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    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>You Said it? How Mis- and Disinformation Tweets Surrounding the Corona-5G-conspiracy Communicate Through Implying</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Lynn de Rijk, Radboud University</institution>
          ,
          <country country="NL">Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2020</year>
      </pub-date>
      <fpage>14</fpage>
      <lpage>15</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>This paper aims to investigate if implied meaning plays a role in mis-/disinformation tweets and what linguistic cues might signal this. A qualitative analysis of 130 mis-/disinformation tweets regarding the corona-5G-conspiracy using Speech Act Theory, shows that often meaning is implied by leaving out coherence markers, putting the words in someone else's mouth through citing and ambiguous phrasing/punctuation.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1 INTRODUCTION</title>
      <p>Systems that automatically recognize mis-/disinformation are
challenged by certain basic communicative features, such as
sarcasm or implied meaning. It is therefore relevant to find
out if indirect communication plays a role in
mis/disinformation and how large this role is. Speech Act Theory
[1] can be used as a framework to index implied meaning. It
distinguishes three forces in every utterance: 1) locution,
what is said literally, 2) illocution, what the utterance does
and 3) perlocution, what happens as a result. For example, in:
“Peter, you are standing on my foot”, the locutionary force is
asserting this state of affairs. The illocution, would generally
be requesting that this Peter lifts his foot, now that he is made
aware. The perlocutionary act would then be that Peter
indeed places his foot elsewhere.</p>
      <p>However, Micheal Geis argues that that the illocutionary force
of a Speech Act (SA) is mostly dependent on the context, not
linguistic cues [2]. Geis gives the example of a teacher asking a
student if they can solve a quadratic equation vs. the same
question being asked by a fellow student. The first would
count as a request for information (Do you need help?), where
the second is more likely a request for action (I don’t
understand, help me.) The importance of context is what
makes recognizing illocutionary force difficult for an
automated system.</p>
      <p>When dealing with data from a platform such as Twitter,
however, this becomes less of an issue, since in one-to-many
communication every member of the audience is addressed
relatively equally and the general context is the same for each
tweet (Twitter). This exploratory study aims to find if indirect
SA’s play a role in mis-/disinformation tweets and if so, if
there are linguistic features identifiable that can capture
indirect SA’s.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>METHODS</title>
      <p>
        Using the dataset compiled for the Medi
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">aEval 2020</xref>
        FakeNews
Task [3], a qualitative analysis of 130 tweets was performed,
coding for direct and indirect SA’s in Atlas.ti (version 8.4.5).
The coding process was iterative and additional codes were
added based on patterns found in the data, such as recurring
linguistic features, like coherence markers (e.g., ‘no
meaningful connectives’) and certain SA’s (e.g., ‘citing’). Some
codes were mutually exclusive (such as ‘Indirect SA: None’
with other Indirect SA’s), where other codes were not (e.g.,
tweets were often coded for multiple direct SA’s, see Example
1). Only tweets supporting a conspiracy (e.g., corona is a
coverup for 5G deaths or 5G causes corona) were included in
the result section, as tweets with a different stance were
rarely found (n = 7). Furthermore, only tweets that were not
part of a thread were analyzed, to ensure that the context did
not differ in regard to one-to-many vs. one-to-one interaction.
The data was coded iteratively until a saturation point was
reached within these inclusion criteria (n = 90). The final code
list can be found in Appendix 1. Indirect SA’s were only coded
for when these were the primary communicative force. For
example, the tweet below was coded for ‘Indirect SA:
concluding’, as the implied meaning is most likely the primary
meaning. Without the implication the assertions made are
simply loose statements.
