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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Automata Under Effective Observation</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Plekhanov Russian University of Economics</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>36 Stremyanny lane, Moscow, 115998</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="RU">Russia</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>0000</fpage>
      <lpage>0001</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>A trapdoor cipher is a cipher whose algorithm contains some hidden structure (a trapdoor) providing the existence of a subliminal information channel. In cryptographic practice, there could be situations when a constructed cipher may contain some critical defect (a trapdoor) whose identification can significantly weaken the cryptographic strength of this cipher. In this paper, we propose and analyze one of such defects in terms of automata-theoretic approach. An operation of the cipher with this defect is modeled by a finite automaton under the so-called effective observation. The existence of effective observation for a finite automaton qualitatively reflects the presence of a trapdoor which allows one to determine the information on automaton input words by observations over the corresponding output words. We prove the criterion of finding an automaton under effective observation and specify the classes of automata under effective observation and the classes of automata for which there is no effective observation. Possible applications of the results for protecting ciphers from side channel attacks are formulated.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Cryptography</kwd>
        <kwd>Automata theory</kwd>
        <kwd>Cipher models</kwd>
        <kwd>Automata under effective observation</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>The analysis of ciphers in terms of automata theory is now becoming quite common.
This approach allows one to formulate and solve cryptographic problems for different
cipher classes. In cryptographic practice related to the synthesis (construction) of
ciphers, there could be situations when one consciously builds a trapdoor cipher, i.e., a
cipher whose algorithm contains some hidden structure (a trapdoor) providing the
existence of a subliminal information channel. Except for this case, ciphers are
usually built without such forethought defects. However, a constructed cipher may
contain some critical defect (a trapdoor) whose identification can significantly
weaken the cryptographic strength of this cipher. One of such defects is proposed and
analyzed in this paper in terms of automata-theoretic approach. This defect presents in
a cipher whose operation is modeled by a finite automaton under the so-called
effective observation.</p>
      <p>Let A=(X,S,Y,h,f) be a finite automaton with an input alphabet X, a set of states S, an
output alphabet Y, a transition function h:SХS, and an output function
f:SХY. Denote by A(s,P) an output word of the automaton A resulting from the
initial state s when the input word is P=x1x2…xk.</p>
      <p>The problem. It is required to find functions Uk, Фk such that Uk(P)=Фk(A(s,P)) for
any pair (s,P)∈SХk, Uk≠const, Фk≠const. An automaton that satisfies this
condition for some k is called an automaton under effective observation.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we justify the need for the setting of
the presented problem and list possible areas of cryptographic information security
where this problem and the results of its solution are of interest. In Section 3, we
introduce the basic notions and notations by which automata-theoretic model of the
problem is formulated. In this model, the examples of possible problem formulations
are presented. Then we prove the criterion of finding an automaton under effective
observation, i.e., the criterion of possible determining the information on key
elements of a cipher or the information on a plaintext by the given observable
information. This section also contains some previous results on the subject obtained
by the author. The main results are in Section 5. It is devoted to finding the classes of
automata for which, within the given mathematical model, it is impossible to
determine the information on an automaton input word by the corresponding output
word. We also consider the question whether this problem is algorithmically
solvable in the class of all automata. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
2</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Relevance of the problem</title>
      <p>Let us clarify in which areas of IT technologies it is useful to apply the description of
automata under effective observation and the automata for which there is no
effective observation. First of all, we are talking about devices and programs that are
modeled by finite automata.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>2.1 Computer bugs</title>
      <p>
        An information channel is called covert if it is not specifically designed and was not
originally supposed to transfer information in electronic data processing system. A
covert channel is called subliminal if it can be used only by the holder of the
corresponding secret information. The idea of subliminal information channels was
first introduced in the works of Simmons [1-3], by the example of a covert channel in
the digital signature system with a public key. In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">4</xref>
        ], there is the description of the
covert channel performance for the digital signature algorithm (DSA) [3], and the
papers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">5</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">6</xref>
        ] describe the covert channel performance for the digital signature
algorithm Ong-Schnorr-Shamir.
      </p>
      <p>The device embedded in a computer and modeled by a finite automaton under
effective observation provides you with an automatic retrieval of the input device
information.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>2.2 Trapdoor cipher</title>
      <p>A trapdoor cipher is a cipher whose algorithm contains some hidden structure
(trapdoor) providing the existence of a subliminal information channel; knowledge
of this structure allows one to obtain sensitive information (such as secret keys).
Without the trapdoor knowledge, the cipher seems to be secure.</p>
      <p>
        One of the most important types of trapdoors that can be embedded in cryptographic
algorithms is the so-called SETUP (Secretly Embedded Trapdoor with Universal
Protection) mechanism [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">5</xref>
        ], [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">6</xref>
        ]. The SETUP mechanism modifies the given
cryptographic algorithm in a way that allows the developer of the cryptosystem to
obtain sensitive user information (often about their secret keys). At the same time,
for any observer different from the developer, the performance of the modified
algorithm is indistinguishable from the performance of the original algorithm. Such
modified cryptosystems are sometimes referred as infected cryptosystems.
