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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>2005] Michael Wooldridge and
Wiebe Van Der Hoek. On obligations and normative ability: An
analysis of the social contract. Journal of Applied Logic</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Ethically Compliant Planning in Moral Autonomous Systems</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Justin Svegliato</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Samer B. Nashed</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Shlomo Zilberstein</string-name>
          <email>shlomog@cs.umass.edu</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>College of Information and Computer Sciences, University of Massachusetts Amherst</institution>
          ,
          <country country="US">USA</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2018</year>
      </pub-date>
      <abstract>
        <p>In many sequential decision-making problems, ethical compliance is enforced by either myopic rule sets or provisional modifications to the objective function. The effect of these strategies is exceedingly difficult to predict, often leading to inadvertent behavior that can jeopardize the values of stakeholders. We propose a novel approach for ethically compliant planning, based on decoupling ethical compliance from task completion within the objective function, that produces optimal policies subject to the constraints of an ethical framework. This paper introduces a formal definition of a moral autonomous system and its key properties. It also offers a range of ethical framework examples for divine command theory, prima facie duties, and virtue ethics. Finally, it demonstrates the effectiveness of our approach in a set of autonomous driving simulations and a user study of MDP experts.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Integrating decision making and ethics in autonomous
systems is challenging due to the diversity and complexity of
deployment domains and stakeholder value systems. For
decision making in the real world, Markov decision processes
(MDPs) are a common, general-purpose model because of
their support for long-term, nonmyopic reasoning in fully
observable, stochastic environments. However, MDPs pose
two additional challenges when generating ethically
compliant behavior. First, the complexity of these models often
obfuscates the effect of the reward function on the behavior
of the agent. Seemingly innocuous adjustments may
drastically change resulting behavior, leading to
unpredictability [Bostrom, 2016]. Second, and more fundamentally, using
the reward function to model both desirable and undesirable
behavior often involves incommensurable unit conversions.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>For example, an autonomous vehicle with a reward function</title>
      <p>that encourages completing a route efficiently and
discourages driving recklessly blends task completion and ethical
compliance implicitly. The resulting policy may drive too
recklessly if offered enough time savings. Thus, in complex
environments, autonomous systems may encounter
unanticipated scenarios that lead to behavior that fails to reflect the
intentions of developers or the values of stakeholders [Taylor
et al., 2016; Hadfield-Menell and Hadfield, 2019].</p>
      <p>Ideally, researchers and practitioners integrating ethical
theories and decision processes could access methods that
offer several desirable features. These features include
support for interpretability and control over behavior with formal
guarantees, nonmyopic reasoning, the acquisition of rules
from a non-technical person, and the application of one or
more ethical theories simultaneously. Ethicists often describe
an ethical theory as a set of moral principles for evaluating
if an action is required, permitted, or prohibited in a given
scenario [Shafer-Landau, 2009]. Given this interpretation, an
ethical theory can be operationalized in a decision process as
constraints on the actions of the agent in specific states.</p>
      <p>In this paper, we propose a novel approach for building
moral autonomous systems that produce an optimal policy to
a decision-making problem subject to the constraints of an
ethical framework. The system models a task with a
decisionmaking model and models an ethical framework as a moral
principle and an ethical context. While we use MDPs for
the decision-making models in our experiments, our approach
supports any decision process expressible as a mathematical
program. The moral principle is an approximation of an
interpretation of an ethical theory that can be represented as a
Boolean function that evaluates whether or not a policy
violates a particular ethical theory. The ethical context contains
all of the information necessary to evaluate the moral
