=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2742/short1
|storemode=property
|title=A Philosophical Approach for a Human-centered Explainable AI
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2742/short1.pdf
|volume=Vol-2742
|authors=Luca Capone,Marta Bertolaso
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/aiia/CaponeB20
}}
==A Philosophical Approach for a Human-centered Explainable AI==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2742/short1.pdf
A Philosophical Approach for a Human-centered
Explainable AI1
Luca Capone1 and Marta Bertolaso2
1 University Campus Bio-Medico of Rome, RM, 00128, Italy.
2 University Campus Bio-Medico of Rome, RM, 00128, Italy.
l.capone@unicampus.it
m.bertolaso@unicampus.it
Abstract. Requests for technical specifications on the notion of explainability
of AI are urgent, although the definitions proposed are sometimes confusing. It
is clear from the available literature that it is not easy to provide explicit, dis-
crete and general criteria according to which an algorithm can be considered
explainable, especially regarding the issue of trust in the human-machine rela-
tionship. The question of black boxes has turned out to be less obvious than we
initially thought.
In this position paper, we will propose a critical analysis of two approaches to
Explainable AI, a technically-oriented one and a human centered model. The
aim is to highlight the epistemological gaps underlying these proposals.
Through a philosophical approach, a new starting point for Explainable AI re-
lated studies will be handed out, which will eventually be able to hold together
the technical limits set by algorithms and the instances of a human-centric ap-
proach.
Keywords: XAI, Black-Box, Philosophy of Technology.
1 Introduction
In the last thirty years, digital technologies have held a leading position in the race to
automation, where artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms are now
taking over. These tools have been used in the most disparate fields, in scientific re-
search [2], hoping to be able to discover causal links starting from correlations; in
logistics and in the administration of companies [11], up to more everyday scenarios
that impact increasingly larger segments of the population. We find algorithms em-
ployed in the medical, jurisprudential and economic fields [16], all these uses have
raised concerns about the reliability of the systems in their relationship with users.
The problems unfolded by the uses of AI in these fields are of a pragmatic kind,
about the correct functioning of these technologies and the possibility of detecting
potential errors, of a legal nature, regarding the responsibility of decision-makers who
1 Copyright ©️2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons Li-
cense Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
rely on these systems, and of an ethical one, concerning the possible discrimination
that these technologies could produce. In the wake of these questions, a research
strand dedicated to explainable AI (XAI) has been developed, which deals with meth-
ods and procedures aimed at explaining, examining and justifying the work of artifi-
cial intelligence systems.
In this position paper, although adhering to Miller's minimum XAI definition of
“explanatory agent revealing underlying causes to its or another agent's decision mak-
ing” [12], we will depart from his empirical approach and will analyze the theoretical
assumptions that have informed the various ramifications of this field of studies.
Throughout the available literature on the subject, two different approaches to the
problem can be immediately identified, corresponding to the two sides of the issue.
The first one, which could be defined as the technical approach, focuses mainly on
algorithms and the requirements which allow them to be defined as explainable (in-
terpretable, transparent). The second one, on the other hand, the human-based ap-
proach, takes on the question of the human-machine relationship. Although in both
approaches there is some attention to the clarification of the term explaination, the
human centered one focuses more on the way users approach systems, their way of
rationalizing outputs and interpreting the information provided by machines. Both
methods, in their partiality, highlight important sides of the problem, but more inter-
estingly, they are united by a common demand for terminological clarity. According
to these studies, requests for technical specifications on the notion of explainability of
AI are urgent, although the definitions proposed are sometimes confusing.
The methodologies adopted are very heterogeneous, there are those who try to out-
line a taxonomy for the terms under examination [1], some try to formulate a tech-
nical definition related to precise requirements that the algorithms should meet [14],
others propose an explaination model based on conversational [15] or cognitive [3]
structures. It is clear from the scientific literature that it is not easy to provide explicit,
discrete and general criteria according to which an algorithm can be considered “ex-
plainable”, especially with regards to the issue of trust in the human-machine relation-
ship [7]. The question of black boxes has turned out to be less obvious than we initial-
ly thought.
This work’s focus will be the highlighting of the conceptual biases underlying the
two aforementioned approaches through a critical and philosophical analysis. Specifi-
cally, two biases underlying the methods of explaination examined will be analyzed.
