=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2781/invited1
|storemode=property
|title=Rethinking Democracy in the “Pandemic Society” A Journey in Search of the Governance with, of and by AI
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2781/invited1.pdf
|volume=Vol-2781
|authors=Gianluca Misuraca
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/ifdad/Misuraca20
}}
==Rethinking Democracy in the “Pandemic Society” A Journey in Search of the Governance with, of and by AI==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2781/invited1.pdf
Rethinking Democracy in the “Pandemic Society”
A journey in search of the governance with, of and by AI
Gianluca Misuraca1*[0000-0002-5406-9447]
1
Danube University, 3500, Krems, Austria
gm@donau-uni.ac.at
Abstract. The COVID-19 outbreak had a swift and severe impact on our lives,
and a subtle transformation is affecting Democracy as we are used to knowing it.
In this paper I argue that the “Pandemic Society” we are now experiencing mag-
nifies a dilemma already evident in the recent evolution of digital government
and governance: securing citizens’ privacy or delivering better services – now
including the protection of personal health. In this scenario, while human inter-
actions are being permanently modified by the mediation of technologies, and in
particular the accelerated adoption of Artificial Intelligence, a fundamental ques-
tion to be addressed is how to ensure digital resilience and collective well-being
while safeguarding liberal democracy and individual rights. Finding an answer
to this challenge requires innovating the democratic settings and functioning of
global governance arrangements in the digital age. Yet too little is known about
the chances and the conditions for AI to become supportive of the needed quan-
tity and quality of democratic innovation in the forthcoming decades. I thus elab-
orate on the quest for redesigning institutional frameworks to rethink and inno-
vate our democratic systems and instruments for deliberation, where the AI phe-
nomenon - under wide scrutiny now also at policy and public service levels –
becomes crucial. I conclude suggesting directions for further research and new
avenues for policy design and governance in the age of digital transformation.
Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Governance, Democratic Innovation, Eu-
rope; Foresight; Digital Resilience; Policy Design; Pandemic Society
1 Democratic innovation and Digital Resilience
In recent decades, reflecting on major challenges to representative institutions has let
emerge a breeding ground for a more informed look into the future of democratic gov-
ernance [1]. In response to some of these challenges, democratic innovations have been
proposed as a remedy for reviving outdated representative systems as well as for in-
creasing social and political trust, especially in the opinion-building and deliberative
stages of democratic life.
The umbrella term “democratic innovations” encompasses a range of new mecha-
nisms aimed at expanding citizens’ participation in political decision‐making [2; 3].
These traditionally include town hall meetings, citizens’ assemblies, deliberative polls,
participatory budgeting, crowdsourcing, online petitioning, consultations and forums.
Copyright © 2020 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons
License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
2
Although they are often more government‐driven rather than citizen‐initiated, they aim
to involve interactions with citizens at the same time as they provide input to institu-
tional processes [4]. Most of them particularly exploit the combination of social media
and mobile technologies, which emerged prominently in the last twenty years as a new
computing paradigm [5]. And while they all have advantages they also convey risks
that have to be anticipated and monitored, to avoid falling into a sort of “digital ideal-
ism” on one side, or on the contrary, let emerge a possible danger of “neo-luddism”.
However, with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic many of us are facing new
challenges that may have a broader influence on the future of humanity. Some of their
implications are already - and maybe too early - labelled “the new normal” for our
democratic systems. Democracy as we know it, is at risk of being overcome by a long-
lasting and enduring status of “anxiety, panic and dread, where faith and confidence
clash and collide in a dynamic and uncertain social milieu”, [6] where human interac-
tions are permanently modified by periodically prevailing sanitary pressure and the pal-
liative or track and trace capacities brought up by digital technologies [7].
In this scenario, not only global value chains, logistics and transport networks, office
and factory work, but also individual freedoms are deeply restructured and even human
rights may be “traded” with collective needs. The spread of tracing and tracking tech-
nologies facilitated by real-time or ex post surveillance of citizens and communities as
a result of AI, Internet of Things (IoT), and other “new” technological paradigms, is
already starting to create tensions between the defenders of civil liberties and the new
“Digital Leviathan” State in continuous emergency to anticipate new possible risks.
