=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2931/ICBO_2019_paper_24
|storemode=property
|title=Foundation for a Realist Ontology of Cognitive Processes
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2931/ICBO_2019_paper_24.pdf
|volume=Vol-2931
|authors=David Kasmier,David Limbaugh,Barry Smith
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/icbo/KasmierL019
}}
==Foundation for a Realist Ontology of Cognitive Processes==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2931/ICBO_2019_paper_24.pdf
Foundation for a Realist Ontology of Cognitive Processes
David Kasmiera, David Limbaugha,b,c, Barry Smitha,b,d
a
National Center for Ontological Research, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, USA
b
Department of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, USA
c
CUBRC, Buffalo NY, USA
d
Department of Biomedical Informatics, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, USA
Abstract
What follows is a first step towards an ontology of conscious Current cognitive ontologies
mental processes. We provide a theoretical foundation and
Work on cognitive ontologies has thus far focused on the needs
characterization of conscious mental processes based on a
of the cognitive sciences and of the mental health domain. The
realist theory of intentionality and using BFO as our top-level
most direct and extensively developed and utilized ontologies
ontology. We distinguish three components of intentional
for this domain remain the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF)
mental process: character, directedness, and objective referent,
and its modules the Emotion Ontology (MFOEM) and the
and describe several features of the process character and
Mental Disease Ontology (MFODO), as well as the Cognitive
directedness significant to defining and classifying mental
Atlas (1) (2) (6). The goal of these ontologies has been to build
processes. We arrive at the definition of representational
frameworks for bridging data collected in different sorts of
mental process as a process that is the bringing into being,
cognitive and neurological studies, focusing on familiar types
sustaining, modifying, or terminating of a mental
of mental processes such as remembering, deciding, attending
representation. We conclude by outlining some benefits and
on the one hand (1) (7-9) and on mental disease on the other (3).
applications of this approach.
The need for ontologies in the cognitive domain is expressed by
Keywords
Poldrack and Yarkoni as follows:
Mental Process, Mental Representation, Intentionality.
a search of PubMed reveals more than 1,800 papers whose title or
abstract includes the phrase “working memory task.” It may not
Introduction register to most of those authors that in using this term (rather
than a more descriptive term such as “Sternberg item recognition
Contemporary cognitive science is a highly interdisciplinary task” or “delayed response task”), they are making a theoretical
field which draws on a wide variety of heterogenous data, claim, i.e. that the task in question provides a way to isolate a
ranging from neurology to the analysis of literary texts. A range specific mental process called “working memory’’ (9).
of ontologies have been developed with the goal of making
these data more easily discoverable and analyzable. Following Hastings, Frishkoff, et al. (7) have noted that recognition tests
the principles and methodology of the OBO Foundry can and other similar tasks are used to operationalize the study of
provide a means of integrating these different kinds of data mental processes. That is to say that they are used to study the
effectively by creating ontologies which are both orthogonal to mental indirectly, by defining mental processes in terms of the
each other and also interoperable. data by which they are measured. Thus, working memory is
studied through research on subjects’ responses to recently
Here we describe the foundations of cognitive process presented stimuli; intelligence is studied through research on
ontologies such as the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) and the accuracy of responses to written questions; and volitional
its extensions (1-3). One unique feature of cognitive process decisions are studied through research on physical task
ontologies is that they can be of value also outside of the completion and recording.
sciences of cognition in applications in finance, medicine, and This practice is motivated by an assumption, widespread in the
intelligence analysis, where cognitive processes such as neurological science community, according to which mental
planning, diagnosing, and problem-solving play an important phenomena are not readily observable while associated
role (4). Successfully capturing cognitive process data in these behaviors are. The former are ‘subjective’. At the same time we
fields holds the promise of bringing improvements to the agree with (7) that indirect methods have certain shortcomings.
management of data about cognitive practices and thereby For example, “operational definitions rely on particular
providing a new sort of starting point for machine-assisted measurement methods, and these methods may not be sensitive
cognition approaches to artificial intelligence. It may also help to all aspects of the phenomenon of interest, or may reflect
us find better ways of understanding evaluative, forensic, additional processes, e.g., so-called task demands” (7). To
diagnostic and other investigative practices (5). avoid these shortcomings and improve the interpretation of test
Copyright © 2019 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
results we require a way to characterize the mental domain by the term ‘aboutness’. Aboutness, as we will show, is
directly, which means independently of operationalizing complex and comes in different types.
techniques and independently of any postulated reductions of
mental processes to neurological or physiological behavior.
is_about
Mental Process Entity
As in the practice of biological science generally, studies of (Perception) (Squirrel)
underlying mechanisms always begin with observations of
organisms and behaviors. This is because the latter are more
well understood. The same, we hold, is true of mental entities.