principle. Formally, this system is expressed as an optimization
problem with a set of constraints representing the task and a
constraint that operationalizes the ethical framework. The
solution to the optimization problem is a policy that optimizes
completing the task while following the ethical framework.</p>
      <p>We evaluate our approach in two experiments. First, in an
autonomous driving simulation, we confirm that our approach
produces optimal behavior while complying with moral
requirements. Second, in a user study, we find that MDP
experts who use our approach require less development time to
produce policies that have higher rates of ethical compliance
compared to modifying the reward function directly.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Our main contributions in this paper are: (1) a formal def</title>
      <p>inition of a moral autonomous system and its key properties,
(2) a range of ethical framework examples for divine
command theory, prima facie duties, and virtue ethics, and (3)
a set of autonomous driving simulations and a user study of</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>MDP experts that shows the effectiveness of our approach.</title>
      <p>Autonomous systems attempt to address a range of problems,
are deployed in diverse social contexts, and draw upon a
heterogeneous collection of algorithms. The potential harms
of these systems can be mitigated through many strategies:
(1) abandonment of technologies that are likely to be abused
when analyzed in a historical context [Browne, 2015], such
as facial recognition [Brey, 2004; Introna and Wood, 2004]
and surveillance of online activity [Burgers and Robinson,
2017; Zimmer, 2008], (2) legal or legislative intervention
that provides oversight and regulation in enough detail to
prevent or discourage malevolent or negligent use
[Goodman and Flaxman, 2017; Desai and Kroll, 2017; Raymond
and Shackelford, 2013; Scherer, 2015], including
metaregulation [Pasquale, 2017], and (3) algorithmic advances
that improve accuracy and interpretability. Though these
strategies will continue to play important roles in the future,
our approach focuses on a fourth strategy that reduces the
opportunity for error during design and development.</p>
      <p>Recently, various principles [Boden et al., 2017],
guidelines [Robertson et al., 2019], and standards [Adamson et al.,
2019] have been proposed for the design and development of
autonomous systems. Although these are essential for
promoting the values of stakeholders throughout the design
process, these initiatives do not offer developers enough detail
to operationalize ethical frameworks in autonomous systems.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>In fact, implicit ethical systems, which satisfy moral require</title>
      <p>ments through careful design, may not always produce
desirable behavior [Moor, 2006]. Many autonomous systems must
therefore be capable of explicit moral reasoning [Dignum et
al., 2018; Bench-Capon and Modgil, 2017].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Engineering efforts to develop explicit autonomous moral</title>
      <p>agents take two forms [Allen et al., 2005]. Bottom-up
approaches generate ethical behavior naturally through
learning or evolution [Anderson et al., 2017; Shaw et al., 2018].
While this is theoretically compelling given the natural
evolution of ethical ideas in human society, the instability and lack
of interpretability are major drawbacks. Instead, we choose
a top-down approach in which prescriptive rules describing
moral behavior are provided to the agent. Many top-down
approaches use logics, such as deontic logic [van der Torre,
2003; Bringsjord et al., 2006], temporal logic [Wooldridge
and Van Der Hoek, 2005; Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2006],
or Answer Set Programming [Berreby et al., 2015]. Some
even propose a form of metareasoning over logics [Bringsjord
et al., 2011]. However, as systems become more complex
and operate in stochastic, partially observable environments,
norm specification represented by logics will become
increasingly challenging [Abel et al., 2016].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>A common approach for handling these environments em</title>
      <p>ploys an ethical governor that reasons online about whether
an action is required, permitted, or prohibited [Arkin, 2008].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Applications include eldercare [Shim et al., 2017] and phys</title>
      <p>ical safety [Vanderelst and Winfield, 2018; Winfield et al.,
2014]. These methods use reactive ethical governors that only
consider a single action at a time as the situation presents the
agent with the opportunity to act. In contrast, our approach is
nonmyopic because it considers entire sequences of actions.
