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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Guessing Games Experiments in School Education and Their Analysis</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Institute of Software Systems of NAS of Ukraine</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>40/5 Academic Hlushkov Ave., Kyiv, 03187</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2062</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0001</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The paper deals with experimental game theory and data analysis. The research question is how different pools of players understand strategic situations, they never faced before. We examine data from a number of strategic interactions (games) and present players progress in finding solutions in competition with other players. We propose four “pick a number” games, all with similar-looking rules but very different properties. These games were introduced (in the body of scientific popular lectures) to very different groups. In this paper we present data gathered during lectures and develop tool for exploratory analysis using R language. Finally, we discuss the findings and open questions.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>behavioral game theory</kwd>
        <kwd>guessing game</kwd>
        <kwd>k-beauty contest</kwd>
        <kwd>active learning</kwd>
        <kwd>R</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>Introduction</title>
      <p>A key element of strategic thinking is to include into consideration what other agents
do. Agent here is a person, who can make decisions and his/her actions have influence
on the outcome. Naturally, person cannot predict with 100% what will others do, so it
is important to include into model beliefs about other person thinking and update them
during the game. Also, if we can’t know what other player think, we can understand
what is his/her best course of action. This is the main research topic of game theory.</p>
      <p>
        All this makes decision making very interesting problem to investigate. In this work
we will apply game theory to analyze such problems. Game theory provides
mathematical base for understanding strategic interaction of rational players. There is
important note about rationality, we should make. As Robert J. Aumann formulate in
his famous paper [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], game theory operates with “homo rational”, ideal decision maker,
who is able to define his/her utility as a function and capable of computing best strategy
to maximize it. This is the main setup of game theory and one of major lines of criticism.
      </p>
      <p>In reality, of course, people are not purely rational in game theory sense. They often do
not want to concentrate on a given situation to search for best decision or simply do not
have enough time or capabilities for this. Sometimes they just copycat behavior of
others or use some cultural codes to make strange decisions. Also (as we see from the
experiments) it seems that sometimes homo sapiens make decisions with reasons, one
Copyright © 2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
can (with some liberty in formulation) label as “try and see what happens”, “make
random move and save thinking energy” and even “make stupid move to spoil game
for others”.</p>
      <p>This is rich area of research, where theoretical constructions of game theory seems
to fail to work and experimental data shows unusual patterns. However, these pattens
are persistent and usually do not depend on age, education, country and other things.</p>
      <p>During last 25 years behavioral game theory in numerous studies examines bounded
rationality (best close concept to rationality of game theory) and heuristics people use
to reason in strategic situations. For example we can note surveys of Vincent P.</p>
      <p>
        Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes and Nagore Iriberri [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] and Felix Mauersberger and
Rosemarie Nagel [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]. Also there is comprehensive description of the field of behavioral
game theory by Colin F. Camerrer [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The guessing games are notable part of research because of their simplicity for
players and easy analysis of rules from game theoretic prospective. In this paper we
present results of games played during 2018-2019 years in series of scientific popular
lectures. The audience of these lectures was quite heterogeneous, but we can distinguish
three main groups:
─ kids (strong mathematical schools, ordinary schools, alternative education schools);
─ students (bachelor and master levels);
─ mixed adults with almost any background.</p>
      <p>We propose framework of four different games, each presenting one idea or concept of
game theory. These games were introduced to people with no prior knowledge (at least
in vast majority) about the theory. From the other hand, games have simple formulation
and clear winning rules, which makes them intuitively understandable even for kids.</p>
      <p>This makes these games perfect choice to test ability of strategic thinking.
1.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>Game theory definitions</title>
        <p>We will consider games in strategic or normal form in non-cooperative setup. A
noncooperativeness here does not imply that the players do not cooperate, but it means that
any cooperation must be self-enforcing without any coordination among the players.
Strict definition is as follows.</p>
        <p>A non-cooperative game in strategic (or normal) form is a triplet
= {Ν, { } ∈Ν, { } ∈Ν}, where:
─ N is a finite set of players, i.e., Ν = {1,..., };
─ Si is the set of admissible strategies for player i;
─ ui: S→R is the utility (payoff) function for player i, with
product of the strategy sets).
