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      <title-group>
        <article-title>A Tool that Uses Human Factors to Simplify Model Building and Facilitate More Accurate Strategic Decisions</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Oscar Kipersztok</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mathematics</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Computing Technology Boeing Phantom Works P.O.Box</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Seattle</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>oscar.kipersztok@boeing.com</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper describes a tool to validate hypotheses in strategic decision making. The system builds on experimental evidence of human factors that lead to more accurate decisions. The paper shows how those factors are translated into specifications for a user interface that simplifies the capture of expert knowledge to create complex models of strategic domains of interest. The tool uses graphical probabilistic reasoning, combined with text classification methods, to expedite the search for relevant information in a large number of documents to help validate hypotheses.</p>
      </abstract>
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  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>This paper describes a tool that facilitates
strategic decision making, i.e., decisions
that, if wrong, can have significantly
negative or even catastrophic consequences.
The questions addressed are what type of
information decision makers need to know,
and how they process such information to
arrive at decisions? Are there processes that
lead to better decisions? What specific
quantities do decision makers need to be
able to make decisions?
There is evidence from experimental
psychology that suggest trends and
behaviors that, on the average, result in
more accurate decisions. This work
summarizes those human factors and
processes and investigates how those can be
used for building systems or computational
tools that facilitate better decision making.
There has been a recent surge in technology
used to support decisions. Graphical
probabilistic networks (Bayesian networks),
for example, are used to model large
complex domains from the aggregation of
smaller, local, probabilistic dependencies
between the variables of a domain [Pearl,
1988; Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988].
The methodology uses efficient
probabilityupdate algorithms that guarantee consistent
and correct propagation of uncertainty when
the models are queried. In Data Mining
[Cabena, et. al., 1998], algorithms are used
to search for information in very large
databases to discover patterns and trends
that can explain new phenomena. For
example, for strategic decisions,
classification algorithms [Langley, 1996] are
contributing to the ability to retrieve
pertinent information in support of critical
decisions. In many instances, not having the
right information available at the right time
can have serious consequences. The large
amounts of information that can be accessed
today make it difficult for decision makers
to search for specific information that may
be needed for time-critical decisions.
In this paper, a prototype tool is presented
that uses human factors found to lead to
more accurate decisions. The system uses
graphical probabilistic reasoning, combined
with text classification methods, to facilitate
the search through a large number of
documents. It allows the capture of user’s
knowledge in a straight forward manner to
create complex models of domains of
interest. These are also referred to as
“mental models” of the domain.</p>
      <p>As the user builds a model, a graphical
probabilistic network is automatically
created that allows the user to raise
hypotheses by making queries to the model.
At the same time a text classifier is also
created for search and retrieval from a large
volume of documents. Once built, the user
queries the model and the system responds
by predicting the likelihood of a hypothesis.
In prediction-driven mode, the classifier will
search for relevant documents that can be
used to substantiate or negate a given
hypothesis. In evidence-driven mode, the
evidence is retrieved ahead of formulating
the hypothesis. In both cases the search is
driven by the most likely hypotheses or the
most likely evidence. The tool creates a
summary report describing the formulated
hypothesis and the evidence gathered to
substantiate or refute it.</p>
      <p>This paper shows that it is possible to embed
in the GUI design features based on the
human factors mentioned to guide the
operational use of the tool to flow in a
manner that facilitates more expedient and
effective strategic decision making.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>HUMAN FACTORS FROM</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY</title>
      <p>
        Evidence from expe
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">rimental psychology
[Oskamp, 1965</xref>
        ; Goldberg, 1968; Heuer,
1999] shows that factoring more information
into a decision process, increases the
confidence of the decision maker without
necessarily increasing the accuracy of the
decision. People tend to believe that they use
considerably more information in their
decisions than they actually do [Summers et
al., 1970; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971].
People compile vast amounts of information,
over a life time of making decisions.
Although it may appear that all that
information is brought to bear in each new
decision; actually, only a relatively small
amount is relevant for each individual
decision [Shepard, 1964].
      </p>
      <p>Over time, people develop “mental models”
of the world that are comprised of ideas and
concepts learned, and the relationships
between them [Heuer, 1999]. Such mental
models become the “filter” through which
people interpret the world around them.
There is a continuous refinement of the
mental model based on new experiences
gained that reinforce certain relationships
and weaken others.</p>
      <p>People tend to utilize two distinct modalities
for decision making. One modality is
referred to as the “mosaic” model [Heuer,
1999] where pieces of information are
accumulated, in no particular pattern, on the
belief that a unified picture will, eventually,
emerge revealing the solution to a problem
query. The emphasis is in accumulating as
much information on the subject of interest
as possible.</p>
      <p>The second modality is using the mental
model to create a hypothesis for the query
and then use the hypothesis to guide the
retrieval of information. The search for
information is driven by the model and the
information retrieved is used to validate,
refute, or reformulate the hypothesis.
