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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>International Semantic Intelligence Conference (ISIC),
February</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Legitimate Open-ended Dissemination of Personal Information</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Srinath Srinivasa</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jayati Deshmukh</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>International Institute of Information Technology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Bangalore</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="IN">India 560100</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2020</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>2</volume>
      <fpage>5</fpage>
      <lpage>27</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Personal and sensitive information about individuals, often needs to be legitimately exchanged among diferent stakeholders, to provide services, maintain public health, law and order, and so on. While such exchanges are necessary, they also impose enormous privacy and security challenges. Data protection laws like GDPR specify conditions and the legal capacity in which personal information can be solicited and disseminated further. But there is a dearth of formalisms for specifying legal capacities and jurisdictional boundaries, so that open-ended exchange of sensitive data can be implemented. This paper proposes an extensible framework called Multiverse in which sensitive data can flow across a network through “role tunnels” established based on corresponding legal capacities.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Privacy</kwd>
        <kwd>Personal information</kwd>
        <kwd>Legal capacity</kwd>
        <kwd>Role Tunnel</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>where open-ended sharing of certain
sensitive information, can endanger a community
or country.</p>
      <p>In addition to the above concerns, there is
also a need for legitimate open-ended
sharileges are associated with roles, rather than ing of private and/or sensitive information in
with individuals, and the association of in- times of crisis, to protect public health and
dividuals with roles are dynamic. Authenti- order. For instance, public health
managecation now involves not only proving one’s ment in the time of Covid crisis requires
priidentity, but also proving one’s role. vate and sensitive information about patients</p>
      <p>
        RBAC models are typically implemented sufering from Covid to be shared with
sevwithin an organizational context. This means eral stakeholders like doctors, administrators,
that the RBAC mechanism is situated within volunteer organizations, etc.
a larger semantic framework that establishes In such cases, there is no overarching
virassociations of users with roles. RBAC frame- tual organizational structure, or role granting
works are also extended for inter-organizationaland mapping authority. The number of
disworkflows [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">6, 7, 8</xref>
        ]. Several approaches are parate entities requiring the data may keep
adopted for extending an RBAC framework changing over time, and may not be known a
across organizations. These include creation priori. This makes it infeasible to apply
existof “virtual organizations” representing role ing approaches to inter-organizational
privigranting authorities for inter-organizational lege management.
interactions and/or mapping of roles across In this paper, we propose a modular,
extenorganizations. sible framework called “Multiverse” to
man
      </p>
      <p>More recently, there has been increased in- age legitimate exchanges of sensitive data in
terest in open-ended data dissemination in an open-ended fashion, without the need for
the form of “open data” for greater common an overarching organizational framework to
good. With increasing numbers of governance enforce the integrity of data exchange. In
Secand administrative workflows appearing on- tion 2 we discuss some of the existing
modline, there is also an increased need for ex- els of access control systems. Details of the
changing data across several entities with lit- “Multiverse” framework are presented in
Sectle or no inter-organizational authorities for tion 3. Section 4 discusses a variety of
advermanaging the integrity of data exchange. sarial scenarios and how it can be handled</p>
      <p>
        While open data improves transparency and by the “Multiverse” framework and Section
accountability in public workflows. it also 5 presents a couple of case studies where it is
brings with it challenges of privacy and secu- useful. Conclusions and future directions are
rity leading to several contradictory require- presented in Section 6.
ments [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14 ref15 ref16 ref17">9, 10, 11, 12, 13</xref>
        ]. Specifically,
openended data exchange is characterized by three
divergent concerns [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">13</xref>
        ]: transparency, privacy, 2. Related Work
and security. Transparency requires relevant
data to be shared publicly in order to uphold
integrity of a public action. Privacy on the
other hand, requires data to be withheld in
order to protect the dignity and liberty of
individuals. Security pertains to collective good, classified into two categories: encryption based
systems and proof based systems [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">15</xref>
        ].
