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    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Workshop on Deep Models and Artificial Intelligence for Defense Applications:
Potentials, Theories, Practices, Tools, and Risks, November</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>“ The Holistic Battlespace: Why the Key to Resilience for AI/ML Algorithms is to Leverage Complexity Science”.</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>By Dr. Joe Schaff</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Mission Systems</string-name>
        </contrib>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2020</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <fpage>1</fpage>
      <lpage>12</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Disclaimer: The work and related approaches in these slides are the opinions of the author, and do not reflect any policy, methods or Joe Schaff, NAVAIR / NAWCAD Mission Systems</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>approaches used by the US government.
1.
2.</p>
      <p>Exploit the weaknesses of an adversary’s environmental dependencies.</p>
      <p>Strengthen the dominant position by protecting key environmental factors.
• Currently, a battlespace consists of a heterogeneous mix of humans and
machines, some with intelligent autonomous systems.
• Looking forward, the majority will be intelligent autonomy.
• Either of these will have a dependency on the judicious use of information –
there will not be complete, but only limited data.
• To win, a dominant force needs to have awareness of its general objectives,
the force laydown of both sides and any significant changes that may occur.
• Information can and should be communicated in a narrow channel as nature
does – i.e. stigmergy.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Emergence</title>
      <p>• Ecosystem- or Battlespace-sized interactions will by default have unexpected
(emergent) behaviors.
• Intelligent autonomous systems (or Complex Adaptive Systems = CAS) will
need to rapidly learn and adapt to their dynamically changing environment.</p>
      <p>Effective learning must occur with limited experiences.
• Below is a list of some key issues with ML in general:
1.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>The need for adequate (i.e. massive) number of samples for comprehensive</title>
        <p>training.
2. Long time scales for adaptive learning, partially due to massive sample size.
3.
4.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Large computational resources needed for training.</title>
        <p>Brittleness due to lack of resilience, emergent misclassifications, and overfitting.
• Most of these are significantly different from human limitations. Let’s look
at the holistic picture to see how we can address some of these:</p>
        <p>Massive embedded mobile ad-hoc (MANET) radios create the “smart swarm”.
• Both humans and machines, referred to as “entities” communicate = interactions.
• Entities are heterogeneous and need to self-organize and be cognizant of order.
• Mathematically equivalent problem whether you assume either radios or UAVs.
2. Entities each can consist of one or more components.</p>
        <p>• Components need to be resilient to attacks – i.e. self-healing and resistant.
• Components are “smart components” that embed AI / ML to augment sensor and route
planning capabilities. World model is the abstract “awareness”.
• What does ETE look like at different scales (1 &amp; 2 above)?
• Battlespace by necessity must be complex.</p>
        <p>• Attempts to over-simplify result in easily targetable entities.
• Emergent behaviors will occur whether you want them</p>
        <p>or not.
• Best choice: “when you can’t beat ‘em, join ‘em”:
• leverage these behaviors to produce tactical advantages.
• Use these to create self-healing resilient networks.
• Use the “creativity” that can emerge from nonlinear</p>
        <p>classifiers in AI.
• Choose wisely where you use emergent aspects of</p>
        <p>complexity, how you apply AI.
• Constrain other systems / components as needed to</p>
        <p>make best use – e.g. formal methods.
• Be the “lion tamer” of complexity to gain winning
tactical advantages.</p>
        <p>Joe Schaff, NAVAIR / NAWCAD Mission Systems</p>
        <p>DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-1">
          <title>Components</title>
          <p>(Red = degree of complexity being used)
Massive
Swarms</p>
          <p>Platforms</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-2">
          <title>Platform</title>
          <p>Components
(use of AI/ML)
Swarm Cloud (10,000’s objects)
Platform Component Architecture</p>
          <p>Swarm
Technology Overlap: #1 – Massive Smart Swarm:
Self-organizing mathematics = uses ”deterministic chaos”
Video: https://youtu.be/iggsygNPEnU</p>
          <p>How Can This Possibly Work?
• Randomly generated, but constrained topology.
• Does translation / rotation (mathematically = affine transformation).
• Implicitly self-similar.
• Computationally simple math
• iterations (Iterated Function System = IFS).
• In this particular function only one float multiplication per iteration: e.g. for
determining the topological layout of 10,000 entities, would be 10KFLOPs.
• Any IoT / edge device would have computational power to get topological
picture of battlespace / other in milliseconds or faster (e.g. ESP32 = 400µsec).
