redundancy while ensuring computational security. However, using a prime number ๐‘) as a key
satisfying the condition: ฮฒ = โˆ/.0" p. > p) > โˆ/2$
                                                 .0) p&2. = ฮฑ leads to increasing the complexity of the



   Copyright ยฉ 2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
encoding and decoding algorithm from linear-logarithmic to quadratic. It does not allow its efficient
use.
   An alternative solution to the problem is to use minimally redundant modular code, which, on the
one hand, satisfies the criteria of compactness of a sequence, and, on the other hand, reduces the
computational complexity of encoding and decoding while maintaining reliability and security at the
same level.
   The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the properties of RNS. Section 3
describes RNS-based minimally redundant code. Section 4 discusses our secret sharing scheme
modification. Section 5 explores the security issues of the proposed scheme. Section 6 concludes the
paper.

2. RNS and its properties
RNS is a non-positional number system that allows splitting long numbers into a series of independent
digits of small length, speeding up the calculations and organizing their parallelism. The main
advantage of RNS is the ability to perform addition and multiplication operations fast compared to all
other number systems. It causes a great interest in RNS in those areas in which large amounts of
computation are required.
   RNS is defined by a system of mutually prime moduli ฮฒ = {p" , p$ , โ€ฆ , p& }. The positive number X
in the RNS for these moduli is represented as a tuple of numbers X = (x" , x$ , โ€ฆ , x& ), where x. =
|X|=. = X mod p. [5] for i = 1,2, โ€ฆ , n. Such a representation of the number X is unique, if 0 โ‰ค X < P,
where P = โˆ&.0" p. , and is called the RNS range.
   The operations of addition, subtraction and multiplication in the RNS for the numbers A =
(a" , a$ , โ€ฆ , a& ) and B = (b" , b$ , โ€ฆ , b& ) are determined by the formulas:
                                          ๐ด ยฑ ๐ต = N|๐‘Ž" ยฑ ๐‘" |QR , . . . , |๐‘ŽT ยฑ ๐‘T |QU V             (1)
                                          ๐ด ร— ๐ต = N|๐‘Ž" ร— ๐‘" |QR , . . . , |๐‘ŽT ร— ๐‘T |QU V             (2)
   The equalities (1) and (2) show the parallel nature of RNS, free from bitwise transfers. In addition,
the numbers ๐‘ŽX and ๐‘X have much smaller number of digits than the original numbers ๐ด and ๐ต.
   In modern technology, one of the most popular properties of algorithms is their parallelism. This
fact is due to the development of many parallel systems, from multiprocessor clusters to embedded
systems for special purposes.
   The most common way to reconstruct the positional value of a number based on its residual
representation is the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), the classical form of which we will
designate as CRTc.
   Let the number ๐‘‹ be given in the form (๐‘ฅ" , ๐‘ฅ$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘ฅT ) in the CRT by moduli (๐‘" , ๐‘$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘T ). Then:

                                          ๐‘‹ = [โˆ‘TX0"]๐‘ƒX2" ]Q ๐‘ƒX ๐‘ฅX [                                 (3)
                                                              _      `

