<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Modeling of information security system and automated assessment of the integrated quality of the impact of controls on the functional stability of the organizational system</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>nko T</string-name>
          <email>babenkot@ua.fm</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>© Hryhorii Hn</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>Kyiv</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>188</fpage>
      <lpage>198</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>A mathematical model of the control system implementation problem is proposed. The concept of criticality of controls, as well as various aspects of functional stability and its relationship with reliability, survivability, fault tolerance are considered. Significant attention is paid to taking into account the subjective component in the tasks of determining the quality of implementation of controls and evaluation of the integrated security indicator of the information system. Attention is paid to the consideration of granularity in the construction of the function of belonging to a fuzzy set. The problem of assessing the integrated quality of control implementation and solving the optimization problem of improving the quality of information system security is considered.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>control system</kwd>
        <kwd>information security</kwd>
        <kwd>critical information infrastructure objects</kwd>
        <kwd>functional stability</kwd>
        <kwd>decision making</kwd>
        <kwd>fuzzy set membership function</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>Reliable and, in some situations, sufficient protection of the information security
management system is an important aspect of its existence and the subject of attention of a
large number of specialists. Building a perfectly reliable system of information
protection, processed using information and communication systems, is a fundamentally
impossible task. In modern conditions, the measures and means of information protection
used can only significantly reduce the likelihood of negative consequences of violation
of the basic properties of information or damage from them, but do not allow to avoid
them completely. Therefore, it makes sense to consider the process of ensuring
information security at some acceptable level for the organization, which corresponds to the
real threats.</p>
      <p>
        The controls to be implemented when building an information security management
system or when building information systems are described, in particular, in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. Some
of the controls are extremely important for the functioning of the system. For the rest
of the controls, a reduced level of control implementation is allowed, and for some
situations, even the absence of some controls is possible without significant danger to
a sufficient level of functional stability of the system.
      </p>
      <p>
        When building a control system in full accordance with the standard [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], the quality
of all controls is one hundred percent and their set is equal to the set of all possible
control indices. That is, such a situation is ideal and the distance from it to the actual
existing control system, which is audited, can serve as a criterion for the quality of the
built control system. In an ideal situation, all standards must be met. But achieving this
level of control is too costly. In many practical situations, the level of information
security has to be sacrificed to some extent. - Growing companies cannot afford to achieve
such an expensive ideal. Therefore, a compromise is proposed - "best practices" as a
guide.
2
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Models for assessing the quality of information security services</title>
      <p>
        The increased level of attention to the problems of assessing the security of information
systems (IS) is explained, among other things, by the emergence of new forms of
hostilities, including hybrid warfare, one of the goals of which is to disrupt critical
information infrastructure (CII). As you know, the national security and defense of any state
depend on the constant work of the CII. Analysis of open publications in the field of
CII disruption and its consequences shows that such influence as a tool is quite common
and can significantly weaken the position of the countries concerned in a particular area
and in globalization is used as an element of political and economic pressure. The
problem of CII security assessment is significantly complicated by the fact that CII entities
have different forms of ownership and different requirements to ensure the protection
of the basic properties of information processed in their IP and, accordingly, can use
their own requirements to protect a wide range of frameworks and so-called "best
practices", in particular such as NIST Cyber Security Framework (CSF), MITER ATT&amp;CK
Framework, NIST Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), NIST 800-53
v5, ISO 2700X, 1504 and others. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2 ref3 ref4 ref5 ref6 ref7 ref8 ref9">2-9</xref>
        ] These regulations are recommended by their
developers to use outside the United States in the commercial and public sectors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3 ref4">3, 4</xref>
        ].
In this context, it should be noted that many countries, based on the relevant
frameworks, will develop their own regulations and methodologies for the creation of
protection systems, including at CII facilities.
      </p>
      <p>Thus, in the sector of information security services processed at CII facilities, there
is a wide variety of approaches to the implementation of information security systems
and possible methods for assessing the level of CII security. Conformity analysis of
information protection systems implemented on the basis of "best practices" and
assessment of the level of security of CII objects is performed based on a risk-oriented
approach, which allows to manage cyber security risks and, accordingly, improve the
level of protection of CII objects. Risk in this context means a potentially possible event
in the field of cybersecurity, which may lead to a violation of the basic properties of the
protected information. At the same time, it is also necessary to take into account the
fact that the analysis must be performed at different stages of the life cycle of the CII
object, which, in turn, sometimes requires processing significant amounts of
unstructured data in conditions of uncertainty and time shortage and the probable use of
destructive actions (methods and means of social engineering) against authorized CII
users.</p>
      <p>
        It is known that the construction and maintenance at a given level of information
security systems or information security management systems (ISMS) at CII facilities
requires a systematic approach to managing cybersecurity risks and identifying the
needs of a particular organization in relation to information protection requirements.
