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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>DIGITAL ARTIFICIAL COMPOSERS: ISSUES OF AESTHETIC VALUE, CULTURAL MEANINGS, CREATIVITY, AND ONTOLOGY</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>May Kokkidou</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Zoe Dionyssiou</string-name>
          <email>dionyssiou@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Adjunct Lecturer, European University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Cyprus, Assistant Professor</addr-line>
          ,
          <institution>Ionian University, Department of Music Studies</institution>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>Digital artificial composing is a new field of musical creation. Artificial composers do not mean to replace humans, but are new technological tools that support algorithmbased musical creation. However, many questions arise especially with respect to music creativity, music aesthetics and music education. The aim of the paper is to critically present and discuss the new scene in the field of musical composition regarding the digital artificial composers, taking three case studies: David Cope's creations Emily Howell and EMI, and Mellomics, created by a team from the University of Malaga. Our suggestion is that we cannot conceptualize this new way of music creation without thinking of the aesthetic context of production, issues of intellectual property, creativity, ontology and related cultural meanings and aesthetic values. Music is defined as a uniquely human phenomenon, according to the anthropological perspective proposed by Alan Merriam (1964), who defined music as “a product of human behavior in time and space” (p. 7). Moreover, every music form corresponds with structures in society, as music “exists only in terms of social interaction” (p. 27). Yet, in the last decades the new digital affordances have transformed the above conceptions and traditional status of musical creation. Recently, computers offer new possibilities for music creation through advanced softwares, presented as artificial composers, who are able to take on complex musical tasks, such as composing, arranging, orchestrating, transforming a musical piece into various styles, inventing new sounds, and so on. Artificial composers were not created to replace real people, but are new technological tools that change or extend the processes of musical creation. However, many questions arise, especially with respect to musical creativity, music sociology, and music aesthetics. Can artificial music be valued [evaluated] by the same criteria and within the same system that measures the value of human music? Who is the author of such works? Is that kind of music a social product and manifestation of culture? What about the 'fair use' of musical data that inform the computer database? What kinds of skills are required to produce such music? What kind of meaning resides in such musical</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>artificial composers</kwd>
        <kwd>creativity</kwd>
        <kwd>ontology</kwd>
        <kwd>aesthetic value</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>forms?</p>
      <p>Our paper attempts to critically present and discuss the new scene in the field
of musical creation by artificial composers, and to cover some concerns taking three
case studies: David Cope’s Emily Howell and EMI, a n d Mellomics, created by a
team at the University of Málaga. Artificial composers create aesthetic, ethical, and
philosophical-ontological concerns. It will take considerable time before the symbolic,
cultural and musical-aesthetic perspectives associated with these new technologies
become fully understood.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Technological evolution and music</title>
      <p>
        One of the most important developments in the history of music was the invention of
digital audio production. Since Edison’s first recording in 1877 –and the following
changes from wax cylinders, vinyl, to compact discs, MIDI files, and mp3– technology
has transformed music production, reception, and dissemination
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">(Mueller et al., 2017)</xref>
        .
Humans are currently interested in building machines that mimic their music abilities
and can perform complex music tasks.
      </p>
      <p>
        The new digital environment has influenced the traditional perception of the
definition of the musician. While some believe that musical creation has benefited
considerably by digital tools, others reject this idea and continue to use traditional ways
in composing their music. Thus it is important to understand how digital media have
influenced musical creation and the production-reception- dissemination of music as a
whole. Technology is both an agent and a medium in today’s musical experiences.
Technology creates music, it mediates music, and it allows us to interact with music
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(van Elferen, 2009, p. 130)</xref>
        ; it has brought considerable changes to the quality of sound
and determines musical experiences. This has led to the formation of ‘digital aesthetics’,
which stands opposed to the ‘analog aesthetics’ of the previous decades (Moseley,
2016).
