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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>A rule-based model of emotion appraisal for narratives</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vincenzo Lombardo</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Beatrice Osella</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>CIRMA</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dipartimento di Informatica</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Universita` di Torino</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Dipartimento di Psicologia</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Universita` di Torino vincenzo.lombardo@unito.it</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>In: A. Jorge, R. Campos, A. Jatowt, A. Aizawa (eds.): Proceedings of the first AI4Narratives Workshop</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Yokohama</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="JP">Japan</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Love</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Hate, Happy-for, Resentment, Pity, Gloating Hope, Satisfaction, Disappointment Fear, Fear-confirmed, Relief Joy, Distress Pride, Shame, Admiration, Reproach Gratification, Remorse, Gratitude, Anger</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper presents a procedural model for the generation of characters' emotions in a narrative. The model is the result of the adaptation of the wellknown OCC model for emotion appraisal to the drama context and its encoding into logic clauses that are computationally tractable. The model has been implemented through a standard ontological reasoner, and applied to sample drama fragments through the Drammar ontology encoding of the dramatic incidents.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        There is a limited number of psychological phenomena that
can be considered recurrent and pervasive as the emotion in
the life of the human being. Emotions characterize almost all
the significant events of our daily lives [Smith and Lazarus,
1990], assuming various nature and different intensity: we
feel proud when we receive a promotion, we become angry
when our companions make fun of us, we are happy at the
birth of our children, and we experience deep condolences
at the death of a person we loved. Emotions have raised
the interest of thinkers since the time of Plato and Aristotle
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Ion [Leighton, 1982])</xref>
        , followed by the more modern Hume,
Kant and Hegel, who have carried out moral reflections on
the relationship that binds human being to her/his affective
states. Even in the artistic environment, great importance is
given to the study of emotions and the way in which these
must be expertly communicated to the viewer. A good
narrative, whether communicated in literary, theatrical or
cinematographic format, is expressly made with the aim of
evoking certain emotional states in the audience [Scheff, 1979]
Authors use emotional reactions as the manifestations of the
motivations and personalities of their main characters,
revealing the close relationship between emotions, personality, and
cognition [Plutchik, 1980].
      </p>
      <p>In the recent decades, there has been an interest in the
computational models of emotions and their potential
applications [Sloman et al., 2005], both to clarify the mechanisms
of the generation of emotions and to improve credibility and
effectiveness of synthetic agents and robots. Hudlicka and
colleagues define the computational models of emotions as
“software designed to synthesize the operations of the process
of elicitation of human emotions based on a specific theory of
emotions” [Hudlicka, 1998] [Tsai et al., 2011]</p>
      <p>There are three consolidated theoretical perspectives that
can be referred to in the construction of a computational
model of emotions [Hudlicka, 2011]. Each of these differs
from the others in function of the semantic primitives that
it believes characterize the procedures of generation of the
emotions, that is the founding constituents of the emotional
experience that can be modeled and inserted as information
within a computational model for the generation of emotions.
• Discrete or categorical theories of emotions emphasize
a small number of fundamental emotions, each of which
mediated by specific neural circuits [Panksepp, 1998].
The emotional states differ from each other for the
different stimuli, the distinct behavioral and
physiological expressions, and the different subjective experiences.
This theoretical perspective roots in the works of Charles
Darwin, who gave rise to an evolutionary perspective by
identifying the presence of a discrete group of emotions
found both in animals and in humans. Taking up
Darwinian theses, Ekman demonstrates the universality of
what he considers to be basic emotions, that is joy,
sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise [Ekman, 1992].
• Dimensional theories of emotions conceive emotional
states as characterized by a small set of underlying
dimensions, which define a space within which the
human emotions can be distinguished from non-emotions.
The most frequent characterization uses mainly two
dimensions: valence and excitement [Russel,
2003][Russel and Barrett, 1999]. The valence reflects a positive or
negative evaluation and the associated state of pleasure
felt (or displeasure), while the arousal defines the
general level of activity of the organism, reflecting a general
readiness for action.