Experimental psychology provides evidence
that the latter is the modality that tends to
conduce to more accurate decisions [Elstein,
et. al., 1978]. The process of scientific
discovery, for example, follows the second
modality where theories are created about
unexplained phenomena and experiments
are designed to validate or refute the
theories. In turn, the data are also used to
improve theories and the process continues
where experiment and theory affect each
other.</p>
      <p>The described system uses these results to
guide the user in the process of making
decisions. Firstly, it allows the user to build
a mental model of their domain of interest in
a fairly simple and unrestricted manner.
Secondly, as the user queries the model, a
hypothesis is proposed, and the system
automatically identifies the essential
parameters that are relevant to it. The system
also conducts a search to retrieve
information for use in validating or negating
the hypothesis. The gathered evidence is
used to redefine the query and to propose a
better and more likely hypothesis. This cycle
of operation patterns itself after the human
factor trends described in this section that
can lead to better decisions.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>A KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>PERSPECTIVE FOR BUILDING</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>COMPLEX MODELS</title>
      <p>From a knowledge acquisition perspective,
the translation of the aforementioned human
factors into system design specifications
must conform to proper practices of user
interface design. Domain models that
facilitate strategic decisions can become
quite complex. How can such complexity be
managed during the knowledge acquisition
stage, was an important question that needed
to be addressed.</p>
      <p>Two basic principles are defined and applied
to the user interface design to manage the
building of complex models. The first
principle is driven by the goal to create a
system that will allow direct and iterative
interaction with the user, and will not
necessitate the presence of an intermediary
knowledge engineer. The communication
language of the system with the user is
limited exclusively to the language of the
user’s domain of interest. All technical
terminology is hidden from the user. The
user defines the domain as a list of concepts
with appropriate labels and defines
relationships between them with a weight of
causal belief. The model is captured, as a
directed graph and hidden from the user.
The second principle is to allow the user to
attach specific qualitative and quantitative
information to nodes and links in the graph.
The intent is to associate the same type of
information uniformly across all nodes
keeping the amount of added information to
a minimum. The new information, although
of the same type, contains different semantic
meaning for each individual concept or
relation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>DESCRIPTION OF THE SYSTEM AND ITS USE 4</title>
      <p>4.1</p>
      <p>WHAT STRATEGIC DECISION</p>
      <p>MAKERS WHANT TO KNOW
Based on documents of strategic decisions
and discussions during meetings of strategic
nature, the observation was postulated that a
common set of prediction parameters that
decision makers are interested are the
occurrence of events and the emergence of
trends. Moreover, for each predicted event
or trend, decision makers are interested in
knowing their likelihood of occurrence, their
magnitude or impact, and the time when
they expected to occur.</p>
      <p>BUILDING THE “MENTAL MODEL”
Specifying the use of mental models in
computing architectures of decision support
system requires defining methodologies of
how such models are to be built. The type of
model suggested here is a cognitive causal
model in the form of a directed graph made
up of nodes representing concepts and links
representing relationships. Concepts are
ideas represented by descriptive labels or
phrases that convey a specific meaning or
thought that is relevant to the domain of
interest. Such model can be built by making
a list of concepts and identifying, for each
concept, all other concepts that may affect it.
This type of model is referred to as an
“unconstrained model” because there are no
restrictions as to the number of concepts or
directional relations that can be defined in
the graph. Any number of cycles is allowed.
Since not all relations have the same degree
of belief, a “weight of causal belief” is
introduced and attached to each parent-child
relation. Such weight represents the degree
of belief that if the parent is true, it will
influence the child to become true as well.
An arbitrary scale between [0, 1] is used to
assign such weight. In order to make
inference about proposed hypotheses and
make predictions about the domain, the
unconstrained model is converted into a
graphical probabilistic network by reducing
the directed graph into an acyclic graph.
During model creation the system allows as
much flexibility for free association, without
much concern about its ability perform
inference. The use of the unconstrained
model enables the system to acquire as
much information as possible.</p>
      <p>Figure 1, shows the model building screen
for building the mental model. The model is
built by defining concepts and their
relations. As an example, concepts are
shown for the “Aviation Safety” domain. In
Figure 2, “Traffic Control Errors” and
“Public concern” represent state transition
concepts that affect the “Occurrence of
Accidents”, a discrete event concept.