According to "best practices", it is considered that the process of cybersecurity risk
management should be consistent with the overall risk management process of the
enterprise and should be applied both in the process of creation and in the process of
ISMS. According to [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ], the process of cybersecurity risk management consists of
identifying circumstances, assessing risks, processing risks, accepting risks, discussing
risks and consulting, monitoring and reviewing risks. The process of risk processing
should be cyclical and based on the results of the risk assessment of violation of the
accepted level of guarantees to ensure the basic properties of information.
      </p>
      <p>
        Assuming that the process of risk assessment and processing is one of the key to
determining the current level of cybersecurity of CII facilities and the current
effectiveness of ISMS and ways to achieve the target profile (Target Profile) for analysis and
assessment of identified risks, use a qualitative or quantitative approach. The
quantitative approach theoretically allows to compare the achieved level of maturity of the
implemented ISMS, but its application in practice is complicated by the following factors
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref11">1, 11</xref>
        ]:
lack of reliable statistics;
the difficulty of assessing losses in the case of intangible assets;
the difficulty of assessing indirect losses from the implementation of threats;
depreciation of the results of long-term quantitative risk assessment due to the
modification of the ISMS.
      </p>
      <p>
        Thus, the process of IS risk assessment is quite subjective, and its results
significantly depend on the adopted assessment methodology, business objectives of the
enterprise and the level of staff training that ensures the performance of external and
internal audit of the CII. Existing tools for assessing the effectiveness of IP and within
them ISMS, which is the result of the use of a "best practice" include models of maturity
and models of process capabilities. As a rule, various tools for assessing the
effectiveness of ISMS use a maturity assessment system, which scales from 0 to 5, and 5 is the
highest level of maturity [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]:
0 - Not performed;
1 - Performed informally;
2 - Planned;
3 - Well defined;
4 - Quantitatively controlled;
5 - Continuous improvement.
      </p>
      <p>In different implementations of this toolkit, there are differences in the methodology
of application: as a rule, the assessment of the level of maturity of ISMS is carried out
by an information security officer, consultant or auditor. The number of questions and
the methodology for obtaining the resulting answer may differ depending on the
maturity model for which of the "best practices" need to be determined (CMMI, NIST,
COBIT, ISO 21827, etc.). In most cases, the assessment of the level of maturity focuses
on the study of the following issues:</p>
      <p>- what are the intentions of the organization to implement information security policy
(ISO 5);
- how the organization manages its information security (ISO 6);
- whether staff are qualified to perform their duties and whether access to resources
is terminated after their dismissal (ISO 7);</p>
      <p>- whether the asset management program includes methods of identification,
tracking, classification of property rights to assets for their protection (ISO 8);
- whether the organization uses administrative, physical, technical functions to
manage the capabilities of users of IP and information and communication systems to
interact with other information resources (ISO 9);</p>
      <p>- how the organization uses cryptographic security methods and how cryptographic
keys are managed (ISO 10);
- how buildings and related infrastructure are protected from IS threats (ISO 11);
- as formalized policies of procedures and controls that help ensure data and IP
protection and assist in the management and operation of networks (ISO 12,13);
- whether security requirements are established in the organization as an integral part
of the development or implementation of ISMS (ISO 14);
- how safe the organization is interaction with third parties (ISO 15);
- how IS incidents are managed (ISO 16);
- whether business continuity management is performed (ISO 17);
- whether compliance with legal requirements for the protection of information
assets is ensured (ISO 18).</p>
      <p>Studying such a wide range of issues without the involvement of external experts in
the field of IS audit is, in most cases, a problem that has no solutions.</p>
      <p>
        In case when the organization seeks to comply with any of the "best practices", it
must ensure compliance with the relevant conditions of a particular "best practice" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]
and in the construction of ISMS to implement the relevant basic elements of
information security management. Given the continuous improvement of "best practices",
such as the need to meet new challenges of the time, the difference between versions
of the same "best practice" may be significant, which will require significant
modifications to existing ISMS and the corresponding costs of CII owners. often unwilling to
carry. For example, the difference between the NIST 800-53 v4 and NIST 800-53 v5
versions is quite significant. In version 5, 66 new controls were added and 202 controls
were improved, 131 new parameters were added to the existing controls. As a result of
a number of improvements in NIST 800-53 v5, 1007 controls and improvements were
created. In some best practices, in particular in the NIST CSF, it is stated that the core
of the standard is widely related to controls from common international standards, such
as ISO / IEC 27001, NIST 800-53, COBIT, Council on Cybersecurity (CCS), Critical
Security Controls (CSC), and the security standard for industrial automated systems
and control systems ANSI / ISA-62443, and CII of real objects, as a rule, is
heterogeneous and, accordingly, requires integration and analysis of complex solutions and
significant costs for creation and modernization of existing SUIB.