X</p>
      <p>X T (s; a; s0) sa
s2S a2A
8s0
8s; a</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>We are aware of only one other approach that focuses</title>
      <p>on proactive ethical governors of policies [Kasenberg and</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Scheutz, 2018]. However, since it is specific to norms, it is</title>
      <p>unclear how it could support other forms of ethical
reasoning, such as adherence to a moral principle like utilitarianism
or deontology. Moreover, both task completion and ethical
behavior are defined in terms of real-valued norm weights,
the coupling of which elides guarantees of ethical behavior.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>In contrast, our approach can generate policies that follow arbitrary ethical theories and avoid unpredictable trade-offs between task completion and ethical behavior.</title>
      <p>3</p>
      <sec id="sec-11-1">
        <title>Background</title>
        <p>A Markov decision process (MDP) is a decision-making
model for reasoning in fully observable, stochastic
environments [Bellman, 1966]. An MDP can be described as a tuple
hS; A; T; R; di, where S is a finite set of states, A is a finite set
of actions, T : S A S ! [0; 1] represents the probability
of reaching a state s0 2 S after performing an action a 2 A in
a state s 2 S, R : S A S ! R represents the expected
immediate reward of reaching a state s0 2 S after performing an
action a 2 A in a state s 2 S, and d : S ! [0; 1] represents
the probability of starting in a state s 2 S. A solution to an</p>
        <sec id="sec-11-1-1">
          <title>MDP is a policy : S ! A indicating that an action (s) 2</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-11-1-2">
          <title>A should be performed in a state s 2 S. A policy induces</title>
          <p>a value function V : S ! R representing the expected
discounted cumulative reward V (s) 2 R for each state s 2 S
given a discount factor 0 &lt; 1. An optimal policy
maximizes the expected discounted cumulative reward for
every state s 2 S by satisfying the Bellman optimality equation
V (s) = maxa2A Ps02S T (s; a; s0)[R(s; a; s0) + V (s0)].</p>
          <p>A common approach for finding an optimal policy
expresses the optimization problem as a linear program in either
the primal form or the dual form [Manne, 1960]. In this
paper, we propose ethical frameworks that naturally map to the
dual form. The dual form maximizes a set of occupancy
measures sa for the discounted number of times an action a 2 A
is performed in a state s 2 S subject to a set of constraints
that maintain consistent and nonnegative occupancy.
4</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-11-2">
        <title>Moral Autonomous Systems</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>We propose a novel approach for building moral autonomous</title>
      <p>systems that decouples ethical compliance from task
completion. The system completes a task by using a decision-making
model and follows an ethical framework by adhering to a
moral principle within an ethical context. We describe these
three components of a moral autonomous system below.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>First, the system has a decision-making model that de</title>
      <p>scribes the information needed to complete the task. For
example, a self-driving vehicle could have a decision-making
model that includes a map of a city [Nashed et al., 2018;
max
s.t.</p>
      <p>X X
s2S a2A
X
a02A
s
a
0
s X
a</p>
      <p>s02S
sa00 = d(s0) +</p>
      <p>R(s; a; s0)
Svegliato et al., 2019]. An engineer must select a
representation for the decision-making model that reflects the
properties of the task. For many tasks, an MDP, a decision process
that assumes full observability, can be used easily. However,
for more complex tasks with partial observability, start and
goal states, or multiple agents, it is possible to use a decision
process like a partially observable MDP, a stochastic shortest
path problem, or a decentralized MDP instead. In short, the
decision-making model is an amoral, descriptive model for
completing the task but not following the ethical framework.</p>
      <p>Next, the system has an ethical context that describes the
information required to follow the ethical framework. For
instance, an autonomous vehicle could have an ethical
context that includes any details related to inconsiderate and
hazardous driving that permit speeding on a highway in some
scenarios but never in a school zone or near a crosswalk
[Vanderelst and Winfield, 2018]. Similar to the decision-making
model, an ethicist must select a representation for the ethical
context that informs the fundamental principles of the ethical
framework. While the ethical context can be represented as a
tuple of different values, sets, and functions, the specification
of the tuple depends on the ethical framework. In summary,
the ethical context is a moral, descriptive model for following
the ethical framework but not completing the task.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-14">
      <title>Finally, the system has a moral principle that evaluates the</title>
      <p>morality of a policy of the decision-making model within the
ethical context by considering the information that describes
how to complete the task and follow the ethical framework.
As an illustration, a moral principle could require a policy
to maximize the overall well-being of the moral community
in utilitarianism [Bentham, 1789; Mill, 1895] or
universalize to the moral community without contradiction in
Kantianism [Kant and Schneewind, 2002]. Given a decision-making
model and an ethical context, a moral principle can be
expressed as a function that maps a policy to its moral status.