where ๐‘ƒX = ๐‘ƒ/๐‘X , ]๐‘ƒX2" ]Q is the multiplicative inversion of ๐‘ƒX modulo ๐‘X for ๐‘– = 1, . . . , ๐‘›.
                           _
   This method is computationally complex, since it leads to calculations that fall outside the range of
๐‘ƒ, and its implementation requires the operation of calculating the residue of the division by a large
number of ๐‘ƒ, which greatly complicates the calculation scheme. The calculation of the residue of the
division in any computer system is traditionally one of the most expensive operations. The
implementation of this operation on the FPGA leads to a significant increase in the hardware costs of
the algorithm and an increase in the delay in operation.
   One approach to get rid of calculating the residue of dividing by the RNS range is an approach
using a Mixed-Radix System (MRS) [6-8]. By MRS with moduli ๐‘" , ๐‘$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘T we mean a system in
which the integer ๐‘‹ is represented as:
                  ๐‘‹ = ๐‘ŽT ๐‘T2" ๐‘T2$ . . . ๐‘$ ๐‘" + ๐‘ŽT2" ๐‘T2$ ๐‘T2e . . . ๐‘$ ๐‘" +. . . +๐‘Ž$ ๐‘" + ๐‘Ž" ,
where ๐‘Žf are the numbers 0,1, โ€ฆ , ๐‘f2" . MRS numbers ๐‘Žf can be found by the formulas.
๐‘Ž" = ๐‘ฅ" ๐‘š๐‘œ๐‘‘ ๐‘" ;
๐‘Ž$ = (๐‘ฅ$ โˆ’ ๐‘Ž" )๐‘"$ ๐‘š๐‘œ๐‘‘ ๐‘$
โ€ฆ.
๐‘Že = N(๐‘ฅe โˆ’ ๐‘Ž" )๐‘"e โˆ’ ๐‘Ž$ V๐‘$e ๐‘š๐‘œ๐‘‘ ๐‘e
๐‘ŽT = N. . . N(๐‘ฅT โˆ’ ๐‘Ž" )๐‘"T โˆ’ ๐‘Ž$ V๐‘$T โˆ’. . . โˆ’๐‘ŽT2" V๐‘T2",T ๐‘š๐‘œ๐‘‘ ๐‘T
    The constants ๐‘Xf are multiplicative inverse elements for ๐‘X modulo ๐‘f for all 1 โ‰ค ๐‘– โ‰ค ๐‘— โ‰ค ๐‘›, i.e.
๐‘Xf โˆ™ ๐‘X = 1 ๐‘š๐‘œ๐‘‘ ๐‘f for 1 โ‰ค ๐‘– โ‰ค ๐‘›, and can be calculated, for example, using the Euclidean algorithm.
    The main advantage of MRS is the transition to the use of low-bit operations. Most operands for
addition and multiplication operations are numbers whose bit capacity is equal to the capacity of the
moduli, which allows constructing simpler schemes than when using CRT. In addition, the considered
method can be presented in parallel form [9]. However, a decrease in the capacity of operands leads to
an increase in the number of operations, including operations for calculating the residue of the
division, which leads to an overall decrease in the operating time of the algorithm.
    Next, we consider a modification of the Chinese remainder theorem using fractional quantities,
which we will denote CRTd [10-12]. If both parts of formula (3) are divided by ๐‘ƒ, then we obtain the
relation
                                                                 ]`_rR ]
                                            p
                                       ๐‘‹o = ` = qโˆ‘TX0"
                                                                           s_
                                                                    Q_
                                                                                ๐‘ฅX q               (4)
                                                                                    "

where the operation | โˆ™ |" means discarding the integer part of the number and the numbers
                                              ]`_rR ]
                                                        s_
                                       ๐‘˜X =                  , ๐‘– = 1,2, โ€ฆ , ๐‘›                      (5)
                                                 Q_

are constants of RNS and can be calculated in advance. In this case, the value of each sum will be in
the range [0,1), which gives enough information to evaluate the sign and value of the number
represented in the RNS.
   Such a transition allows replacing the exact number with its fractional characteristic, making it
possible to control the accuracy of the presentation depending on the available resources and the task.
The value ๐‘‹o can be considered as a positional characteristic of the number ๐‘‹, while the number ๐‘‹ can
be found by the formula
                                                      ๐‘‹ = ๐‘‹o๐‘ƒ                                      (6)
   However, in the case of machine calculations, we can use only limited accuracy, which requires
rounding or discarding the least significant bits of the fraction. Let us estimate the number of bits that
make it possible to uniquely determine the fractional characteristic of the number ๐‘‹. Let ๐‘˜wv be a finite
fraction containing ๐‘ bits that coincide with the first ๐‘ bits of the number ๐‘˜X for all ๐‘– = 1,2, โ€ฆ , ๐‘›. In
other words ๐‘˜wv = โŒŠ๐‘˜X โŒ‹$r{ , where the operation means rounding the number down. The approximate
value of the number ๐‘‹o will not be more accurate, since ๐‘˜X โ‰ฅ ๐‘˜wv . The exact value of ๐‘‹ can be restored
by multiplying ๐‘‹o by ๐‘ƒ, discarding the fractional part with rounding up. Let us estimate the required
calculation accuracy ๐‘, at which the value ๐‘‹o reconstructed using ๐‘˜wv will not lead to errors when
restoring the exact value of ๐‘‹. For this, the relation
                                       p2"                                      p
                                         `
                                             < ]โˆ‘TX0" ๐‘˜wv ๐‘ฅX ]" โ‰ค `                                (7)