=
× ... ×
(Cartesian
A game is said to be static if the players take their actions only once, independently of
each other. In some sense, a static game is a game without any notion of time, where
no player has any knowledge of the decisions taken by the other players. Even though,
in practice, the players may have made their strategic choices at different points in time,
a game would still be considered static if no player has any information on the decisions
of others. In contrast, a dynamic game is one where the players have some information
about each others’ choices and can act more than once. Summarizing, these are games
where time has a central role in the decision-making. When dealing with dynamic
games, the choices of each player are generally dependent on some available
information. There is a difference between the notion of an action and a strategy. A
strategy can be seen as a mapping from the information available to a player to the
action set of this player.</p>
        <p>Based on the assumption that all players are rational, the players try to maximize
their payoffs when responding to other players’ strategies. Generally speaking, final
result is determined by non-cooperative maximization of integrated utility. In this
regard, the most accepted solution concept for a non-cooperative game is that of a Nash
equilibrium, introduced by John F. Nash. Loosely speaking, a Nash equilibrium is a
state of a non-cooperative game where no player can improve its utility by changing its
strategy, if the other players maintain their current strategies. Formally, when dealing
with pure strategies, i.e., deterministic choices by the players, the Nash equilibrium is
defined as follows:</p>
        <p>A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) of a non-cooperative game
= {Ν, { } ∈ , { } ∈ } is a strategy profile ' ∈ such that for all ∈ Ν we have the
following:
' ,
≥
( ,
) for all
∈
.</p>
        <p>Here</p>
        <p>= ∈ ,
words, a strategy profile is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if no player has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate to another strategy, given that other players’ strategies
remain fixed.</p>
        <p>denotes the vector of strategies of all players except i. In other
1.2</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>Guessing games</title>
        <p>
          In early 1990th Rosemary Nagel starts series of experiments of guessing games,
summarized in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ]. She wasn’t the first one to invent the games, it was used in lectures
by different game theory researchers (for example Hervé Moulin [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
          ]). But her
experiments were first experimental try to investigate the hidden patterns in the
guessing game. Later, Teck-Hua Ho, Colin Camerer and Keith Weigelt [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
          ] gave the
name “p-beauty contest” inspired by Keynes comparison of stock market instruments
and newspaper beauty contests. This is interesting quote, so lets give it here:
“To change the metaphor slightly, professional investment may be likened to those
newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice
most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; It is
not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest,
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached
the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion
expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the
fourth, fifth and higher degrees.” (John Maynard Keynes (1936) “The General Theory
of Employment, Interest and Money”, Chapter 12.V).
        </p>
        <p>The beauty contest game has become important tool to measure “depth of reasoning”
of group of people using simple abstract rules. Now there are variety of rules and
experiments presented in papers, so lets only mention some of them.
2</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Experiments setup</title>
      <p>The setup is closer to reality then to laboratory and this is the point of this research. All
games were played under following conditions:
1. Game were played during the lecture about the game theory. Participants were asked
not to comment or discuss their choice until they submit it. However, this rule wasn’t
enforced, so usually they have this possibility if wanted;
2. Participants were not rewarded for win. The winner was announced, but no more;
3. During some early games we use pieces of paper, later we switch to google
spreadsheets. The last tool has possibility to make multiple submission (with
different names), but total number of submissions allows to control that.
The aim of this setup was to free participants to explore the rules and give them
flexibility to make decision in uncertain environment. We think it is closer to real life
learning without immediate rewards then laboratory experiments. Naturally, this setup
has strong and weak sides. Let’s summarize both.</p>
      <p>The strong sides are:
1. This setup allows to measure how people make decisions in “almost real”
circumstances and understand the (possible) difference with laboratory experiments.
2. These games are part of integrated approach to active learning, when games are
mixed with explanations about concepts of game theory (rationality, expected
payoff, Nash equilibrium etc), and they allow participants to combine experience
with theory;
3. Freedom and responsibility. The rules doesn’t regulate manipulations with
conditions. So, this setup allows (indirectly) to measure how players cheat with rules
or spend their time to solve the task.</p>
      <p>Weak sides are:
1. Some percentage of players make “garbage” decisions. For example, choose
obviously worse choice just to spoil efforts for others;
2. Kids has (and often use) possibility to talk out decision with the neighbors;
3. Sometimes participants (especially kids) lost concentration and didn’t think about
the game but made random choice or just didn't make move at all;
4. Even for simplest rules, sometimes participants failed to understand the game first
time. We suppose it is due to conditions of lecture with (usually) 30-40 persons
around.</p>
      <p>Probably these weaknesses are inevitable in realistic scenarios. We claim that even if
experiments are not in “pure” laboratory conditions, they reveal interesting behavior
and are worth to introduce in this paper.