Encryption based systems encrypt the data and
send it of to the individual. The individual
needs to have the appropriate key in order to
decrypt the data. On the other hand, proof
Access control systems act a mediator between
users and data / resources to grant or deny
access based on the underlying security
policy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">14</xref>
        ]. Access control systems can be broadly
based systems require the individual to pro- cessed by diferent types of users. There are a
duce all the necessary proofs required to au- few open data management systems [19, 20]
thenticate their identity and after authentica- however most of these systems focus on data
tion, the data is shared with the individual. It cleaning and pre-processing so that it can be
is dificult to provide fine grained access con- stored in a database or graph etc. To the best
trol using encryption based methods without of our knowledge, there does not exist a
sysincreasing the number of keys as well as it is tem which combine data pre-processing, data
computationally expensive to manage these storage, data retrieval, data visualization along
systems specially at a large scale. Proof based with secure access control system of data
specifmethods and its variants on the other hand, ically for open data systems.
can better handle fine-grained granularity and Data containing personally identifiable
inconstraints. formation (PII) needs to be handled much more
      </p>
      <p>Individuals can be granted / revoked ac- carefully than say population level aggregate
cess based on their identity, which is known data, since it can reveal the identity of
indias Identity-Based Access Control (IBAC) [16, viduals and in turn put them at risk. For
ex15]. In these designs, the individuals need ample, in healthcare setting even anonymized
to prove their identity using authentication data can be used to infer patient’s identity
techniques like the use of passwords, biomet- based on their diagnosis details, location etc
rics, or combinations of public and private [21, 22, 23]. There are encryption based and
keys. Once an individual’s identity is authen- data masking techniques to manage access
ticated, they can access the required data. How- to personal and personally identifiable data.
ever, in large organizations and teams span- However, there is a dearth of computational
ning multiple organizations, it is dificult and models which can define access mechanisms
cumbersome to manage access controls of all for data aligned to the laws of that region or
the stakeholders individually in this manner. country. It is especially crucial with data
pro</p>
      <p>Role-based access control (RBAC) methods tection laws like EU’s General Data
Protec[3, 5] were designed so that permissions can tion Regulation (GDPR), Sweden’s Data Act,
be granted to users based on their roles rather Philippines’s The Data Privacy Act, India’s
than their identity. This access control design Personal Data Protection Bill, California’s
Conis more efective as changing roles of an indi- sumer Privacy Act etc being defined around
vidual automatically updates their privileges. the world.</p>
      <p>The roles can be assigned to the individuals
by an authorized individual. A RBAC policy
is designed using role-permission, user-role 3. The Multiverse
and role-role relationships. There are vari- Framework
ants of RBAC models like models which can
handle role hierarchies, constraints, triggers The proposed framework called “Multiverse”
and temporal dependencies, teams within the to create an extensible, open-ended
infrastrucorganization etc [5, 3, 17]. ture for legitimate exchange of data, is
de</p>
      <p>Using open data has its own benefits as scribed in this section. A Multiverse
framewell as challenges [18], however it is difi- work, also called a “Frame”  is made up of
cult to make appropriate use of open data in the following building blocks:
the absence of open data management
systems which can handle handle large volume  = ( , , ,  ) (1)
of diverse data such that it can be securely
ac</p>
      <p>Here  is a set of containers called “worlds” and also reads data only from  ( ).
that represent the semantic boundary or le- Figure 1 depicts a multiverse schematically.
gal jurisdiction within which, a data element The multiverse is a network of worlds
conis accessed and processed.  represents the nected by one or more relations defined in
set of all data elements or “resources” that are templates. Data are published within worlds
being shared. The term  represents “agents” and exchanged between them based on a
syswhich could be users or application programs tem of legal capacities explained later on. Agents,
that produce and consume resources. The term which include users and application programs,
 represents a set of “templates” where each lie outside of the multiverse cloud, but have a
template defines a set of access points through representation for themselves in the form of
which data may be accessed, and a set of rela- a semantic world, within the multiverse.
tionship types with which worlds can be re- Worlds could be contained within one
anlated. other. If world  2 is contained within world</p>
      <p>A world represents the basic unit within  1, this is represented as  2 ⊳  1.