shows the uniqueness of the positional characteristic ๐‘‹o for different numbers of RNS. The
transformation of expression (7) using formula (4) leads to the inequality
                                                                                        "
                                       0 โ‰ค ]โˆ‘TX0"N๐‘˜X โˆ’ ๐‘˜wv V๐‘ฅX ]" < `                              (8)
                       ]`_rR ]            ${ ]`_rR ]s 2}${ ]`_rR ]s }                     }${ ]`_rR]s }
                                                         _                 _ s                                _ s
   Since ๐‘˜X โˆ’ ๐‘˜wv =
                                 s_
                                      โˆ’                                          _
                                                                                     =                              _
                                                                                                                        , then
                          Q_                             ${ โˆ™Q     _                           ${ โˆ™Q      _

                                                                                          }${ ]`_rR ]s }
                                                                                                              _ s
                                          โˆ‘TX0"N๐‘˜X โˆ’ ๐‘˜wv V๐‘ฅX = โˆ‘TX0"                                                _
                                                                                                                        ๐‘ฅX .                               (9)
                                                                                                ${ โˆ™Q     _

   Considering ๐‘ฅX โ‰ค ๐‘X โ€“ 1, the left side of equality (9) satisfies the inequality:
                                 }${ ]`_rR ]s }                                                                                  }${ ]`_rR ]s }
                                               _ s                     "                                                                     _ s
                      โˆ‘TX0"                          _
                                                         ๐‘ฅX โ‰ค ${ โ€ขโˆ‘TX0" [2โ‚ฌ ]๐‘ƒX2" ]Q [ โˆ’ โˆ‘TX0"                                                     _
                                                                                                                                                       โ€ข   (10)
                                      ${ โˆ™Q_                                                                  _ Q                      Q_
                                                                                                                    _


   It follows from (8) and (10) that ๐‘ satisfies the inequality:
                                                                           }${ ]`_rR ]s }
                                                                                              _ s
         2โ‚ฌ โ‰ค ๐‘ƒ โ€ขโˆ‘TX0" [2โ‚ฌ ]๐‘ƒX2" ]Q [ โˆ’ โˆ‘TX0"                                                       _
                                                                                                        โ€ข โ‰ค โˆ’SQ + ๐‘ƒ โˆ‘TX0"(๐‘X โˆ’ 1).                         (11)
                                                     _ Q                             Q_
                                                             _


where ๐‘†๐‘„ = โˆ‘TX0" ๐‘ƒX .
   Denoting ๐œŒ = โˆ‘TX0"(๐‘X โˆ’ 1), from formula (11) we get that when choosing ๐‘ equal to ๐‘ =
โŒˆlog $ (๐‘ƒ โˆ™ ๐œŒ โˆ’ ๐‘†๐‘„)โŒ‰, the resulting estimate is the estimate refinement obtained in [12], where ๐‘ =
โŒˆlog $ (๐‘ƒ โˆ™ ๐œŒ)โŒ‰. Using the approximate method allows getting away from calculating the residue of the
division by the RNS range, by increasing the dimension of the coefficients. An alternative solution is
to use minimally redundant code, which imposes additional restrictions on the moduli, but at the same
time reduces the complexity of decoding.

3. Minimally redundant code and its properties
In the following, we assume that the RNS moduli are ordered in increasing order ๐‘" < ๐‘$ < โ‹ฏ < ๐‘T .
The number ๐‘‹ can be restored using the properties of the modular code, according to the following
formula:
                                          ๐‘‹ = โˆ‘T2"      2"
                                               X0" ๐‘€X ]๐‘€X โ‹… ๐‘ฅX ]Q + ๐‘ƒT โ‹… ๐ผ(๐‘‹),                                                                             (12)
                                                                                          _