Operationalization and other modeling techniques may be is_about
useful and informative in some cases, but they both depend on Mental Process Entity
and are improved by an understanding of the initial phenomena (Remembering) (Meeting)
of interest. Part of the solution to both the bridging and
operationalization challenges is to provide a way to characterize Figure 1: Relation of Aboutness
the mental as it is understood pre-theoretically in the sorts of
subjective experiences that give rise to inquiry into the mind in Direct realism
the first place. What is needed for this sort of understanding is Realism is a view about what entities exists and what our
a characterization of the sorts of mental processes one cites knowledge of them consists in. Our approach to the mental is
when asked questions like “What were you thinking?”, “How called ‘direct realism’ and sometimes referred to as ‘common
did you arrive at that diagnosis?”, or simply “How are you sense realism’, which we characterize by the following
feeling?” In so far as there are meaningful answers to these principles:
questions, there are also cognitive processes which we are
describing when we give such answers. The reason there are a. The types of entities and features of the real world are
mental process data is because such processes are observable – much as we take them to be in common sense ordinary life
both directly through introspection (conscious self-awareness) and our knowledge of those entities is augmented by
and also indirectly, through reports others provide of what they advances in scientific discovery.
observe through introspection. Such reports are readily
available and can, we believe, serve as a basis for an ontology b. Mental processes are the means by which we acquire
of mental processes. knowledge of, think about, feel towards, and act in
meaningful ways in relation to the real world.
Methods c. We can and often do enjoy direct cognitive access to the
entities and features of the real world and these direct
The theory of intentionality as the starting point for an cognitive relations are central to our ability to know reality.
ontology of mental processes
d. The aboutness of mental processes is unrestricted in the
In the following we provide a theoretical foundation for a sense that it can relate to portions of reality of any type,
characterization of mental processes based on a realist theory of including any type of real entity or feature, including types
intentionality. This realist theory was employed already in themselves and also including instances of these types and
building the Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) as well as combinations of types and instances.
providing a starting point for the current development of the
e. Mental processes are natural processes and as such are
Cognitive Process Ontology (CPO) (5), but in the MF related
also parts of the natural world.
literature the theory itself remained implicit.
These principles entail that our minds have access to a real
We draw here specifically on the literature of what is called world of which we are a part. We can directly think about real-
realist phenomenology (10–16), which takes as its starting point world entities and features, as well as acquire knowledge of
the two-part thesis that 1. the mental phenomenon we are most portions of reality out there in the world. Direct realism rejects
evidently familiar with is our own conscious awareness and that views according to which we can access in our thoughts and
2. this conscious awareness bears the defining characteristic perceptions at best only inner mental entities such as sense data
that it is always consciousness-of one thing or another. If I look or subjective appearances. It also rejects views according to
through the window and become conscious of squirrels on the which the real world is made or constructed by the mental
lawn, then my consciousness is successfully directed toward processes that apprehend it.
those very squirrels. A thought you might have just now of a
meeting you attended yesterday is about a meeting that Direct realism does not entail that all intentional conscious
happened yesterday. As a picture is a picture of something and mental processes involve direct aboutness relations, nor that all
a statement is a statement about something, so thinking is in intentional conscious processes are always about some real
every case a thinking about something. (See Figure 1.) entity. However, following (18) we maintain that all such non-
veridical and non-relational mental aboutness is ultimately
This quality of consciousness has traditionally been called dependent and derived in various ways from direct relational
‘intentionality’, though it is also sometimes referred to using the aboutness to some portion of reality. The ways in which
terminology of ‘representations’, as when we say that an act of intentional conscious mental processes can fail to relate to that
consciousness has a certain ‘representational quality’ (17). In which they purport to be about is multifarious and is outside the
more general parlance, intentionality is just what is conveyed scope of this paper. For our analysis it is sufficient to point out
that mental processes have intentional qualities whether they directedness is the difference between the manner in which you
are direct, indirect, veridical, or non-veridical. Furthermore, we bring something to mind, and the way that thing brought to
note that intentional conscious mental processes can and often mind is represented to be.