Definition 1. A moral principle, : ! B, represents
whether a policy 2 of a decision-making model D is
moral or immoral within an ethical context E .</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-15">
      <title>By putting all of these attributes together, we provide a formal description of a moral autonomous system as follows.</title>
      <p>Definition 2. A moral autonomous system, hD; E ; i,
completes a task by using a decision-making model D and
follows an ethical framework by adhering to a moral principle
within an ethical context E .</p>
      <p>A moral autonomous system has the goal of finding an
optimal policy that completes its task and follows its ethical
framework. This can be expressed as an optimization
problem solving for a policy in the space of policies that
maximizes the value of the policy subject to the constraint that the
policy satisfies the moral principle. We define the goal of a
moral autonomous system as follows.</p>
      <p>Definition 3. The goal of a moral autonomous system is to
find an optimal moral policy, 2 , by solving for a policy
2 that maximizes a value function V subject to a moral
principle ( ) in the following optimization problem.
maximize</p>
      <p>2
subject to</p>
      <p>V
( )
Moral
Policies
Π</p>
      <p>Optimal
Amoral Policy</p>
      <p>∗
Moral
Policies
Π</p>
      <p>Immoral
Policies
Π¬</p>
      <p>Moral
Policies
Π</p>
      <p>Optimal
Moral Policy
∗</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-16">
      <title>However, the goal of a standard autonomous system has typi</title>
      <p>cally been to find an optimal amoral policy, 2 , that only
completes its task without following any ethical framework.</p>
      <p>Figure 1 depicts the goal of a moral autonomous system
and a standard autonomous system. For a moral principle
, the space of policies is partitioned into a moral region
and an immoral region : . The moral region contains
the optimal moral policy 2 of the moral autonomous
system while the immoral region contains the optimal amoral
policy 2 of the standard autonomous system. In
general, the optimal amoral policy 2 can be contained by
either the moral region or the immoral region : .</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-17">
      <title>A moral autonomous system may follow an ethical frame</title>
      <p>work that adversely impacts completing its task. Engineers
and ethicists can assess the cost of this impact by calculating
the maximum difference across all states between the value
function of the optimal moral policy and the value function
of the optimal amoral policy. We define this cost below.
Definition 4. Given the optimal moral policy 2 and the
optimal amoral policy 2 , the price of morality, , can
be represented by the expression = kV V k1.</p>
      <p>A moral autonomous system may even follow an
ethical framework that is mutually exclusive with completing its
task. In this situation, engineers and ethicists should
reconsider the moral implications of the system and could augment
the decision-making model or adjust the ethical context if
deemed safe. Naturally, depending on whether or not there
is a solution to the optimization problem, the system can be
considered either feasible or infeasible as follows.
Definition 5. A moral autonomous system is realizable if and
only if there exists a policy 2 such that its moral
principle ( ) is satisfied. Otherwise, the system is unrealizable.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-18">
      <title>It is natural to find the optimal moral policy by solving the</title>
      <p>optimization problem of a moral autonomous system using
mathematical programming. This process involves four steps.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-19">
      <title>First, the moral principle can be mapped to a moral constraint in terms of the occupancy measures of a policy. We show that this mapping can always be performed as follows.</title>
      <p>Theorem 1. A moral principle, : ! B, can be expressed
as a moral constraint c ( ) in terms of the matrix of
occupancy measures for a given policy .
2
Proof (Sketch) 1. We start with a moral principle ( ) using
a deterministic or stochastic policy (s) or (ajs). Recall
c F ( ) = ^s2S;a2A;f2F T (s; a; f ) sa = 0
c ( ) = Ps2S;a2A sa Ps02S T (s; a; s0) P 2 s0
c M ( ) = ^s2S;a2A
s
a
[ (s; a)]
( ; s0)</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-20">
      <title>Type</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-21">
      <title>Linear</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-22">
      <title>Linear</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-23">
      <title>Linear</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-24">
      <title>Conjunctions</title>
      <p>jSjjAjjF j
1
jSjjAj</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-25">
      <title>Operations</title>
      <p>2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-26">
      <title>Computations</title>
      <p>2jSjjAjjF j
3jSjjAjjSjj j + 1</p>
      <p>3jSjjAjjSjj j + 1
1 + 3LjMj
jSjjAj 1 + 3LjMj
that the discounted number of times that an action a 2 A is
performed in a state s 2 S is an occupancy measure sa.