The unconstrained model can be as large
and complex as needed. The model is
captured as a directed graph. Figure 3 shows
a simple version of the Aviation Safety
model where the negative signs at the end of
the arrows representing negative weights of
belief.
To be able to make predictions that decision
makers are interested, such as the likelihood,
magnitude and time of expected event and
trend occurrences, Bayesian networks are
used. The tool computes likelihoods and
probabilities in response to queries. The user
can add information to concepts to define
them in term of dimensional quantities.
Characteristic time quantities are also added
for use in temporal reasoning [Nodelman, et.
al., 2002]. To transform the directed graph
into an acyclic Bayesian network, two steps
are necessary. The first step is to eliminate
cycles in the directed graph. This is done by
minimizing information loss as a trade-off
between the full expressiveness of the
unconstrained model and the ability to make
predictive inference. The second step is to
utilize the weights of causal belief to create
conditional probability tables between each
node in the acyclic graph and its parent
nodes. Similar approaches are found in
[Rosen and Smith, 1996]
4.4</p>
      <p>QUERY AND HYPOTHESIS CREATION
A query presents a question of how evidence
or beliefs about current events (or trends)
can predict the occurrence of future events
of interest. The current evidence is the state
of occurring events and on-going trends.
Experimental psychology factors described
in Section 2, suggests that only a few
parameters are relevant in addressing a
specific query in support of a decision. To
answer a query the system identifies the sub
model from the unconstrained model
containing only those parameters that are
relevant to the query [Druzdzel and
Suermondt, 1994]. The screen in Figure 4
shows the results of such query with the
corresponding prediction.</p>
      <p>The response to the query is in the form of a
hypothesis that predicts the likelihood of an
event or trend given current evidence or
beliefs. The user can simulate various ‘what
if’ scenarios to gain insight into which of the
postulated hypotheses will result in the most
likely future events.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>MENTAL MODEL GUIDING</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>EVIDENCE SEARCH</title>
      <p>As mentioned in Section 2, the iterative
process of using mental models to raise
hypotheses and the subsequent search for
information to help validate them has been
shown by experiments to result in more
accurate decision making.
While the user builds the model, the tool
also provides added utilities to facilitate the
automated building of a text classifier. The
creation of the classifier is based mostly on
the concept labels and the text descriptions
that are attached to the nodes and links of
the model graph.</p>
      <p>The tool’s prediction capability using the
mental model allows the user to discover the
most likely hypotheses that justify the search
for validating information. The capability to
identify the parameters most relevant to the
hypotheses further narrows the space of
possible search. And the text classifier built
using the domain language, introduced by
the user, helps conduct the search in an
efficient manner as is shown next. The
search requires the presence of a large
corpus of text documents. The text classifier
built by the tool is used to rank text content
relevant to concepts and relations associated
with the hypotheses that resulted from the
query.</p>
      <p>Figure 5 shows the screen with the results of
the classification process. Every document
has been classified into the relevant concepts
for the query. A score is computed by the
classifier for each relevant concept. The
documents are ranked according to content
most relevant to the concepts in the
hypothesis.
The user can inspect each concept and
identify the specific documents that have
been associated with it. The screen in Figure
6 shows the specific documents that have
been assigned to a concept. A second score
is also computed to rank the documents with
the most relevant content. Shown on the
right pane of Figure 6 is information about
author, source, title of each document, and a
level of reliability that the user selects for
each source. Such reliability factor is used to
re compute the ranking of each document.
Each document associated with a concept is
further broken down into ranked paragraphs,
as shown in Figure 7.</p>
      <p>The highest ranked paragraph contains the
content most closely associated with the
concept. The user can, quickly, inspect the
most relevant paragraphs of each document
and select the paragraphs that contain
evidence to help substantiate or reject the
hypothesis. In this manner, the user can
search through the documents and build a
case by selecting the pertinent document
paragraphs that help support or reject the
hypothesis.
The last step is summarization of the
evidence gathered from the selected
documents and paragraphs which content
helps to substantiate the hypotheses. The
paragraphs selected by the user are compiled
automatically and captured in a file with the
postulated hypothesis and the conclusions
drawn by the user.
6</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>SUMMARY</title>
      <p>Experimental evidence from human factors
studies describe behaviors that lead to more
accurate decisions. A prototype system is
presented that utilizes those factors in the
design of the user-interface to help the user
step through the creation of a model,
presentation of a query, postulation of a
hypothesis and, lastly, validation of the
hypothesis by expediting the search through
a large corpus of documents in the context
of the most likely evidence.
[Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988] Lauritzen S. L.,
and D.J. Spiegelhalter. Local Computation with
Probabilities in Graphical Structures and Their</p>
    </sec>
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