where for any ๐‘– โˆˆ [1, ๐‘› โˆ’ 1]: ๐‘€X = ๐‘ƒT /๐‘X , and ๐ผ(๐‘‹) is an interval characteristic that is determined
using the following Theorem 1.
   Theorem 1 [13]. If the RNS moduli satisfy the condition ๐‘T โ‰ฅ 2๐‘" + ๐‘› โˆ’ 2, then the interval
characteristic ๐ผ(๐‘‹) is calculated using the following formula:
                                                            ๐ผโ€˜(๐‘‹) ๐‘–๐‘“ ๐ผโ€˜(๐‘‹) < ๐‘"
                                          ๐ผ(๐‘‹) = โ€ข                                                                                                         (13)
                                                  ๐ผโ€˜(๐‘‹) โˆ’ ๐‘T ๐‘–๐‘“ ๐ผโ€˜(๐‘‹) โ‰ฅ ๐‘T โˆ’ ๐‘" โˆ’ ๐‘› + 2
                 โ€œ                            "
where ๐ผโ€˜(๐‘‹) = q[`U [      โˆ’โ‹… โˆ‘T2"
                              X0" [Q [                    โ‹… ]๐‘€X2" โ‹… ๐‘ฅX ]Q q .
                  U Q                          _ Q                               _
                     U                            U                                  QU
  As shown in Chernyavsky & Kolyada, 2009 [13], for RNS moduli to be minimally redundant
modular code, it is necessary and sufficient that
                                                                 ๐‘T = 2๐‘" + ๐‘› + |๐‘T โˆ’ ๐‘›|$ + 2                                                              (14)
   We consider four cases:
   Case 1, ๐‘T and ๐‘› are even numbers, ๐‘T = 2๐‘" + ๐‘› + 2,
   Case 2, ๐‘T and ๐‘› are odd numbers, ๐‘T = 2๐‘" + ๐‘› + 2,
   Case 3, ๐‘T is even number and ๐‘› is odd number, ๐‘T = 2๐‘" + ๐‘› + 3,
   Case 4, ๐‘T is odd number and ๐‘› is even number, ๐‘T = 2๐‘" + ๐‘› + 3.
   Considering four cases, we can conclude that if ๐‘T > 2๐‘" , then the minimally redundant code does
not satisfy the compactness criterion.
   Using (12) we can reduce the computational complexity of the data decoding algorithm.

4. Modification of the secret sharing scheme
To formalize the proposed scheme, we use the following notations. ๐‘† โˆˆ ๐‘โ€“ is a secret, ๐‘" , ๐‘$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘T are
prime numbers (RNS moduli set), with properties of the minimum redundant modular code, where
Q = ๐‘ž" , ๐‘ž$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘žหœ is secret key and ๐‘žX is prime numbers and compact sequence, i.e. ๐‘ž" < ๐‘ž$ < โ‹ฏ <
๐‘žหœ < 2๐‘ž" .
   We perform a masking transformation that translates ๐‘† to ๐‘†ฬ… = ๐‘† + ๐‘„ โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘, where ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ is a
random number and ๐‘†ฬ… < โˆโ€บX0" ๐‘X . To calculate the chunks, we get ๐‘X = |๐‘†ฬ…|Q_ .
   It follows from the condition ๐‘†ฬ… < โˆโ€บX0" ๐‘X = ๐›ฝ that ๐‘† + ๐‘„ โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ < ๐›ฝ, which means that ๐‘† < ๐›ฝ โˆ’
๐‘„ โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘. Let ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ be bounded above ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘ โ‰ค ๐‘Ÿ. We have
                                                            ๐‘† <๐›ฝโˆ’๐‘„โ‹…๐‘Ÿ                                      (15)
   On the other hand, ๐‘† = |๐‘†ฬ…|โ€“ so that we can uniquely decode data if
                                                            ๐‘†<๐‘„                                           (16)
   Multiplying inequality (16) by ๐‘Ÿ and adding to (15), we have
                                                            (๐‘Ÿ + 1) โ‹… ๐‘† < ๐›ฝ                               (17)
   Hence,
                                                                  โ€ข
                                                            ๐‘†<                                            (18)
                                                                  ลพลธ"