Within this context, the key question becomes how to ensure digital resilience and
collective well-being while safeguarding liberal democracy and individual rights?
In this respect it is worth nothing that the term resilience has emerged as a popular
construct in several disciplines, and it can be defined as “the ability to face shocks and
persistent structural changes in such a way that societal well-being is preserved, with-
out compromising the heritage for future generations” [8].
Here, however, I refer to the concept of digital resilience, borrowing the concept
from the field of cyber-security and expanding it. In a constantly evolving digital envi-
ronment, in fact, “organizations must be able to move quickly and seamlessly to adopt
new digital technology solutions and then to recover, rebound and move forward if
things go wrong” [9].
We are embedded in an increasingly digital world, but many organizations – both
public and private - are still unaware of the extent to which they rely on digital technol-
ogy and the risks that come with it.
The fallout of the COVID-19 crisis is showing - more than ever - the importance of
digital technologies to maintain a path of transformation compatible with sustainability
and shared prosperity. This is in line with the ambitious goals set out by the new Digital
Strategy for Europe [10], well before the COVID-19 crisis, which emphasized the need
to rethink our model of production and social welfare, in order to better preserve them
for future generations. As we head towards a digitally dependent future, the need for
digital resilience has never been greater to ensure that our society evolves in a sustain-
able manner.
3
In the new global “Pandemic Society” that is emerging after the crisis, the EU cannot
fail again on the promise of ensuring “A New Start for Europe” [11] and must revitalize
the trust relationship with citizens. This asks for new channels of expression, reflection
and opinion building, requiring a strong incitation towards innovating the democratic
settings and functioning of EU institutions and Member States.
Against this background, in this paper I present and discuss the main elements and
outcomes of a dedicated foresight exercise at the horizon 2040 [12] involving alterna-
tive scenarios for digital transformation of governance in Europe. Then I elaborate upon
different hypotheses underlying the political choices that our institutions are challenged
with in order to shape our future digital society, with a specific regard to the topic of
the “governance with, of and by” AI. These reflections will serve to highlight the need
for redesigning our institutional frameworks, to rethink and innovate our democratic
systems and instruments for enhancing collective reflection and deliberation. I conclude
by outlining directions for research and new avenues for policy design in the emerging
“Pandemic Society”.
2 European Digital sovereignty and global AI governance:
two sides of the same coin?
As a result of the ongoing pandemic, the massive cultural shift to online learning and
distance working, coupled with the increase of eCommerce and multimedia offerings
for home entertainment, with related threats and further innovation required in shop-
ping, logistics and service fruition, are expected to give advent to new mechanisms of
social connection, guaranteeing social distancing and health prevention through effec-
tive prediction of risks and monitoring of citizens behaviours.
This will imply the need to rethink how services are designed and delivered, the way
data is shared and managed, and the manner algorithmic decision-making is imple-
mented, putting at odds the very principles of privacy, data protection and human rights
and their trade-off with health security, economic productivity and social cohesion.
As a matter of fact, the rush to understand the new socio-economic contexts created
by the wide adoption of AI is justified by its far-ranging consequences, spanning across
almost every walk of life - from labour markets [13], through human rights protection
[14] to healthcare [15]. Yet, governments and policy-makers are faced by a difficult
dilemma: the obligation to protect citizens from potential algorithmic harms is at odds
with the temptation to increase the efficiency and enhance the quality of digital services
delivery. In other words – they are confronted with the challenge to govern algorithms
and related automated processes (governance of AI), while governing with algorithms
and associated computerized methods and systems (governance with and by AI).
Whether such multiple role is even possible has been a matter of long lasting debate,
further accelerated by the evolving dynamics influenced by the rapid introduction and
use of AI systems and tools in most public and private sectors’ activities, with a push
to adopt AI as it is good for society, despite the possible risks and threats it entails.