Observe that the discounted number of times that a state s 2 S is
visited is the expression Pa2A sa. A policy (s) or (ajs) is
thus arg maxa2A sa= Pa2A sa or sa= Pa2A sa.
Therefore, by substitution, we end with a moral constraint c ( ).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-27">
      <title>Second, the moral principle can be classified as either lin</title>
      <p>ear or nonlinear depending on the form of its moral constraint.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-28">
      <title>If the moral constraint is linear in the occupancy measures of a policy, the moral principle is linear. Otherwise, the moral principle is nonlinear. We formalize this property below.</title>
      <p>Definition 6. A moral principle, : ! B, is linear if it can
be expressed as a moral constraint c ( ) that is linear with
respect to the matrix of occupancy measures for a given
policy 2 . Otherwise, the moral principle is nonlinear.</p>
      <p>Third, the optimization problem can be described as a
mathematical program. For task completion, following the
linear program of an MDP in the dual form, the program
maximizes a set of occupancy measures sa for the discounted
number of times an action a 2 A is performed in a state s 2 S
subject to a set of constraints that maintain consistent and
nonnegative occupancy. However, for ethical compliance, the
program has a moral constraint c ( ) derived from the moral
principle ( ) given a matrix of occupancy measures .</p>
      <p>Fourth, the mathematical program can be solved to find
the optimal moral policy. Given a linear moral principle, it
can be solved using techniques designed for linear
programming, such as the simplex method or the criss-cross
algorithm [Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, 1997]. However, given a
nonlinear moral principle, it can be solved using techniques
designed for nonlinear programming instead [Bertsekas, 1997].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-29">
      <title>Note that, while we use the dual form of the linear program of an MDP, this process can also be used with the primal form.</title>
      <p>5</p>
      <sec id="sec-29-1">
        <title>Ethical Frameworks</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-30">
      <title>In this section, we offer a range of ethical framework exam</title>
      <p>ples that can be used to build a moral autonomous system.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-31">
      <title>Each ethical framework is influenced by an interpretation of</title>
      <p>an ethical theory in moral philosophy [Shafer-Landau, 2009].
During the design of an ethical framework, ethicists and
engineers select a representation for the ethical context and the
moral principle. This involves choosing the contextual details
of the ethical context and the logical structure of the moral
principle that most accurately describe the capabilities of the
agent, the effect of its actions on its environment, and the
moral implications of its behavior. In short, an ethical
framework, composed of an ethical context and a moral principle,
is an approximation of an interpretation of an ethical theory.</p>
      <p>Table 1 offers the moral constraints that have been derived
from the moral principle of each ethical framework. For each
moral constraint, there are several columns that describe its
computational tractability. The Type column lists whether
the moral constraint is linear or nonlinear with respect to the
occupancy measures of a policy. The Conjunctions column
states the number of logical conjunctions that compose the
moral constraint. The Operations column indicates an upper
bound on the number of arithmetic, comparison, and logical
operations that must be performed for each logical
conjunction. The Computations column contains an upper bound on
the number of computations that must be executed for the
moral constraint to evaluate the moral status of a policy.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-32">
      <title>We now present a set of simplified ethical frameworks.</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-33">
      <title>They are not definitive and do not capture all nuances of eth</title>
      <p>ical theories. Their purpose is to tractably operationalize an
ethical theory within a decision process. We encourage the
development of more complex ethical frameworks that reflect
the depth of different ethical theories, including those below.
5.1</p>
      <p>Divine Command Theory
Divine command theory (DCT), a monistic, absolutist
ethical theory, holds that the morality of an action is based
on whether a divine entity commands or forbids that
action [Idziak, 1979; Quinn, 2013]. We consider a simplified
ethical framework in which a moral autonomous system uses
a policy that selects actions that have a nil probability of
transitioning to any forbidden state [Mouaddib et al., 2015]
Definition 7. A DCT ethical context, EF , can represented by
a tuple, EF = hF i, where F is a set of forbidden states.