      </p>
      <p>Anyone else curious about the majority of deaths in china seem
to be the same areas they rolled out their stand alone 5G just a
couple months ago. Verry few deaths being reported in other
areas in comparison. #5G #CoronavirusOutbreak #COVID19
#5gamechanger (Example 1)
The user asks a question in the first sentence, evidenced by
the syntactic structure of the sentence (‘direct SA: asking’),
even though they did not use punctuation. This is followed by
two assertions (‘direct SA: asserting’). The intended relation
between the three sentences is not made explicit through
coherence markers such as meaningful connectives (‘no
meaningful connectives’). The last sentence does have a lexical
cue phrase (phrases that show the relation between sentences
or the attitude of the speaker, e.g., ‘in my opinion’ or, in this
tweet, ‘in comparison’), that shows the relation between areas
the user wishes to point out. As the causal relation is not made
explicit, the act of concluding that these assertions are
causally related is an indirect SA.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3 RESULTS</title>
      <p>Users seem to employ a couple of strategies to avoid outright
claiming there is a conspiracy, often communicating through
implication (see Table 2). First, they often omit connectives,
leaving the relation between sentences implicit (e.g., Example
1 and Table 3). Second, they tend to cite others (Table 2), such
as citing the headline of an article they then link to, or use
other means to put a middleman between themselves and
what is said, as can be seen in Example 2:
I’ve been reading a few posts from ppl I know about how the
#CoronavirusOutbreak is because of 5G trials and Wuhan was
the place that first rolled this out and therefore is seen to be
used as a biologocal warfare weapon...  #coronavirus
(Example 2)
In this tweet, connectives and lexical cue phrases (because of,
therefore) are used to make author intent clear, but the user
puts the words in the mouths of ‘ppl I know’.
Third, users employ ambiguous phrasing. This can be seen in
Example 1, where the question is not clearly stated, since a
question mark is omitted and instead an assertion follows
immediately. It is thus phrased initially as a question, but the
question itself does not seem of much importance. In Example
2, this strategy can also be seen in ‘ ’. It is left to the reader
to infer what the target of the emoji is; is it the entire prior
statement (how awkward that people I know say these things)
or only the part describing a possible relation between 5G and
corona (there might be a relation between corona and 5G)?
Depending on the interpretation, the meaning of the tweet
changes completely, even with regard to the user’s stance.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4 DISCUSSION</title>
      <p>This study found that there are linguistic cues identifiable that
capture indirect SA’s, such as omission of certain connectives
and lexical cue phrases. A possible explanation for these
findings is that users might (subconsciously) try to
circumvent the forewarning effect. This effect has been studied
extensively in psychology and suggests that forewarning is a
factor that causes resistance to persuasion [4]. Using
connectives and lexical cue phrases helps reader
comprehension in informative texts, but in persuasive texts
can build up the reader’s resistance, since they recognize
more easily when they are being persuaded [4]. Apart from
the omission of connectives and lexical cue phrases, the
ambiguity of certain tweets also points to this explanation.
Alternatively, the omission of certain words might also be a
result of the affordances [5] of Twitter, where the limited
characters per tweet might incentivize users to leave out
words they deem unnecessary. However, this does not seem
to be the case, as one would expect that emojis would be used
quite often, since they leave room for ambiguity while
simultaneously only taking up one character space. As seen in
Table 1, this is not the case. Additionally, emojis are often used
decoratively as well, such as arrows or bullet points, without
making use of their potential for ambiguity. Furthermore,
citing linked article titles is an interesting practice with these
affordances in mind, as it leaves little room for the user’s own
view. The limited space Twitter affords gives weight to the
chosen citation, which in turn creates the implication that the
citation is important/true/relevant.</p>
      <p>Lastly, leaving things ambiguous and citing others, could point
to a user orientation to distance themselves from
conspiracythinking – a way for users to keep plausible deniability for
their support of what is said. It should be noted though, that
grammatical or punctuation ambiguity might also be a result
of users not being native English-speakers or simply
inattentiveness or oversight by the user.</p>
      <p>Similar to [6]’s findings on Indonesian hoax data, I found that
SA Theory can be useful to analyze mis-/disinformation online
data. Where they focused on direct SA’s, finding that assertive,
directive and expressive SA’s were most common. In this
study, indirect SA were also considered, showing that
communication is often indirect in mis-/disinformation
tweets. Future research could compare these findings to
nonconspiracy-tweets, to shed some light on which explanation
provided here is more plausible and to show if the found
linguistic features might aid in distinguishing information
from mis-/disinformation. It would also be useful to see if
machine-learning might have already been able to distinguish
between the two regardless of picking up on the indirect SA’s.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</title>
      <p>I thank Martha Larson for her input and critical eye. I also
thank John Keates and Zhengyu Zhao for help with
preprocessing.</p>
      <p>FakeNews: Corona virus and 5G conspiracy</p>
    </sec>
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