On the one hand there is the illusion that a term belonging to ordinary language might
have a unique technical definition, a regularity of use which, however, does not be-
long to it. This prejudice is closely linked to a second mentalist misconstruction, the
idea that behind our common speech, behind the terms we use to describe our behav-
iors, mental processes are hidden, in a one-to-one relationship with our behavior.
Therefore, coherently to this, in order to explain an algorithm one should look into it.
Interestingly, this is the same conceptual error behind the GOFAI (good-old-
fashioned artificial intelligence) [4]. To clarify these prejudices, these dominant met-
aphors [6] within the XAI debate, will serve to clear the ground for future research on
the subject.
2 A Technical Definition for XAI
It is possible to imagine the strand of works in XAI as an imaginary line at the ex-
tremes of which there are, on the one hand, the human-centered approach and on the
other the technical approach. In this section we will deal with the latter.
Although this is a mere descriptive expedient, and there are no studies that com-
pletely ignore the opposite side of their point of view, we can still exemplify the tech-
nical approach to the problem of explainable AI based on some characteristic fea-
tures:
• The concern for a unique and shared definition of terms (explaination, interpre-
tation, transparency).
• The subdivision of terms into taxonomies that show precise similarities and dif-
ferences.
• The concern about the clarification of precise technical characteristics that may
be valid as requirements to declare a model as transparent, an algorithm as explaina-
ble, a decision-making assistance system as interpretable.
These three factors are obviously interlinked and try to answer to the problem of
interpretability according to a coherent reasoning, which we could reformulate in this
way: to address the problem of the intelligibility of the work of algorithms it is neces-
sary, first of all, to define what we mean by the term explaination. Once we have de-
fined what we mean by explaination and specifically, explicability of an algorithm,
we will have to list the characteristics that it must have, or the conditions under which
an algorithm can be defined explainable, or even the procedures by which it can be
made so. Although at first glance it may seem a reasonable program, the literature has
already raised several critical issues in this regard, which we list below.
The heterogeneous composition of the users population makes the suggested ex-
plainations excessively standardized. Specifically, the risk is that technicians are de-
signing explainations that work for them, but not for those who will have to use these
technologies and even less for those who will simply be subject to them [13]. A fur-
ther criticism is that this kind of solutions would lose sight of the socially situated
nature of these tools, providing models of explainations designed for ideal situations
[7], with the risk of losing contact with the real world.
Although it might be useful to go into detail on each of the previous criticisms, and
many others not reported here, the current goal of this article is to critically analyze
this approach, highlighting its epistemological gaps. The objection, from this point of
view, is that this approach is based on an incorrect terminological assumption about
the status of the term explaination. It is necessary to reflexively explore this concept
and its place within the language to clarify this misunderstanding. Among the various
definitions proposed in the examined papers, formulated from scratch or cited by
authoritative dictionaries [14], it is possible to see how the term explaination is almost
always referred to a description [3], it has a discursive character [15] and, in the end,
could be described as the exposition of a series of information [9]. The problem here
is of a linguistic nature.
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein, a famous philosopher of
language, devotes several pages to the question of explaination and its pragmatic and
conversational character [17].
“§87. […] One might say: an explanation serves to remove or to avert a misunder-
standing – one, that is, that would occur but for the explanation; not every one that I
can imagine.” And shortly after, “§109. […] We must do away with all explanation,
and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to
say, its purpose, from the philosophical problems. There are, of course, not empirical
problems; they are solved rather, by looking into the working of our language, and
that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in despite of an urge to
misunderstand them.” [17].
What Wittgenstein proposes is not a hymn to relativism, but an honest acknowl-
edgement of the descriptive and situational nature of what constitutes an explaination.
It is possible to imagine that in certain circumstances, having to explain why some
products are suggested to me instead of others, it will be enough to indicate some
information about my past purchases. While, to understand why I was refused a loan,
it will require much more data, and sometimes more or less sophisticated technical
knowledge. In both cases, the term explaination does not need a univocal definition,
but performs its normal function despite its intrinsic vagueness, as if it was a conver-
sation between human beings. Whether it is about interacting with another human
being or with a machine, these explainations will amount to nothing more than de-
scriptions, they are basically lists of facts that become explainations to the extent that
users know what to do with them. It is unthinkable to have a theory of explaination
[7] in the same way as we have a theory for physics. It is possible to have approaches
to explaination depending on the problem to be clarified, the level of abstraction
needed [8] and the target of the explaination.