   Since ๐‘† must satisfy two conditions (16) and (18), therefore:
                                                                          โ€ข
                                                            ๐‘† < min ๐‘„, ลพลธ"ยก                               (19)
   We consider two cases:
                โ€ข
   Case 1: ๐‘„ <    , then ๐‘† < ๐‘„ and redundancy is equal to
                ลพลธ"
                          ยคยฅยฆยง โˆU
                                _ยจR Q_             ยคยฅยฆยง โˆU
                                                         _ยจR Q_               ยคยฅยฆยง (ลพลธ")ลธยคยฅยฆยง โˆU
                                                                                               _ยจยฉยชR Q_
                     ๐‘…โ‰ˆ                  >                              =1+                               (20)
                              ยคยฅยฆยง โ€“         ยคยฅยฆยง โˆยฉ
                                                   _ยจR Q_ 2ยคยฅยฆยง (ลพลธ")          ยคยฅยฆยง โˆยฉ
                                                                                     _ยจR Q_ 2ยคยฅยฆยง (ลพลธ")

                 โ€ข                 โ€ข
   Case 2: ๐‘„ โ‰ฅ ลพลธ", then ๐‘† < ลพลธ"
                 ยคยฅยฆ โˆU Q
                  ยง _ยจR _                    ยคยฅยฆยง โˆU
                                                   _ยจR Q_                ยคยฅยฆยง (ลพลธ")ลธยคยฅยฆยง โˆU
                                                                                          _ยจยฉยชR Q_
         ๐‘… โ‰ˆ ยคยฅยฆ โ€ข2ยคยฅยฆ       =                                    =1+                                     (21)
                 ยง     (ลพลธ")
                          ยง            ยคยฅยฆยง โˆยฉ
                                             _ยจR Q_ 2ยคยฅยฆยง (ลพลธ")          ยคยฅยฆยง โˆยฉ
                                                                               _ยจR Q_ 2ยคยฅยฆยง (ลพลธ")

   From (20) and (21), it follows that the secret sharing scheme has optimal redundancy (21). If the
                โ€ข
condition ๐‘„ โ‰ฅ ลพลธ" is fulfilled, then (๐‘Ÿ + 1)๐‘„ โ‰ฅ ๐›ฝ. On the other hand, from (15) ๐‘Ÿ โ‹… ๐‘„ โ‰ค ๐›ฝ follows,
therefore ๐›ฝ satisfies the condition:
                                                            ๐‘Ÿ โ‹… ๐‘„ โ‰ค ๐›ฝ โ‰ค (๐‘Ÿ + 1)๐‘„                          (22)
   Dividing (22) by ๐‘„, we get:
                                                                  โ€ข
                                                            ๐‘Ÿ โ‰คโ€“ โ‰ค๐‘Ÿ+1                                     (23)
                                                     โ€ข
   From (23), it follows that the value ๐‘Ÿ = ยซโ€“ยฌ. Since, from the point of view of safety, ๐‘Ÿ satisfies the
condition ๐‘Ÿ โ‰ฅ 1, then ๐‘„ < ๐›ฝ/2. Therefore, the scheme parameters must satisfy the following
conditions:
   Condition 1: ฮฒ > โˆ/2$
                      .0) ๐‘T2X (determines that the proposed scheme is a threshold)
                    โ€ข
   Condition 2: ๐‘„ < $ and gcd(๐‘„, ๐›ฝ) = 1.
                      โ€ข
   Condition 3: ๐‘Ÿ = ยซโ€“ยฌ.
  Condition 4. 2ยฎ2" < ๐‘" < ๐‘$ < โ‹ฏ < ๐‘T is the minimum redundant modular code.
  In contrast to the Asmuth-Bloom scheme [14], the proposed scheme provides data security with
minimum redundancy.