do directly relate, that we are aware of and can locate these
cases, and that we can describe the features of mental processes Character and directedness are mutually dependent parts of a
that make this possible when it does occur. representational whole. A pairing of this sort is common to
many sorts of processes. For example, walking has both a
Basic structure of intentional mental processes manner of walking (for example a certain gait or a limp) and a
direction of walking. An instance of one type can only exist
We restrict our discussion to intentional (henceforth
with an instance of the other as parts of a complex whole. This
representational) mental processes of the sort we consciously
relationship is illustrated in Figure 2.
experience. We focus exclusively on non-pathological cases of
mental processes. We believe that, as in the case of anatomy so
also in the case of the ontology of the mental, disorders and Mental Process Objective Referent
anomalies are best defined in terms of standard (or ‘canonical’)
cases (19). Character is_about
(as wondered)
We begin with three general observations about Entity
representational mental processes. (weather)
Directedness
1. They have a representational structure. (about weather)
2. This representational structure is complex.
3. This representational structure is tied to the portions of Figure 2. Representational Structure
“| |” indicates a relation of mutual dependence
reality the corresponding mental processes are about in
non-arbitrary ways. The objective referent of a mental process is the entity or
We discuss each of these in turn. portion of reality that a given thought is or is intended to be
about – for example the people, meetings, buildings, cars,
Structure of a mental process trucks, and so on that we consider in our thoughts or perceive
in our everyday experience of the world. The object of Jim’s
Three dimensions have traditionally been distinguished in the doubting, discovering, and affirming in the example above is
relational structure of representational mental processes, the actual person Jim and his actual illness. It is thus not what
namely: character, representational directedness, and some might call a concept of Jim or any other theoretical mental
objective referent (11) (20) (21). entity; it is not a bundle of sense data; and it is not any sort of
The character (or ‘mode’) of a representational mental process image or representation of Jim.
is that feature by which process types such as judging, doubting, Representational structure is complex
supposing, inferring, hoping, desiring, and fearing are
distinguished from each other. Differences in character are The representational qualities involved in mental processes are
differences in the way an entity is consciously represented. both internally complex, which means that they have multiple
Representational mental processes are not mere cases of parts standing in relations to each other, and externally
aboutness; there is always some characteristic way each is about complex, which means that they are embedded in larger
something. Wondering whether Jim is ill, doubting that Jim is complex wholes consisting inter alia of the representational
ill, discovering that Jim is ill, and affirming that Jim is ill are qualities of other distinct mental processes.
each about Jim in some specific way. In each case a distinct
characteristic manner of relating (wondering, doubting, Consider the experience E of wondering whether you turned the
discovering, affirming) relates the experiencing subject to the stove off this morning. This experience is not simply about the
same portion of reality, namely, Jim and his illness. stove and its being on or off. Rather, your concern is complex
and includes representing (thinking about) the stove as your
The representational directedness (or ‘content’) of a mental stove, as an appliance, as persisting across time, as occupying a
process is the qualitative way an entity is represented to be in certain physical location, as previously having been used by
an experience. This quality is what gives a mental process its you, as a valued object, as capable of being on and off, as having
aboutness to a particular entity as qualified in this or that way. a color, a size, a function, an associated fire risk, and so on.
For example, it gives rise to the difference between thinking Some of these will be in the front your attention and concern
about an airplane ticket as yours, or as lost, or as cancelled. (the on switch, the fire risk), others at the periphery (its cooking
Mental processes of a single character type can involve a function).
different representational directedness. Thus, one might wonder
about the weather, wonder about your flight times, or wonder Such qualities and relations belonging to (or associated by you
about that parking spot at the airport. In each case the same with) the stove are co-represented in the experience E, not just
process character (wondering), is paired to a different concurrently, but in such a way as to form a unified whole of
representational directedness: being “about the weather”, which each co-representational quality is a part. Some of these
“about your flight” or “about that parking spot”, respectively. aboutness relations are illustrated in Figure 3. Each small arrow
The difference between the character and representational signifies a relation of aboutness towards a part or feature of the
stove. Each is what we might call a ‘partial representation’ the different contexts within which our mental processes
involved in the whole representational complex that is about represent.
