=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-2931/ICBO_2019_paper_25
|storemode=property
|title=Mental Capabilities
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2931/ICBO_2019_paper_25.pdf
|volume=Vol-2931
|authors=Eric Merrell,David Limbaugh,Alex Anderson,Barry Smith
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/icbo/MerrellLA019
}}
==Mental Capabilities==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2931/ICBO_2019_paper_25.pdf
Mental Capabilities
Eric Merrella, David Limbaugha,b,c, Alex Andersona, Barry Smitha,b,d
a
Department of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, USA
b
National Center for Ontological Research, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, USA
c
CUBRC, Buffalo NY, USA
d
Department of Biomedical Informatics, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, USA
Abstract & this realization occurs in virtue of the bearer’s
physical make-up (1).
We propose capability as a universal or type intermediate
between function and disposition. A capability is, broadly
One subclass of ‘disposition’ is formed by those dispositions
speaking, a disposition that is of a type whose instances can be
which provide the rationale for the existence of their bearers. A
evaluated on the basis of how well they are realized. A function,
disposition of this sort is called a ‘function’. Here ‘rationale’
on the view we are proposing, is a capability the possession of
covers both cases where functions exist in reflection of
which is the rationale for the existence of its bearer. To say for
evolutionarily development (as in the case of lungs or hearts)
example that a water pump has the function to pump water is to
and cases where functions exist in reflection of intentional
say that the pump exists because something was needed that
design (as in the case of the water pump and other material
would pump water. A water pump may have many capabilities,
artifacts). In BFO:
including: to be weatherproof, to run without lubricant, to be
transportable, and so forth. But its function is to pump water.
f is a function means:
We focus here on capabilities possessed by humans – such as
f is a disposition,
piano playing or language using – and we explore the relation
& f exists in virtue of its bearer’s physical make-up,
between capabilities of these sorts and structures in the brain.
& this make-up is something that this bearer
possesses because it came into being, either through
Keywords: evolution (in the case of natural biological entities) or
through intentional design (in the case of artifacts), in
Capability, Ability, Mental Functioning order to realize processes of a certain sort (1).
Introduction Examples include: the function of amylase to break down starch
into sugar, reflecting the fact that the disposition to break down
‘Disposition’ is a class in Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) whose starch into sugar was evolutionarily selected for; and the
instances are, for example, the fragility of this glass, the function of a hammer to drive nails, which exists because the
irascibility of this old geezer, the solubility of this chunk of salt. hammer was designed to bear a disposition to drive in nails (1).
Dispositions are potentials for this or that to happen, and they
are realized when the right trigger or circumstance arises Spear et al. (2) note that,
(sometimes, as in the case of a beating heart, always). The notion of function is indispensable to our understanding of
Dispositions specifically depend for their existence on their distinctions such as that between being broken and being in
bearers and – unlike roles, such as the student role or the lawyer working order (for artifacts) and between being diseased and
role – they are dependent only on their bearers. Hence, they are, being healthy (for organisms).
according to BFO, internally grounded, specifically dependent, Functions go hand in hand with the gradeability of their
realizable entities. realizations. (Compare the treatment of ‘normativity’ in (2).)
Your heart may pump well, or it may pump less well, and the
BFO 2.0 elucidates disposition as follows: latter is sometimes associated with the presence of disease (3–
6).
d is a disposition means:
d is a realizable entity, However, there appears to be a further class of dispositions
& d ’s bearer is some material entity, whose instances are also evaluated based on how well they are
& d is such that, if it ceases to exist, then its bearer is realized but whose bearers were not created specifically to
physically changed, realize that disposition as a matter of evolutionary selection or
& d ’s realization occurs when and because this intentional design. This class of disposition is broader than that
bearer is in some special physical circumstances, of function. More recently the term ‘capability’ has been
mooted as an appropriate term to describe entities in this
Copyright © 2019 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
intermediate class (7). A capability is (roughly) a disposition postulate that there are networks formed in the brain in the
whose realization brings benefits to some organism or group of process of acquiring such abilities, and that these networks are
organisms. Those capabilities which constitute the primary the bearers of the corresponding acquired dispositions. (Note
reason for the existence of the bearer (either as a matter of that we here use the term ‘bearer’ in the narrow sense, following
evolutionary biology or as a matter of intentional design) we BFO; in common speech we often speak of the whole organism
call functions. as bearer in such cases.)
Evidence for the Existence of Abilities
Both organisms and artifacts can have capabilities. For
example, my hands are capable of opening cans of sparkling Mental Arithmetic
water and my car is capable of keeping me warm. In both of
Starting with the case of mental arithmetic, (8) points to
these examples the disposition is not a mere disposition. Rather,
evidence to the effect that, first, there are a number of shifts in
it is a disposition that in typical circumstances brings benefits
the neuronal networks in children between second and third
to an organism interacting with the bearer of this disposition or
grade and that, second, some of these developments, such as
to an organism that itself bears this disposition. Such benefits
can be graded on a scale (in some cases on multiple scales). greater connectivity in visual-processing areas, are directly
Thus, capabilities are not mere dispositions. But they are also related to learning arithmetic:
not functions. They are a class of realizable entities [Our] results suggest that the development of numerical skills is
intermediate between the two. characterized not just by a shift to dorsal PPC areas involved in
visuo-spatial attention, but also to ventral visual areas that are
Some capabilities are distinguished in that they can be realized involved in higher-order visual processing. We suggest that
by their bearers’ deliberately and in such a way as to bring ventral visual areas contribute to arithmetic skill development by
concordant benefit to the bearer. For example, the capability to building improved perceptual and mnemonic representations for
play the guitar is something the guitarist realizes on purpose and numerical problems (8).