      </p>
      <p>Based on the fact that the creation or modernization of an existing ISMS requires
significant investment, at the same time, excessive implementation of controls, with the
exception of the economic component, increases the level of complexity and,
consequently, reduces the reliability of ISMS complexity of staff support and dissatisfaction.
Thus, to determine a sufficient level of controls implemented in the ISMS in accordance
with specific "best practices" or their set, which would ensure the protection of
information processed at CII facilities at a given level of guarantees at which the ratio of
costs for security measures and the amount of possible losses should have a level
acceptable to the organization is relevant.</p>
      <p>
        The tasks of ensuring the functional stability of systems are constantly in the field of
view of researchers [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref14">13, 14</xref>
        ]. Many scientific papers today are also devoted to
information security and critical cybersecurity infrastructure management [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15 ref16">15, 16</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>This work proposes a mathematical model that allows, based on a list of controls
implemented in a particular ISMS, to determine the level of its reliability, in relation to
the goals assigned to it by the owners of the CII or individual IP.
3</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Formulation of the problem</title>
      <p>In many practical situations, a significant part of domestic companies cannot afford
the full-scale implementation of a complete and comprehensive information security
system that would fully meet the relevant existing tasks and challenges. Therefore, in
some cases, companies use as a guideline or example for the creation of ISMS so-called
"best practices" that have proven themselves in real situations and can be implemented
with less labor and financial costs, but provide a sufficient level of information security
for a particular company.</p>
      <p>
        Suppose that an information security management system is built, for which, in
accordance with "best practice" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref7">1, 7</xref>
        ], a system of controls is defined and implemented.
We will denote the set of control indices i  I  1,..., n.
also assume that
      </p>
      <p>In this case, each control is characterized by the level of its implementation in the
system ai , i  I , and the quality of its application or robustness bi , i  I , level of
implementation ai , i  I , and quality bi , i  I . Without reducing the generality, we will
assume that 0  ai  1,i  I та 0  bi  1, i  I . The level and quality are determined
by experts or using specially designed procedures.
vij L,ie,tj theI relationships between controls be known, evaluated or expertly determined
, which characterize the level of influence of control with the index і:
ai , i  I , on control with the index j: a j , j  I . Without reducing the generality, we will
0  vij  1, i, j  I
.</p>
      <p>
        The task is to model the characteristics of the information security management
system (ISMS), which is created, as well as arithmetic (metrization, digitization) of quality
controls and determine an integrated assessment of the level of information security.
The ultimate goal of such modeling is to ensure the functional stability of the system
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]. For the task of providing information protection, the functional stability of the
system is to determine such a configuration of controls and to choose such a limit level
of quality of controls that allow to ensure an acceptable level of protection.