• So, what do we do with this? Distributed C2 / Resilient comms in
denied environments? Control massive swarms?
How
Human Immersion
into Battlespace:
1) Put on Oculus / other</p>
          <p>headset
2) Link controls (BCI /
other) to one of the UxVs
in proximity circle.
3) Pass token to first one to
respond / arbitrary
choice.
4) View what it “sees”, and</p>
          <p>fly in its “world”.
5) Handoff token when
done / other location
needed.</p>
          <p>OK, but what is it???
Further details can be found in the chapter I wrote (Leveraging Deterministic Chaos to
Mitigate Combinatorial Explosions) for the book “Engineering Emergence: A Modeling
and Simulation Approach”, CRC Press ⓒ2019.</p>
          <p>Trust:
decisions</p>
          <p>Cyber
Architecture for cyber-hardened smart components to learn &amp;
adapt while creating a greater trust in their autonomous
• Trust and resilience go</p>
          <p>hand-in-hand.
• Must merge Cyber and</p>
          <p>A.I. holistically.
• Must allow free-reign of</p>
          <p>A.I. (i.e. creativity) but
use effective resiliency
constraints.
• Meta-reasoning to
prevent A.I. algorithms
from being deceived.</p>
          <p>Resilience &amp;
the desired
attributes of
behaviors
creates trust.</p>
          <p>Patent disclosure was
submitted and
presented to Invention</p>
          <p>Evaluation Board
Adversarial AI: Natural Adversarial</p>
          <p>Examples*
• Natural adversarial examples from IMAGENET-A. The red text is a ResNet-50
prediction with its confidence, and the black text is the actual class.
* from: arXiv:1907.07174v2 [cs.LG] 18 Jul 2019</p>
          <p>How do we avoid some of these issues?
• We may never be able to design “foolproof” resilience into a system.
• There are good strategies to limit some of the weaknesses in AI/ML.
• Some aspects of transfer learning – IF the data is “clean” to begin
with: “An Empirical Evaluation of Adversarial Robustness under
Transfer Learning”
• Others may not be avoidable if data is “poisoned”. See: Poison frogs.
• First steps: Architecting trustworthy resilience and validating these
architectures
DARPA started the Assured Autonomy program.
• This program looks at the methods for some AI / ML validation, but does not
look at the battlespace “Big Picture”.
• Early stage - Focused on AI/ML specifically.
• Funding academic research for verifying /validating performance aspects of
primarily NNs
• Example:
• VerifAI/SCENIC = toolkit for design/analysis of AI systems (SCENIC=probabilistic</p>
          <p>programming language). D. Fremont, et.al, UCal Berkeley.
• Study uses Grand Theft Auto 5 (GTA5).</p>
          <p>• Download software here: https://github.com/BerkeleyLearnVerify/VerifAI
• Many more examples available from other schools.
• Formal Methods Approaches are frequently used.
Formal Methods for Trust(?)…but it doesn’t Scale
well…</p>
          <p>Can it work with “smart components”?
• Sometimes- complexity may rule it out</p>
          <p>Component Architecture Background
*Architectures have been designed in the past that address some
but not all of these. Below are some of the attributes of the
proposed architectural approach:
• 1. Is able to use heterogeneous AI/ML technologies.
• 2. Mitigates shortfalls in specific vision/other algorithms.
• 3. Does meta-reasoning (cognitive architecture).
• 4. Is Cyber-resilient.
• 5. Is fully scalable from low-cost expendable to high value platform.
• 6. Has a fully open architecture in hardware and software.</p>
          <p>• 7. Allows exploration of algorithm internals for AI/ML and cyber analysis.
• * Note: “architecture” is clearly an overloaded word - if you don’t like the
word “architecture”, replace it with “framework”.
Quick Fix for Minimal Data and “basic” Rapid</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Learning</title>
      <p>• What about DLNN issues:</p>
      <p>adequate (i.e. massive) number of samples for comprehensive training?</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Short time scale for adaptive learning?</title>
        <p>• Transfer learning: take the trained weights / other parameters for similar
NN trained on similar problem, load into new NN.</p>
        <p>• Issues include: is the problem domain sufficiently similar? Does this limit the item
classified to only those close / exact enough to original training data (i.e.</p>
        <p>overfitting)?
• Better way: Use “helper” algorithms and mathematical functions as coarse
classifiers to “pre-train” the DLNN.</p>
        <p>• Helper algorithms can work in a complementary manner with algorithms that are
more accurate but challenging to train / adapt.