      </p>
      <p>
        The new generation of composers is the first one that creates within the digital
revolution. A musician in today’s world of music software differs a lot from the
musician of the past, as “the dividing lines between the composer, the arranger, the
performer, the studio engineer, and even the listener are becoming much less clear-cut”
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">(Hargreaves, Marshall &amp; North, 2003: 149)</xref>
        . For digital musicians, acoustic awareness
–the ability to listen to music widely and accurately and to understand how the
sound behaves in space and time– is becoming increasingly important. Similarly, skills
and knowledge about technology, such as sound recording, mixing, remixing, etc. are
also crucial. Tasks, which until recently required a group of skilled people with
professional knowledge, can now be managed by only one person, in most cases, the
music creator. Musicians are now able to have their own personal home studio for sound
manipulation and recording. This is a new culture of musical creation.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Artificial music composers</title>
      <p>What exactly is an artificial composer? In fact, it is a computer program that composes
music based on algorithms, a set of rules and instructions for composition. The program
receives input and manipulates it in human-like ways; it analyzes the material using
deep neural networks, combines information, and forms a final product. Algorithms
are designed to make decisions. Algorithms, based on probability equations, were used
in most works by Iannis Xenakis. It seems that, among other things, technology breaks
down the myth that creativity is purely human.</p>
      <p>
        Computers can execute every task formulated in a language their hardcore
understands. They use a modular language, like the human one. Most works by artificial
composers are based on audio input material while the programmer is the one who
designates the result.There are softwares, such as Max/ MSP/ Jitter, that allow users to
manage input tones and transform them into new sounds that can be changed further.
Namely, according to the artificial composer’s programs, one may feed an idea into the
computer and get a final output. Then they can manage this material as they want:
elaborate it, modify, reverse or expand it, add various effects and so on. Algorithms for
artificial synthesis can work in many ways. In one sense, the artificial composer learns
almost like a human composer: it ‘learns’ the rules of composition, the physical
constraints of the instruments, the most usual combinations that fit a particular style
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Farrell, 2015)</xref>
        . At any rate, the question we may ask is: should artificial composers be
considered and evaluated as human composers?
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Artificial composers, three cases: Emily Howell, EMI, and Melomics</title>
      <p>
        We will discuss some examples of digital artificial composers. Emily Howell and EMI
are two new music composers, or a ‘new kind’ of composers, two artificial composers,
created by David Cope, composer and emeritus professor of music. The idea started in
1990 and was completed in 2003. Cope has created two artificial composers that follow
two different algorithmic methods. The first method (used in EMI) involves the analysis
of musical examples for motifs, rules and similarities, and the use of this data to create
new original content in the style of a composer. Similarly, as
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">Farrell (2015)</xref>
        observes,
one could analyze Shakespeare’s sonnets to identify the similarities in their underlying
structures and their content, and then they can use those rules to create a new
Shakespearean-style sonnet. The second method (used in Emily Howell) uses external
association networks that give a ‘response’ and automatically receive external feedback
as to whether or not the result produced is appropriate and acceptable. Cope’s creations
are some of the most well-known cases of artificial composers, with Emily Howell seen
as the most successful. Composers’ programs have allowed Cope to create hundreds of
tracks within few minutes
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Muscutt, 2007, p. 12)</xref>
        and choose the best version.
      </p>
      <p>
        Prior to Emily Howell, Cope created Emmy following the initials of EMI
(Experiments in Musical Intelligence), which was less active, based on his first method
of analytical approach. EMI could imitate famous composers like Bach and Mozart,
analyzing thousands of their works and finding similarities within them. In an interview
to Keith
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">Muscutt (2007)</xref>
        , Cope was asked about how he felt that EMI’s music could
compete with real composers. Cope responded that it is not an issue about
machineversus-man, but one about a man with pen and paper versus a man with algorithmic
rules. He also added that he is a human who creates music using his software tools
claiming: “m y programs follow my instructions in producing what would have taken
me several hundred or even a thousand times longer to create”
(p. 13). Hence, he considers EMI not as an autonomous entity but as an extension of
his own compositional abilities. It is him who provides the music input for EMI in order
to create music and customizes the algorithm to have the desired result. It is him who
has the final word on whether the result is satisfactory. The result is not what the
computer proposes, but what Cope wants.
      </p>
      <p>
        Emily is scheduled to create music according to feedback received from Cope.
Therefore, Emily’s compositions follow the associations network model that requires
programmer’s approval. Emily’s music has received positive critique by some reviewers
though it has been criticized by others as “bland, chordal sequences [...] like a child
with technical skills that tries to copy Beethoven or Bach, or even Michael Nyman on a
bad day: it is good for elevator, and not for a concert hall”
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Ball, 2014)</xref>
        . The radio
producer Fred Childs, who heard Howell’s compositions, said that if he did not know
that this was the result of a computer program, he could think it was the work of
someone who might not be a great composer, but with many interesting ideas
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Farrell,
2015)</xref>
        . While Emily is labelled as a ‘person’, Cope believes that “computers simply obey
their programmers’ commands. [...] Computers are tools, nothing more, nothing less”
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">(Muscutt, 2007, p. 19)</xref>
        . EMI and Emily are tools that Cope uses for speeding up
the process of composition
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Farrell, 2015)</xref>
        . Although those artificial composers produce
and combine sounds, Cope is the one who has control over the starting point and the
final result of music.