• Componential theories of emotions emphasize both the
cognitive component of the emotion (the cognitive
evaluation procedure that the individual performs on some
situation) and the distinct dimensions or variables of
the cognitive evaluation process called appraisal of the
emotions [Leventhal and Scherer, 1987]: they include
novelty, valence, relevance of the objective, congruence
with the objective, and coping ability. These theories
assume that a stimulus, be it real or imaginary, elicits an
emotion because it is analyzed according to the
meaning and consequences that the agent attributes to it. The
analysis of the input situation implies the assignment of
specific values to the appraisal variables: the number of
emotions that can be obtained is quite large, given the
large combinations of the possible values assumed by
the variables.</p>
      <p>From a computational point of view, each theoretical
approach tries to bridge the gap between the stimulus that elicits
the emotion and the emotion itself: for example, in the
discrete/categorical perspective there are no intermediaries since
the base emotions themselves constitute the semantic
primitives of the ideally calculated emotions, while in the other
two perspectives it is the dimensions or the variables of
appraisal to act as intermediaries. The best candidates for the
formulation of a computational model of emotion for the
narrative realm are the appraisal theories, which address the way
in which the cognitive evaluation is related to the emotional
experience, concluding that the former can be both the cause
of the emotion and its consequence: in fact, Roseman and
Smith point out how it is possible that, on the one hand, the
appraisal of a blameworthy behavior causes anger, but, on the
other, such an appraisal is a typical component of the
phenomenological experience of proven anger and so, often, a
consequence of anger itself [Roseman and Smith, 2001]. In
the modular theories of cognitive appraisal, cognition is
temporally placed before the experience of emotion and adopted,
through specific semantic primitives of emotion, to estimate
the emotional experience. According to Lazarus [Lazarus,
1984], the appraisal theorists argue that some form of
”analysis of the meaning” of the stimulus situation is needed to elicit
an emotion; taking a dramatic narrative sample, one could
say that Hamlet cannot react angrily to Ophelia’s behavior as
long as he does not interpret the fact that she has betrayed him
[Smith and Ellsworth, 1985].</p>
      <p>Among the appraisal theories, OCC theory [Ortony et al.,
1988] has received a great attention for the formulation of a
computational model [Marsella et al., 2010], because it
represents in an explicit form the appraisal of the situation on
behalf of the individual and the calculus for the computation
of the emotion types. According to Ortony, Clore and Collins,
emotions are basically the result of a mechanism of cognitive
interpretation of events, agents and objects in terms of their
desirability with respect to the agent’s objectives, their
coherence in relation to her/his moral standards, and their
pleasantness according to the dispositional tendencies of the agent.
The individual would tend, for example, to experience a more
or less differentiated emotion of hope if s/he appraised an
event as desirable for the achievement of her/his goals. The
construction of a computational model is supported by OCC
theory, since it takes as input the formal representation of the
components of the cognitive evaluation procedure and returns
as output the development of a calculation algorithm for the
computation of the emotions related to them. The
representation and calculation of emotions are outlined through the use
of practical examples and tree charts, and this makes
implementation of the computational model truly immediate.</p>
      <p>In this paper, we present a computational model for the
emotion appraisal in the context of narratives. The model
takes as input the appraisal of the basic elements of some
narrative situations and returns as output the emotion appraisal of
the characters. The model builds on the narrative elements
devised by the Drammar theory [Damiano et al., 2019], which
are already formalized as formal ontological entities. In
particular, the model is a revised version of the model in
[Lombardo et al., 2015], with a simplified account of narrative
elements and a novel implementation of model rules. We call
this model DrammarOCC model. This model can be useful
for the calculation of emotions appraised by characters in a
narrative context, and be used for emotion analysis as well as
synthesis in the entertainment industry.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>The DrammarOCC model</title>
      <p>In this section, we sketch the Drammar-OCC model, starting
from the formal description of the narrative, adapted from the
Drammar theory [Damiano et al., 2019]. Going top to
bottom in Fig. 1, narratives are split into units (concept Unit),
grouped into timelines (of one or several units, one
preceding the next) and containing a description of the occurring