The true ambiguity here lies in the fact that governing “by AI” would imply that
human decision-makers should surrender to algorithms’ “superhuman capacities”,
4
while, governing “with AI” means that humans should remain in the classical situation
of using and controlling technologies that reinforce our capacity, through a process that
requires human supervision. For this reason, what type of governance “of AI” is
adopted, becomes crucial and not so straightforward to determine upfront.
In this respect, the key challenge stems from the algorithms’ intrinsic properties,
which make them distinct from other ICT solutions, long embraced by governments
and private sector organizations: vast computing power, incompatible with human cog-
nitive capabilities; “learning” capacities, or autonomous knowledge creation happening
without proper supervision; profiling abilities, of categorizing traits and behaviours;
and a nudging – compliance incentivizing – attitude: all these elements create external-
ities that rule-based programming lacks [16], especially when it comes to more sophis-
ticated deep-learning approaches.
It is thus crucial to understand how to use and govern algorithms, data and global
digital infrastructures in a pandemic world – that seems to be here to stay – while safe-
guarding our collective social and economic prosperity and guarantee individual rights
and democratic values. Two broad considerations that cut across the debate on digital
transformation emerge here as fundamental. The first regards the concept of digital
sovereignty that has been advanced strongly by the EU [17]. The other concerns the
contrast between a precautionary and a cost-benefit approach to AI regulation and how
we are in a position today of appraising the long-term consequences of the arbitration
that will impact our society tomorrow.
This unsettled situation with respect to the control of data has led a number of Euro-
pean policy circles to reflect on digital strategic autonomy and sovereignty [17; 18; 19].
As noted in a recent parliamentary brief [20], this concept builds on the concern that,
while Europe is at the forefront in terms of research and on a par with its global com-
petitors, it nonetheless lags behind the US and China when it comes to private invest-
ment and major commercial applications. To address this concern, the new European
data strategy [21] proposes the construction of a common data framework that would
favour and support sharing of data across-EU.
From a foresight perspective, one may wonder to what extent this is a tactical or a
strategic move. In this sense, a key argument is that any attempt to regulate the current
digital transformation would stifle innovation. The opposing view is that in the face of
uncertainty, a strong regulatory approach could be applied, based on the precautionary
principle [22]. Although reasonable a priori, the precautionary approach is usually con-
tested on the ground that, if regulation is supported by the principle of the worst sce-
nario, then a lack of regulation can be defended by the same argument when the conse-
quences of strict regulations are potentially very negative. Precautionary regulation
runs the risk of becoming the source for a “law of fear” approach [23].
In this regard, a recent analysis by Floridi [24] opens further questions to the debate.
While it is acknowledged that the first two decades of this century have seen a sort of
de facto digital corporate sovereignty, and – in his view - the EU General Data Protec-
tion Regulation (GDPR) seems paving the way for a European digital data sovereignty,
the jury is still out with respect to AI and 5G governance, where he in fact advocates
for the establishment of a - de jure and not only de facto - supranational digital sover-
eignty mechanism at the EU level.
5
In his own words, Floridi sees the resurgence of a sort of mediaeval battle, similar
to the “Investiture Controversy”, reminding us that “whoever will win the fight for dig-
ital sovereignty will determine the lives of all people on both sides of the digital divide,
exactly like the Investiture Controversy affected all people, no matter whether religious
or not” [24].
It is clear, in fact, that the issues of strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty
involve a deep reflection on the whole value chain of how the data economy operates
and its geo-political underpinnings.
In practice, despite the rhetoric that may often surround the concept of European
Digital leadership, with implications on data protection, global competition and cyber-
security in face of big tech platforms dominance, 5G deployment rules and the danger
of exporting data and importing services, the key question revolves around the need to
build a systematic development of alternatives, with a citizen-centered narrative on how
each click, at the end, matters, through regulatory and policy innovations that safeguard
European values and democratic principles.