whether the stove is on. The large arrow signifies the aboutness
of the total representational structure of which the other For example, your stove, when you stand before it and perceive
representational qualities are parts. it, is represented also as having parts and features that are not
wholly present to you (its inside, its backside, its weight, the
cable connecting it to the power supply, its dispositions, for
Representational is_about instance to cause a fire). They are co-represented as waiting, in
Stove
Complex the background so to speak, for you to perceive should you turn
your attention to them. The directedness corresponding to the
Character function parts and properties of an object that are co-represented but not
as wondered, immediately present in the experience make up what can be
color
remembered… size called the object’s ‘internal horizon’. There is also an ‘external
` horizon’ of directedness towards the relations and anticipated
spatial
actions of an object of concern. This anticipatory structure can
Directedness owner region
be illustrated by our experience of processes unfolding in time.
(of on/off switch,
color, function...)
The experience of witnessing the beginning of an action you are
on/off switch familiar with, say the leap of a cat, co-represents the anticipated
path of flight and landing. The expected unfolding of the cat’s
action makes the experience to be about a leap from the very
Figure 3: Complex of Representational Qualities in start.
Experience E
There are also elements of the horizon that pertain to the context
The representational complex with which you wonder about of the occurrence of the mental process itself. Since mental
your stove in E is not static and will vary across time. It is also processes occur in the context of other concurrent mental
not the case that every person that wonders about your stove processes, what we might call a ‘subjective’ horizon extends
represents it in the same way and with the same set of qualities.
out to the anticipated further experiences of the conscious
However, some parts of this representational complex are
subject herself. The horizon of a single representational mental
essential to any mental process of any person that would relate
process involves representational qualities directed to other
to that very stove. For instance, your stove (and any stove) is potential experiences of other objective referents and other
represented as a physical object; and were it not so represented, mental processes. In the above example, the perception of the
the stove would fail entirely to be related to your thinking. You
leap of a cat includes the anticipation of its landing, but the
would not in fact be thinking about the stove at all. A
perceptual process also represents something about itself and its
representational quality directed to the material nature of
own potential. It co-represents its own expected continuation,
something like a stove is so fundamental to our thoughts about
and specifically a continuation that leads to the presentation of
physical objects that it normally goes unnoticed. Other parts are the completion of the cat’s landing. The subjective horizon of a
accidental. For instance, if you sell your stove and no longer perceptual experience also relates to the potential for further
represent it as one of your possessions, your thought can
perspectives. The directedness to the cat’s leap includes the co-
nonetheless be related to, and be about, the same stove.
representation of your perspective and its potential to change
Additionally, mental processes do not occur in isolation. Every with respect to that leap. For example, should the cat leap
representational complex arises in the context of other behind a tree and just out of view, co-represented is a horizon
representational qualities about not only the immediate object of potential adjustments to your perspective needed to get a
of concern but of the representing subject and the environment better view of the landing.
of this subject. Thus, your initial wondering takes place in
The horizon of mental process can also include representations
combination with processes of representing your current of the mental processes of other persons (22). We see the world
environment, your bodily position and location, the obligations not merely as we see it but also, potentially, as Jim, over there
and tasks you are currently fulfilling, the present passage of on the other side of the room, would see it. Should we see Jim
time, the occurrences you just witnessed and the anticipated
looking with interest around a corner that occludes our view,
occurrences just beginning, and much more.
our perception has as a part of its horizonal content a
Horizon representation of Jim’s perspective. His action is seen as
including a perspective we ourselves could have should we go
This last-mentioned example points to another structural feature over next to him and look for ourselves. This is part of what we
of mental processes. The structure of every representational might call the ‘inter-subjective horizon’, consisting of those
mental process involves what phenomenologists have called its familiar and expected mental features, processes, and behaviors
‘horizon’, which extends outward both spatially and temporally of other persons and other thinking organisms. For example,
from the object or process in the foreground of the experience Jim’s action is, in the normal case, perceived as motivated and
(22). Our representational complexes are directed not only to rational. His behavior of looking around a corner is an objective
their target and its various parts and features as described above, referent whose horizon points to a motive, purpose, and
but also to the expected and anticipated parts, features, perspective that Jim bears, and that purpose, motive, and
relations, and actions of the target beyond what is currently perspective represented as something that we could, in
presented. There are many sorts of horizons corresponding to principle, possess.
Fulfillment established. Her examination will typically be directed to
ascertaining the presence of those phenotypical features.