5. Properties of the proposed scheme
In this section, we examine the security parameters of the proposed scheme. Condition 4 states that
RRNS moduli set is a minimum redundant modular code. Hence, each user has approximately the
same amount of information about the original data. Now, we show that proposed scheme minimizes
the probability of access to data by collusion of adversaries. To this end, we prove the following
statements, corollary, and theorem.
    Statement 1. In proposed (๐‘˜, ๐‘›) secret sharing scheme, if an adversary coalition knows less than ๐‘˜
secret shares and secret key ๐‘„, then the probability obtaining the secret is less than 1/2(ยฎ2") .
    Proof. For the set ๐ผ โŠ‚ {1,2, โ€ฆ , ๐‘›} with the cardinality less than ๐‘˜, we can compute the value ๐‘† โˆ— that
satisfies the equality ๐‘† โˆ— = |๐‘†|`ยฑ , where ๐‘ƒยฒ = โˆXโˆˆยฒ ๐‘X . Therefore, ๐‘† can be represented as: ๐‘† = ๐‘† โˆ— + ๐‘ƒยฒ โ‹…
๐‘ค, where integer ๐‘ค โˆˆ [0, โŒŠ๐›ฝ/๐‘ƒยฒ โŒ‹]. Each value of ๐‘ค corresponds the value of ๐ถยตโˆ— calculated by the
following formula: ๐ถยตโˆ— = |๐‘† โˆ— + ๐‘ƒยฒ โ‹… ๐‘ค|Qยถ .
    Taking into account Condition 1, ๐‘ƒยฒ satisfies the condition ๐‘ƒยฒ โ‰ค โˆโ€บ2$     X0) ๐‘T2X . Consequently, the
                                              โˆ—                                 "        "       "
probability to compute ๐‘† with the known ๐‘† , satisfies the equality ๐‘ƒ๐‘Ÿ(๐ผ) โ‰ค ยธ โ‰ค Q             < $ยปrR
                                                                                                       ยท ยบ      UrยฉยชR
                                                                                                       ยนยฑ
  Statement 2. In the proposed (๐‘˜, ๐‘›) scheme, probability to obtain the secret based on known ๐‘˜ or
                                                   $
more secret shares without secret key is less than   ยฉยชR , where ๐œ™(๐‘ฅ) is Euler function.
                                                                     ยผ(โ€ข)2$
     Proof. Knowing ๐‘˜ or more secret shares using the Chinese remainder theorem, we can restore the
value of ๐‘†ฬ…. In order to calculate ๐‘† from ๐‘†ฬ… it is necessary to sort out the whole set of possible values of
                                                            โ€ข
๐‘„. Since from Condition 2 gcd(๐‘„, ๐›ฝ) = 1 and ๐‘„ < , then ๐‘„ represented in RNS by the moduli
                                                            $
๐‘" , ๐‘$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘โ€บ should not contain a single residue from the division equal to zero. Let us consider the
values of the form ๐‘‹ยพ , the smallest of the numbers which in the representation of the moduli ๐‘ƒ
contains ๐‘’ โ‰ค ๐‘˜ different zero values at the positions ๐ธ = {๐‘–" , ๐‘–$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘–ร }, respectively, then the number
                                                                      โ€ข       โ€ข
of numbers containing at the positions {๐‘–" , ๐‘–$ , โ€ฆ , ๐‘–ร } zeros and $ is ยซ$p ยฌ. Therefore, the number of
                                                                                                   ร‚
                                             โ€ข
non-coprime to ๐›ฝ numbers is โˆ‘ยพโˆˆยฒ ยซ$p ยฌ. Considering that the cardinality of the set ๐ผ is 2โ€บ , then
                                                 ร‚

                             โ€ข                       โ€ข       "         โ€ข          "           โ€ข
                    โˆ‘ยพโˆˆยฒ ยซ
                             $pร‚
                                   ยฌ < โˆ‘ยพโˆˆยฒ $p = $ โˆ‘ยพโˆˆยฒ p โˆ’ 2โ€บ < $ โˆ‘ยพโˆˆยฒ ยซp ยฌ + 2โ€บ                                        (24)
                                                         ร‚             ร‚                       ร‚