3 Back to the future: Envisioning the digital
transformation of governance in 2040
In light of what discussed above, the famous saying by Niccolò Machiavelli may well
apply to the challenges European policy makers are confronted with today as: “…there
is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain
in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because
the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions,
and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new” [25].
Within this context, it is thus instrumental taking a look at how digital transformation
of governance could evolve in light of the current debate and possible regulatory inter-
ventions, with a specific focus on the role of the EU. To support us in this exercise, I
consider the foresight scenarios for Digital transformation of governance at the horizon
2040 elaborated as part of the prospective component of the JRC research on Exploring
Digital Government Transformation in the EU – Understanding public sector innova-
tion in a data-driven society (in short DigiGov) [12].
The proposed scenarios were defined on the basis of two main dimensions of impact:
a) the digital transformation landscape, ranging from “regulated” to “unregulated”; and
b) digital citizenry, ranging from “active” to “passive”.
The dimension of the digital transformation landscape shows the extent to which
government is “steering” the process, rather than leaving to the market the responsibil-
ity for dealing with the ethical, societal and economic consequences of adopting tech-
nologies. The digital citizenry axis measures the extent to which individuals are actively
in charge of their digital lives, especially with regard to their rights as data subjects.
The scenarios presented are set to help find appropriate policy steps towards a more
effective and efficient European digital future within an evolving global context, and
to contribute advancing the policy debate on the governance “with, of and by AI” and
its impact on society. See Fig. 1.
6
Fig. 1. Scenarios for Digital transformation of governance 2040 [12]
While I do not discuss here the scenarios in detail, it is worth noticing that, as it is
well known to futurists, “A Scenario is a possible world… a world that does not have
to be, but may yet come to pass...” [26]. This means that the future will most probably
be characterized by a mix, combining elements from each scenario, the kind of mixture
depending on policy decisions that will be taken today, reflecting the current cultural
and governance value systems.
In this regard, it is likely that neither “leave it to the market” nor “make it a public
utility” can adequately represent the full gamut of values, economic interests and state
priorities of the EU and its Member States. Digital infrastructures, if totally unregu-
lated, will not automatically ensure distributed innovation and equitable economic op-
portunity and growth. In the same way, interventionist regulation would not necessarily
produce the desired outcomes and might also delay innovation if not well calibrated
and implemented in a specific way to promote investments and social impact [12].
7
In view of the fact that both interventionism and laissez-faire approaches may appear
inadequate - which to some extent mirrors the juxtaposition between a precautionary
view and a cost-benefit attitude - it is more realistic to expect that government players
acting at the same time as users as well as infrastructure and service providers and reg-
ulatory innovators, can solve the dilemma between innovation and regulation, in col-
laboration with the “makers” themselves. This of course requires that appropriate in-
centives and regulatory mechanisms are set-up, taking into account all the biases po-
tentially involved in the dynamics tensions between different institutional and commer-
cial interests. If successful, however, this would allow defining the governance frame-
work needed to spur innovation and build trust in Digital Europe in 2040 [12].
4 Digital Governance innovation and institutional re-
design in the “Pandemic Society”
Against the backdrop of this debate, I argue that digital technologies can further amplify
the cross-boundary dimension of political engagement and, as far as it concerns the
European Union at least, it is the role of the European Commission, as “guardian of the
Treaties”, to guarantee the respect of freedoms and human rights for all citizens and
make sure that nation-States will follow the EU’s values and improve the well-being of
citizens. This is pivotal in a “Pandemic Society” that is further shifting to social media
and digital technologies the role of uniting citizens and the capacity to gather data, sen-
timents and nudge decisions, often through malicious use and manipulation of infor-
mation [27].