A further central structural dimension of our experience is the
dimension of fulfillment. When we witness the completion of The examination process is a perceptual process that represents
the cat’s leap we experience a fulfillment of our initial the lesion along with a context of horizons. Her perceptual
expectation. What had initially been mere anticipations of leap examination will include, among other things, representations
and landing become filled by perceptual experiences of those making up
very leap and landing processes themselves.
a. the intersubjective horizon of the patient (what to ask
Should you go home and check on the stove you were them, how to communicate with them),
wondering about, the representational qualities of your
consciousness mental processes will continue to change. Yet b. the internal horizon of the lesion (coloration, structural
when you arrive home the stove will (in non-pathological cases) features of the epidermis and dermoepidermal junction),
be represented as the same stove as you wondered about earlier
in the day. Although new representations of the stove are c. the subjective horizon of her potential to get a better view
produced, they are not only about the same objective referent as (using a dermascope, moving a lighting source to fix color
earlier wondered about, but they are specifically about the stove and shadowing effects), and
“as” earlier wondered about, your new mental processes being
about your stove in its relation to your previous concern. d. the external horizon of relations (the age of the lesion,
Finding that the stove is switched off may offer a sense of relief the behavior of the patient, family history).
– something it would not do if you had not been concerned to
check on it in the first place. For you to check on and verify As the examination proceeds the perceptual processes involved
that the stove is in fact off (in the canonical case) involves you will fulfill to various degrees these horizons, and while doing
yourself perceiving that the stove is off. This amounts to so will also directly represent various features relevant to the
perceptually representing the stove and finding it to be as it was clinical phenotype of a melanoma. Should the features
previously thought to be. In this process of verifying, perceptually represented fulfill the doctor’s initial
representational qualities belonging to the process of wondering representation affirmatively, she will find the lesion to in fact
are brought into relation with the representational qualities and bear that phenotype. The initial question will represented as
objective referent of a process of perception. This bringing into settled and the representation questioned, that the lesion has the
relation is a distinct higher-order process that is directed to both phenotype of a melanoma, will be represented to be true.
the stove as wondered about and to the stove as perceived, and
through them represents a new situation: the stove’s being as it The examination of these familiar cases of wondering and
was thought to be. The fulfillment of the wondering about the examining illustrate both the structure and complexity of the
stove by way of the perception of the stove is more than a aboutness that is part of our everyday conscious experience.
sequence or even a co-representation, but a unity, what has been Such complexity points to the difficulty of describing mental
termed a ‘fusion’ of parts that represents a new object based on processes. Whether for the sake of scientific research, therapy,
these parts (10). This sense might be expressed with the diagnosis, or even personal communication about drinks at
exclamation “Whew! The stove is off”. party next week, there is a potential for misidentification and
misinterpretation. Despite these difficulties, it is worth pointing
Through this new process the stove is represented not just as out that we know perfectly well what is intended when someone
being off, but also as related to another higher-level distinct tells us that they are wondering whether or not they left the
representation with its own distinct character; what might call stove on. We know what they mean, and we know to some
the apprehension of truth. A representation of this sort is degree what they are thinking about and how they are thinking
remarkable because it describes a case of knowledge about it. We also know what sort of actions and experiences
acquisition and belief formation not just about the stove (the (and what further representations) would settle their concern.
objective referent) but of a representational structure itself. The This is true in general. When we know what someone is
process of wondering whether the stove was on or off is thinking about and how they are thinking about it, we know also
represented as settled and the representational directedness what portions of reality and what sorts of representations
towards the stove’s being off is represented as correct or true. directed to them would fulfill their intentions, satisfy their
This is something that neither mere wondering nor perception desires, help to prove their statements true or false, motivate
nor the sequence of the two could ever result in on their own. their actions, or explain the meaning of their words. All of this
Simple perceptual validation and its twin, the process of is due in large part to the sharing of a common real world to
perceptual frustration form the basis also of scientific which our thoughts are directed and to the shareable repertoire
observation and hence of all scientific evidence gathering (10). of representational qualities that direct us to it.