• More than just ensemble classifiers = these are matched complementary sets. The
sets can also be combined with other classifiers for an ensemble.
Build a Scalable Prototype for ML &amp; Cyber, and</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Future Advanced Threats.</title>
      <p>Real-time Convolutional Neural Networks for
Emotion and Gender Classification (academic pub.)
Every row starting from the top corresponds respectively to
the emotions {e.g. “angry”, “happy”, “sad”, “surprise”, …}
Both left &amp; right blocks represent same pictures.</p>
      <p>Right=convolved using backpropagation variant algorithm.</p>
      <p>Prototype for
expendable
robot with
deep-learning
vision / object
recognition.</p>
      <p>Cost:
&lt;$300.
From Prototype to Production: Overlaying a</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Technology Transition Architecture</title>
      <p>Even if the ETE architecture is incomplete, now is the time to design a
“universal” production system designed for adaptation and validation.</p>
      <p>Questions to be asked:
1. Is the research current state of the art?</p>
      <p>Who is doing various parts of this research?
How do we avoid the “valley of death” common to research transition?
Can information flow effectively to / from researchers and customers?
What conduits exist for resilient &amp; consistent software to transition to
customer use cases?
Enhanced DevSecOps = researchers, tools, taxonomy conduits, secure
containers.</p>
      <p>Taxonomy
conduits</p>
      <p>Prototype ready</p>
      <p>for customer
Customer Use</p>
      <p>Cases:</p>
      <p>Connected via
automated UML
generated from
selected software
containers
Researchers</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Issues and What’s Next?</title>
      <p>The “big picture” is currently incomplete:
• Segments of the ETE architecture exist, satisfy some gaps.
• Other gaps exist: both known and unknown.
• Where does complexity provide advantages? Where are deterministic
solutions better?
• Must work in a multi-domain battlespace – the two ends (swarm,</p>
      <p>components) are designed specifically for that.
• What organizations can address the “big picture”?
• Now at critical junction for MUmT and autonomy – incomplete/delayed
response could put us too far behind adversaries to catch up.</p>
      <p>On-going work – things I am doing so far:
• Developed a class of algorithms that manage massive “smart” swarms:
• Similar approach to ecosystems in nature, “stigmergic” communication.
• Leverages “swarm intelligence” = AI, so that any entity “knows” where the others are positioned, as
well as changes when broadcasted.
• Needs only a few bytes of data to reorganize / know relative positioning of all battlespace entities.
• Trivial math – e.g. raspberry Pi can calculate 10,000+ entities positions &amp; dynamics in less than
100µsec.
• Developed the resilient meta-reasoning architecture for components:
• Uses heterogeneous AI / ML algorithms in a complementary manner = weakness of one type of
algorithm is covered by another, + helper functions for learning as needed. Scales from raspberry Pi to
largest available.
• AI algorithms are given free reign in a ”sandboxed” environment to allow the full creativity or
innovative results for most effective tactical decisions.
• Meta-reasoner is the “rationalizer” or “adult supervision” that decides whether an algorithm has been
deceived, choosing another algorithm’s results if needed. Periodically, meta-reasoner learns and
adapts.
• Ongoing collaboration with NASA LaRC Formal Methods laboratory.
• Ongoing collaboration with academia, DARPA Assured Autonomy, OFJoeFSSchEafTf,NpAVrAIoR/gNrAaWmCADsM.ission Systems
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Adversarial AI</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Adversarial AI Malware</title>
      <p>1. Extracted from Hu and Tan: “Generating Adversarial Malware Examples for
Black-Box Attacks Based on GAN”
• Works even when attackers have no access to the architecture and weights of the
neural network to be attacked.
2. Extracted from paper by UMD researchers: “Poison Frogs! Targeted
Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks on Neural Networks ”
• Data poisoning = attack on machine learning (ML).
• Attacker adds examples to training set to manipulate the behavior of the model.
• Targeted to control the behavior of the classifier on a specific test instance without
degrading overall classifier performance.
• Attacker adds a seemingly innocuous image (that is properly labeled) to a training set
for face recognition, and control the identity of a chosen person.
• Poisons could be entered into the training set simply by leaving them on the web and
waiting for them to be scraped by a data collection bot.
3. Images in nature can confound machines.</p>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>Deconvolutional Network for Face Decomposition</title>
        <p>• Top-down parts-based image
decomposition with an
adaptive deconvolutional
network. Each column
corresponds to a different
input image under the same
model.
