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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.18287/2412</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Definition of basic violators for critically important objects using the information probability method and cluster analysis</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vladimir Kostin</string-name>
          <email>vladimirkostin5@mail.ru</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Aleksandr Borovsky</string-name>
          <email>borovski@mail.ru</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Orenburg State University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Orenburg</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="RU">Russia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2012</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>43</volume>
      <issue>5</issue>
      <fpage>810</fpage>
      <lpage>817</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>-One of the approaches to analyzing the relationships between the characteristics of critical objects and typical intruders using the information-probabilistic method is considered. Categories of objects and typical intruders are described by many common heterogeneous characteristics. The probabilistic information method ensured the homogeneity of the entropy potential of the offender training characteristics and the characteristics of the consequences of the offender actions according to the Pearson chi-square criterion and on this basis the characteristics of the offenders and critical objects are summarized in a common information field in single six-point measurement scales. Using the information probabilistic method and the cluster analysis method for the general information field, we obtained the basic type of intruder for each category of objects. The results can be used to determine the requirements for physical protection systems of critical facilities.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>information-probability method</kwd>
        <kwd>entropy</kwd>
        <kwd>base type of intruder</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>I. INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>The analysis of the source [1] revealed that each
protected object has an attractive potential, which is formed
by a hazard potential, in accordance with which the
necessary security potential is formed in the form of a
physical protection system (PPS). In turn, each typical
intruder has the potential for preparedness (danger), which
is determined by the degree of his motivation. Thus, many
typical intruders have a definite impact on many categorized
objects in accordance with their potential capabilities.
Typical violators and categorized objects have many
characteristics that determine their potential motivation
(danger) and attractiveness, which intersect informationally.
Obviously, between the categories of critical objects (CIO)
and typical intruders (threats) there must be a certain
correspondence, which is based on the general
commensurability or ratios of the characteristics of these
sets (potentials). That is, each category of CIO must
correspond to a certain basic type or types of violators.</p>
      <p>The author of the article suggests, using the information
probabilistic method (IPM) and cluster analysis, to
determine the typical basic intruders for each category of
CIO, i.e. identify existing compliance. Based on the hazard
results of typical violators, an appropriate level of security
(safety) of objects is proposed.</p>
      <p>This problem is solved to differentiate the necessary
requirements when determining the required value of
protection of categorized objects from basic typical
violators.</p>
      <p>Currently, the task of determining the basic threats for
various categories of objects is determined mainly by expert
methods [2], where there is an element of subjectivity, or
based on the theory of fuzzy logic and fuzzy hypergraphs
[3]. Recent methods do not allow us to estimate their
weight contribution to the formation of the hazard potential
of the object. In addition, sometimes when composing
fuzzy membership matrices (performing disjunction and
conjunction operations) for certain data (if one of the
characteristics is significantly small), fuzzy logic methods
show doubtfully low results.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>II. FORMULATION OF THE PROPLEM</title>
      <p>On the basis of processing the combined general
information field of the characteristics of violators and
categorized objects with an information probabilistic
method and cluster analysis, it is necessary to determine
each category of CIO of the corresponding typical intruder,
that is, it is necessary to determine the degree of potential
impact of the i-type intruder on the j-th category of CIO, to
solve the problem of determining ratios and on this basis to
propose the necessary amount of security for each category
of objects. The source [4] discusses the finding of
correspondences on images presented in the form of graph
models, but this problem has a limitation — the number of
vertices in the image graphs must be the same. The source
[5] provides an in-depth analysis of clustering methods. A
technique for clustering big data is proposed. The issues of
graph clustering are considered, while the weight of the
signs of cluster analysis is not taken into account.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>III. PROBLEM SOLVING</title>
      <p>To solve this problem, it is necessary to form a common
information field in a unified scale for measuring the
characteristics of violators and CIO.</p>
      <p>To assess the potential danger of the object from the
actions of violators, six private types of losses were
introduced [4]:
- political (determined by a decrease in all levels of
authority of the authorities and general instability);
- human (consists in the loss of people's lives and
health);
- financial (consists in the loss of material values);
- economic (take into account the costs of relocating
people from the accident zone and the related
compensation payments);
- environmental (loss of natural resources leading to
environmental degradation in the region);
- informational (losses consisting in the loss of advanced
technologies, confidential information and artistic
values).</p>
      <p>For each particular type of loss, one of the six scales of
potential losses in the event of an emergency (ES) was
determined in the form of a six-point hazard scale, which
are presented in Table 1.</p>
      <p>The results of the hazard assessment (attractiveness) for
the seven categories of CIO in case of emergencies on a
sixpoint scale, obtained in article [7], are shown in table 2.
cter character character character al character</p>
      <p>To solve this problem, we describe typical intruders and
objects in a single scale of measurement of characteristics.
Based on the data of Table 3 and expert evaluations of
specialists, a transition
was
made from
qualitative to
of Many dangerous emergencies (violators, objects)
Name
characteristics
 1