events. The events occurring in the units are motivated by
the action plans (Action Plan) intended by the characters (or
Agents) that try to achieve the agents’ goals (Goal). Goals
are triggered by agents’ Values. By appraising 1) the events
occurring in the units of some timeline, 2) the intentional
actions of the agents (including themselves), and 3) the
pleasantness/liking of objects and agents in the story world, the
characters experiences emotions, which are conveyed to the
audience, in empathy with the characters themselves (if the
text is well written, if the staging is effective, . . . ,
depending on the conveying medium). Action plans and goals are
central to the work of dramaturgy studies in the analysis and
interpretation of a text and by the directors in the creation of
a staging and in the direction of the actors, as well as by the
actors themselves for the acting job.</p>
      <p>As an example, we refer to Brecht’s play Mother Courage
and her children (original title Mutter Courage und ihre
Kinder, 1938-39). The work, set during the Thirty Years’
War in some countries of Central and Northern Europe, tells
the misadventures of the vivandie`re Anna Fierling, who earns
a living by selling wares to soldiers, the only people who have
money during the war. The war, on the one hand, gets her
business, but, on the other, will take her three children away,
leaving her alone. Most likely, Brecht wrote it as a protest
about the First World War, while feeling its approaching, and
about war in general, which deprives Mother Courage of her
three children by blurring her maternal instinct, not allowing
her to realize that war is bad, not a place for business. To
illustrate how modeling takes place, let’s take a specific unit as
an example, the second of the first scene (Unit 1.2)1:
1Such a segment is detected through an authoritative critical text
…</p>
      <p>Now we see how the logical form of the narrative is expressed
as predicates, to be matched with the definite clauses that
encode the emotion calculus of the Drammar-OCC model.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>Units: incidents, characters, values</title>
        <p>The units of events, which are ordered sequentially into
timelines (minimal timeline made of one unit):
• concept, monadic predicate U nit(u);
• relation, binary predicate, precedes(u1, u2), represents
the sequence.</p>
        <p>For example, Unit 1.2 is following Unit 1.1
(precedes(U nit1.1, U nit1.2)). Each unit corresponds
to a significant event in the drama; in this representation,
unit or timelines embed events; the units or timelines are
motivated by the intentions of the characters (see goal and
action plans below). Complementary to events, there are
states, which represent an existing situation, the result of
events, which have effects on the subsequent evolution of the
narrative. In this representation, the states are of two types:
1. the mental states of the characters with respect to the
facts of the story;
2. an actual state of affairs that holds true at some point in
history.
about the narrative at hand, namely a manuscript written by Brecht
himself, ”Brecht zu Courage”, contained in the book “Brecht and
Courage”, edited by Walter Benjamin, Bernard Dort, Enrico
Filippini, Jean Claude Francois, Henning Rischbieter, Bruno Schacherl,
Luigi Squarzina, Genoa, Teatro Stabile di Genova, 1970, pp. 40–91.
However, we developed an automatic segmentation approach for
dramatic text, to be integrated here [Croce et al., 2019].
In particular, the mental states are represented through the
values of the characters in a certain unit, which are put at risk
(at stake) or in safety (in balance) by events. The values are
part of two sets of states, one preceding and one following the
unit, respectively; the unit makes the transition between one
set and another, allowing the story to progress. In predicate
logic,
• concept, monadic predicate, StateSet(s);
• relationship, binary predicate, hasEf f ect(u, s),
between a unit and a set of states which are effects of the
unit;
• relationship, binary predicate, hasP recondition(u, s),
between a unit and a set of states;
• relationship, binary predicate, atStakeI nSet(v, s),
between a value and a set of states (meaning that the value
is at risk in the set);
• relationship, binary predicate, inBalanceI nSet(v, s),
between a value and a set of states (meaning that the
value is safely in the set);
For example, U nit1.2 has the effect of putting at stake the
value “safety of children”, a value of Mother Courage. The
representation includes the following elements:
• ChildrenSaf ety: constant representing the “safety of
children” value of Mother Courage;
• P reconditions1.2: constant that represents the set of
values that are valid before Unit 1.2;
• Ef f ects1.2: constant representing the set of values that
apply after Unit 1.2;
• StateSet(P reconditions1.2) and
StateSet(Ef f ects1.2): monadic predicates that
establish the type of the constants together;
• hasEf f ect(U nit1.2, Ef f ects1.2)
hasP recondition(U nit1.2, P reconditions1.2):
and
predicates that establish the relationship between the