The ability of people to organise and deliberate digitally is becoming a direct evolu-
tion of the democratic process and must be understood at an institutional (global) level
as it may forge new forms of democratic participation and policy-making, not neces-
sarily linked to traditional models of representative democracy or “context-based” pol-
itics. In this perspective, the European Union may be uniquely positioned to contribute
shaping a common approach at global level in this crucial area, asserting the EU’s iden-
tity on the international scene and protecting the rights and interests of its citizens, while
pursuing the effectiveness of the implementation and the future evolution of the acquis
communautaire within Europe, and influencing global standard-settings [28], in line
with the Commission’s priorities for “A new push for European democracy” and “A
Europe fit for the Digital Age” [29]. Nevertheless, a dilemma naturally emerges be-
tween securing citizens’ privacy and maximizing the efficiency of service delivery. As
a rule of thumb, it should be borne in mind that citizens tend to be more likely to accept
the necessity of data sharing, if there is a public benefit (however defined) clearly per-
ceived (and some level of perceptible control by trustable expert sources). However,
there is ample evidence that users find it difficult to turn their privacy preferences into
meaningful decisions, sacrificing long-term privacy for immediate gains [30].
Furthermore, citizens’ perception towards data sharing is only one of the issues to
consider in relation to AI governance of course, and it must be avoided that AI is con-
sidered as a sort of “super-agent”, involved in everything capable to do more or less
8
everything. Relying on automated methods follows an all too familiar pattern: stake-
holders initially consider decision making aids trustworthy, then after observing that
errors happen they distrust even the most reliable applications. In brief, a too early
adoption of faulty applications puts the trust in the system at risk. Similarly, reliance
on voluntary best practices and self-regulation fares well, as long as no misdemeanour
is found on the side of data processors - as exemplified by the public outrage and calls
for regulation of Internet platforms that have ignored self-imposed standards, even after
the introduction of the GDPR which has forced companies processing data to conform
and introduce new handling and security practices [31].
The development of AI is in fact driven by the “combination of enormous amounts
of data with powerful computation and sophisticated mathematical models, that in turn
allows the development of complex algorithms which are capable to simulate human
intelligence such as problem solving and learning” [32]. However, it is impossible to
talk about an emerging shared global AI landscape, without looking at existing data
governance regimes and practices [33]. In fact, existing data protection and AI govern-
ance landscapes seemingly have a lot in common. Landmark achievements in the field
of data protection – such as the GDPR – would not be possible without years and years
of negotiation, established fora, robust civil society advocacy, infrastructure and en-
forcement mechanisms. It would be only logical for AI governance – that is rule-mak-
ing around algorithms that process data – to be established in accord, and as an exten-
sion of the legacy and infrastructure of data protection and competition regulation [16].
To the contrary, what seems to be happening, is an effort driven by the narrative of
exceptionalism, whereby AI (however defined) is a phenomenon that is immune to ex-
isting governance structures, policies and laws. A gold rush to become a rule-maker in
the field of AI governance has seen governments, international organisations, and cor-
porations publish many (often similar) frameworks, strategies, and guidelines. These
documents reflect a search for effective global coordination and rule-based order, yet –
for the most part – omit or override existing governance mechanisms and institutions,
as if they were completely mismatched for “the age of AI” [33].
With the current turn of attention towards AI governance, especially in the EU [34;
35], there have been recurrent warnings against the creation of such regulatory silos
that would favour technocratic frameworks over a comprehensive view of the effects
of data on the economy and society. Many of these warnings could be applicable to the
current setup of AI governance in fact. It is therefore important to assess existing and
emerging regulatory scenarios and tools that will gain traction in the future [36]. Exist-
ing portfolios of regulatory measures include, but are not limited to: national strategies,
antitrust and consumer protection measures, ethical guidelines, impact assessments,
data protection enforcement, bans and standards and Intellectual Property rules.
Further, it would make an enormous difference to think of AI governance as an ex-
tension of data protection and competition regulations, acting hand in hand to reduce
harms and secure human dignity. Such effort – instead of happening in a vacuum –
would help update major existing regulations (not only the GDPR but also the Machin-
ery Directive and the EU Legislation on liability for instance) to make they work where
they do not: by addressing massive imbalances in power, advancing data portability and
9
privacy by design or securing EU wide, public digital infrastructure and related under-
pinning digital content and commercial rules for its exploitation and protection [16].