Containwhich data is accessed. Every agent  ∈  ment of a world is called its “jurisdictional
lohas its own corresponding world named as cation” or simply “location” that represents
 ( ). In addition to representing agents, a system of privilege inheritance explained
a world could represent any semantic entity later on.
or legal jurisdiction. Some examples of worlds Each world may implement one or more
include: institutions, town municipalities, un- templates  ∈  , that gives it a semantic
chardivided families, resident welfare societies of acterization in the form of a set of data
accommunities, etc. Every data element is pub- cess points and relationship types with other
lished within the boundaries of a world, and worlds. Any template  ∈  is made up of the
data is only exchanged between worlds. An following elements:
agent  only publishes its data into  ( ),
(3)
called 
in an outgoing relationship specification means
(2) that the target world with which this
relationship is being established, should be
implementing template  . Similarly, such a
constraint for an incoming relation means that,
the relationship can be accepted only if the
recipient world is implementing template  .</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>Here, the reference to template  is in the form</title>
        <p>of a universally uniquer ID like a URI.</p>
        <p>Hence for example, in a template called   
we can specify that an outgoing relationship
can be established with a
,
point 
elements:

∈ 
 = (, 
)</p>
        <p>Here 
points, and
represents a set of data access</p>
        <p>represents a set of relationship
specifications . A data access point represents
a gated interface through which a given data
element may be accessed. Any data access
comprises of the following

= (, , 
)</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-2">
        <title>Here  is the query with which the data</title>
        <p>element is accessed. The terms  and 
represent legal capacity and purpose code
respectively, which are both explained later.</p>
        <p>The relationship specifications 
specimay have a constraint that the source world
ifes the kind of relationships that the world
should have implemented a template called
can implement with other worlds, as well as   
the kinds of relationships that the world can
accept from other worlds.</p>
        <p>A relationship specification may be of two
kinds– an incoming relationship specification,
and an outgoing relationship specification. These
.</p>
        <p>The 
A relationship specification comprises of the
are represented as 

and 

respectively. ification of a   
, we can specify a
rela</p>
        <p>with another world
the target or source world should have a
rela(, 
) constraint specifies that</p>
        <p>with a world that
im</p>
        <p>Hence for example, in the template
spectionship named 
plements template  .
 , only if</p>
        <p>tionship called  
called  
)
)
(4)
(5) tal.</p>
        <p>with a world that is implementing a template
has a relationship named</p>
        <p>. In other words, a person can
be related to another person as a patient, only
if the other person is a doctor at some
hospitarget world, only if the world implements
a template called 
template called 
coming relationship called 
. Similarly, for a
there can be an
in, which</p>
        <p>The   
ification for 
tionship edge.</p>
        <p>any agent obtains, when traversing a
relapart of the relationship
spec, represents the privileges that
following elements:
  = (,</p>
        <p>,
  ,</p>
        <p>= (,
 , 

( )</p>
        <p>In addition to template and relationship
specA relationship has a name at its incoming
end and its outgoing end. The incoming
relaifications, a constraint could also identify
specific worlds with their unique identifiers,
usentering a world through a relationship, where
tionship name is also called a role. Any agent ing the 
the incoming name of the relationship is  , is
said to be playing the role  in the world.
(,</p>
        <p>) specification.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-3">
        <title>Any given</title>
        <p>or   specification may
have multiple constraints specified. In such
cases, all the specified constraints need to be</p>
        <p>Both outgoing and incoming relationships satisfied, for an instance of the relationship
are subject to a set of constraints. Table 1 to be formed.
specifies diferent kinds of constraints on a
relationship. The template constraint:</p>
        <p>Constraint
Template</p>
        <p>Specification
implements(t)
ship
ship
Template
Relationrelt(name, t)</p>
        <p>The source or target world needs to have a
relaIdentity
Relationrelid(name, id)</p>
        <p>The source or target world needs to have a
relaMeaning
valid.
gitimacy for the access. The</p>
        <p>The</p>
        <p>element of  
An incoming agent who enters a world through Hence, in a given world  , an outgoing
rea relationship, gets the role specified in 
and the corresponding privileges associated

, lationship specification of the form: (  , ,  )
represents that any agent playing the role 
over resources (including templates), and the target world.
world itself. A role having a resource.read
that apply respectively to a set of operations
with it. Table 2 details a set of privilege classes, can traverse the relationship edge  
to act as
a representative of the source world  , in the</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-1-4">
        <title>Every world also has a role called</title>
        <p>privilege for example, enables the role player</p>
        <p>which trivially has all privileges. The creator
to read resources hosted by this world.</p>
        <p>The  
element of 

specifies a set
of a world is its default owner, but may add
other owners and/or give up the owner role
of legitimate reasons or “purpose codes” for to other agents.