unit and the two sets;
• binary predicate isM otivationF or(p, u): the action
plan p is a motivation for unit u.</p>
        <p>• concept, monadic predicate Agent(a).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>The characters and their values</title>
        <p>The characters, or agents, are the entities that have goals and
intend plans to achieve them:
• inBalanceInSet(ChildrenSaf ety, P reconditions1.2): Action plans are used by a character to achieve her/his goals.</p>
        <p>predicate that applies to preconditions; Plans can be implemented when certain preconditions are
• atStakeInSet(ChildrenSaf ety, Ef f ects1.2): predi- met, that is, situations or states that must be verified for the
cate that applies to effects. plan to be applied. In our case, as we have seen, the
preconditions concern values at stake: on the one hand, the plans
are designed to restore values put at stake, that is, the success
of the plan has the effect of restoring the value; on the other,
plans put at risk values that are in balance until some point.</p>
        <p>The additional elements needed to represent these aspects are
as follows:
In U nit1.2, Mother Courage and Recruiter are Agent
(Agent(M adreCourage) and Agent(Recruiter)). Each
character has values that help determine her/his behavior,
since they are brought into play (at stake or in balance) by
the events that occur:
• concept, monadic predicate, V alueEngaged(v);
• relationship, binary predicate, hasV alue(a, v);
• concept, monadic predicate, V alue(v).</p>
        <p>As we have seen before, the value of Mother Courage “safety
of children” leads her to defend them from recruiting for war;
U nit1.2, has the effect that Courage’s children risk being
recruited, i.e. that Courage’s value of children safety is put at
stake. Another value of Mother Courage is the “business”,
which leads her to negotiate a sale with the Brigadier in a unit
that follows U nit1.2; a value of the Brigadier is the
“obedience” (balanced), typical of military service; a value of the
Recruiter is the “patriotism” (balanced), which leads him to
convince people to go to war.</p>
        <p>In predicate logic:
• V alue(ChildrenSaf ety): the type of the constant</p>
        <p>“safety of children” of Mother Courage;
• Agent(M otherCourage): MotherCourage is of type</p>
        <p>Agent;
• hasV alue(M otherCourage, ChildrenSaf ety):</p>
        <p>predicate that relates Mother Courage and her value.</p>
        <p>The characters’ goals and the plans to achieve them
The intentions, or plans, of the characters are the engine of
the story, used in the deliberation process, when the character
decides what actions to uptake. The characters intend to
implement action plans and it can be said that a plan motivates
the occurrence of an event, that is, of a unit. The motivation
can be read in two ways, from the dynamic point of view,
considering the point of view of the author and the public,
respectively: on the one hand, the events in the unit arise from
the action plans of the characters; on the other, the intentions
attributed to the characters are the result of the interpretation
of the events.</p>
        <p>• monadic predicate ActionP lan(p): p is of the category</p>
        <p>ActionP lan;
• binary predicate intends(a, p): agent a intends the
action plan p;
• monadic predicate Goal(g): g is a goal (category Goal);
• binary predicate hasGoal(a, g): agent a has the goal g;
• binary predicate achieves(p, g): action plan p achieves</p>
        <p>goal g;
• binary predicate hasP recondition(p, s): the action</p>
        <p>plan p has the set of values s as a precondition;
• binary predicate hasEf f ect(p, s): the action plan p
re</p>
        <p>sults in the set of values s.</p>
        <p>For example, in U nit1.2, the interest of officers for Mother
Courage’s sons jeopardizes the “children safety” value for
Mother Courage; that is, the value at stake “children safety”
is a precondition of the plan‘ ‘to distract the attention of the
officers ”.</p>
        <p>For there to be a real change in value balancing, the
characters’ plans must succeed, that is, the actions set out in the
plan are executed and the plan achieves the goal. However, in
narratives, because of conflicts, the agents’ plans cannot all
succeed; in alternative, a plan could support the realization of
another plan, of the same character or of another character. In
logical terms:
• accomplished(p): plan p succeeded;
• unaccomplished(p): plan p did not succeed;
• inConf lictW ith(p1, p2): plan p1 is in conflict with</p>
        <p>plan p2;
• inSupportOf (p1, p2): plan p1 supports plan p2;.</p>
        <p>For example, Mother Courage’s plan to “ distract the
officers ” fails; instead, the Brigadier’s plan to “get the Recruiter
contact with Courage’s children” is successful; moreover,
Mother Courage’s plan to “distract the officers” is in
conflict with the Brigadier’s plan to “get the Recruiter contact
with Courage’s children”, while the Brigadier’s plan to “get
the Recruiter contact with Courage’s children” supports the
Recruiter’s plan to “recruit soldiers for the army”.