In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6 ref7 ref8">5-7</xref>
        ], it is shown that a number of well-established cryptographic primitives can
be modified by including the SETUP mechanism in the body of the relevant
program. For example, in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">7</xref>
        ], there is the description of the scheme for constructing a
covert information channel in a block cipher. An embedded SETUP mechanism
completely compromises the corresponding cryptosystems in relation to its
developer (and only in relation to him). These attacks require a single tampering with
a cryptosystem. A particular danger is posed by SETUP mechanisms for smart-cards
because its key generation always takes place without user intervention. In the case
of block ciphers, one can also employ the leakage channels running during the
generation and transmission of the so-called Initial Vectors used in OFB, CFB, and
CBC modes.
      </p>
      <p>The main known results for embedding trapdoors in ciphers are obtained for
public-key cryptosystems, in particular, for the little-known public-key encryption
algorithm based on finite automata and called FAPKC (Finite Automaton Public Key
Cryptosystem).</p>
      <p>Our proposed method for constructing a trapdoor cipher is different from the known
ones. It is based on the choice of the automata-theoretic model for the cipher under
effective observation. Its principal features are described in the section 5 «On
reconstruction of information on an automaton input word by the corresponding
output word».</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>2.3 Side-Channel Attacks</title>
      <p>
        Side-channel attacks (SCA) are a type of cryptographic attacks which exploit
information leaked from side channels [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10 ref11 ref12 ref13 ref14 ref15 ref16 ref17 ref18 ref9">8-17</xref>
        ]. Let us list some methods to prevent
side-channel attacks: masking; blinding; carrying out the computations whose
performance time does not depend on data; refusing procedures that use secret
intermediate values or keys for conditional transfers; preventing timing attacks by the
alignment of performance time for various operations; balancing power consumption;
adding a noise (one of the solutions proposed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">18</xref>
        ] against Differential Power
Analysis (DPA) with the use of a noise is to add random computations which increase
the noise level so that it becomes impossible to determine the shift of DPA spikes);
shielding; performing double encryption [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">19</xref>
        ]. The approach proposed in the section
5 allows one to put forward an idea of protecting a given automaton from
cryptographic attacks using information leaked from side channels. The idea is to
construct a new automaton with a large number of states that has the given
automaton as a homomorphic image. In the said section, the homomorphic image of
the new automaton is an automaton with one state.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>2.4 Ciphers</title>
      <p>
        In the works of Claude Shannon [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">20</xref>
        ], there is the description of the so-called "perfect
ciphers". In the modern terminology, they are sometimes referred as theoretically
unbreakable ciphers. An example of such a cipher is the random gamma cipher. The
input alphabet of such a cipher is the set of indexes I={0,1,...,N-1} which label the
letters of the ordered alphabet used for plaintexts. Then the set IL is the set of all
possible plaintexts of length L. At the same time, IL is the set of keys and the set of
ciphertexts. The encryption process of the plaintext i=i1i2…iL by the randomly and
equiprobably selected key γ=γ1γ2…γL is described by the equations
ij+γj=zj mod N, j∈{0,1,…,N-1},
where z=z1z2…zL is a ciphertext.
      </p>
      <p>It is obvious that any plaintext i can be encrypted into the ciphertext z under the
appropriate choice of the key γ. Thus the plaintext reconstruction based on the
knowledge of a ciphertext is impossible. But if the cipher is not theoretically
unbreakable, the known ciphertext sometimes allows one to reconstruct a subset Ii,z
of the set IL that contains the desired plaintext. In this case, it is convenient to talk
about the information on the plaintext i extracted from its corresponding ciphertext z.
The smaller cardinality of this subset, the more extracted information on the desired
plaintext. The subset Ii,z can be defined by its characteristic function F1. In
cryptographic practice, there could be situations when the ciphertext z is fully
unknown. In the introduced notation, this means we know a subset Zz of the
ciphertext set Z that contains the given z, or equivalently the value of the
characteristic function F2 of this subset.</p>
      <p>The cipher for which the desired plaintext can be uniquely determined by its
ciphertext is obviously the worst cipher. Not the best cipher would be the cipher for
which information on the desired plaintext can be extracted from the observed data
of the ciphertext. The above gives rise to the following novel setting of a
cryptographic problem. Is it possible, for a given cipher with a plaintext set W, a
ciphertext set Z, a set of keys K, and an encryption equation f(w,k)=z, to find
nonconstant functions F1 and F2 that satisfy the condition F1(w)=F2(f(w,k)) for any
wϵW, kϵK. The conditions under which such functions do not exist are of value for
the synthesis of ciphers.</p>
      <p>This problem will be solved below using the automata-theoretic approach. It should
be noted that by now the automata-theoretic approach to the analysis and synthesis of
ciphers has become the natural and traditional direction of cryptanalysis. This is
because many encryption systems are mathematically modeled by finite automata.