4
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Mathematical model</title>
      <p>The set of controls and relationships between them will be modeled by graphs or
matrices of contiguity or incidence. Note that the level of control implementation can
be characterized by some discrete values: scores, verbal expressions, clustered
indicators, and so on. In any case, it should be emphasized that the measurement is performed
on an ordinal scale. Therefore, the average in such cases should be defined as the
median, not as an arithmetic mean. And the quality of control is functionally dependent on
the level of its implementation and is expressed by some given or empirically defined
function - in analytical or tabular terms i  f ai , i  I .</p>
      <p>b</p>
      <p>Based on the analysis of controls, with the help of a group of experts, you can build
a graph of the relationship of controls, which is generally multifaceted. The vertices of
the graph are controls with multiple indices i  I , each of which is characterized by
the level of implementation of control in the system ai , i  I , and quality of operation
bi , i  I vij , i, j  I
. The relationships between the controls are graph arcs
. In the
abs:evnijce o0f, i,anj arIc between some vertices of the graph under construction, i.e.</p>
      <p>, the impact of control with the index i, i  I , on control with the
index j, j  I</p>
      <p>, is absent. The level of influence between controls is expressed in the
feedback: positive and negative.</p>
      <p>We will assume that at the initial stage of modeling and evaluation of ISMS it is
determined that the level of implementation of controls in the system is ai0 , i  I , and
the quality of functioning of each of them is defined or measured as. bi0 , i  I . The
modeling of possible states of the system is that hypothetically or practically changes
the initial levels of implementation of some controls and, according to the introduced
heuristics, determines how these changes will affect the quality of interconnected
controls and ISMS as a whole.</p>
      <p>In this case, the level of influence between the controls is expressed in the feedback:
v , i, j  I
this relationship can be positive or negative. Positive feedback
, is that in
ij
the case of reaching the top i  I of graph, even in the absence of control
ai  0, i  I , the system provides some level of quality at this peak, i.e. bi  0, i  I
. The specific numerical value of the level of quality control in this case is determined
by experts, experimentally, empirically or statistically. Negative feedback level
v ij , i, j  I when reducing the level of control ait  ait 1, i  I , entails a decrease in
the quality of control not only of this peak bit  bit 1, i  I , but also the associated
btj  btj1, j : vij  0, i, j  I
, where t  tact of quality
asvertices of the graph:
sessment of the system: t  0,1,2,... .</p>
      <p>In the same way the interaction between the shares of the graph is modeled - through
the bridges between the shares. We will also assume that in the case of a discontinuity
of the graph, the modeling of each connectivity component can be performed
autonomously, by analogy with the approach described in this paper.</p>
      <p>The task is to maximize the integrated level of quality controls and minimize the cost
of their implementation.
5</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Model for determining the quality of performance of elements of the organizational system</title>
      <p>sets
executes an element with an index</p>
      <p>Suppose that i  element of the system is missing and subset problems Ai , i  J ,
j, j  J ,
or several elements( ki , ki  k , ) with
indeces jt  J \ {i}, t  1,..., ki . Thus, according to the accepted heuristics, quality of
performance of problems of a subset Ai , i  J , may be about 80% of the nominal. Due
to the additional load on items with indexes jt  J \ {i}, t  1,..., ki , the quality of
subA jt , jt  J , t  J \ i, i  J ,</p>
      <p>will also decrease significantly.</p>
      <p>Quality of performance
A jt , jt  J , t  J \ i, i  J ,
functions
 ij ( x), i  J , j  J i ,
of
functions
from</p>
      <p>subsets
can be set in the described case also by membership
where x  100%, J i  a set of indexes of functions</p>
      <p>Ai , i  J ,
and
belonging to a subset of functions of a particular system element Ai ,i  J . Thus, with
a significant additional load on the element of the system, which is transferred to
perform the task of the missing element, significantly reduces not only the quality of new
tasks, but also the tasks that he previously performed. This model should consider
additional features.</p>
      <p>In addition, in the situation of long-term absence of a system element there are
additional costs:
- losses in duplicate execution of subtasks described by membership functions;
- the cost of time and resources to find and replace the missing element of the
system (internal recruitment or implementation of technical regulations in
technical systems);
payment for external recruitment or involvement of external repair services in
technical systems;
the cost of time and resources of the entire system, depending on the probability
of a successful search for a replacement item that is excluded from the system;
the cost of the procedure of adaptation of a new element, the cost of interaction
with adjacent interconnected elements (the effectiveness of this procedure and
its duration can also be described by membership functions);
when modeling the described situation should also take into account the
duration of the new element in the system, the cost of such a set of tasks in the
market and other factors.
6</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>Assessment of the integrated control level</title>
      <p>Today there is a group of indicators that are used to determine the overall security of
the system. One of the common tasks of expert evaluation is the choice in a pre-fixed
class of relations of some resulting (group, collective, compromise) relationship. At the
same time, on the basis of several contradictory indicators, the aggregation
(aggregation, integration, generalization, etc.) of indicators into a single integrated indicator is
carried out. To construct a convolution (generalized, aggregating, integral, integrative
criterion of quality of object) - it means to supplement a partial order on set of objects
to full. This procedure can be carried out in many ways and necessarily includes an
element of subjectivity.</p>
      <p>
        At the first stage, experts build a model of an ideal control system that meets the
standard [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], in the form of a graph with normative vertices and arcs, the model of
which is described above.