 
…
…</p>
      <p>…

 
…
…
…
…
…

…</p>
      <p>The weight of parameters in the formation of the
estimated</p>
      <p>potential is characterized by a quantitative
measure of the degree of confidence in the situation,
objectively existing uncertainty and is identified with the
probability distribution Pji. Characteristics {Xji} are uniquely
set in various physical scales.</p>
      <p>Therefore, to bring the
characteristics {Xji} to a single common scale, we use the
natural normalization, carried out relative to the extreme
values {Xji} of the components as without changing the
ingredient to the opposite:
and with the change of ingredient to the opposite:


The level is</p>
      <p>the
stics
violators
with display in xji → r[0,1]. Dependencies (1) and (2)
ensured the mapping of the sample space shown in Table 5
to another having the power of the continuum shown in
 1
 

…
…
…
…
…</p>
      <p>Elements rji (continuum power spaces) in a single scale
will be identified with elementary events.</p>
      <p>Moreover, the
measure defined on rji the normalized corresponds to the
probability p(r), which is identified with the concept of the
integral potential of a given complex of elementary events.
The meaning of this measure is to appropriately interpret the
concept of probability. Moreover, probability, as a category
of dialectics, combines both the measure of the objective
possibility of an event and the degree of subjective
confidence in the occurrence of events.</p>
      <p>In order to
formalize the problem of choosing a solution, we identify
many alternatives with the event space {A}, and
many
attributes with events {x}. Then the connection between all
the characteristics that form the estimated potential of the
emergency is carried out through the normalized measure
defined on these characteristics, which is identified with
probability p(a). The probability distribution p(a) provides
an estimate of entropy Hi.</p>
      <p>Information in probabilistic-statistical theory acts as a
removable, diminished
uncertainty.</p>
      <p>Therefore, further
construction of the method is associated with the study of
the laws of transformation of the information field of the
Cartesian product of two sets (emergency situations and
their
characteristics)
into
quantitative
components
of
information. For this purpose, we introduce concepts such
as a priori, a posteriori, and conditional probabilities into the
logic diagram, apply the Bayesian theorem and the formula
for the total probability, and introduce the concept of the
conditional p probability of the j-th characteristic in the
formation of the estimated potential, provided that the
events that form the estimated potential have occurred.</p>
      <p>To obtain the dependence of determining the quantity
p(r), which is a normalized measure on elementary events
{r}, we use the fact that the concept of the estimated
potential of a given complex of elementary events can be
identified with the membership function, which associates
each r with a real number in the interval [0,1].</p>
      <p>Moreover,
without violating the generality of reasoning, the desired
dependence of the membership function is represented in
the form:

  ( ) =   / ∑
 =1 

(3)</p>
      <p>One of the methods for calculating the probability of
manifestation of the j-th characteristic of the compared
emergency situations (violators, objects) to the formation of
the estimated potential is based on the input V. Khomenyuk
concept of the potential probability distribution, which is
determined by the formula:
(4)</p>
      <p>The principle of the potential probability distribution is
based on the fact that it is preferable to choose with greater
probability those
characteristics of the system
whose
properties have a large contribution to the total value of the
estimated potential. At the same time, we note that for the
principle
of
potential
probability
distribution,</p>
      <p>Khomenyuk, a priori information about the
state
of
characteristics is based on the principle of insufficient
knowledge.</p>
      <p>However, the weight of various characteristics in the
formation of the estimated potential is different. Obtaining
estimates of the a priori distribution is related to the order
relation   , which was studied in detail in the works of
Fishborn [6]. For a simple linear relationship, the order of
the Fishborn estimates of a priori probabilities form a
decreasing arithmetic progression of the form:
 ̌ = 2 ∗ (
−  + 1)/
∗ (
+ 1)</p>
      <p>Introducing an a priori probability based on Fishborn
estimates, we, setting the “input” to the method, take into
account the different weight of the characteristics in the
formation of the estimated potential.</p>
      <p>Then, using the
principle of potential distribution (4) and the provisions of
the Bayesian theorem, we obtain a logically justified “exit”
from the
model in the form
of posterior conditional
probabilities in the form:</p>
      <p>= ∑ =1 