For example, one can imagine that a plaintext is supplied to an input of an encryption
device, while the corresponding ciphertext is generated as an output, and the
encryption device sequentially changes its state. Note that for a number of classical
ciphers, one often imposes the requirement of reversibility which, in the case of
decryption error detection, allows one to return to the previous decrypted text and
correct the error. In terms of the automata-theoretic approach, the latter is achieved
by the use of the so-called permutation automata. Block ciphers are usually also
represented by permutation automata, for which reason it is interesting to solve the
problem of extracting information on round keys (on an input automaton sequence)
from the pairs of input and the corresponding output units (from the pairs of initial
and final automaton states).
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Basic notions and notations</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>3.1 The notion of an automaton under observation</title>
      <p>We will use the following notation:
A=(X,S,Y,h,f) is a finite automaton with an input alphabet X, a set of states S, an
output alphabet Y, a transition function h:SХS, and an output function
f:SХY;
hx:SS is a partial transition function corresponding to the input symbol xX,
hxs=h(s,x);
hPs  hxk ...hx2 hx1 s</p>
      <p>is a final state of the automaton A resulting from the initial
state s when the input word is P=x1x2…xk;
A(s,P) is an output word of the automaton A resulting from the initial state s when
the input word is P.</p>
      <p>The cardinality of a set M is denoted by |M|.</p>
      <p>For a finite automaton A=(X,S,Y,h,f) and a natural number k, denote by Rk, Тk some
finite sets. Consider the surjective mappings
Нk:SХkТk,
Пk:SХkRk.</p>
      <p>Suppose that the automaton A with initial states s from S receives the input words
РХk. The pairs (s,Р)SХk for which the automaton operates are unknown.
However, for each pair (s,Р)SХk, we know the element t=Нk(s,P) called an
observation element.</p>
      <p>The problem. Identify the information on the element r=Пk(s,P), where r is the value
of the desired operation parameter of the automaton A with initial state s and input
word P. By the information on the unknown element r, we mean the identification of
a proper subset R` of the set Rk that contains r. Conventionally speaking, we suppose
that some function Uk on Rk is given and its value Uk(r)=j defines the subset R`={r`:
r`Rk, Uk(r`)=j} (lumped state). It is also supposed that j (or the subset R`) can be
defined by the known observation element t=Нk(s,P). Formally, we mean that there
is a function Фk whose value Фk(t) defines j. Thus we have (Fig.1):
k is a natural number indicating the length of automaton input words;
Пk:SХkRk is an objective function;
r=Пk(s,Р) is the value of the parameter under study for the triple (k,А,(s,Р)),
(s,Р)SХk;
Нk:SХkТk is an observation function;
t=Нk(s,P) is an observation element for the triple (k,А,(s,Р)), (s,Р)SХk;
Фk is an observation information function;</p>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>Uk is an objective information function.</title>
        <p>The family of introduced objects (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk) is called the observation over the
automaton A.</p>
        <p>P
s</p>
        <p>A(s,P)</p>
        <sec id="sec-8-1-1">
          <title>Find Пk(s,Р)</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-8-1-2">
          <title>Observation</title>
          <p>Нk(s,P)
Definition 1. An automaton A=(X,S,Y,h,f) is said to be under the effective
observation (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk) if there exist nonconstant functions Фk on Тk and Uk
on Rk such that</p>
          <p>Uk(Пk(s,P))=Фk(Hk(s,P))</p>
          <p>(1)
for any pair (s,P)SXk.</p>
          <p>The property of effective observation can be interpreted as the ability of automatic
extraction of the information on the desired parameter r=Пk(s,Р) from the
observation parameter t=Нk(s,P) during the automaton operation process.
Note that if the functions Фk, Uk are constant, equation (1) does not provide any
useful information on the value of the parameter r for the observation t.
Definition 2. For the sequence of observations (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk), k∈{1,2,…} over an
automaton A, denote by D(A) the minimum k for which the automaton A is under
effective observation. We call D(A) the depth of the automaton observation. If there
is no such k, we set D(А)=.</p>
          <p>Definition 3. An automaton A is said to be under effective observation if the depth of
its sequence of observations is finite.</p>
          <p>Definition 4. The functions Фk and Uk for k=D(А) are called the main functions for
the automaton A under the observation (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk).</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>3.2 Examples of basic notions</title>
      <p>
        Example 1. Diagnostic experiment with the automaton A [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">21</xref>
        ]. Consider the
following observation (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk), where Нk(s,P)=(P,A(s,P)), Тk is the image
of the set SXk under the mapping Нk, Пk(s,P)=s, and Rk=S. The fulfillment of the
condition Uk(Пk(s,P))=Фk(Hk(s,P)) for any pair (s,P)∈SXk can be written in the
form Uk(s)=Фk(P,A(s,P)). In this case, the function value Uk(s) is determined by the
input and the corresponding output automaton sequences. Suppose further that
Uk(s)=s for any s∈S. Then the equalities s=Фk(P,A(s,P)), (s,P)∈SXk mean that
each input word РХk is diagnostic for the automaton A [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">21</xref>
        ]. If, instead of all the
pairs (s,P)∈SXk, we consider only the pairs (s,P)∈S{Р}, where {P} is a singleton,
then the condition s=Фk(P,A(s,P)), (s,P)∈S{Р} will imply that the word P is a
diagnostic sequence for the automaton A.