The technical approach criticized here is, nonetheless, trying to answer to legiti-
mate needs. On the one hand, we have the algorithms, which we could more precisely
define as parametric functions, which can be represented as computational graphs in
the case of neural networks. On the other hand, we have end-users who may have no
idea of what a parametric function is, and how difficult it is to get an explaination out
of it. The insistence of the technicians for a correct definition of the term explaination
can be seen as a reasonable response to this tension. This leads to the next section and
the need to consider the human counterpart of the problem.
3 The Human-centered Approach
As illustrated in the previous chapter, human centered approach to XAI criticizes the
technical one for being too monolithic with regards to the problem of explaination,
both on the issue of the terminological definition and on the assumptions of the hu-
man machine relationship. On the other hand, what is proposed is a more socially
situated solution [6], which takes into account the way in which users approach ma-
chines and their interest in understanding the way algorithms work [1], their ratio.
In short, if a definition of a general explaination to be applied to algorithms was
previously sought, now terminology issues are left (partially) aside, to look for the
substance of this explaination directly within the algorithms, in their structure and
their alleged internal mechanisms, or trying to extrapolate it post hoc, from their out-
puts. In the rest of the chapter how this reiterates a mentalist prejudice and how this
has cost dearly in the early days of AI research will be illustrated [5].
The prejudice lies in believing that the internal operations of the algorithm can be
translated into satisfactory causal explainations, or that through the outputs we can
trace back to a theory of which the system would be the repository. In short, it is a
matter of reducing the problem of the explaination to a mere question of convertibil-
ity. But even assuming that this is possible, is this really what an explaination
amounts to? Nobody would explain his own behavior by giving a causal account of
his internal states, this is not what we are looking for in an explaination. The differ-
ence here lies between a causal explaination and a justification [9].
It is worth noting two things: the first is that if we require a theory that explains the
ratio according to which some phenomena can be predicted, it makes no sense to look
for it within the algorithms, since they are mostly used in contexts where it is not
possible to have a theory, but only a probabilistic prediction. The second is that, the
type of intrinsic transparency that we would like to ascribe to these systems, has no
role in the relationship between human beings, where the explainations (justifications)
are always and only post hoc. Confirming indeed Wittgenstein's quotation, on the fact
that every explaination can be better framed as a description. In this sense, individuals
are extremely opaque.
In conclusion, even if it was possible to look into one of these systems and repre-
sent their model graphically, it is not immediately clear how the n-dimensional repre-
sentation of a parametric function can help us to understand how our algorithm ar-
rived at a certain prediction or classification. However, if we consider Miller’s idea
that taking the way in which individuals provide explainations as a model might be
used inductively, we have not yet come to terms with the fact that providing a post
hoc explaination of an algorithm, interpreting the ratio of its predictions, is a herme-
neutical exercise that still needs legitimization.
4 Conclusions
The term explaination, or rather the practice of explaining, is one of what the above-
mentioned philosopher calls language games. These are original human practices,
which cannot be further reduced and are inextricable from the cultural, social, linguis-
tic and pragmatic fabric of which they are made up. If we look for a definition of
explaination, we must look at the way this word is used within the language, where it
has its home. Keeping these ordinary practices in mind, it will then be possible, in
accordance with the reference context, to formulate specific solutions to explain the
algorithms' activities. There will be cases in which to make an algorithm actually
transparent will be possible, and the parameters taken under consideration by the sys-
tem will be available for observation. In other instances, this will not be possible, and
we should rely on a post hoc explaination able to convince us of the algorithm's work.
But we should always recognize the fact that in both cases we are dealing with de-
scriptions, whether they are textual or graphic, in natural language or in code. Once
these premises have been taken into consideration, it becomes possible to formulate
specific explaination procedures and justification criteria, related to specific sectors.
Similarly, professional figures can be imagined, experts in a specific field, who can
provide post hoc justifications if necessary. As previously seen, there are no general
solutions, able to satisfy every need. Technologies will have to adjust to the proce-
dures and contingencies of the domain in which they operate, trying to support the
decision, without replacing it or hindering it.
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