      </p>
      <p>
        There are other artificial composers that work with different algorithms. The
Melomics program is a compositional algorithm developed by a team at the University
of Málaga in Spain, based on a biological evolution approach. According to the
designers, for the creation of Melomics, nearly a thousand rules were coded to determine
the environment for music creation. As opposed to Cope’s algorithms, Melomics does
not depend on musical data of other projects, which allows those who use it to create
unique works of any kind, as the system is programmed with sufficient data to manage
the species without relying on human interaction
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Farrell, 2015)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Two artificial composers are using the Melomics: Iamus and Melomics109. Iamus
was named after the mythical son of Apollo, who could speak the language of birds.
It was activated in September 2010 and composes pieces in the Western art music
canon. According to the Melomics algorithm, Iamus takes a piece of music, transforms
it and checks for changes that are consistent with certain rules. The best products keep
changing, allowing the most appropriate pieces to continue to evolve until all conditions
are met and complete compositions are created
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">(Ball, 2014)</xref>
        . These compositions are not
based on human feedback, as in Emily. Iamus works autonomously to create original
music. The only input is what is usually provided by a human composer or by a group,
guiding orchestration and duration. The rest is 100% automatic. Melomics109 is
directed towards modern popular music and was activated in November 2013. It is more
commercial in the sense that it can produce mainstream music. The head of the
Melomics project, Francisco Vico, has said that this project could “democratize the
music” as everyone can produce music just like as everyone can shoot great photos. So
there will be many more musicians
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">(Farrell, 2015)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>All the above seem exciting and promising. However, the idea of an artificial
composer is not only a technological challenge, as it has musical and moral dimensions.
Concerning music itself, the ‘mathematical correctness’ can be considered as both an
advantage and a disadvantage. Surprisingly, today many are trying to create softwares
to give a feeling of warmth in digital music. Regarding artificial composers, one can ask
whether what we hear is the sound of the machine, and how this machine music
challenges the borders of human music as we know it.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Artificial Composers: issues of aesthetic value and cultural meanings</title>
      <p>
        What values are articulated in artificial compositions? What meanings reside in such
musical forms? Is it possible to detect the cultural connotations of such music? For
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">Hainge (2016)</xref>
        , a piece generated by a non-human agentic force “is music since the
sound produced results from a certain aesthetic and thus human disposition [...], even if
direct agency over the actual sound produced is surrendered” (p. 215). However, “the
use of generative algorithms to produce sound raises different issues since the human
agent is involved only in the design of a sound-producing assemblage” (p. 211).
      </p>
      <p>Confusion increases by the fact that human music and machine/artificial music
cannot be placed within the same value system and aesthetic continuum, because they
come from, and thus represent, different systems of thinking. In the case of human
creation the music work is the product. In artificially composed music, the software is
the product. This kind of music forces the listener to perceive disembodied sounds,
sounds without any origin whose creator seems to be technology itself. For van Elferen
(2009), such music works represent the blurring of boundaries between the once clearly
designated realms of humans and machines, between human and non-human musical
agencies. They are free from the constraints of materiality as they exist as numeric data.