      </p>
      <p>
        Homing experiment with the automaton A [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">21</xref>
        ]. The homing experiment formulation
in the introduced terms is analogous to that one of the diagnostic experiment.
In [22-24], authors studied the problem of partial definition of an automaton input
word by its initial state and the corresponding output word as well as the problem of
partial definition of an automaton input word by its final state and the corresponding
output word. A more systematic study of these issues was conducted by Sh. Iwen
[25], A. A. Kurmit continued this study in his monograph [26].
4
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>Effective observation over an automaton</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>4.1 The criterion of finding an automaton A under the effective</title>
      <p>observation (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk)
For brevity, we introduce the following notation:  means “if and only if”; 
means “then”;  means “exists”;  means “for all”; PQ is a concatenation of words P
and Q (in particular, (P)k is a concatenation of k copies of the word P).
Let M be a finite set, σ a reflexive (mσm mM) symmetric binary relation on M,
σ* the transitive closure of σ, and rang σ* the number of equivalence classes under
the binary relation σ*. The binary relation σ is said to be transitive if rang σ*=1.
The functions Нk, Пk induce the partitions of the set SXk defined by the binary
equivalence relations Н*=Н*k, П*=П*k on SXk. Namely,
(s,P)Н*(s`,P`)  Нk(s,P)=Нk(s`,P`),
(s,P)П*(s`,P`)  Пk(s,P)=Пk(s`,P`).</p>
      <p>The classes under the equivalence relations Н*k, П*k will be denoted by the letters t
and r of the corresponding sets Тk, Rk, i.e, the letter t can also denote Нk-1(t), the
preimage of t, and similarly for the letter r. The context will make it clear whether t
and r stand for elements or classes. In particular, Тk, Rk will refer, if necessary, to the
sets of the classes under the equivalence relations Н*k, П*k, respectively.
Denote by t[s,P] the class comprising (s,P) under the equivalence relation Н*k and
by r[s,P] the class comprising (s,P) under the equivalence relation П*k.
Let us introduce the binary equivalence relations Тk/П*k on Тk and Rk/Н*k on Rk.
For this purpose, we use the auxiliary binary relations ~ on Тk and ~ on Rk. The same
symbol ~ is used for simplicity. The elements t, r of the sets Тk, Rk are
simultaneously considered as the classes t[s,P], r[s,P],
t~t`  (s,P)t, (s`,P`)t`, rRk:</p>
      <p>(s,P)r, (s`,P`)r.</p>
      <p>The equivalence relation Тk/П*k is the transitive closure of the binary relation ~, i.e.,
t1 Тk/П*k tL  t2,…,tL-1Tk: t1~t2~…~tL-1~tL.</p>
      <sec id="sec-11-1">
        <title>Similarly,</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-11-2">
        <title>Note that</title>
        <p>r~r`  (s,P)r, (s`,P`)r`, tTk:</p>
        <p>(s,P)t, (s`,P`)t,
and Rk/Н*k is the transitive closure of the binary relation ~ on Rk.</p>
        <p>tTk, rRk: t~t, r~r, t Тk/П*k t, r Rk/Н*k r.</p>
        <p>Define the binary equivalence relation Н*kП*k on SXk by the auxiliary binary
relation  on SXk,
i.e., (s,P), (s`,P`)t or (s,P), (s`,P`)r. To specify the relation
(s,P)  (s`,P`)  tTk, rRk:</p>
        <p>(s,P), (s`,P`)tr,
(s,P)  (s`,P`), (s,P), (s`,P`)tr,
(s,P) Н*k (s`,P`)  tTk:</p>
        <p>(s,P), (s`,P`)t
(s,P) П*k (s`,P`)  rRk:</p>
        <p>(s,P), (s`,P`)r.
we write
and
Denote by Н*kП*k the transitive closure of the binary relation .