2.1</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Rules of games</title>
        <p>All games have the same preamble: Participants are asked to guess integer number in
range 1 – 100, margins included. Note, that many setups, investigated in references, use
numbers starting with 0. But the difference is small.</p>
        <p>To provide quick choice calculation we have used QR code with link to Google
Forms, where participants input their number. All answers were anonymous (players
indicate nicknames to announce the winners, but then all records were anonymized).
The winning condition is specific for every game.
1. p-beauty contest. The winning number is the closest to 2/3 of average.
2. Two equilibrium game. The winning number is the furthest from the average.
3. Coordination with assurance. The winning number is the number, chosen by
plurality. In case of tie lower number wins.
4. No equlibrium game. The winning number is the smallest unique.
All these games are well-known in game theory. Let’s briefly summarize them. First
game is dominance-solvable game. Strategy “to name numbers bigger than 66” is
dominated, since it is worse than any other. So rational player will not play it and
everybody knows that. Then second step is to eliminate all numbers higher than 44 and
so on. At the end rational players should play 1 and all win. In our setup we go further
than just give players learn from observation. After first round we explain in detail what
is Nash equilibrium and how it affects the strategies. After this explanation all
participants actually knew that choosing 1 is the equilibrium option, when everyone
wins. We supposed, that this should help to improve strategies in next round, but it is
not.</p>
        <p>Second game is about mixed strategies. Easy to show that if you want to choose
number smaller then 50 – best way is to choose 1, since all other choices are dominated.
And if you want to choose number bigger then 50 – best idea is to choose 100. Also, it
is meaningful to choose 50 – it almost never wins. So, if many players will choose 1 –
you should choose 100 and vice versa. In this game the best way to play is literally drop
a coin and choose 1 or 100.</p>
        <p>
          Third game has many equilibriums, basically every number can be winning. But to
coordinate players must find some focal points (Thomas C. Schelling [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]). Natural focal
point (but not only one!) is the smallest number since smaller number wins in case of
tie. This slim formulation allows nevertheless make successful coordination in almost
all experiments.
        </p>
        <p>Finally, last game is in a dark water. As far as we know there is no equilibrium or
rational strategy to play it. So sometimes very strange numbers are winners here.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Results and data analysis</title>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>First game</title>
        <p>First game results are given in the Table 1.</p>
        <p>Pool of players
Alternative humanitarian school
Alternative mathematical school
Adults
Alternative humanitarian school
Adult (Facebook online)
Ordinary high school
Mathematical school 1
Mathematical school 2
Mathematical school 3
Mathematical school 4
Ordinary school
Adults (conference on data
science)
IASA KPI (BSc)
NAUKMA (MSc)</p>
        <p>
          Almost all winning numbers are fall (roughly) in the experimental margins, obtained
in Rosemary Nagel work [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ]. With winning number no bigger than 36 and not smaller
than 18 in first round. Two exceptions in our experiments were Facebook on-line test
(15.32), when players can read information about the game in, for example, Wikipedia.
And other is alternative humanitarian school (66.69), which seems didn’t got the rules
from the first time.
        </p>
        <p>Using R statistical visualization tool, we can analyze in details how players from
different types change their decisions between first and second round (Figure 1).</p>
        <p>
          Interesting metric is the percent of “irrational choices” – choices that can’t win in
(almost) any case. Let’s explain, imagine that all players will choose 100. It is
impossible from practice but not forbidden. In this case everybody wins, but if only one
player will deviate to smaller number – he/her will win and others will lose. So, playing
numbers bigger than 66 is not rational, unless you don’t want to win. And here we come
to important point, in all previous experiments this metric drops in second round and
usually is very low (like less than 5%) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]. But in our case, there are experiments where
this metric become higher or changes very slightly. And initially values are much higher
than expected. So here we should include factor of special behavior, we can call it “let’s
show this lector how we can cheat his test!”. What is more interesting – this behavior
more clear in case of adult then kids.