Definition 8. A DCT moral principle, F , can be expressed
as the following equation:</p>
      <p>F
( ) = ^
s2S;f2F</p>
      <p>T (s; (s); f ) = 0 :
5.2</p>
      <p>Prima Facie Duties
Prima facie duties (PFD), a pluralistic, nonabsolutist
ethical theory, holds that the morality of an action is based on
whether that action fulfills fundamental moral duties that can
contradict each other [Ross, 1930; Morreau, 1996]. We
consider a simplified ethical framework in which a moral
autonomous system uses a policy that selects actions that do not
neglect duties of different penalties within some tolerance.
Definition 9. A PFD ethical context, E , can be represented
by a tuple, E = h ; ; i, where
is a set of duties,
: S ! R+ is a penalty function that represents
the expected immediate penalty for neglecting a duty 2
in a state s 2 S, and
, can be expressed
2 R+ is a tolerance.</p>
      <p>Definition 10. A PFD moral principle,
as the following equation:
( ) =</p>
      <p>X d(s)J (s)</p>
      <p>:
s2S
The expected cumulative penalty, J : S ! R, is below:
J (s) =</p>
      <p>X T (s; (s); s0) X ( ; s0) + J (s0) ;
s02S</p>
      <p>s0 is the set of duties neglected in a state s0 2 S.</p>
      <p>Virtue ethics (VE), a monistic, absolutist ethical theory, holds
that the morality of an action is based on whether a virtuous
person who acts in character performs that action in a similar
situation [Anscombe, 1958; Hursthouse, 1999]. We consider
a simplified ethical framework in which a moral autonomous
system uses a policy that selects actions that align with any
moral trajectory performed by a moral exemplar.</p>
      <p>Definition 11. A VE ethical context, EM, can represented by
a tuple, EM = hMi, where M is a set of moral trajectories.
Definition 12. A VE moral principle, M, can be expressed
as the following equation:</p>
      <p>M
( ) = ^
s2S
(s; (s)):
The alignment function, : S</p>
      <p>A ! B, is below:
(s; a) = 9m2M;0 i ` s = m(si) ^ a = m(ai) ;
where m(si) and m(ai) are the ith state and the ith action of
a moral trajectory m = hs0; a0; s1; a1; : : : ; s` 1; a` 1; s`i of
length ` L bounded by a maximum length L.
6</p>
      <sec id="sec-33-1">
        <title>Autonomous Driving</title>
        <p>We turn to an application of moral autonomy to autonomous
driving. A moral self-driving vehicle must complete a
navigation task by driving from an origin to a destination in a
city. However, to follow an ethical framework, the moral
selfdriving vehicle must adjust its route and speed depending on
the type and pedestrian traffic of each road. We describe how
to separate task completion and ethical compliance below.
6.1</p>
        <p>Task Completion</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-34">
      <title>The vehicle must complete a navigation task by driving from</title>
      <p>a start location 0 2 to a goal location g 2 along a
set of roads in a city with a set of locations . At each
location 2 , the vehicle must turn onto a road ! 2 .
Each road ! 2 is a type 2 that indicates either a city
street, county road, or highway with a low, medium, or high
speed limit. Once the vehicle turns onto a road ! 2 , the
vehicle observes the pedestrian traffic as either light
or heavy with a probability Pr( = ). After the vehicle
observes the pedestrian traffic 2 , the vehicle accelerates
to a speed 2 that reflects either a low, normal, or high
speed under, at, or above the speed limit. To drive along the
road ! 2 from the current location 2 to the next
location 0 2 , the vehicle cruises at the speed 2 . Note
that this is repeated until arriving at the goal location g 2 .</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-35">
      <title>We represent the decision-making model of a navigation</title>
      <p>task by an MDP D = hS; A; T; R; di. The set of states S =
S [ S has a set of location states S for being at a location</p>
      <sec id="sec-35-1">
        <title>2 and a set of road states S for being on a road ! 2</title>
        <p>of a type 2 with a pedestrian traffic 2 at a speed
2 . The set of actions A = A [ A [ f ; g has a
set of turn actions A for turning onto a road ! 2 , a set
of accelerate actions A for accelerating to a speed 2 , a
stay action , and a cruise action . The transition function
T : S A S ! [0; 1] reflects the dynamics of a turn action
a 2 A and a stay action in a location state 2 S or an
accelerate action a 2 A and a cruise action in a road state
s 2 S (with a self-loop for any invalid action a 2 A). The
reward function R : S A S ! R reflects the duration
of a turn action a 2 A from a location state S to a road
state s 2 S , a stay action at a location state 2 S , an
accelerate action a 2 A at a road state s 2 S , and a cruise
action from a road state s 2 S to a location state S (with
an infinite duration for any invalid action a 2 A and a nil
duration for a stay action at a state s 2 S that represents the
goal location g 2 ). The start state function d : S ! [0; 1]
has unit probability at a state s 2 S that represents the start
location 0 2 and nil probability at every other state s 2 S.