∗  ̌/ ∑</p>
      <p>=1 ∑ =1  ̌
(5)</p>
      <p>Thus, the benefit of introducing a priori probability is
that it provides an attachment of the information necessary
for analysis.</p>
      <p>After introducing the a priori probability into the
decision-making method and calculating the a posteriori
value of the conditional probability   , we proceed to the
next modeling stage, which is associated with obtaining
probabilistic
estimates
To this end, we use the Bayesian theorem, in which we are
talking
about
reversing
the
order
of
statements
in
conditional probability, that is, in the notation we have
adopted   ( ) and are related   . Then the probability
 ( ) in the considered information situation is determined
by the dependence:

  ( ) =   ( ) ⋅   / ∑
 =1</p>
      <p>∑ =1   ( ) ⋅  
(6)</p>
      <p>Then the significance level of the emergency (intruder,
object) is estimated through the uncertainty function:
  ( ) = − ∑

 =1   ( )    ( ) .</p>
      <p>For the data in Table 4, the entropy potential of each
type of intruder was evaluated using an IVM. The results
are presented in Figure 1.</p>
      <p>In Table 7, the characteristics of the damage caused by
typical violators of the CIO on the same six-point scale
were formed in such a way that the entropy assessment of
the potentials of preparation (danger) of violators coincided
with the entropy assessment of the potentials of the
consequences of the target implementation of violators.
That is, the entropy estimates in Figures 1 and 2 are uniform
according to the Pearson chi-square criterion.</p>
      <p>On this basis, information on violators and CWS (tables
2 and 7) should be combined into one information field. As
a result, we get table 8 with a common information field in a
single measurement scale. In table 8, we replace the
sixpoint scale with the entropy scale of the danger of
emergency consequences, which was determined using the
IWM to the data of table 1 [9] (H is the corresponding
entropy value of damage):</p>
      <p>1 - local (damage within the territory of the facility) - H
= 0.007;</p>
      <p>2 - local (damage within the territory of the settlement)
- H = 0.116;</p>
      <p>3 - territorial (damage to the territory of the constituent
entity of the Russian Federation) - H = 0.173;</p>
      <p>4 - regional (damage on the scale of two constituent
entities of the Russian Federation) - H = 0.555;
5 - state (damage to the limits of more than two
constituent entities of the Russian Federation) -H= 0.621;
6 - interstate (damage extends beyond the borders of the
Russian Federation) - H = 0.878.</p>
      <p>The transition from the six-point scale to the entropy
hazard potentials is justified by the requirement to increase
the reliability of the damage assessment scale [1].</p>
      <p>Applying ICM to the data in Table 8, we obtained the
entropy potentials of typical intruders and categorized
objects (shown in the bottom row of Table.8 and in fig. 3).
1
0 Model violators and categories of</p>
      <p>X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 1-к 2-кC3IO-кC4-к 5-к 6-к 7-к
Fig. 3. Graph of the entropy potential of the CIOC and typical violators.</p>
      <p>Having solved the problem of combining homogeneous
potentials into clusters by the agglomerative method using
Statistika 10.0 SPP, we obtained the results of combining
typical intruders and categorized KBO into clusters
categories (Table 9). An analysis of Table 9 and Figure 3
shows that the first type of intruder is lower in potential
capabilities than an object of the first category, so he needs
to combine with internal intruders X5 or X6.</p>
      <p>It should be noted that the preparedness potential is
consistent with the hazard potential of the consequences of
the actions of violators and with their capabilities to
overcome the PPS of objects, i.e. each potential of the
intruder can be assigned the corresponding protection
potential of the object (PPS potential) - for example, the
probability of a safe state of the object. That is, it is
required to determine the necessary probability of the safe
state of the object depending on the hazard potential of the
base intruder for the corresponding hazard category of the
object. Obviously, there should be a correspondence
between the danger potential of a typical intruder and the
degree of protection from his actions, i.e. the nature of the
change in the dependencies of the potentials of violators and
their counteraction should be similar functions.</p>
      <p>If the function of changing the entropy potentials of the
type of intruder is related to the required probability of a
safe state according to the first type of intruder (the highest
estimate is the probability of protection 0.98 - the value is
close to the limit), and the weakest type of intruder (the
sensitivity of the detection sensor is 0.7 and the probability
of timely arrival - 0.9 gives a value of a safe state of 0.6),
i.e. we associate with each type of intruder the required
value of the object's security (the probability of a safe state)
from its actions. The results of the probabilities of the safe
state of the PPS, as similar values to hazards (typical
violators), are shown in table 9.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>CONCLUSION</title>
      <p>The basic typical violators for each category of CIO are
defined, which are shown in table 9. The results obtained do
not contradict the physical meaning. The results of the
probabilities of the safe state of categorized objects (Table
9) can be used to justify the requirements for the
effectiveness of the PPS CIO.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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</article>