3</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>The emotion-appraisal calculus</title>
      <p>The emotions experienced by the characters represent a
crucial aspect of the narrative, because the emotional
connection allows the audience/reader to fully understand the
action that takes place and how the story develops. For
example, in U nit1.2,, Mother Courage experiences “fear” for her
children’s fate and “distress” for the failure of her distraction</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Narrative</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-2">
        <title>Perception</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-3">
        <title>Drammar Mental Objects</title>
        <p>Agents, Objects, Units(Events),
Plans(Intentional Actions), Values engaged</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-4">
        <title>Appraisal of</title>
        <p>situation</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-5">
        <title>Appraisal Variables of Narratives</title>
        <p>Intentional actions engaging values
Desiderability of events
Prospect relevance of events
Pleasantness of individuals
Liking of agents</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-6">
        <title>Rule-based</title>
        <p>computation</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-3-7">
        <title>Emotion types (22)</title>
        <p>plan, while the Brigadier feels “hope” for a possible
recruitment.</p>
        <p>The Drammar-OCC model assumes the flow in Fig. 2. The
narrative is encoded through a perception process in the
entities of the Drammar model, namely Agents, Objects, Units,
Plans, Values; the situation is appraised by the utility rules
that compute how plans engage values (making them safe or
putting them at stake), the prospect relevance of the events,
their desirability, and the pleasantness and liking of objects.
Finally, the rules for the computation of emotions (for each
agent in the narrative) are applied to compute the emotions
types that hold for some agent.</p>
        <p>In Fig. 3, we illustrate how Drammar-OCC computes the
emotions, with a decision tree representation format: starting
from the root, each path in the tree that arrives at some boxed
term represents an appraisal rule (multiple rules can fire in
parallel, since many emotions can be felt at the same time).
The root node sets the Agent a as the one that feels the
emotion(s) as a consequence of the rule execution (i.e., of the
appraisal). The next level tests whether the emotion is caused by
some Unit u that occurred (event appraised emotions), some
Object o (can also be an Agent) that can be P leasant or not
and that the Agent Likes or not (object appraised emotions),
some Action Plan p carried out by some agent (intentional
action appraised emotions).</p>
        <p>In the case of the event-appraised branch, 1) if the event is
desirable for an Agent b that a likes, a feels Happy f or
b; 2) if the event is desirable for an Agent b that a dislikes,
a feels Resentment for b; 3) if the event is undesirable for
an Agent b that a likes, a feels P ity for b; 4) if the event is
undesirable for an Agent b that a dislikes, a feels Gloating
for b. Yet in the case of the event-appraised branch, if Agent a
appraises the current unit as prospect relevant (i.e., somewhat
related to her/him), then 5) if the event is desirable for a, then
a feels Hope, which, in case the perspective is confirmed,
generates 6) Satisf action, otherwise 7) Disappointment;
8) if the event is undesirable for a, then a feels F ear, which,
in case the perspective is confirmed, generates 9) F ear
conf irmed, otherwise 10) Relief . Also, in general, 11) if
the event is desirable for a, a feels J oy; 12) if the event is
undesirable for a, a feels Distress.</p>
        <p>In the case of the object-appraised branch, 13) if the object
o is generally judged pleasant and is liked by Agent a, then
a feels Love for o; 14) if the object o is generally judged
unpleasant and is disliked by Agent a, then a feels Hate for
o.</p>
        <p>In the case of the intentional action-appraised branch, 15)
if the intentional action Plan p is intended by the same Agent
a and p makes safe a value of the agent put at stake, a feels
P ride; 16) if the intentional action Plan p is intended by the
same Agent a and p puts at stake a value of the agent, a feels
Shame; 17) if the intentional action Plan p is intended by
another Agent b and p makes safe a value of the agent a put at
stake, a feels Admiration for b; 18) if the intentional action
Plan p is intended by another Agent b and p puts at stake a
value of the agent a, a feels Reproach for b.</p>
        <p>Finally, there are four compound emotions: 19) if Agent
a feels both J oy and P ride, then a feels Gratif ication;
20) if Agent a feels both Distress and Shame, then a feels
Remorse; 21) if Agent a feels both J oy and Admiration,
then a feels Gratitude for b; 22) if Agent a feels both
Distress and Reproach, then a feels Anger for b.</p>
        <p>Now we show some rules for the appraisal of a
situation and the calculation of emotions from the example unit
above. The encoding of a unit that is relevant in
perspective (P rospectRelevant(u, a, pa)) is the following: an
event/unit u that is considered relevant in perspective for an
agent a because it is in support of or in conflict with a plan pa
of an agent a that can be implemented in the future; that is,
for each agent a, for each event u, if the event is motivated by
a p plan in support of or in conflict with a pa plan of a that
is not yet realized, then u is relevant in perspective for a, in
relation to the pa plan. In particular, for the conflict case, we
have:
^ isM otivationF or(p, u) ^ inConf lictW ith(p, pa)
(1)
^ intends(a, pa) ^ accomplished(pa, f alse)
)</p>
        <p>P rospectRelevant(u, a, pa)
The encoding of a unit that is undesirable for the agent
(U ndesirable(u, a)) is the following: an event/unit u that
is considered undesirable for an agent a because it conflicts
with agent a plan; that is, for each agent a, for each event u
motivated by a plan p or for each plan p, if the p plan conflicts
with a pa plan of a, then u is undesirable for a.</p>
        <p>… for each event Unit u …
… IF Unit u is
DESIDERABLE
for Agent b …</p>
        <p>… IF Unit u is
UNDESIDERABLE
for Agent b …
For each object o …
PLEASANT? LIKE?