  Since the number of numbers that are non-coprime to ๐›ฝ and smaller ๐›ฝ is, on the one hand, equal to
      โ€ข
โˆ‘ยพโˆˆยฒ ยซ ยฌ, on the other hand, substituting ๐›ฝ โˆ’ ๐œ™(๐›ฝ) in (24), we find that the number of numbers non-
      pร‚
                              โ€ข
coprime to ๐›ฝ and less than $ is less then:
                                                                 "
                                                                 $
                                                                     N๐›ฝ โˆ’ ๐œ™(๐›ฝ)V + 2โ€บ                                     (25)
                                                                                      โ€ข
   Therefore, the number of numbers coprime to ๐›ฝ and less than                            is greater than or equal to:
                                                                                      $
                                   โ€ข     "                                    "                    ยผ(โ€ข)2$ยฉยชR
                                   $
                                     โˆ’   $
                                           N๐›ฝ โˆ’ ๐œ™(๐›ฝ)V + 2โ€บ ยก = $ ๐œ™(๐›ฝ) โˆ’ 2โ€บ =                                $
                                                                                                                         (26)
                                                                     $
   Hence, the probability to obtain ๐‘„ is less than ยผ(โ€ข)2$ยฉยชR .
   Now, we show the computational security of the proposed scheme. The concept of computational
security is based on the following idea: information cannot be effectively restored if there is no
complete information. Therefore, the scheme is computationally secure, if the adversary knows the
secrets ๐‘† (") , ๐‘† ($) and incomplete sets of shares ๐ถ (") , ๐ถ ($) , but cannot map N๐‘† (") , ๐ถ (")V and N๐‘† ($) , ๐ถ ($) V
unambiguously.
   Computational security for secret sharing schemes can be defined in more strong way [15]. It is
based on the polynomial indistinguishability concept [16-23]. For any probability distribution ๐ท(๐ถ, ๐‘†),
a secret sharing scheme is computationally secure if, for any pair of secrets ๐‘† (") , ๐‘† ($) and incomplete
subsets of shares ๐ถ (") and ๐ถ ($) , the distributions ๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (")V and ๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (") V are polynomial
indistinguishable, i.e. for any probabilistic algorithm ๐ด
                                                                                                   1
                [Pr ๐ด ๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (") Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ Pr ๐ด ๐ทN๐ถ ($) , ๐‘† ($) Vยก = 1ยก[ <                           ,
                                                                                               ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘™๐‘ฆ(๐‘›, ๐‘˜)
where ๐‘๐‘œ๐‘™๐‘ฆ(๐‘›, ๐‘˜) is the some polynomial over the amount of possible shares.
  Theorem 2. The proposed scheme is computationally secure if ๐‘˜ โ‰ค 4.
  Proof. To prove the computational security of proposed scheme, we use the auxiliary inequality.
                                    โˆ€ ๐‘Ž, ๐‘, ๐‘ โˆˆ ๐‘…: |๐‘Ž โˆ’ ๐‘| โ‰ค |๐‘Ž โˆ’ ๐‘| + |๐‘ โˆ’ ๐‘|                                    (27)

  Let = Pr ๐ด ๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (") Vยก = 1ยก, ๐‘ = Pr ๐ด ๐ทN๐ถ ($) , ๐‘† ($) Vยก = 1ยก, ๐‘ = PrN๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (") V = 1V .
We have:

                          [Pr A DNC(") , S(") Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ Pr A DNC($) , S($) Vยก = 1ยก[

                        โ‰ค [Pr A DNC(") , S(") Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ PrNDNC(") , S(") V = 1V[                                  (28)

                           + [Pr A DNC($) , S($) Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ PrNDNC(") , S(") V = 1V[

where PrN๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (") V = 1V is the probability of obtaining the secret using the first ๐‘˜ shares.
   Since the number of desired outcomes is less than or equal to โˆโ€บX0" ๐‘X and the total number of all
outcomes is โˆTX0" ๐‘X , then the probability is

                                             (")        (")
                                                                       โˆโ€บX0" ๐‘X     1
                              Pr A DNC             ,S         Vยก = 1ยก โ‰ค T       = T      ,
                                                                       โˆX0" ๐‘X โˆX0โ€บลธ" ๐‘X