      </p>
      <p>
        At the second stage, an expert or group of experts who audit the real control system
and establish or assess the presence of controls, the level of their implementation in the
system and fill in the column that simulates the real ISMS. The coefficients of relative
competence of experts can be taken into account [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ], etc.
      </p>
      <p>
        On the basis of expertly determined or calculated by another method of control levels
ai , i  I , considering the system that meets the standard [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], dependings on this
information quality levels of control are determined: bi , i  I .
      </p>
      <p>
        In the third stage, with the participation of experts, the quality levels of the ISMS are
clustered to build an integrated membership function [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref19">19</xref>
        ], which reflects the
distribution of quality controls by quality levels and creates a membership function based on
the frequency of values. The integral value of the level of quality of the implementation
of the control system, which indicates the degree of functional stability of the system,
can be calculated, for example, by the method developed by the authors [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>To determine the integrated assessment,Vwebuild a matrix of frequencies of different
levels of quality of performance functions vij , i  1,...,100, j  n. Each row of
this matrix displays the estimated level of function quality from 0% to 100%, and the
column shows the number of functions with the specified level of performance.</p>
      <p>
        To determine the integrated level of quality of functioning of a complex system, the
classification of functions by the level of quality and completeness of their
implementation is carried out. After that, the function of belonging to a fuzzy set of values of the
integral quality of control implementation is constructed [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17 ref20">17, 20</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The integral value of the quality level of the control system, which indicates the
degree of functional stability of the system, can be calculated, for example, by the
method described in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ]. An integrated assessment of the quality of the information
security system will be determined using an additive criterion. In this case, we use a
number of heuristics that allow to justify the adequacy of the calculation of a single
integral value of the criterion.
      </p>
      <p>The quality of the information security system largely depends on the quality of the
system elements. Determining the integrated level of quality of a complex poorly
structured system based on the analysis of the interchangeability of its subsystems and
determining the best options for improving the quality of functions requires the creation
of an appropriate mathematical model.
7</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Optimization of the system protection integrated quality</title>
      <p>
        To increase the overall (resulting, integrated, aggregate, integrative) level of quality of
control system implementation, an expert or group of experts suggests options to
improve the system quality by increasing the level of implementation of some controls
and estimating the cost of implementing higher levels of individual controls. This is
due to the limited resources that the organization can allocate to improve the quality of
the information security management system. The task of choosing a compromise
option to ensure quality control is a multifaceted problem and can be formalized in the
classroom of multi-criteria optimization or by applying the idea of system optimization
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ]. System optimization for the task of building an information security model is to
determine the decision maker, the allowable level of protection and to optimize only
those controls that are critical to ensure the level of protection of the system as a whole.
It should be borne in mind that the definition of directions and the choice of options for
optimizing the integrated level of information security of the organizational system is
a multi-criteria task [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref22">22</xref>
        ]. In addition to ensuring the desired level of implementation of
controls, almost every organization should take into account, in particular, their
financial capabilities.
      </p>
      <p>Due to the computational complexity of the problem of direct search of control
system optimization options, experts can suggest, for example, about ten such options to
improve quality. There may also be comprehensive options when estimating or
monitoring the cost of combined control improvements.</p>
      <p>On the basis of the options offered by experts of increase of level of introduction of
separate additional controls recalculation of new states of system is carried out. That is,
the optimization two-criterion problem is solved to improve the integrated quality of
the protection system and minimize the cost of improving the condition of individual
controls. Scales and the admissibility of transactions with indicators play an important
role.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>Areas of further research</title>
      <p>The problem described in this work has broad prospects for research and modeling of
information security of a complex system. Based on the described approach, new
problem statements can be developed and new approaches to improving the adequacy of
modeling can be identified. To more fully take into account the features of real systems,
it is necessary to complicate the described mathematical model. In particular, this can
be done by taking into account the following factors:</p>
      <p>- determination of the limits of reducing the margin of safety of the system,
assessment of threats to its information security;</p>
      <p>- assessment of the allowable level of reduction of information security of the system
elements and the level of task performance;</p>
      <p>- considering the presence or absence of links between tasks: the impact of the task
on the quality of other tasks;</p>
      <p>- solving optimization problems of forecasting the quality of the system, the cost of
ensuring this quality and calculating the allowable time;</p>
      <p>- restoration of the admissible level of quality of functioning of system at failure of
several its elements: definition of necessary conditions of functioning.</p>
      <p>It is also perspective to use the RACI methodology for the development of a matrix
of responsibility distribution, which is used in various management doctrines:
functional, process and design: Responsible, Accountable, Consult before doing, Inform
after doing.</p>
      <p>In further research, it is also possible to construct functions for a priori introduced
linguistic variables with the following names: "critically acceptable level of
information security", "risky operation of the system", "sufficient level of information
security", "high level of information security" and so on.