        </p>
        <p>It is also interesting to see distribution of choices for different types of groups. We
can summarize choices on the histograms (Figure 2).</p>
        <p>
          Another metric [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ] is how much winning choice in second round is smaller than in
first. Due to concept of multi-level reasoning, every player in this game trying to its
best to win but can’t do all steps to winning idea. So, there are players, who just fight
with nature. They think – let’s assume all players chose numbers in random, then 50
will be average and 33 will be winning choice. It is first level reasoning. Then they try
to estimate how many players chose 33, and calculate that best response for it will be
22 (of course we should also include those who failed to do first step and make some
random choice) and so on. Based on result of first round and, in fact, explanation about
the Nash equilibrium, players must know that it is better to choose much lower
numbers. But graph shows that decrease is quite moderate. Only students show good
performance in this matter. And tech school shows increase in winning number in
second round! (Figure 3)
In second game the key point is to understand that almost all strategies are dominated.
The results are presented on Figure 4. and we can see that average can be bigger or
smaller than 50, and accordingly winning choice will be 1 or 100. It is worth to note,
that popular nature of these experiments and freedom to participate make the data
gathering not easy. For example, many participants just didn’t take any decision in
second game. Results summarized in next table.
        </p>
        <p>This is remarkable result, players without prior communications choose to almost
perfect mixed equilibrium: almost the same percentage choose 1 and 100. This is even
more striking taking into account no prior knowledge about mixed strategies and mixed
equilibrium, kids play it intuitively and without any communication.
3.3</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Third game</title>
        <p>Third game is simpler than first two, it is coordination game where players should
coordinate without a word. And, as predicted by Thomas Shelling, they usually do.
Date presented on Figure 5 shows that 1 is natural coordination point, with one
exception – Tech school (id = 1 here) decided that it would be funny to choose number
69 (it was made without singe word). Probably, it is the age (11th grade) here to blame.
Also, we can note attempt to coordinate around 7, 50 and 100.
Here we just present the resulting histogram for each group and the winning numbers
were: 12, 2, 4, 20 (Figure 6). Since no equilibrium here was theoretically found, we can
only gather data at this stage and formulate hypothesis to found one.</p>
        <p>
          All experimental data and R file for graphs can be accessed in open repository [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ].
5
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>In this paper we have presented approach to make experimental game theory work for
learning in educational process and be a research tool at the same time. Our result show
classical pattern in decision making – actually every group behave in almost the same
way dealing with unknown game. Some tried to deviate for unusual actions (like
choosing 100 or choosing 69), and this is interesting point of difference with more
“laboratory” setup of existing research. The main findings of the paper are following:
1. To learn the rules, you need to break them. Participants have chosen obviously not
winning moves (&gt; 66) partly because of new situation and trouble with
understanding the rules. But high percent of such choices was present in second
round also, when players knew exactly what is going on. This effect was especially
notable in the cases of high school and adults and almost zero in case of special math
schools and kids below 9th grade. We can formulate hypothesis that high school is
the age of experimentation when children discover new things and do not afraid to
do so.
2. If we considered winning number as decision of a group, we can see that group
learning fast and steady. Even if some outliers choose 100, mean still declines with
every round. It seems that there is unspoken competition between players that leads
to improvement in aggregated decision even if no prize is on stake. Actually, it is
plausible scenario when all participants choose higher numbers. But this didn’t
happen in any experiment. The closest case – Tech school, when bunch of pupils
(possible coordinating) switch to 100 still only managed to keep mean on the same
level.
3. In second game the surprising result is that players use mixed strategies very well. It
is known (from experiments of Colin Camerer) that chimpanzee can find mixed
equilibrium faster and better than humans. It seems that concept of mixed strategies
is very intuitive and natural. But still in quite unfamiliar game players made almost
equal number of 1 and 100, so each player unconsciously randomized his own
choice.
4. In third game players coordinates to 1, as expected, because of condition that from
numbers with equal choices – lesser wins. Also, we can note attempts of coordination
around 7, 50 and 100. What is interesting is that in practice the condition was never
applied – majority chooses 1 and that’s it. If we decrease the numbers range to 1-10,
other numbers have chance to win (5 or 7 for example). So, this is unexpected
result – increasing of number of choices leads to bigger uncertainty when players
trying to find slightest hint what to do, and this is condition of “lesser wins”. When
players apply this condition to big area, they probably think – “1 is perfect choice,
and other will think in that way also, this increase chances of winning”.
The results have multiple applications:
─ to provide kids with first-hand experience about strategic interactions and explain
their decisions;
─ to demonstrate how game theory experiments can be used in educational process;
─ to understand difference in decision making among groups;
─ to compare results with classical experiments and replicate them in modern</p>
      <p>Ukrainian education system.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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