                                             ($)        ($)
                                                                       โˆโ€บX0" ๐‘X     1
                              Pr A DNC             ,S         Vยก = 1ยก โ‰ค T       = T      ,
                                                                       โˆX0" ๐‘X โˆX0โ€บลธ" ๐‘X
                                                                                 1
                                           PrNDNC (") , S (") V = 1V =                 .
                                                                              โˆโ€บX0" ๐‘X
   From Condition 4 and k โ‰ฅ 4, it follows that p"/ < โˆ/.0" p. < 2/ p"/ and p"&2/ < โˆ&.0/ลธ" p. <
2&2/ p"&2/ .
                "        "   "          "          "      "
   Therefore, $ยฉ Qยฉ < โˆยฉ   < Qยฉ and $Urยฉ QUrยฉ < โˆU   Q
                                                       < QUrยฉ .
                    R      _ยจR Q_      R                      R     _ยจยฉยชR _       R
   Let us estimate terms of (28):
                                                                                       "   "       "      "
   [Pr A DNC (") , S (") Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ PrNDNC (") , S (") V = 1V[ < max รQUrยฉ โˆ’ $ยฉ Qยฉ , Qยฉ โˆ’ $Urยฉ QUrยฉ รŽ (29)
                                                                                       R       R   R          R

                                                                                       "   "       "      "
   [Pr A DNC ($) , S ($) Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ PrNDNC (") , S (") V = 1V[ < max รQUrยฉ โˆ’ $ยฉ Qยฉ , Qยฉ โˆ’ $Urยฉ QUrยฉ รŽ .
                                                                                       R       R   R          R
   By substituting (29) in (28), we obtain:

                   [Pr ๐ด ๐ทN๐ถ (") , ๐‘† (") Vยก = 1ยก โˆ’ Pr ๐ด ๐ทN๐ถ ($) , ๐‘† ($) Vยก = 1ยก[                         (30)

                                            1     1    1      1
                               < 2 โˆ™ max โ€ข T2โ€บ โˆ’ โ€บ โ€บ , โ€บ โˆ’ T2โ€บ T2โ€บ ร .
                                          ๐‘"    2 ๐‘" ๐‘" 2     ๐‘"
   It means that the proposed scheme satisfies the formal definition of computational security.
   The theorem is proven.
   Theorem 2 has a significant practical importance. It states that the adversary cannot obtain any
information from an incomplete set of shares.
   Let (๐‘† (") , ๐ถ (") ) and (๐‘† ($) , ๐ถ ($) ) satisfy the following assertions for all ๐‘– โˆˆ [1, โ€ฆ , ๐‘›]:
                                 (")                                 ($)
                               ๐‘X      = ]๐‘† (") + Q โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘" ]Q , ๐‘X        = ]๐‘† ($) + ๐‘„ โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘$ ]Q       (31)
                                                                 _                                   _

   Since for all โˆˆ [1, โ€ฆ , ๐‘›] gcd(Q, ๐‘X ) = 1, there exist ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘"ร , ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘$ร , Qโ€ฒ such that the following
equations are satisfied:
                    (")                                  ($)
                   ๐‘X     = ]๐‘† ($) + Qโ€ฒ โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘$ร ]Q , ๐‘X       = ]๐‘† (") + Qโ€ฒ โ‹… ๐‘Ÿ๐‘Ž๐‘›๐‘‘"ร ]Q .               (32)
                                                     _                                   _

   From (31) and (32), it follows that to unambiguously map (๐‘† (") , ๐ถ (") ) and (๐‘† ($) , ๐ถ ($) ) , ๐‘„ is
required. Since ๐‘„ is not known, our scheme is computationally secure.

6. Conclusion
We propose and analyze computationally secure threshold secret sharing schemes based on the
minimally redundant modular code. We show that a minimally redundant modular code does not
possess the compact sequence property. We study the selection of circuit parameters to minimize
redundancy while ensuring data security. We demonstrate that a scheme has minimal redundancy if it
satisfies Conditions 2 and 3.
    We prove the security property of the proposed modification of the secret sharing scheme. The
probability of a secret being obtained by an attacker is provided, as well as we prove the
computational security of this scheme. This information shows a possible level of security that allows
working out a more detailed strategy for protecting data in cloud storages when applying this
modification.
    In the future work, we plan to study the applicability of the proposed scheme in different areas:
homomorphic data encryption; efficient implementation of data encoding and decoding algorithms
using artificial neural networks and minimally redundant modular code; generating moduli with the
property of minimally redundant modular code; implementing safe and reliable storage systems for
processing and transmitting data in cloud computing; building devices of low-power devices for use in
the design of smart Internet of things, etc.

Acknowledgments
This work was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation Grant No. 19-71-10033.

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