9</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>Conclusions</title>
      <p>A model for assessing the integrated quality of the information security management
system and ways to purposefully improve the quality of its operation are proposed.</p>
      <p>Also substantiated:
- Built model of controls;
- Admissibility of expert assessment;
- An approach to determining an integrated assessment of the quality of
implemented controls is proposed.</p>
      <p>This model can be adapted to the needs of a particular organization, as well as
applied in other subject areas. The model is open to improvement and can easily be
focused on dealing with fuzzy data.</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
  <back>
    <ref-list>
      <ref id="ref1">
        <mixed-citation>
          1.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Diogenes</surname>
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Ozkaya E. D44</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Cybersecurity: Attack and Defense Strategies / translated from</article-title>
          <string-name>
            <given-names>English. D. A.</given-names>
            <surname>Belikova</surname>
          </string-name>
          . - M .: DMK Press,
          <year>2020</year>
          .-- 326 p
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref2">
        <mixed-citation>
          2. State standard of Ukraine ISO/IEC 27001:
          <year>2015</year>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref3">
        <mixed-citation>3. https://d1.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/compliance/NIST_Cybersecurity_Framework_CSF.pdf</mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref4">
        <mixed-citation>
          4. SP 800-
          <issue>53</issue>
          <year>Rev</year>
          .
          <article-title>5, Security and Privacy Controls for Info Systems and Organizations CSRC (nist</article-title>
          .gov)
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref5">
        <mixed-citation>
          5. https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/16-3713
          <article-title>-finding-cyberthreats%20with%20att%26ck-based-analytics</article-title>
          .pdf
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref6">
        <mixed-citation>
          6.
          <article-title>Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1 (nist</article-title>
          .gov)
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref7">
        <mixed-citation>
          7.
          <article-title>State standard of Ukraine ISO/ІЕС 27002:2015 Information Technology</article-title>
          .
          <article-title>Methods of protection. Code of practices for information security measures (ISO/ІЕС 27002:2013; Cor 1:</article-title>
          <year>2014</year>
          ; IDT)
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref8">
        <mixed-citation>
          8. State standard of Ukraine ISO/IEC 27006:
          <year>2015</year>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref9">
        <mixed-citation>
          9. State standard of Ukraine ISO/IEC 27005:
          <year>2015</year>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref10">
        <mixed-citation>
          10. ISO/IEC 31000:
          <year>2018</year>
          <article-title>Risk management - Guidelines</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref11">
        <mixed-citation>
          11.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Bondarev</surname>
            <given-names>V.V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>Security analysis and monitoring of computer networks. Methods and means</article-title>
          . / - Moscow:
          <article-title>publishing house MSTU im</article-title>
          . N.E. Bauman,
          <year>2017</year>
          -
          <fpage>225</fpage>
          ill.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref12">
        <mixed-citation>
          12. ISO/IEC 21827:2008 Information technology - Security
          <string-name>
            <surname>techniques - Systems Security</surname>
          </string-name>
          Engineering - Capability Maturity Model®
          <article-title>(SSE-CMM®)</article-title>
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref13">
        <mixed-citation>
          13.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>Kravchenko</given-names>
            <surname>Yu</surname>
          </string-name>
          .V.
          <article-title>The current camp and development of the theory of functional style / Yu</article-title>
          . V.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kravchenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S. A.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <string-name>
            <surname>Mikus</surname>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>// Model and information technologies: collection of scientific practices IPME іm</article-title>
          . G.Є.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Pukhova</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>-</article-title>
          <year>2013</year>
          . -
          <fpage>VIP</fpage>
          . 68. P.