Equally significant are the ways artificial composers negotiate the complex musical forms
of the past. “Emanating from the field of performance studies, recent debates over the
ontology of audiovisual materials and their functions as reenactment of memories of the
past have given rise to new formulations of relations between archive and repertoire,
text and performance, event and trace” (Moseley, 2016, p.37).</p>
      <p>Trying to understand how artificial composers “work”, we tried to examine some
new aesthetic dimensions. When we listen to this music, does it create meanings and
emotions? Our suggestion is that the knowledge about the ontology of music has
aesthetic implications. The process by which music works are created may influence
aesthetic evaluation. Although the products of artificial composers and algorithm-based
music have certain musical qualities, it is rather hard to determine if those qualities can
be considered as music in human terms and have aesthetic value. In short, we claim that
if one is not able to recognize the ontological category, which a music piece belongs
to, it may be difficult for them to have a fully aesthetic experience. This can be
connected to Green’s (1988) theory about the two types of musical meanings:
a) inherent meaning (resulting from music syntax or patterns created from the
organization of sounds) and b) delineated meanings (extra musical meanings associated
with social, cultural, political and personal use of music). In the case
of artificial composers, the connection between inherent and delineated meanings
is ambiguous and may result in musical alienation between the listener and the music.</p>
      <p>Given that artificial composers are not free to break the rules and overcome the
constraints of an aesthetic canon, we cannot conceive their outcomes in terms of
reflection, musical skills, and aesthetic awareness. The meaning of such music may lie
in our willingness to see issues of creativity, authenticity, ontology, and culture in
new ways. Conceiving artificial composers as cultural-musical agents, we may ask
whether they formulate the aesthetic protocol of the future.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Artificial composers: issues of creativity</title>
      <p>
        Can only men create music? Can artificial composers be considered as creators? What
about the medium? How can we define these creative procedures? Is this kind of music
valuable enough to be delivered to the next generations? Thinking about creativity, we
usually consider the exploration of new possibilities and the negotiation of materials,
media, or ideas in order to make something new, in response to new situations.
Creativity emerges when we see the world from a new point of view and it is related to
open-mindedness, reasoning, imagination, and intention to reach a desirable end. It
has long been seen as an ability to produce original and useful works.
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">Seltzer and
Bentley (1999)</xref>
        suggest that creativity is the application of knowledge and skills in new
ways to achieve a valued goal.
      </p>
      <p>Within the field of arts and music, creators combine various components, following
or breaking certain rules, and using tools, techniques, and materials within an aesthetic
tradition. They make aesthetic choices in order to express ideas, emotions, and personal
experiences; they use their imagination and reasoning. During creative processes, new
possibilities may arise in response to culture. More abstractly, we can think of creativity
as a complex encounter of self and the world.</p>
      <p>
        Musical creativity is a concept, which has had various meanings over time as it
highly depends on the context. These changes represent shifts in the conception of
individual agency, expressiveness, aesthetic values, and meaning. So, what happens to
the idea of “creativity” when it has to do with tools, which have been elaborated and
extended into softwares? Is it still valid to talk about creativity at all? According to
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">Farrell (2015)</xref>
        , those questions are divisive. It is clear that artificial composers, such as
Emily, Iamus, etc., were not created to replace physical composers; they are new
technological tools that change or extend the process of musical creation.
      </p>
      <p>Creativity cannot be divorced from the context in which it is displayed. With regard
to artificial composers, one option is to consider creativity in relation to both humanistic
and technological terms. Obviously, computers do not create anything by themselves.
Without human skills to set them in motion, computers accomplish nothing by way of
innovative outputs, at least in terms of human creativity. Their operations are always
restricted and never get beyond thisstage. On the other hand, we must acknowledge the
fact that artificial composers’ programs offer a new world of possibilities for creative
people who want to explore the secrets of musical synthesis.</p>
      <p>
        David Cope (1991) refuses to problematize the term “creativity”, viewing it simply
as the utilization of particular patterns. It is convenient for him to avoid other
values, which do not fit in his computational creativity. What was Cope’s thinking and
motivations for the construction of Emily and EMI?
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">Cope (2005)</xref>
        responds that: a)
machine programs can create, b) the quality of music has nothing to do with who or
what created it, and c) the only limit to what machines can do is the limit of what we as
humans can do with machines (pp. 370-371).
      </p>
      <p>Yet, Cope seems to ignore that humans do not just solve music problems. They also
seek problems; reflect on their compositions, question their ideas, re-think and re-write
certain melodic or harmonic passages. Instead of just merely applying compositional
rules, they break rules seeking for new techniques and aesthetic principles. The final
product incorporates all decisions the artist has made during the creative process. In this
context, the computers’ creative effectiveness should be questioned, because the music
they produce is strictly determined by mathematical laws: the combination of sounds
and the musical procedures is totally determined in advance. This aligns with the
Pythagorean and Hegelian notion of music in which the relations between the notes in
any musical piece are purely abstract –governed by mathematical laws.</p>
      <p>In our view, the mechanism and ecology of the system guide the creativity of
artificial composers and designate the result. The fact is that the system can only select
one object from a closed set of objects. It lacks human capacity for intention and
contemplation. The computational logic of music works against the idea of imaginative
play resulting in the construction of a fixed meaning. Equally importantly, the
constraints of the musical material do not allow the emotive and social coding (as is
held to be the case for the human music). Hence, this music seems to be generative
without being creative.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Artificial composers: issues of ontology</title>
      <p>For many decades, the ontology of musical works has gained attention among
philosophers. By ontology we mean the nature of music phenomena, the music practices,
and the musical material. Ontology is associated to the function of music procedures
and performances in social contexts. The aesthetic-ontological problem about artificial
music has to do with its originality and its authorization.</p>
      <p>
        Debates about the ontology of music are parts of broader philosophical discussions.