The equivalence relations Тk/П*k on Тk and Rk/Н*k on Rk induce the equivalence
relations (Тk/Пk)*, (Rk/Нk)* on SXk,</p>
        <p>t[s,P] Тk/П*k t[s`,P`],
(s,P) (Rk/Нk)* (s`,P`) </p>
        <p>r[s,P] Rk/Н*k r[s`,P`].</p>
        <p>Denote by Н*kП*k[s,P], (Тk/Пk)*[s,P], (Rk/Нk)*[s,P] the classes comprising (s,P)
under the equivalence relations Н*kП*k, (Тk/Пk)*, (Rk/Нk)* on SXk,
respectively.</p>
        <p>Theorem 1. For the binary equivalence relations on SXk there holds the equality
Н*kП*k=(Тk/Пk)*=(Rk/Нk)*.</p>
        <p>Proof. Let us show that (Тk/Пk)*=Н*kП*k. The equality (Rk/Нk)*=Н*kП*k can
be proved similarly. Suppose (s,P) (Тk/Пk)* (s`,P`). Then
t1[s,P] Тk/П*k tL[s`,P`] </p>
        <p>t2,…,tL-1Tk:
t1[s,P]~t2~…~tL-1~tL[s`,P`] </p>
        <p>tj~tj+1, j{1,2,…,L-1} 
(sj,Pj)tj, (s`j,P`j)tj+1, rjRk:
(sj,Pj), (s`j,P`j)rj  (s,P)Н*k(s1,P1)П*k(s`1,P`1)Н*k(s2,</p>
        <p>P2)П*k(s`2,P`2)…(s`,P`) </p>
        <p>(s,P) Н*kП*k (s`,P`).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-11-3">
        <title>Conversely, suppose (s1,P1)Н*kП*k(sL,PL). Then</title>
        <p>(s1,P1) Н*kП*k (sL,PL)  (s2,P2),…,(sL-1,PL-1), (1),(2),…,(L-1){Н*k, П*k}:
(s1,P1)(1)(s2,P2)(2),…, (sL-1,PL-1)(L-1)(sL,PL).</p>
        <p>In the above chain of binary relations, choose the chain of minimum length L. In this
case, (j)(j+1) for any j{1,2,…,L-2} and we have</p>
        <p>t[sj,Pj]=t[sj+1,Pj+1] if (j)=Н*k,
Hence,</p>
        <p>t[sj,Pj]~t[sj+1,Pj+1] if (j)=П*k.
t2,…,tL`: t[s1,P1]~t2,~…~tL`~t[sL,PL] 
t[s1,P1] Тk/П*k t[sL,PL] 
(s1,P1) (Тk/Пk)* (sL,PL).
□
Corollary 1. For the number of classes under the equivalence relations Н*kП*k on
SXk, Тk/П*k on Тk, and Rk/Н*k on Rk, it follows that rang Н*kП*k=rang
Тk/П*k =rang Rk/Н*k.</p>
        <p>Proof. In view of Theorem 1, it suffices to show that</p>
        <p>rang Тk/П*k=rang (Тk/Пk)*.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-11-4">
        <title>By definition,</title>
        <p>from whence it follows that
(s,P) (Тk/Пk)* (s`,P`) 
t[s,P] Тk/П*k t[s`,P`],
(Тk/Пk)*[s,P]=tj[sj,Pj]
for any (s,P)SXk, where the union is taken over all the classes tjТk/П*k[t[s,P]].
The required statement follows directly from the above equation.
□
Theorem 2. The automaton А=(Х,S,Y,h,f) is under the effective observation
(k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk) if and only if rang Н*kП*k2. Moreover, the values of the
functions ФkHk, UkПk on SXk are the same and constant on the classes Н*kП*k,
while the values of the functions Фk, Uk are constant on the classes Тk/П*k and
Rk/Н*k, respectively.</p>
        <p>Proof. Suppose that some functions Фk, Uk satisfy the following:</p>
        <p>Фk(Hk(s,P))=Uk(Пk(s,P))
for any (s,P)SXk.</p>
        <p>Consider two elements (s1,P1), (sL,PL) from the same class under the equivalence
relation Н*kП*k. Then
(1), (2), …, (L-1){Н*k, П*k}, (s2,P2),…,(sL-1,PL-1)SXk:</p>
        <p>(s1,P1)(1)(s2,P2)(2)… (L-1)(sL,PL).</p>
        <p>For (j)=Н*k, we obtain Фk(Hk(sj,Pj))=Фk(Hk(sj+1,Pj+1)) and hence
For (j)=П*k, we obtain Uk(Пk(sj,Pj))=Uk(Пk(sj+1,Pj+1)) and hence
Uk(Пk(sj,Pj))=Uk(Пk(sj+1,Pj+1)).</p>
        <p>Фk(Hk(sj,Pj))=Фk(Hk(sj+1,Pj+1)).</p>
        <p>Thus the functions ФkHk, UkПk on SXk take the same and constant values on the
classes Н*kП*k. By Theorem 1,</p>
        <p>Н*kП*k=(Тk/Пk)*=(Rk/Нk)*,
and hence the functions ФkHk, UkПk are constant on the classes under the
equivalence relations (Тk/Пk)*, (Rk/Нk)*.</p>
        <p>For any pair (s,P)SXk,
(Тk/Пk)*[s,P]=</p>
        <p>t j[s j , Pj ] ,
tj
rj
where the union is taken over all tjTk/П*k[t[s,P]]. Similarly,</p>
        <p>(Rk/Hk)*[s,P]= rj[s j , Pj ] ,
where the union is taken over all rjRk/Н*k[r[s,P]]. Therefore, Фk and Uk are
constant on the classes Тk/П*k and Rk/H*k, respectively. It is clear that Фk and Uk
are nonconstant if and only if
rang Н*kП*k=rang Тk/П*k=
rang Rk/Н*k≥2.