• low-level edges, mid-level
edge junctions, high-level
object parts and complete
objects
{extracted from: Zeiler, Taylor,
Fergus; “Adaptive
Deconvolutional Networks for
Mid and High Level Feature
Learning”}
Several methods to construct deep fakes – some use Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs), other methods for deconstruct / reconstruct facial features.
Joe Schaff, NAVAIR / NAWCAD Mission Systems</p>
        <p>DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Understanding Differences Between</title>
      <p>Cyber - {Security} and {Resilience}
Security:
1) Preserving data ”at rest” and in-transit.
2) Privacy = encryption, least-privilege access.</p>
      <p>3) Securing system against external attack – hostile takeover,
network-based attacks, etc.</p>
      <p>Resilience:
1) More AI / ML based problems.
2) Resilient to deception / misclassification.
3) Resilient to noise added to data.
4) Recovery from exploitation of known weaknesses in classifiers.
5) Recovery from unanticipated attacks.
Steps 1 and 2: Cyber-secure Kernel, Linux Containers</p>
      <p>Use a microkernel OS = Example: Fuchsia (by Google – in
development).</p>
      <p>Based on a new microkernel called "Zircon” secure computing environment.
Similar approach used by DARPA High Assurance Cyber Military Systems
(HACMS) program.</p>
      <p>Use Linux Containers (e.g. “Docker”)
a)
b)</p>
      <p>Why?
1. It “sandboxes” unstable or vulnerable, yet useful ML algorithms.
2. Sandbox can re-instantiate the algorithm if it “crashes” due to malicious attack or instability.
3. Allows full creativity or “emergent behaviors” of algorithms.</p>
      <p>Overhead and stability costs?
a) Almost identical to bare metal or native ML application without sandboxing.
b) If container crashes, then microkernel restarts container app with “sandboxed” algorithm.
Pipeline Architecture: R&amp;D to customer</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Conduits</title>
      <p>Pipeline Architecture:</p>
      <p>A Multi-pronged Approach
1. Foundation: create developer pipelines, i.e. - remove any burden
of operations so that researchers concentrate on research.
2. Latest technology advances from all available sources = follow
the taxonomy tree.
3. Identify gaps and unfulfilled needs = where to invest in the
research effort.
4. Map use cases to UML / MBSE language abstraction of software,
for transition pipeline.
OSD DevSecOps &amp; more?
Containers help
visibility and
sharability of
products.</p>
      <p>Pipelines to / from developers.</p>
      <p>Hardened containers for algorithms or other software components.</p>
      <p>MilCloud based = latest research in AI/ML may be shared with other researchers.
BUT...this pipeline is not enough. Need to insert taxonomy...</p>
      <p>Joe Schaff, NAVAIR / NAWCAD Mission Systems</p>
      <p>Additional labs
(e.g. NAWCAD,</p>
      <p>NIWC, DHS)
Additional algorithms (i.e. ant
colony optimization or nature
inspired algorithms with the
swarms, LDA, PCA)
add other
architectures
(CNNs)
Joe Schaff, NAVAIR /
Systems
DISTRIBUTION</p>
      <p>Taxonomy
conduits</p>
      <p>Prototype ready</p>
      <p>for customer</p>
      <p>Connected via
automated UML
generated from
selected software
containers
Researchers
Course Outline1
• Course will cover topics as diverse as the technology for biologically
inspired robots, cognitive robotics, cultural, social and legal aspects of
robotics, data mining, examples of human systems interfacing, machine
learning principles and their limitations with respect to AI.
• Your objective as a student will be to integrate this interdisciplinary
knowledge and perform out of the box thinking, demonstrating this in a
term project.
• We're going to look at the ideas like robot emotion, and collaborative
robots that can form limited social interactions.
• You will design a robot that can implicitly determine the action it needs to
take without explicit commands given to it, by observing its interaction with
people.
• The term project: Think of creating a Kickstarter where you will be building
the next generation of cognitive human-behaving robots.
• You need to show your product as something investors would buy into.
• I will provide course material and extensive reference sources for both
hardware and software to design these robots.
• These robots could realistically be built with hardware and software for as
little as $2000.
• The Kickstarter is only a goal to shoot for, and if you indeed want to create
an actual one after the course is over, you are encouraged to do so either
alone or in collaboration with others in your class.
• Unlike an actual Kickstarter, there's no penalty for not being sponsored - if
you try and think out of the box, and apply whatever knowledge you're
capable of finding as well as what I will provide, you will succeed.</p>
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