The COVID-19 outbreak had a swift and severe impact on our lives, and a subtle transformation is affecting Democracy as we are used to knowing it. In this paper I argue that the “Pandemic Society” we are now experiencing magnifies a dilemma already evident in the recent evolution of digital government and governance: securing citizens' privacy or delivering better services - now including the protection of personal health. In this scenario, while human interactions are being permanently modified by the mediation of technologies, and in particular the accelerated adoption of Artificial Intelligence, a fundamental question to be addressed is how to ensure digital resilience and collective well-being while safeguarding liberal democracy and individual rights. Finding an answer to this challenge requires innovating the democratic settings and functioning of global governance arrangements in the digital age. Yet too little is known about the chances and the conditions for AI to become supportive of the needed quantity and quality of democratic innovation in the forthcoming decades. I thus elaborate on the quest for redesigning institutional frameworks to rethink and innovate our democratic systems and instruments for deliberation, where the AI phenomenon - under wide scrutiny now also at policy and public service levels becomes crucial. I conclude suggesting directions for further research and new avenues for policy design and governance in the age of digital transformation.
In recent decades, reflecting on major challenges to representative institutions has let
emerge a breeding ground for a more informed look into the future of democratic
governance [
The umbrella term “democratic innovations” encompasses a range of new
mechanisms aimed at expanding citizens’ participation in political decision‐making [2; 3].
These traditionally include town hall meetings, citizens’ assemblies, deliberative polls,
participatory budgeting, crowdsourcing, online petitioning, consultations and forums.
Although they are often more government‐driven rather than citizen‐initiated, they aim
to involve interactions with citizens at the same time as they provide input to
institutional processes [
However, with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic many of us are facing new
challenges that may have a broader influence on the future of humanity. Some of their
implications are already - and maybe too early - labelled “the new normal” for our
democratic systems. Democracy as we know it, is at risk of being overcome by a
longlasting and enduring status of “anxiety, panic and dread, where faith and confidence
clash and collide in a dynamic and uncertain social milieu”, [
In this scenario, not only global value chains, logistics and transport networks, office and factory work, but also individual freedoms are deeply restructured and even human rights may be “traded” with collective needs. The spread of tracing and tracking technologies facilitated by real-time or ex post surveillance of citizens and communities as a result of AI, Internet of Things (IoT), and other “new” technological paradigms, is already starting to create tensions between the defenders of civil liberties and the new “Digital Leviathan” State in continuous emergency to anticipate new possible risks.
Within this context, the key question becomes how to ensure digital resilience and collective well-being while safeguarding liberal democracy and individual rights?
In this respect it is worth nothing that the term resilience has emerged as a popular
construct in several disciplines, and it can be defined as “the ability to face shocks and
persistent structural changes in such a way that societal well-being is preserved,
without compromising the heritage for future generations” [
Here, however, I refer to the concept of digital resilience, borrowing the concept
from the field of cyber-security and expanding it. In a constantly evolving digital
environment, in fact, “organizations must be able to move quickly and seamlessly to adopt
new digital technology solutions and then to recover, rebound and move forward if
things go wrong” [
We are embedded in an increasingly digital world, but many organizations – both public and private - are still unaware of the extent to which they rely on digital technology and the risks that come with it.
The fallout of the COVID-19 crisis is showing - more than ever - the importance of
digital technologies to maintain a path of transformation compatible with sustainability
and shared prosperity. This is in line with the ambitious goals set out by the new Digital
Strategy for Europe [
In the new global “Pandemic Society” that is emerging after the crisis, the EU cannot
fail again on the promise of ensuring “A New Start for Europe” [
Against this background, in this paper I present and discuss the main elements and
outcomes of a dedicated foresight exercise at the horizon 2040 [
As a result of the ongoing pandemic, the massive cultural shift to online learning and distance working, coupled with the increase of eCommerce and multimedia offerings for home entertainment, with related threats and further innovation required in shopping, logistics and service fruition, are expected to give advent to new mechanisms of social connection, guaranteeing social distancing and health prevention through effective prediction of risks and monitoring of citizens behaviours.
This will imply the need to rethink how services are designed and delivered, the way data is shared and managed, and the manner algorithmic decision-making is implemented, putting at odds the very principles of privacy, data protection and human rights and their trade-off with health security, economic productivity and social cohesion.