To address such complex challenges, there is an urgent need to innovate our institu-
tional designs and strengthen the resilience of our social and economic systems. This
calls for better understanding the intertwined relations and policy implications of
emerging paradigms of governance “with and of” digital technologies, which are trans-
forming the way public and private sector organisations operate and can enhance how
services are delivered and policies are shaped, implemented and evaluated [37].
At the same time, as the pressures to deploy automated decision making systems in
both the private and the public sector intensify, it is crucial to examine how machine
learning and bureaucracy have both “become generalizable modes of rational ordering
based on abstraction and deriving authority from claims to neutrality and objectivity”
[38]. To this end, as we have anticipated above, the new emerging phenomenon of “Al-
gorithmic governance”, or “governance by AI”, must be discerned and evaluated in its
full dimension, analysing the enormous potential for make decisions more effective and
of high objective quality – if implemented without biases – but also the high risks it
could generate, especially in sensitive policy areas with strong impact on human be-
haviour, with implications for the underlying conditions and principles of our demo-
cratic systems.
This requires a deeper investigation of how data and digital infrastructures are de-
veloped and governed at global level, the rules underpinning and guiding algorithmic
decision making, and in what manner citizens’ engagement is structured and channelled
to generate collective wisdom and new forms of social innovation in the current “tech-
nology-diplomacy” arena, expected to harness AI to increase wellbeing for all [39].
5 Conclusions: towards a policy-research agenda for
Governance with/of and by AI
In “Machiavelli and the Politics of Democratic Innovation” [40], Holman highlights
that the project of the Florentine philosopher was “to think a system of institutions ca-
pable, through harnessing the creative energy of the people who constitute the society
…. to provide a means for the actualization of that human desire that is detailed in The
Prince. It is in this sense that the Republic is the regime in which all the people can, by
means of their virtue, become Princes”.
In a similar vein, we can imagine a post-COVID-19 “Pandemic Democracy” where
digital technologies really empower the citizens, crafting new ways of engaging them
in politics and decision making. But as this new pandemic world will evolve how digital
technologies will mediate our actions and facilitate (or even automate) deliberations is
by no means known or secured already. Therefore, EU level policymaking must be able
to keep the pace of technological innovation, and play a prominent role in the strive to
redefining global governance.
In this connection, as pointed out by Walker [41], the growing “convergence” be-
tween superpowers like the US, Russia and China led the National Endowment for De-
mocracy to coin the term “sharp power”, meaning the use of the digital information
10
arena to implement a sort of new authoritarian policies - and even battles, mostly based
on online disinformation [28]. Digital wars have been the “new normal” for several
years now, but the “new normal” of pandemic societies may put individual rights and
democratic values at risk.
Some scholars [42] also argue that democratic innovation in the future will be mark-
edly different from the old theoretical concepts of participatory democracy. This calls
for better understanding how institutions and governments can integrate digital tech-
nologies and data science approaches into public discourse, in an effort to let the voices
of the people be heard, regardless of socio-economic status, party affiliation, or
party(ies) in power.
The COVID-19 pandemic crisis has highlighted even more the need for governments
and EU institutions to engage with citizens and civil society, to build trust and rely on
the wealth of information and knowledge that bottom-up processes can generate, tap-
ping on the use of digital infrastructures, tools and applications [43]. The post-lock-
down phase of the pandemic may last for long and transform our way of living. The EU
and its Member States will have to adopt decisions that may not succeed unless shared
with all stakeholders. As the Future of Europe conference is expected to focus on em-
powering citizens, the use of digital tools to co-create the future with civil society is a
true imperative [44]. The capacity of the EU to shape policies that reconcile its interests
with the priorities of Member States, while speaking to its citizens, will prove crucial
to revitalize the EU project – and the European dream.