It is useful to remember that music is not only a physical acoustic object but, as Arnold
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">Berleant (2009)</xref>
        articulates, “a social phenomenon involving a community of composers,
performers, and listeners and that it has a history of performance practice and of
valuing.” (p. 57). These topics are part of a wider discussion about the ontology of
musical creation that includes positions such as what is and what is not music. Can
music be disembodied and cut off from the social practices and human functions
associated with it?
      </p>
      <p>
        Greg
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">Hainge (2016)</xref>
        poses an interesting question: What happens if we turn to
the question of how sounds produced by non-human agents might be perceived by a
listener not aware of how the sounds were generated? (p. 214). According to him, the
answer depends on whether we are talking about “the ontology of music at the point
of production or the point of reception, given that music is a complex ontological
substance that is expressed in different modes”. The question that emerges
has as follows: can we make aesthetic judgments in complete ignorance of the ontology
of music?
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">Young (2014)</xref>
        proposes that ontological judgments about works of music
may have meta-aesthetic implications. “The possibility that ontological judgments have
meta-aesthetic consequences remains open. […] Meta-aesthetic judgments are
judgments about what sorts of aesthetic judgments are possible and the form that they
take if they are possible. [...] Which aesthetic judgments can be true depends on what
sorts of aesthetic properties exist.”
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref14">(Young, 2014, p. 7)</xref>
        .
      </p>
      <p>
        Many theorists argue that we live in an age of technocultural crisis in which the
presence of nonhuman agents has rendered our familiar world uncanny
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">(van Elferen,
2009, p. 124)</xref>
        . As with all technological advances, artificial composers seem terrifying
to those who believe that artists are threatened by machines. Still, there is a risk that the
market will be flooded with non-human works and new aesthetic criteria will be formed
regarding the understanding and appreciation of music.
      </p>
      <p>Concluding, the aesthetic and material limits of the artificial composers stand as
evidence for their ontological blurriness. In other words, they resist ontological
foundation: their existence relies on their being contextualized as such. If we accept the
fact that music can only be understood in terms of the culture and society in which it
is created, artificial composers’ products should be understood in terms of execution in
the context of computation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>Artificial composers are probably a temporary phenomenon that may soon expire. Or,
they may further develop if we invent advanced computational tools and techniques by
trained programmers and software developers. We do not claim that such endeavors will
eventually lose their energy and interest. Yet, the main questions still remain: Could
these products meet or even outplay and replace the human music? From the
perspective of music education we may ask: Does the use of such music signify practices
for certain kinds of social function? Should we prepare students for careers in this field?
What can artificial composers teach to music students? Should we support our students
to develop skills to design or interact with such programs?</p>
      <p>The conflict between artificial and human intelligence arises as these concepts
appear in different scientific fields. In the larger picture, this probably indicates one of
the several symptoms of a society obsessed with technological changes. In such context,
music acquires a symbolic quality to be interpreted in light of modernistic faith of
‘progress’ and ‘innovation’.</p>
      <p>Our suggestion is that we cannot conceptualize artificial composers’ music without
thinking of the aesthetic and ethical context of production, issues of intellectual property,
and their complex and contingent conjunctions. This music is almost liminal regarding
notions of human mind, values, and culture. The mathematical rules impose a kind of
music that does not allow for playing with sounds imaginatively and emotionally. It
seems that artificial composers make us believe that interpreting authenticity and
aesthetic values is obsolete. Their compositions wish to function as symbols of digital
culture. In our view, the final products are open to critique and things can become
political or ethical. Music that could elicit a positive response may as well
not be accepted by the same people if they are aware that a machine produces it. A
critical analysis of the terms of music reception and the connotations music bears is
the only way to understand its dynamic for the audience. The future might provide a full
account for these issues. Time will tell.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
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