As a matter of fact, the rush to understand the new socio-economic contexts created
by the wide adoption of AI is justified by its far-ranging consequences, spanning across
almost every walk of life - from labour markets [
Whether such multiple role is even possible has been a matter of long lasting debate, further accelerated by the evolving dynamics influenced by the rapid introduction and use of AI systems and tools in most public and private sectors’ activities, with a push to adopt AI as it is good for society, despite the possible risks and threats it entails.
The true ambiguity here lies in the fact that governing “by AI” would imply that human decision-makers should surrender to algorithms’ “superhuman capacities”, while, governing “with AI” means that humans should remain in the classical situation of using and controlling technologies that reinforce our capacity, through a process that requires human supervision. For this reason, what type of governance “of AI” is adopted, becomes crucial and not so straightforward to determine upfront.
In this respect, the key challenge stems from the algorithms’ intrinsic properties,
which make them distinct from other ICT solutions, long embraced by governments
and private sector organizations: vast computing power, incompatible with human
cognitive capabilities; “learning” capacities, or autonomous knowledge creation happening
without proper supervision; profiling abilities, of categorizing traits and behaviours;
and a nudging – compliance incentivizing – attitude: all these elements create
externalities that rule-based programming lacks [
It is thus crucial to understand how to use and govern algorithms, data and global
digital infrastructures in a pandemic world – that seems to be here to stay – while
safeguarding our collective social and economic prosperity and guarantee individual rights
and democratic values. Two broad considerations that cut across the debate on digital
transformation emerge here as fundamental. The first regards the concept of digital
sovereignty that has been advanced strongly by the EU [
This unsettled situation with respect to the control of data has led a number of
European policy circles to reflect on digital strategic autonomy and sovereignty [17; 18; 19].
As noted in a recent parliamentary brief [
From a foresight perspective, one may wonder to what extent this is a tactical or a
strategic move. In this sense, a key argument is that any attempt to regulate the current
digital transformation would stifle innovation. The opposing view is that in the face of
uncertainty, a strong regulatory approach could be applied, based on the precautionary
principle [
In this regard, a recent analysis by Floridi [
In his own words, Floridi sees the resurgence of a sort of mediaeval battle, similar
to the “Investiture Controversy”, reminding us that “whoever will win the fight for
digital sovereignty will determine the lives of all people on both sides of the digital divide,
exactly like the Investiture Controversy affected all people, no matter whether religious
or not” [
It is clear, in fact, that the issues of strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty involve a deep reflection on the whole value chain of how the data economy operates and its geo-political underpinnings.
In practice, despite the rhetoric that may often surround the concept of European Digital leadership, with implications on data protection, global competition and cybersecurity in face of big tech platforms dominance, 5G deployment rules and the danger of exporting data and importing services, the key question revolves around the need to build a systematic development of alternatives, with a citizen-centered narrative on how each click, at the end, matters, through regulatory and policy innovations that safeguard European values and democratic principles. 3
In light of what discussed above, the famous saying by Niccolò Machiavelli may well
apply to the challenges European policy makers are confronted with today as: “…there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain
in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because
the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions,
and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new” [
Within this context, it is thus instrumental taking a look at how digital transformation
of governance could evolve in light of the current debate and possible regulatory
interventions, with a specific focus on the role of the EU. To support us in this exercise, I
consider the foresight scenarios for Digital transformation of governance at the horizon
2040 elaborated as part of the prospective component of the JRC research on Exploring
Digital Government Transformation in the EU – Understanding public sector
innovation in a data-driven society (in short DigiGov) [
The proposed scenarios were defined on the basis of two main dimensions of impact: a) the digital transformation landscape, ranging from “regulated” to “unregulated”; and b) digital citizenry, ranging from “active” to “passive”.
The dimension of the digital transformation landscape shows the extent to which government is “steering” the process, rather than leaving to the market the responsibility for dealing with the ethical, societal and economic consequences of adopting technologies. The digital citizenry axis measures the extent to which individuals are actively in charge of their digital lives, especially with regard to their rights as data subjects.
The scenarios presented are set to help find appropriate policy steps towards a more effective and efficient European digital future within an evolving global context, and to contribute advancing the policy debate on the governance “with, of and by AI” and its impact on society. See Fig. 1.