□
Corollary 2. The depth D(A) of the observation over the automaton А for the
sequence of observations (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk), k∈{1,2,…} coincides with the minimum
k for which rang Н*kП*k=rang Тk/П*k=rang Rk/Н*k≥2. If there is no such k, then
D(А)=.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>4.2 Previous results</title>
      <p>Reconstruction of information on the first input symbol of an automaton input word
by the corresponding initial state and output sequence [27]: Rk=Х, Тk=(SYk),
k{1,2,…};</p>
      <p>Пk(s,x1x2…xk)=x1, Нk(s,x1,x2,…,xk)=(s,А(s,x1,x2,…,xk)).</p>
      <p>Reconstruction of information on an input word in a permutation automaton by the
corresponding initial state and output sequence [27]:.</p>
      <p>Rк=Хк, Пк:ХкSХк, Пк(х1,х2,…,хк,s)=х1,х2,…,хк, Тк=SYк, Нк:ХкSSYк,
Нк(х1,х2,…,хк,s)=(s,A(s,х1,х2,…,хк)).</p>
      <p>Reconstruction of information on an automaton input word by the corresponding
final state and output sequence [27]: Rк=Хк, Пк:ХкSХк,
Пк(х(1)х(2)…х(к),s)=(х(1)х(2)…х(к)), Тк=SYк, Нк:XкSSYк,
Нк(х(1)х(2)…х(к),s)=(h(s,х(1)х(2)…х(к)), A(s,х(1)х(2)…х(к))).</p>
      <p>Reconstruction of information on an input word in a permutation automaton given
initial and final states [28].</p>
      <p>For a word Р=х(1)х(2)…х(k) in Хk, set hР=hх(k)hх(k-1)…hх(1). Denote by hРs the
image of s under hР and by S(L) the set of all subsets of S with cardinality L, L≥1.
Define the function Hk,L on Xk×S(L) as follows. For s(L)={sj(1),sj(2),…,sj(L)} in
S(L) and P=x(1)x(2)…x(k) in Xk, set</p>
      <p>Hk,L(P,s(L))=(s(L);hPs(L))=
{(sj(1),hРsj(1)),(sj(2),hРsj(2)),…,(sj(L),hРsj(L))}.</p>
      <p>This expression can be considered as a partial permutation on S (L transitions are
defined for the permutation hР). Denote by Hk,L(Xk×S(L)) the image of Hk,L.
We say that k-length input words of an automaton A can be approximately
reconstructed given L initial and final states if there exist nonconstant functions Φk,L
and Uk,L, defined on Hk,L(Xk×S(L)) and Xk, respectively, such that for any PXk
and s(L)S(L) we have</p>
      <p>Uk,L(P)=Φk,L(s(L),hPs(L)).</p>
      <p>In what follows, we refer to this fact by saying that the automaton A possesses the
(Хk,s,hPs,L)-reconstruction property.</p>
      <p>The problem of describing automata with the (Xk,s,hPs,L)-reconstruction property is
close to the following problems: experimental designs for automata (see [24], [30]),
where an unknown input word is used for testing, with initial and final states being
observed as experimental results; local reconstruction of information on an input
word (see [29], [30]) given initial and final states; description of information-lossless
automata [24]. A number of results concerning the problem under consideration are
presented by the author in [31-35].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>5 On reconstruction of information on an automaton input</title>
      <p>word by the corresponding output word</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-14">
      <title>5.1 Setting of the problem</title>
      <p>In what follows, Тk is the set of all k-length output words A(s,Р) of the
automaton A corresponding to the input word PXk and the initial state sS, Rk=Xk,
Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р), Пk(s,Р)=Р.</p>
      <p>Such an observation depends on the parameter k. From a cryptographic point of
view, this naturally gives rise to the question whether there exists a natural k for
which the given automaton А=(Х,S,Y,h,f) is under the observation (k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk).
In the case of positive answer to this question, one naturally comes to the further
problem of the upper estimate for such a minimum k. If there is no such k, then the
cipher that is modeled by such an automaton is particularly valuable.</p>
      <p>In order to describe the classes of automata under the effective observation
(k,Тk,Rk,Нk,Пk)=(Rk=Xk,Пk(s,Р)=Р, Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р)) and the automata for which
there is no effective observation, we introduce the following notions and notation.
Denote by X* the set of all finite-length words over the alphabet X and by X∞ the set
of all infinite words over the alphabet X. For the concatenation of words PXn,
P”Xm, we write РP”, where Р is an initial subword of РP”. If n=0, then any word
from Xn is considered to be empty and РP”=P”. For the subwords of P=x1,x2,..., we
use the notation:
P1=P; Pn=xnxn+1... P]m=x1x2...xm Pn]m=xnxn+1...,xm n≤m; (P)k=PP…P k times.</p>
      <p>Define a number of binary relations on the sets X∞ and XL, L{1,2,…}.</p>
      <sec id="sec-14-1">
        <title>The relation σL on XL</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-14-2">
        <title>The relation σ∞ on X∞</title>
        <p>PσLP”  s,s”S: A(s,P)=A(s”,P”).