Consider another example. When a dermatologist examines a Representational qualities are tied to their respective objects
skin lesion for indications of a melanoma, she often intends to in non-arbitrary ways
make a determination whether a biopsy is warranted. But,
before this determination can be made an initial examination Each mental process, in virtue of the representational qualities
directed toward the question of whether the patient’s lesion instantiated within it, represents its target in regular and
bears the clinical phenotype of a melanoma will need to be distinctive ways according to its process type. Perceptual
processes represent the thing perceived to be both sensorially
present and to be causally responsible for the perceptual process feeling of fear and quite possibly other related feelings of dread
itself. A judgment represents some state of affairs as obtaining or terror, there are also associated representations of
or not obtaining (for example, that the stove is off, that the dangerousness that include as a part not the feelings but the
dinner was cold). An emotion represents a thing or an event as representational directedness to threat and impending doom.
differentially valued, as dangerous (in fear) or sudden (in
surprise). An expectation represents something as not occurring The description of these representational qualities can be
but as at the same time impending. These representational extended along the lines discussed above. We add to this
quality types cannot be arbitrarily exchanged as they are tied to description that fear, in the normal case, includes co-
the qualitative character that participates in each mental process representations of the presence of a potential and expected
according to its type. harm, such that there is an anticipation of the imminent
realization of that harm, and also that the feared thing itself is
The Emotion Ontology (MFOEM) makes use of this represented as something that adversely affects conditions and
relationship between the representational quality types and possibilities that the organism deems valuable and important.
mental process types. Consider the MFOEM definition of the Being struck with the fear that your laptop containing important
emotion process of fear. work may be irrevocably broken has as a part the conscious
Fear =def. An activated, aversive emotion that motivates representational directedness to the threatening condition of the
attempts to cope with events that provide threats to the damaged laptop as well as the impending doom that a
survival or well-being of organisms. Characterized by permanent loss would entail. Of course, if nothing in the laptop
feelings of threat and impending doom, and by an urge to is of sufficiently serious value, then these representations would
get out of the situation. normally not arise and neither would the emotion of fear.
The representational qualities associated with specific types of Objective Referent
emotion processes are captured in MFOEM under ‘appraisal’.
The emotion process of fear has as a part the ‘appraisal of We have thus far addressed the role of the objective referent in
dangerousness’ defined as follows. this discussion, only briefly, with respect to its place in the
representational relation and its role in the processes of
Appraisal of Dangerousness =def. An appraisal that fulfillment. Representational qualities, however, are themselves
represents an evaluation that an object or situation is to a great deal dependent on and determined by the nature of the
dangerous to the person (MFOEM). entities they are about. An aboutness directed to a color could
The emotion process of fearing thus essentially involves the not be directed to sound, and an aboutness directed to a person
quality of representing an object or situation as being dangerous could not also be directed to the number five. Each entity type
to the fearing agent. If someone were to appraise an object or determines the ways its instances can be both represented and
event to be safe and secure they could not be said to be afraid known (for example, sounds are heard, colors seen, equations
of it. Similar principles apply also to the behavioral and calculated). Each entity type also limits the ways its instances
physiological dimensions of emotion. Thus, the can be represented and known. These are not accidental
representational qualities of fear go hand in hand, for example relationships and there is a remarkable isomorphism between
with an increase in heart and breathing rate, increased muscle what sorts of things exists and how those things are related to
tension, and piloerection (goose bumps), to name a few. conscious mental processes. Were it not the case, then any sort
of entity with any set of features, could be represented by any
In cases where the behavioral, affective, and other sort of mental process with any set of features. To the contrary,
physiological experiences that are normal for the fearing sounds cannot be premises in deductions, colors cannot be
experience are present without the representational qualities known through a process of counting, and equations cannot be
characteristic of fear, we would regard the person to be found as spatially extended objects orbiting the earth.
suffering a disorder.
Towards a foundation for the Cognitive Process Ontology
We can enhance the MFOEM definition of ‘fear’ by noting that (CPO)
there are representational qualities expressed in the definition
but currently couched in terms of feelings. MFOEM adds to the With this account in hand, we now turn to the ontological
definition of ‘fear’ the comment that it is “characterized by representation of mental processes using Basic Formal
feelings of threat and impending doom …”. Here the term Ontology (BFO) as our top-level ontology.