While I do not discuss here the scenarios in detail, it is worth noticing that, as it is
well known to futurists, “A Scenario is a possible world… a world that does not have
to be, but may yet come to pass...” [
In this regard, it is likely that neither “leave it to the market” nor “make it a public
utility” can adequately represent the full gamut of values, economic interests and state
priorities of the EU and its Member States. Digital infrastructures, if totally
unregulated, will not automatically ensure distributed innovation and equitable economic
opportunity and growth. In the same way, interventionist regulation would not necessarily
produce the desired outcomes and might also delay innovation if not well calibrated
and implemented in a specific way to promote investments and social impact [
In view of the fact that both interventionism and laissez-faire approaches may appear
inadequate - which to some extent mirrors the juxtaposition between a precautionary
view and a cost-benefit attitude - it is more realistic to expect that government players
acting at the same time as users as well as infrastructure and service providers and
regulatory innovators, can solve the dilemma between innovation and regulation, in
collaboration with the “makers” themselves. This of course requires that appropriate
incentives and regulatory mechanisms are set-up, taking into account all the biases
potentially involved in the dynamics tensions between different institutional and
commercial interests. If successful, however, this would allow defining the governance
framework needed to spur innovation and build trust in Digital Europe in 2040 [
Against the backdrop of this debate, I argue that digital technologies can further amplify
the cross-boundary dimension of political engagement and, as far as it concerns the
European Union at least, it is the role of the European Commission, as “guardian of the
Treaties”, to guarantee the respect of freedoms and human rights for all citizens and
make sure that nation-States will follow the EU’s values and improve the well-being of
citizens. This is pivotal in a “Pandemic Society” that is further shifting to social media
and digital technologies the role of uniting citizens and the capacity to gather data,
sentiments and nudge decisions, often through malicious use and manipulation of
information [
The ability of people to organise and deliberate digitally is becoming a direct
evolution of the democratic process and must be understood at an institutional (global) level
as it may forge new forms of democratic participation and policy-making, not
necessarily linked to traditional models of representative democracy or “context-based”
politics. In this perspective, the European Union may be uniquely positioned to contribute
shaping a common approach at global level in this crucial area, asserting the EU’s
identity on the international scene and protecting the rights and interests of its citizens, while
pursuing the effectiveness of the implementation and the future evolution of the acquis
communautaire within Europe, and influencing global standard-settings [
Furthermore, citizens’ perception towards data sharing is only one of the issues to
consider in relation to AI governance of course, and it must be avoided that AI is
considered as a sort of “super-agent”, involved in everything capable to do more or less
everything. Relying on automated methods follows an all too familiar pattern:
stakeholders initially consider decision making aids trustworthy, then after observing that
errors happen they distrust even the most reliable applications. In brief, a too early
adoption of faulty applications puts the trust in the system at risk. Similarly, reliance
on voluntary best practices and self-regulation fares well, as long as no misdemeanour
is found on the side of data processors - as exemplified by the public outrage and calls
for regulation of Internet platforms that have ignored self-imposed standards, even after
the introduction of the GDPR which has forced companies processing data to conform
and introduce new handling and security practices [
The development of AI is in fact driven by the “combination of enormous amounts
of data with powerful computation and sophisticated mathematical models, that in turn
allows the development of complex algorithms which are capable to simulate human
intelligence such as problem solving and learning” [
To the contrary, what seems to be happening, is an effort driven by the narrative of
exceptionalism, whereby AI (however defined) is a phenomenon that is immune to
existing governance structures, policies and laws. A gold rush to become a rule-maker in
the field of AI governance has seen governments, international organisations, and
corporations publish many (often similar) frameworks, strategies, and guidelines. These
documents reflect a search for effective global coordination and rule-based order, yet –
for the most part – omit or override existing governance mechanisms and institutions,
as if they were completely mismatched for “the age of AI” [
With the current turn of attention towards AI governance, especially in the EU [34;
35], there have been recurrent warnings against the creation of such regulatory silos
that would favour technocratic frameworks over a comprehensive view of the effects
of data on the economy and society. Many of these warnings could be applicable to the
current setup of AI governance in fact. It is therefore important to assess existing and
emerging regulatory scenarios and tools that will gain traction in the future [
Further, it would make an enormous difference to think of AI governance as an
extension of data protection and competition regulations, acting hand in hand to reduce
harms and secure human dignity. Such effort – instead of happening in a vacuum –