which a particular activity needs to be
performed. Annotating a purpose code for each
data access, helps in establishing oficial
le</p>
        <p>When an agent traverses a relationship to
reach a new world, the legal capacity in which
the agent performs any operation in the
tarcode is</p>
        <p>get world is a concatenation of all the roles
represented as an enumerated list of values.</p>
        <p>played by the agent beginning from the world
the roles within the source world that are
enFigure 2 shows an example. Here, an agent
titled to traverse the given relationship edge. who is a user named Dr. Ram is accessing
in Eq 5 specifies
representing the agent.
some data stored in a world called Sharada. pathway from the agent to the dataset based
Sharada has implemented a template called on legal arrangements between worlds.
Clinic, and it is in relationship with another A role tunnel is valid if each element in the
world called Fortis, which has implemented role tunnel satisfies their corresponding  
a template called Hospital. The world for the constraints, and the last element in the
tunuser Ram, is also in relationship with Fortis, nel represents the  ( ) role, where  is
with the role of Doctor. The relationship be- the id of the agent performing the access.
tween the Hospital and the Clinic enables a Each resource stored in a world also has
Doctor of the Hospital to appear as Advisor stored along with it, the legal capacity by which
in the Clinic, which gives them some privi- it was brought there. Formally, a resource 
leges over the data. in a world has the following fields:</p>
        <p>Here, when Dr. Ram accesses some data
element  stored at Sharada, the data access (6)
point would look as follows:
 = (, ,   )</p>
        <p>Here,  is the data element, and  is the
legal capacity by which the data element came
 = ( ( ), to be stored in the world. If the data element
is local to the world and was not imported
 (ℎ  ) ∶ from elsewhere, the  field would be null.
 (   ) ∶  ( ), A data element with a string of multiple
 ) roles for its legal capacity represents a remote
puTrphoeselacsotdtee,r min di cating the orficeiaplrepsuernptosstehe dAalltareelmemoteendtabtraoueglehmt einnftrsoamlsoa rheamvoetea s“oTuirmcee.
for which the data is being accessed. The To Live (TTL)” parameter, which indicates the
length of time until which it can be stored at
string:  (ℎ  ) ∶  (   ) ∶ the remote location. After the TTL expires,
which t(he ac)creespsreissebnetsintghemleagdael. caTphaicsitryepin- the data needs to be fetched again through a
resents a string of role and world specifica- legal role tunnel.
tions that leads up from the agent to the data Every access of a data element involves
checksource. ing the validity of the legal capacity. A role</p>
        <p>The string representing the legal capacity tunnel of the form:   (  ) ∶ ⋯ ∶  2( 2) ∶
is called a Role Tunnel, since it creates a legal  1( 1) ∶  ( ) requires  + 1 integrity
checks before the data access can be made ileges, in all branches contained in  .
possible. If the legal capacity of the agent
fails to hold when accessing a remote data Template visibility: Templates are treated
element that is cached in its world, then the like any resource, and can be created within
data element is removed from the world. Sub- any world by agents who have write
privisequent access to the data element requires leges on the world. Other worlds that have
the agent to approach the source world of read privileges on a given world  can
acthe data element through an legal role tun- cess and implement the templates defined in
nel, and fetch it once again. world  . When a template  that is defined</p>
        <p>Note that a legal capacity represents a logi- in world  is used in another world  ′, it
cal tunnel. A role tunnel of the form   (  ) ∶ is treated as a remote resource in  ′ and the
⋯ ∶  2( 2) ∶  1( 1) ∶  ( ) does not role tunnel with which  was accessed, is stored
require the data to physically flow through along with  , in addition to the TTL
parameall the intermediate worlds in the tunnel be- ter. Use of the template data access points, or
tween   and  . The interim worlds are re- creation or deletion of relationship instances
quired only for establishing the legitimacy of of the template will require the legal capacity
the data access. The interim worlds should of the template to be satisfied.
be reachable and be able to validate the given For instance, let template  in world  be
role at the time of access. accessed through a role tunnel  2( 2) ∶  1( 1) ∶</p>
        <p>Data and network level security in the form  ( ). The use of this template for
acof encryption and secure communication, will cessing a data element and/or defining a
relaneed to be implemented in addition to the tionship, will require the above legal capacity
mechanisms of the Multiverse. The Multi- to be valid. The template  will also need to be
verse framework only provides a system for retrieved once again after its   has expired.
creating legally tractable privilege frameworks An expired template will return false for all
across independent institutional contexts. its relationships and data access points. At
any point during the use of a template, if the
Role inheritance: Containment of worlds template role tunnel is not satisfied, the
temhave special semantics in terms of inheritance plate is marked as expired and will be
unusof roles. Suppose world  2 is contained in able, until it is retrieved again from the source.