6.2</p>
        <p>Ethical Compliance
The vehicle must follow one of the ethical frameworks. First,
the vehicle can follow DCT with forbidden states comprised
of hazardous states H and inconsiderate states I. Hazardous
states H contain any road state at high speed while
inconsiderate states I contain any road state at normal speed with
heavy pedestrian traffic. With the DCT moral principle F ,
we represent the DCT ethical context by a tuple, EF = hF i,
where F = H [ I is the set of forbidden states.</p>
        <p>Next, the vehicle can follow PFD with duties comprised of
smooth operation 1 and careful operation 2. Smooth
operation 1 is neglected in any road state at low speed with light
pedestrian traffic while careful operation 2 is neglected in
any road state at high speed or at normal speed with heavy
pedestrian traffic. When smooth operation 1 and careful
operation 2 are neglected, they incur a low and high penalty
that changes with any pedestrian traffic. Neglecting duties
is permitted until a limit . With the PFD moral
principle , we represent the PFD ethical context by a tuple,
E = h ; ; i, where = f 1; 2g is the set of duties,
: S ! R+ is the penalty function that represents the
expected immediate penalty for neglecting smooth operation</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-35-2">
        <title>1 2 and careful operation 2 2 in a state s 2 S with a</title>
        <p>pedestrian traffic 2 , and = is the tolerance.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-36">
      <title>Finally, the vehicle can follow VE with moral trajectories</title>
      <p>comprised of cautious trajectories C and proactive trajectories</p>
      <sec id="sec-36-1">
        <title>P. Cautious trajectories C exemplify driving on any road state</title>
        <p>at normal speed with light pedestrian traffic or at low speed
with heavy pedestrian traffic while proactive trajectories P
exemplify avoiding any highway road states and a set of
populated location states. With the VE moral principle M, we
represent the VE ethical context by a tuple, EM = hMi,
where M = C [ P is the set of moral trajectories.
7</p>
        <sec id="sec-36-1-1">
          <title>Experiments</title>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-37">
      <title>We now demonstrate that the application of moral autonomy</title>
      <p>to autonomous driving is effective in a set of simulations and
a user study. In the set of simulations, an amoral self-driving
vehicle and a moral self-driving vehicle that follows different
ethical frameworks both complete a set of navigation tasks.</p>
      <p>Each navigation task can use a different start location 0 2
and goal location g 2 based on the city in Figure 2. The
speed limits of city streets, county roads, and highways are
25, 45, and 75 mph. The probability Pr( = ) of observing
light or heavy pedestrian traffic 2 is 0:8 and 0:2. A
low, normal, and high speed is 10 mph under, at, and 10 mph
above the speed limit. Turning onto a road ! 2 from a
location 2 requires 5 sec. Accelerating 10 mph requires</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-38">
      <title>2 sec. Cruising requires a time equal to the distance of the</title>
      <p>road ! 2 divided by the speed 2 . Staying at a location</p>
      <sec id="sec-38-1">
        <title>2 other than the goal location g 2 requires 120 sec.</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-39">
      <title>Each ethical framework can use different settings. For</title>
      <sec id="sec-39-1">
        <title>DCT, the forbidden states F can be just hazardous states H or</title>
        <p>both hazardous states H and inconsiderate states I. For PFD,
the tolerance = can be the limit = 3, = 6, or = 9.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-40">
      <title>For VE, the moral trajectories can be just cautious trajectories</title>
      <sec id="sec-40-1">
        <title>C or both cautious trajectories C and proactive trajectories P</title>
        <p>that avoid any highway road states and a set of populated
location states that contains the School and College locations.</p>
        <p>Table 2 highlights that the price of morality incurred by
the behavior of the agent is appropriate given each ethical