Y,Y N,N
ATgHeEnNta ATgHenENta
feels feels</p>
        <p>LOVE HATE
… and Unit u is
DESIDERABLE
for Agent a …</p>
        <p>Y
THEN
Agent a
feels
HOPE
N</p>
        <p>N
THEN
Agent a
feels
FEAR
Y</p>
        <p>N
PERSPECTIVE
confirmed</p>
        <p>PERSPECTIVE
confirmed
… and Unit u is
DESIDERABLE
for Agent a …</p>
        <p>Y
THEN
Agent a
feels
JOY</p>
        <p>N
THEN
Agent a
feels
DISTRESS</p>
        <p>… and … and
Intentional Intentional
Action p Action p
balances a puts at stake
Value v of a Value v of
Agent a Agent a
THEN
Agent a
feels
PRIDE</p>
        <p>THEN
Agent a
feels
SHAME</p>
        <p>… and
Intentional
Action p
balances a
Value v of
Agent a
THEN
Agent a
feels
ADMIRATION</p>
        <p>… and
Intentional</p>
        <p>Action p
puts at stake
a Value v of
Agent a</p>
        <p>THEN
Agent a
feels
REPROACH
THEN
Agent a
feels
SATISFACTION</p>
        <p>THEN
Agent a
feels
DISAPPOINTMENT</p>
        <p>THEN
Agent a
feels
FEAR-CONFIRMED</p>
        <p>THEN
Agent a
feels
RELIEF</p>
        <p>THEN
Agent a
feels
GRATIFICATION</p>
        <p>MToHEtNher CouTrHaENge feelsTHDENistress and Fear
RAEMgfeeeOnltRsSaE GRAAgfTeeIenTltUsaDE AAgfNeeGenlEtsRa
^ intends(a, pa) ^ inConf lictW ith(p, pa)
) U ndesirable(u, a)
The calculation of emotion Fear follows from this definition:
being sorry, suffering, for the prospect, future occurrence of
an event that is NOT desirable for some agent; that is, for
each agent a, if the event u, which is relevant in perspective
for the agent a given some intentional plan p, which is NOT
desirable for the agent a, then a feel the emotion of Fear.</p>
        <p>Agent(a) ^ U nit(u) ^ P lan(p)
^ P rospectRelevant(u, a, p) ^ U ndesirable(p, a) (3)
) F eel(a, F ear)
Given the predicates above and the added predicates here
below, we can compute the emotion Fear for Mother Courage
by applying the Modus Ponens inference.</p>
        <p>U nit(U nit1.3MC ) ^ P lan(P M C ContinueOnP ath) ^
inConf lictW ith(P B ContactCourageSons,
P M C ContinueOnP ath) ^
isM otivationF or(P M C ContinueOnP ath, U nit1.3MC )</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4 Conclusions</title>
      <p>The paper has presented a computational model for the
generation of characters’ emotions in a narrative. The model
descends from the well-known OCC theory of emotion
appraisal and its encoded into logic clauses that are
implemented through a standard reasoner, and applied to a
fragment of a dramatic narrative. We are going to apply the
model to a whole narrative (beyond the excerpt limits) and
to validate the model with the comparison with human
annotations.In particular, we are going to test the knowledge that
the participants have of the emotion types.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>The authors like to thank Rossana Damiano for her comments
on Beatrice Osella’s thesis.</p>
    </sec>
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