 1 and both implement a template  . In such Templates can also be subclassed from other
cases, any agent playing a given role  in the templates to form a conceptual subsumption
container world, also gets the privilege of role tree. If template  ′ is a subclass of template  ,
 in the contained world. This enables aggre- then  ′ inherits all the data access points and
gation of similar worlds into a larger world, relation specifications from  . The subclass  ′
and defining privileges on the larger, container can override definitions of data access points
world, rather than on each world individu- and/or relation specifications to apply to the
ally. world implementing the subclass template.</p>
        <p>Hence for example, if a Hospital  has
several branches each implementing a template Access risk: Suppose that a remote data
elof type Hospital, with each branch contained ement  is cached in a world  using the
folwithin the larger world  , then any agent lowing role tunnel:   (  ) ∶ ⋯ ∶  1( 1) ∶
playing a role (say,  ) in  would also  ( ). Accessing this data element 
reget to play the same role with the same priv- quires  + 1 integrity checks to be made. Now
suppose that a given role   (  ) is implemented it also opens up questions about how easy
by world   using template   that itself is would it be for the framework to be
comprofetched using yet another role tunnel   (  ). mised.</p>
        <p>Validating   (  ) will now require validating In this section, we will consider several
adthe role tunnel for the template that has de- verserial scenarios that could potentially
afifned   . This validation may in turn require fect the integrity of data exchange, and see
further validations of further templates along how the framework addresses such situations.
the way.</p>
        <p>
          In order to reduce and limit this unfolding Scenario 1: False implementation of a
temof role tunnel integrity checks, data access is plate: One of the constraints for a world
characterized by a notion of access risk, de- to form a relationship with another world, is
noted by a parameter  ∈ [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">0, 1</xref>
          ]. This repre- the  ( ) that requires the source or
sents a decay parameter computing a proba- target world to have implemented template  .
bility function, which defines whether an in- Since any world can implement a given
temtegrity check is made at a given level. plate, it can be possible that the
implement
        </p>
        <p>For the initial level of data access (also called ing world is a bogus world that appears like
level 0), where integrity check is done for the an instance of  .
role tunnel from which a data element is re- For instance, suppose a role of type 
trieved, the integrity check is performed with can be established between a person and a
a probability (1 −  )0. For the next level of in- world of type “Hospital” (that is, the world
tegrity checks, where the templates defining has implemented the “Hospital” template). Since
the roles are themselves validated, integrity any world can implement any template, it could
check is initiated with a probability (1 −  )1. be possible that the world is not actually a
Similarly, integrity check at level  is initi- hospital, but a bogus world implementing the
ated with a probability (1 −  ) . Hence, the template.
higher the value of  the lesser the levels to Such a scenario is possible, only if the
“Hoswhich integrity check is performed, and the pital” template is publicly available. To
pregreater the access risk. vent fake representations, important templates</p>
        <p>Access risk is a parameter that is set by the should be defined in a world representing a
agent performing a read operation, balancing certifying authority, and read access granted
between speed of access and guarantee of le- to worlds based on an ofline verification of
gal authenticity of the access. their authenticity.
4. Adverserial Scenarios Scenario 2: False implementation of a
relationship: The  (,  ) constraint for
One of the ways in which the proposed Mul- a relationship, require the source or target
tiverse framework difers from Roles Based world to have a relationship called  with
Access Control (RBAC) is the absence of an a world implementing template  .
overarching role-granting authority. Role spec- In such a case, there could be two levels
ifications are defined in templates that are in at which information can be falsified– either
turn defined within worlds and exchanged across template  does not have a relationship named
them based on access privileges.  , and/or the world implementing
tem</p>
        <p>While this provides enormous flexibility and plate  is a bogus world.
scalability for the access control framework,</p>
        <p>In either case, the main security mecha- template, even though it was legally required
nism is to control the definition of  . If tem- to discontinue its use. What would be the
plate  is defined by a certified authority and repercussions of such a case?