Pσ∞P”  s,s”S: A(s,P)=A(s”,P”).</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-14-3">
        <title>The relation σ∞]L on XL induced by the binary relation σ∞</title>
        <p>P1σ∞]LP2  P,P”X∞: Pσ∞P”, P]L=P1, P”]L=P2.</p>
        <p>Denote by (σ∞)*, (σ∞]L)*, (σL)* the transitive closures of the binary relations
σ∞, σ∞]L, σL. For the binary relation τ{(σ∞), (σ∞]L), (σL)}, denote by rang τ the
number of equivalence classes under the binary equivalence relation τ*and by t(τ)
the minimum L for which
rang(σL)*&gt;1</p>
        <p>(rang(σ∞]L)*&gt;1).</p>
        <p>Otherwise, set t((σL)*)=∞ (t((σ∞]L)*)=∞). The introduced parameters are
called the degrees of the transitive binary relations σL, σ∞]L, respectively.</p>
        <sec id="sec-14-3-1">
          <title>The next proposition follows from Theorem 2.</title>
          <p>Proposition 1. The automaton A is under the effective observation (k, Rk=Xk,
Пk(s,Р)=Р, Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р)) if and only if rang(σk)&gt;1.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-15">
      <title>5.2 The class of automata without effective observation</title>
      <p>The class of automata with the loss of information (B1 type) and without
effective observation. Now let us turn to the description of the automaton classes
for which the observation (k, Rk=Xk, Пk(s,Р)=Р, Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р)) is not effective for
any k.</p>
      <p>Definition 5. An automaton А=(Х,S,Y,h,f) is said to be an automaton with the
loss of information B1 if for L  | S | (| 2S | 1)  1 there exists a binary
relation ε on the set X with the following properties:</p>
      <p>1) For each pair (x,x”) from ε there exist P,P” from XL and sS such that
A(s,xP)=A(s,x”P”);</p>
      <sec id="sec-15-1">
        <title>2) The binary relation ε is transitive on the set X.</title>
        <p>Theorem 3. If a permutation automaton A is an automaton with the loss of
information (B1 type), then its observation (k, Rk=Xk, Пk(s,Р)=Р, Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р)) is
not effective for any k.</p>
        <p>Proof. Suppose the conditions of the theorem are satisfied. Let us first prove
that the theorem conditions imply the following: for any pair (x,x”)ε and any
word PX* there exist Q, Q”X∞ such that PxQσ∞Px”Q”. Indeed, suppose there is
a pair (x,x”)ε. Then there exist automaton input words P=p1p2…pL,
P”=p”1p”2…p”L and an initial state sS such that A(s,xP)=A(s,x”P”). In the
transition graph of the automaton, the words P, P” are represented as the paths from
the initial state sS passing through the states
s, hp1 s, hp2 hp1 s,..., hpL ...hp2 hp1 s and
s, hp"1 s, hp"2 hp"1 s,..., hp"L ...hp"2 hp"1 s , respectively. The two following
cases are possible: 1) there exists a pair of states
(hp j ...hp2 hp1 s, hp"j ...hp"2 hp"1 s) such that
hp j ...hp2 hp1 s  hp"j ...hp"2 hp"1 s , 2) the states in each pair of states
(hp j ...hp2 hp1 s, hp"j ...hp"2 hp"1 s) , j{1,2,…L} are different. By standard
methods of graph theory, it can be shown that in each of the cases 1), 2)</p>
        <p>Pxσ∞]k+1Px”
for any k{0,1,…}, PXk, and (x,x”)ε.</p>
        <p>In particular, xσ∞]1x”. Hence, rang(σ∞]1)*=1. Thus we obtain rang (σ1)*=1 on
X1. Assume that for some K, rang(σ∞]K)*=1. Then let us prove that rang(σ∞]K+1)*=1.
By the assumption, it follows that there exists a chain of binary relations</p>
        <p>P1σ∞]KP2σ∞]KP3…σ∞]KPN, N≥|X|K
that contains all the words from XK.</p>
        <p>From the definition of the binary relation σ∞]K on XK it follows that</p>
        <p>∃αj,βjX: Pjαj σ∞]K+1 Pj+1βj, j{1,2,…,N}.</p>
        <p>To complete the proof of transitivity of the binary relation σ∞]K on XK for any
K, we introduce the binary relation ε(Q) on the set of words {Qx: xX}, where Q
is an arbitrary finite word of length K over the alphabet X. Let ε(Q) be a subset of
the set (XK)2 that consists of all the pairs (Qx,Qx”), where (x,x”)ε.</p>
        <p>Lemma 1. The binary relation ε(Q) on the set of words {Qx: xX}, where
QXK, is transitive.</p>
        <p>Proof. For the automaton A, fix all the triples (s,x,x”) with the property: for
each pair (x,x”) from ε there exist P, P” from X∞ and sS such that
A(s,xP)=A(s,x”P”). Since the automaton A is a permutation automaton, it follows
that for any triple (s,x,x”) and any automaton input word Q there exists a state sQ
such that hQsQ=s. It is obvious that A(sQ,Qx)=A(sQ,Qx”). For this reason, and by
virtue of transitivity of the binary relation ε, the binary relation ε(Q) is transitive.