framework. Naturally, the amoral self-driving vehicle does
not incur a price of morality. The moral self-driving vehicle,
however, incurs a price of morality that increases with more
forbidden states for DCT, decreases with more tolerance for</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-41">
      <title>PFD, and increases with more moral trajectories for VE.</title>
      <p>Figure 5 indicates that the behavior of the agent is correct
given each ethical framework. The amoral self-driving
vehicle drives the shortest route at high speed. The moral
selfdriving vehicle, however, differs for each ethical framework.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-42">
      <title>For DCT, the vehicle drives the shortest route at low or normal speed based on pedestrian traffic. For PFD, the vehicle drives the shortest route at low or normal speed based on pedestrian</title>
      <p>traffic aside from driving on the first road at normal or high
speed with some probability for light pedestrian traffic and
at normal speed for heavy pedestrian traffic due to the
tolerance. For VE, the vehicle drives at low or normal speed based
on pedestrian traffic but drives a different route to avoid the
highway road states and the set of populated location states.</p>
      <p>In the user study, planning and robotics experts had to
complete two tasks in a randomized order. In both tasks,
developers were given a complete decision-making model for
navigating efficiently around the example city and had to enforce
the following moral requirements. The agent should drive at
high speed with light pedestrian traffic or at normal speed
with heavy pedestrian traffic at most once in expectation but
should never drive at high speed with heavy pedestrian
traffic. In one task, developers were asked to achieve the desired
behavior by modifying the existing decision-making model,
an MDP, by changing its reward function or transition
function. In the other task, developers were asked to achieve the
same desired behavior but by defining the ethical context for
the prima facie duties ethical framework.</p>
      <p>Figure 4 illustrates that our method led to better policies
than the other method. In our method, all policies satisfy the
requirements and optimize the navigation task with exactly
one violation. However, in the other method, the majority of
policies fail to optimize the navigation task or even satisfy
the requirements: aggressive policies in the upper right
corner are faster but immoral while conservative policies in the
lower left corner are slower but moral. It is also
encouraging that our method (24 min) had a significantly lower mean
development time than the other method (45 min).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-43">
      <title>Our open source library, Morality.js, which is available on</title>
      <p>the website https://www.moralityjs.com with the
customizable grid world environment dashboard seen in
Figure 3, was used for all experiments [Svegliato et al., 2020].</p>
      <sec id="sec-43-1">
        <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-44">
      <title>This work was supported in part by an NSF Graduate Research Fellowship DGE-1451512 and the NSF grants IIS1724101 and IIS-1813490.</title>
      <p>Light
Service Road</p>
      <p>Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light</p>
      <p>Gas
Station
Gas</p>
      <p>Station
Service Road</p>
      <p>Sunrise Highway
Gas
Station</p>
      <p>Sunrise Highway</p>
      <p>Office
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy
Light
Heavy</p>
      <p>Light
Oak
Road
Heavy</p>
      <p>Office
Office
Office
(a)</p>
      <p>Home
(b)</p>
      <p>Home
(c)</p>
      <p>Home</p>
      <p>Light
Gray Street
Heavy
Light
Heavy</p>
      <p>Light
Gray Street
Heavy</p>
      <p>Train
Station
Train
Station
Train</p>
      <p>Station
Gray Street</p>
      <p>Service Road</p>
      <p>Sunrise Highway
Light</p>
      <p>Light
Light
(d)</p>
      <p>Home SGtrreaeyt STtartaiionn MReorraidck PPilzazcae PSletaresaetnt GSrotocreery SSttraeteet
Town
Hall
Heavy</p>
      <p>Heavy</p>
      <p>Heavy</p>
      <p>Heavy</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
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