would help update major existing regulations (not only the GDPR but also the
Machinery Directive and the EU Legislation on liability for instance) to make they work where
they do not: by addressing massive imbalances in power, advancing data portability and
privacy by design or securing EU wide, public digital infrastructure and related
underpinning digital content and commercial rules for its exploitation and protection [
To address such complex challenges, there is an urgent need to innovate our
institutional designs and strengthen the resilience of our social and economic systems. This
calls for better understanding the intertwined relations and policy implications of
emerging paradigms of governance “with and of” digital technologies, which are
transforming the way public and private sector organisations operate and can enhance how
services are delivered and policies are shaped, implemented and evaluated [
At the same time, as the pressures to deploy automated decision making systems in
both the private and the public sector intensify, it is crucial to examine how machine
learning and bureaucracy have both “become generalizable modes of rational ordering
based on abstraction and deriving authority from claims to neutrality and objectivity”
[
This requires a deeper investigation of how data and digital infrastructures are
developed and governed at global level, the rules underpinning and guiding algorithmic
decision making, and in what manner citizens’ engagement is structured and channelled
to generate collective wisdom and new forms of social innovation in the current
“technology-diplomacy” arena, expected to harness AI to increase wellbeing for all [
In “Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation” [
In a similar vein, we can imagine a post-COVID-19 “Pandemic Democracy” where digital technologies really empower the citizens, crafting new ways of engaging them in politics and decision making. But as this new pandemic world will evolve how digital technologies will mediate our actions and facilitate (or even automate) deliberations is by no means known or secured already. Therefore, EU level policymaking must be able to keep the pace of technological innovation, and play a prominent role in the strive to redefining global governance.
In this connection, as pointed out by Walker [
Some scholars [
The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has highlighted even more the need for governments
and EU institutions to engage with citizens and civil society, to build trust and rely on
the wealth of information and knowledge that bottom-up processes can generate,
tapping on the use of digital infrastructures, tools and applications [
In this perspective, future research should aim at studying the impact of innovative
mechanisms for engaging citizens in democratic processes moving away from
traditional policy tools, to embrace data-driven policy-making, foresight, experimental and
AI-assisted decision systems and dynamic simulation models, as ways to increase the
speed and effectiveness of policies and their social acceptance and adoption [
Therefore, from a methodological perspective, when coping with complex, but also
possibly disruptive and open-ended social dynamics, and in line with the foresight
tradition of making anticipatory systems more robust [
In other words, we need to take into account the fact that AI-based technologies provide the government with powerful tools and capacity for ‘nudging’ citizens to behave in one way or another, and this must be considered carefully from both a research and a policy perspective.
In doing so, key enabling factors and alternative regulatory governance regimes
should be explored through piloting data driven digital solutions in ‘Smart City’
environments, analysing results of specific Hackathons and large scale computational
experiments based on big-data-driven nudging techniques. These, also defined as
“hypernudge” [
The overall goal of such approach would thus be to assess both the positive and negative consequences of different data-driven and algorithmic governance models on collective behaviour and the interaction among individuals and groups, especially in the “new normality” we may be living in, in the hoped to be a post-COVID-19 world, which instead seems being permanently prolonged as a form of “Pandemic Society”.
It must be considered in fact that, even if social trust, political trust, and satisfaction with democracy are mutually dependent, the cause‐and‐effect relations between them are not perfectly symmetrical, and the links are sometimes loose and contingent, especially in times of crisis and political turmoil.
By doing so, lights could be shed on how a different way to approach policymaking
at the EU and National level, centred on democratic innovation and digital resilience
can offer important advantages to policy-makers, while ensuring liberal EU values are
respected and further promoted globally. This research may thus have an influence on
global cooperation, supporting the ambitious goal of the von der Leyen Commission of
having a “geopolitical” nature, committed to sustainable policies and to act as “the
guardian of multilateralism” [
This paper builds in part on research led by the author when he was Senior Scientist responsible for research on Digital transformation of governance and AI for the Public Sector at the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre in Seville, being also involved in other projects as a member of the Scientific Committee or Advisory Board. However, the opinions expressed here may not be regarded as stating the official position of the European Commission. A special thanks for the joint work conducted goes to Cristiano Codagnone, Egidijus Barcevicius and Maciej Kuziemski as well as Francesco Molinari and Pierre Rossel for their comments on an early draft of the text.