In this perspective, future research should aim at studying the impact of innovative
mechanisms for engaging citizens in democratic processes moving away from tradi-
tional policy tools, to embrace data-driven policy-making, foresight, experimental and
AI-assisted decision systems and dynamic simulation models, as ways to increase the
speed and effectiveness of policies and their social acceptance and adoption [28]. This
would require combining a mix of interdisciplinary methods, venturing into several new
domains, paving the way for the implementation of AI-assisted and other innovative
approaches of policy design, engaging policy-makers, relevant stakeholders and citi-
zens panels in foresight and systems thinking sessions for scenarios design, conduct
behavioural experiments and explore new methods for exploiting data-driven policy
modelling, so to lay the foundations for using data science in the analysis of democratic
innovations and new models of policy-making [45]. In doing this, however, we must
make sure to maintain ourselves reflexive regarding AI, as it suggests some new levels
of complexity to get accustomed and being able to cope with.
Therefore, from a methodological perspective, when coping with complex, but also
possibly disruptive and open-ended social dynamics, and in line with the foresight tra-
dition of making anticipatory systems more robust [46], it is essential to take into con-
sideration the concept of ‘reframing’ public sector innovation, which refers to “the need
to consider both tangible changes in procedures, functions and institutions, as well as
a ‘cognitive restructuring’ that concerns values, culture and shared understandings to
articulate a reinforced set of values for the public sector ethos” [12].
11
In other words, we need to take into account the fact that AI-based technologies
provide the government with powerful tools and capacity for ‘nudging’ citizens to be-
have in one way or another, and this must be considered carefully from both a research
and a policy perspective.
In doing so, key enabling factors and alternative regulatory governance regimes
should be explored through piloting data driven digital solutions in ‘Smart City’ envi-
ronments, analysing results of specific Hackathons and large scale computational ex-
periments based on big-data-driven nudging techniques. These, also defined as “hyper-
nudge” [47], require that particular attention is given to collect, filter, curate and intel-
ligently tap bottom-up data, available from multiple sources, and incorporate them in
dynamic social simulation models to allow real-time informed decision-making. This
requires highlighting algorithmically determined correlations between data items and
within data sets that would not otherwise be observable through human cognition alone,
or even with standard computing and modelling techniques. At the same time, appro-
priate consideration must be given to the possibility to generate local content to guar-
antee different cultural backgrounds and diverse perspectives are taken into account.
The overall goal of such approach would thus be to assess both the positive and
negative consequences of different data-driven and algorithmic governance models on
collective behaviour and the interaction among individuals and groups, especially in
the “new normality” we may be living in, in the hoped to be a post-COVID-19 world,
which instead seems being permanently prolonged as a form of “Pandemic Society”.
It must be considered in fact that, even if social trust, political trust, and satisfaction
with democracy are mutually dependent, the cause‐and‐effect relations between them
are not perfectly symmetrical, and the links are sometimes loose and contingent, espe-
cially in times of crisis and political turmoil.
By doing so, lights could be shed on how a different way to approach policymaking
at the EU and National level, centred on democratic innovation and digital resilience
can offer important advantages to policy-makers, while ensuring liberal EU values are
respected and further promoted globally. This research may thus have an influence on
global cooperation, supporting the ambitious goal of the von der Leyen Commission of
having a “geopolitical” nature, committed to sustainable policies and to act as “the
guardian of multilateralism” [28], which is becoming evident in key policy areas such
as the current effort to establish an International Alliance for human-centric AI, pro-
moting a value-driven approach on the impact of the digital transformation, having an
impact on how our society is governed today, and more so on how this will shape the
world in which our children, and the children of our children, will live in the future.
Acknowledgments
This paper builds in part on research led by the author when he was Senior Scientist responsible
for research on Digital transformation of governance and AI for the Public Sector at the European
Commission’s Joint Research Centre in Seville, being also involved in other projects as a member
of the Scientific Committee or Advisory Board. However, the opinions expressed here may not
be regarded as stating the official position of the European Commission. A special thanks for the
joint work conducted goes to Cristiano Codagnone, Egidijus Barcevicius and Maciej Kuziemski
as well as Francesco Molinari and Pierre Rossel for their comments on an early draft of the text.
12
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