Thus Lemma 1 is proved.</p>
        <p>Since the set of words XK+1 is divided into disjoint subsets ε(Q), QXK, on
each of which the binary relation ε is transitive, and the subsets are related by (2),
the induction step is carried out. We now note that the transitivity of the binary
relation σ∞]K+1 on XK+1 implies the transitivity of the binary relation σK+1 on XK+1.
□</p>
        <p>The class of automata with the loss of information (B2 type) and without
effective observation.</p>
        <p>Definition 6. An automaton А=(Х,S,Y,h,f) is said to be an automaton with the
loss of information (B2 type) if for L  | S | (| 2S | 1)  | S | there exists a
binary relation ε on the set X with the following properties:
1) For each pair (x’,x”) from ε there exist P’,P” from XL and s, s”S such that</p>
        <p>A(s,P’x)=A(s”,P”x”), hP ' x 's  hP"x"s" .</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-15-2">
        <title>2) The binary relation ε is transitive on the set X.</title>
        <p>Theorem 4. If an automaton А=(Х,S,Y,h,f) is an automaton with the loss of
information (B2 type), then its observation (k, Rk=Xk, Пk(s,Р)=Р, Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р)) is
not effective for any k.</p>
        <p>Proof. Suppose that for L=0, XL consists of an empty word. We will use the
previously introduced notation σL of the binary relation on XL. Denote by  (L)
the new binary relation on XL,</p>
        <p>P’  (L) P” </p>
        <p> words P1’, P1” X N1 , P2’, P2” X N2 , where
N1=N1(P’,P”)≥1, N2=N2(P’,P”)≥0: k≥1 it follows that (P1’)kP2’P’ kN1N2 L
(P1”)kP2”P”.</p>
        <p>Lemma 2. If А=(Х,S,Y,h,f) is an automaton with the loss of information (B2
type), then
 x’,x”ε, PXL, L{0,1,2,…}: x’P (L  1) x”P.</p>
        <p>A(s,P’x)=A(s”,P”x”), hP ' x 's  hP"x"s" .</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-15-3">
        <title>2) The binary relation ε is transitive on the set X.</title>
        <p>6</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-16">
      <title>Discussion</title>
      <p>We note the universality of the approach to the study of useful (key)
information of a finite automaton based on its possible observation. In this
connection, the range of topical problems of finding information about the
automaton of interest to the researcher can be significantly expanded. The
question of existence of an algorithm recognizing the effective observation
(k, Rk=Xk, Пk(s,Р)=Р, Нk(s,Р)=A(s,Р)) in the class of all automata remains
opened.
7</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-17">
      <title>Conclusion</title>
      <p>In this paper, we have introduced some novel notions of the
automata-theoretic approach: observation over an automaton and an
automaton under effective observation. The latter qualitatively reflects the
presence of an automaton trapdoor for determining the information on an
automaton input word by the observable information. For a given
observation, we have proved the criterion of finding an automaton under
effective observation. Also we have specified the classes of automata under
effective observation and the classes of automata for which there is no
effective observation.
22. Huffman D A. Canonical forms for information-lossless finite-state logical machines.</p>
      <p>IRE Trans. Circuit Theory, 6, Spec. Suppl., 1959, 41-59.
23. Huffman D A. Notes on information-lossless finite-state automata. Nuovo cimento,
13, Suppl. 2, 1959, 397-405.
24. Even Sh. On information-lossless automata of finite order. IEEE Trans. Electronic</p>
      <p>Comput., 14, 1965, 4, 561-569.
25. Even Sh. Ob avtomatah konechnogo poryadka bez poteri informacii. Trudi
mejdunarodnogo simpoziuma po teorii releinih ustroistv i konechnih avtomatov (On
information-lossless automata of finite order. Proceedings of the International
Symposium on the theory of relay devices and finite automata.). Moscow: Nauka,
1965, 269-279.
26. Kurmit A. A. Avtomati bez poteri informacii konechnogo poryadka (On
information-lossless automata of finite order). Riga: Zinatne, 1972, 264.
27. Babash A. V. Ob eksperimentah po raspoznavaniyu informacii o vhodnom slove
avtomata (On experiments on recognition of information on an automaton input
word). Proceeding on Discrete Mathematics, v.8., Moscow: FIZMATLIT, 2004,
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28. Babash A. V. On Reconstruction of Information on an Input Word in a Medvedev
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29. Bogomolov A.M., Barashko A.S., and Grunskii I.S., Eksperimenty s avtomatami
(Experiments with Automata), Kiev: Naukova Dumka, 1973.
30. Tverdokhlebov V.A., Logicheskie eksperimenty s avtomatami (Logical Experiments
with Automata), Saratov: Izd. Sarat. Univ., 1988.
31. Babash A. V. Neotlichimost sostoyanii konechnogo avtomata otnositelno funkcii,
zadannoi na ego vhodnih i vihodnih slovah (Indistinguishability of finite automaton
states for the function defined on its input and output words). Obozr. Prikl. Prom.</p>
      <p>Mat., 2001, vol. 8, no. 1, pp.94–95.
32. Babash A. V. On Some Invariants of a Finite Automaton. Obozr. Prikl. Prom. Mat.,
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