‘feelings’, is best understood to imply that the agent is
We limit ourselves to representational mental processes of a
representing something to be threatening, impending, and
sort that are experienced consciously and are basic to our shared
dooming. MFOEM does not have a term for ‘feeling of threat’
mental lives and to our shared mental vocabulary. Trivially,
or ‘feeling of impending doom’ and ‘feeling’ itself is defined as
mental processes are a type of BFO: process. Process in BFO is
follows:
a very broad term, but comprehends inter alia the coming into
Feeling =def. The subjective emotional feeling is that (fiat) being, sustaining, modifying, or passing away of a quality or
part of the emotion process by which the organism qualities.
experiences its own emotion.
A quality in BFO is a Specifically Dependent Continuant (SDC)
that inheres in some independent continuant (IC). In the case of
While the subjective emotional feelings involved in fear would
representational mental qualities, the relevant independent
conform to the above definition and would include at least the
continuant is the cognitive system or relevant parts thereof of a
conscious organism. When I am thinking about something,
representational qualities inhere in the relevant parts of my
cognitive system, and correspondingly, those parts of my
Mental Quality
cognitive system bear the representational qualities. In this way
my thinking processes relate me, by way of my cognitive
system, to the entities I think about. (See Figure 4.)
Consequently, mental processes are changes in qualities borne
by an organism’s cognitive system. Following (18) we define
is_a
‘mental quality’ as follows: Character
has_part
Mental Quality =def. Quality which specifically depends
Mental
on an anatomical structure in the cognitive system of an inheres_in Cognitive
Representation
organism. (Representational
System
Quality)
Throughout the occurrence of a mental process, the cognitive
system of an organism participates in the process by bearing Directedness
the mental qualities that come into being, endure, change, or has_part
has_part
pass away. The qualities themselves participate in the process
as those entities that are formed, sustained, modified, or
destroyed by the process. We term the whole qualitative Agent
structure of representational mental qualities a ‘mental
representation’ and define ‘representation’ and ‘mental
‘Representational Mental Process’
representation’, as follows:
=def. Process that is the bringing into being,
Representation =def. Quality which is about or is intended sustaining, modifying, or terminating a mental participates_in
to be about a portion of reality. representation.
Mental Representation =def. Representation which is a
mental quality. Figure 4. Representational Mental Process
We can now clarify talk of mental processes and their
aboutness. Mental processes have aboutness only derivatively; Discussion
their aboutness is due to the representational qualities that are
involved as participants in those processes. Aboutness does not Consider now the difference between the characters of
inhere in a process but in the thinker as she is related to the processes of fearing, questioning, imagining, and regretting. An
target (some entity or portion of reality) that is being thought adult under suitable conditions is able to distinguish between
about. The conscious processes of a cognitive system, as we these on the basis of the representational relation each has to its
experience and communicate about them, are changes in the object. A question process represents its object as yet to be
vast qualitative structures of aboutness we consciously live determined, an imaginative process as unreal, a regret as past.
through. Following our definitions, representational mental An ordinary adult, similarly, cannot fear what she represents as
processes thus consist in the coming into being, sustaining, past or regret what she represents as unreal. These examples are
modifying, or passing away of mental representations of not intended to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
various complexity and duration. each process type but rather to point to the sorts of ties that hold
between character, representational content, and objective
Representational Mental Process =def. process that is the referent. As a matter of principle descriptions of such ties, when
bringing into being, sustaining, modifying, or terminating made explicit, often appear as more than obvious to anyone that
a mental representation. (5) has feared, questioned, imagined, or regretted.
The basic structural components of a mental representation are When mental process data are collected whether for cognitive
its representational character and representational directedness research experiments, cognitive and behavioral therapies,
defined as follows: psychiatric evaluation, correlations in neuro imaging studies, or
for review and evaluation of diagnostic and other analytical
Representational Character =def. a quality that is part of a practices, then, one important organizational dimension of these
mental representation and determines the way in which that data relates to the coming into being, changing, and passing
representation is about its objective referent. away of complexes of mental representations.
Representational Directedness =def. a quality that is part of Potential difficulties and further research.
a mental representation and determines the way its
objective referent is represented as being. Although cognitive processes have been discussed in the above
as if they were discrete events, our conscious lived experience
is much more like a continuous flow. Divisions into wondering,
doubting, perceiving, and so forth, although not arbitrary,
delineate events that of their own character do not exist in
isolation but are rather fused together in much larger complexes
of intentional representational structures. This fact does not,
however, remove the significance of the distinctions we have universal grammar, and philosophical analysis of language,
drawn, but it makes isolating and studying individual processes Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 1987; 205-227.
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