be made accessible to worlds based on ofline There are two safeguards that addresses cases
validation of their credentials (which is a one- involving such malicious intermediaries. The
time activity), both levels of falsification can ifrst is the   parameter for the template, which
be addressed. limits the duration until which, the template
will be illegally valid. The second safeguard
Scenario 3: Unauthorized read of third- is the access risk  parameter by the agent
party data from a world: Suppose that Dr. performing a read. If the data being accessed
Ram has accessed data about a patient from is very sensitive, the reader may set the
acSharada clinic from the example from Figure 2. cess risk  to a low value, which will force
When the resource is copied to the world of integrity check for the template that defines
Dr. Ram, would it now be accessible to other a role.
agents who have a read privilege on this world?</p>
        <p>To answer this, we need to note that the le- 5. Case Studies
gal capacity with which the data element was
accessed is also stored along with the data In this section, we will consider some case
element. In this example, the legal capacity study applications where a Multiverse
frameis:  (ℎ  ) ∶  (   ) ∶ work would be useful.
 ( ). This Role Tunnel representing
the legal capacity is stored along with the
resource in the  world, and has to be valid 5.1. CET Score Verification
at the time of accessing the data element. Hence,Many countries have some form of a
Comanother agent who is trying to access this data mon Entrance Test (CET) for graduate
admiselement, will be able to do so, only if the agent sions. Applicants who take the test use these
satisfies all the roles in the Role Tunnel: scores to gain admissions in universities. The
 (ℎ  ),  (   ) and number of universities who recognize CET
 ( ). That is, the agent should not scores may be large, and may vary over time.
only be listed as a co-owner of the world  , In addition, several other organizations may
but should also be listed as a  in the also consider CET scores for hiring
employworld    and as  in the world ees.
ℎ  . These organizations will need to
independently verify scores of an applicant from the
Scenario 4: Malicious Representation: In CET database. This process can be securely
the example from Figure 2, suppose that the automated using the Multiverse framework
hospital has implemented its   tem- as follows:
plate by downloading it from a regulatory agency Applicant  takes the  which is
re , that recognizes hospitals and issues cer- quired for admission at    University. In
tificates and templates for their operations. this setup as shown in Figure 3, there are three
Suppose that the hospital loses its recogni- entities student  , university    and 
tion due to some malpractice, and is no longer administering organization, each of which have
eligible to use the   template. How- their own worlds. Applicant  implements
ever, the hospital continues to implement the the template of    ,  implements the
template of  and University    UID details from the UID application. Since
implements the template of    . Fol- the bank is a well known entity which has
lowing relationships exist among the worlds: been pre-verified and pre-approved, it has read
Applicant  plays the role of prospective stu- rights on the UID world. Next,  wants to
dent in the world of    University and a rent a house    . Before  is accepted as a
test applicant for  application. Once  tenant, house    needs to verify the
idenhas completed the  , the scores are stored tify of  . Since house    is not a
centralin their database.  also informs the  ized entity, it does not have direct access to
application regarding universities / organiza- the UID application. However, it is a
welltions that s/he is applying to. In turn,    known fact that  ′ identity is valid if s/he
university requests to access the  scores has an account in  bank. And thus house
of applicant  and if the constraints such as    accepts bank account details (like
acapplicant  exists, has valid scores, and has count number and address) as valid identity
applied to university    are all satisfied, proof of  . The role tunnel is complete if 
then  ′ scores are securely shared with    requests  bank to share the account
deuniversity. tails with    .
5.2. Identity Validation</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>Most countries have a unique ID (UID) of all
its citizens. It is used to uniquely identify the Data utility needs to contend with three
concitizens and this UID is mandatory for a vari- lficting concerns– transparency, privacy and
ety of purposes like opening a bank account, security. Most of the solutions to address these
buying / renting a property etc. Even in this concerns have thus far required a larger
inscenario, Multiverse framework can be used stitutional framework, that regulates access.
as follows: Extending the legitimacy of access control across</p>
      <p>As shown in Figure 4, let’s say person  is organizational boundaries in an open-ended
a citizen and his UID details are stored in the fashion had always been a challenge.
UID application. When  wants to open an The Multiverse framework proposed in this
account in  bank, the bank validates the paper addresses this problem, and uses role</p>
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