          <volume>60</volume>
          -
          <fpage>68</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref14">
        <mixed-citation>
          14.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Kravchenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>Y.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Vialkova</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>The problem of providing functional stability properties of information security systems</article-title>
          // Modern Problems of Radio Engineering, Telecommunications and Computer Science,
          <source>Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on TCSET</source>
          <year>2016</year>
          ,
          <year>2016</year>
          , pp.
          <fpage>526</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>530</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref15">
        <mixed-citation>
          15.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Toliupa</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Parkhomenko</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>I.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , &amp;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Shvedova</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>H. Security</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>and regulatory aspects of the critical infrastructure objects functioning and cyberpower level assesment</article-title>
          .
          <source>In 2019 3rd International Conference on Advanced Information and Communications Technologies, AICT 2019 - Proceedings</source>
          (pp.
          <fpage>463</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>468</lpage>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref16">
        <mixed-citation>
          16.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Slipachuk</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>L.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Toliupa</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>S.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          , &amp;
          <string-name>
            <surname>Nakonechnyi</surname>
            ,
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>The Process of the Critical Infrastructure Cyber Security Management using the Integrated System of the National Cyber Security Sector Management in Ukraine</article-title>
          .
          <source>In 2019 3rd International Conference on Advanced Information and Communications Technologies, AICT 2019 - Proceedings</source>
          (pp.
          <fpage>451</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>454</lpage>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref17">
        <mixed-citation>
          17.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hnatiienko</surname>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Vialkova</surname>
            <given-names>V</given-names>
          </string-name>
          .
          <source>Model-Based Analysis Of The Estimation Of Integral Level Of Secuhity Of The Information System // Scientific and Practical Cyber Security Journal (SPCSJ)</source>
          . Vol.
          <volume>2</volume>
          , No.
          <issue>4</issue>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>December</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <year>2018</year>
          . Pp.
          <volume>95</volume>
          -
          <fpage>103</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref18">
        <mixed-citation>
          18.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hnatiienko</surname>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Snytyuk</surname>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          <article-title>A posteriori determination of expert competence under uncertainty / Selected Papers of the XIX International Scientific and Practical Conference "Information Technologies and Security"</article-title>
          (ITS
          <year>2019</year>
          ), pp.
          <fpage>82</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>99</lpage>
          (
          <year>2019</year>
          ).
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref19">
        <mixed-citation>
          19.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Kiktev</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>V.</given-names>
            <surname>Osypenko</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Shkurpela</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>A.</given-names>
            <surname>Balaniuk</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Input Data Clustering for the Efficient Operation of Renewable Energy Sources in a Distributed Information System</article-title>
          .
          <source>2020 IEEE 15th International Conference on Computer Sciences and Information Technologies (CSIT)</source>
          .
          <volume>23</volume>
          -
          <issue>26</issue>
          <year>Sept</year>
          .
          <year>2020</year>
          , Zbarazh, Ukraine. рр. 9-
          <fpage>12</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref20">
        <mixed-citation>
          20.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Hnatiienko</surname>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <surname>Snytyuk</surname>
            <given-names>V</given-names>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Expert technologies accepted solutions: Monograph</article-title>
          . - К .:
          <source>LLS "Maklaut"</source>
          ,
          <year>2008</year>
          . -
          <fpage>444s</fpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref21">
        <mixed-citation>
          21.
          <string-name>
            <surname>Glushkov</surname>
            <given-names>V</given-names>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Fundamentals of paperless computer science</article-title>
          . M.:
          <string-name>
            <surname>Science</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <source>The main edition of physical and mathematical literature</source>
          ,
          <year>1982</year>
          . - 552 p.
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
      <ref id="ref22">
        <mixed-citation>
          22.
          <string-name>
            <given-names>N.</given-names>
            <surname>Kiktev</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>H.</given-names>
            <surname>Rozorinov</surname>
          </string-name>
          ,
          <string-name>
            <given-names>M.</given-names>
            <surname>Masoud</surname>
          </string-name>
          .
          <article-title>Information model of traction ability analysis of underground conveyors drives</article-title>
          .
          <source>2017 XIIIth International Conference on Perspective Technologies and Methods in MEMS Design (MEMSTECH)</source>
          .
          <volume>20</volume>
          -
          <issue>23</issue>
          <year>April 2017</year>
          , Lviv. pp.
          <fpage>143</fpage>
          -
          <lpage>145</lpage>
          .
        </mixed-citation>
      </ref>
    </ref-list>
  </back>
</article>