something that brings benefit to the guitarist (as also, Furthermore, it is clear that damage to certain areas of the brain
potentially, to other organisms). A car’s capability to warm its will impair arithmetic function (9). In addition, (8) found that
passenger, in contrast, is never intentionally realized by its when a child learns arithmetic there are “significant task-related
bearer, nor does the production of heat benefit the car itself; changes in brain response and connectivity.”
rather, it is the passengers who are benefited by being kept
warm. To capture these cases, where a capability can be The authors found also that performing arithmetical
intentionally realized by and for the benefit of its bearer we calculations correlates with the coordination of multiple parts
introduce the further term ability. of the brain. This is inferred from the significant activation
found when children do arithmetic in the pre-supplementary
A still narrower class is that of mental ability – for example the motor Area (preSMA), bilateral anterior insula cortex (AIC),
ability to perform mental arithmetic. These are abilities that, in and the visual cortex (VC) (8).
contrast to the case of playing tennis, or playing the guitar, can
be realized purely mentally. Mental arithmetic is clearly an ability in our sense of the term.
Arithmetic is done intentionally, and people can be better or
worse at doing mental arithmetic, can improve their skill with
Methods
practice, and in typical circumstances benefit from the
performance of this skill. It is indeed a widely shared ability,
We shall use ‘ability’ to refer to a realizable entity that (i) has
and it would seem that everyone (even the uneducated) have the
an organism as its bearer and (ii) is such that its possession
ability to perform very simple calculations, so that it is
and/or realization brings benefit to this bearer and (iii) is
considered to be abnormal (and in some cases a disability) if
realizable deliberately (thus on the basis of an intention of the
one is unable to carry out such calculations to a certain level.
bearer). Thus, plants, fungi, and unicellular organisms bear no
abilities. This difference in skill might be explained by pointing to the
finding in (8) to the effect that there are task-related changes in
This paper assumes that mental properties supervene on the
connectivity which occur when children engage in tasks that
physical properties of the brain and nervous system. Given this
train mental arithmetic. Although the neuronal networks that
assumption, when mental capabilities are acquired, there must
bear the ability to perform mental arithmetic exist before this
be some physical change in the brain. We will present evidence
ability is exercised, practicing mental arithmetic certainly
that the acquisition of abilities on the part of a human being is
changes the connectivity of these structures. Arithmetic can
in some cases correlated with the development of novel
thus be considered as an ability that is in part innate and which
neuronal structures. The relevance of cases of this sort would
can be developed through practice. Many human abilities are
turn on the fact that the entities in question would be examples
similar in this regard. Jumping, running, and eating are all
of mental functions – since they would be capabilities whose
abilities that are innate in this sense.
bearers have evolved (or better: developed) to realize
dispositions of the given sort. Speaking a Second Language
Mechelli, et al. (10) provide evidence for structural changes to
We here consider three examples: being able to carry out
the brain induced through training that results in proficiency in
arithmetical operations in one’s head, being able to speak a
a second language. They found that there were measurable
second language, and being able to play a musical instrument.
differences in the density of grey matter in those subjects who
All of these are such that they can be exercised deliberately. We
were proficient in a second language (10). Grey matter consists
mainly of the cell bodies of neurons (11), and the increase in in the brain as a “capability bearing network”. The question of
grey matter density implies the genesis of new neurons in those interest is whether capability-bearing networks bear
regions. evolutionary functions, artifact functions, roles, or some other
class of realizable entity.
In this case, too, the increase in brain matter density can be
understood as a matter of developments in an existing structure, Do these networks bear biological functions?
rather than as the appearance of a new structure. This means It is relatively clear that the ability to perform arithmetic, the
that the learning of a second language indirectly causes ability to speak a second language, and the ability to play a
modifications to neuronal networks in the brain. musical instrument are distinguished from a mere disposition in
that they intentionally realized. These abilities are trained by the
The difference in density is more pronounced in those who
organism, which results in the acquisition or further
learned their second language earlier in life, reflecting the fact
development of the ability in conjunction with a change in
that this may be the result of a more natural process (informal
neuron networks in the brain. The networks themselves are not,
socialization rather than formal learning). Whether (or the
however, intentionally developed. When a novice pianist learns
degree to which) the structures developed in language learning
to play piano, the ability is acquired intentionally through
are simply extensions of existing networks of neurons or should
deliberate practice by the pianist. Yet, a pianist need not intend
be understood as separate networks altogether may thus depend
that anything happen to the structures in her brain for those
in part on when the language was learned.
structures to change. Finally, while the processes that are
Playing a Musical Instrument realized by the pianist’s piano playing ability are realized
Acquiring the ability to play a musical instrument has been intentionally, this is not the case of the processes carried out by
shown to go hand in hand with the development of associated the underlying neuron networks.
neuronal networks. Elbert et al. (12) found that string players –
If the above-mentioned abilities are dispositions, then they are
specifically, violinists who fret with their left hand – had greater
dispositions with a purpose (they are intentionally acquired and
cortical representation in the brain for their left hands than the
intentionally realized). However, it seems that they cannot be
control group, and that the amount of cortical representation
biological functions in BFO’s sense. This is because entities
correlated with the age the subject learned to play.
like contemporary languages and musical instruments were
Croom also notes that musical training can cause “significant introduced too recently in our history for a disposition (say) to
changes in the function and organization of the brain” (13). speak Italian or to play the viola to be borne by an ability-
Croom asserts further that neuroplasticity – the capability of the bearing structure that would have been evolutionarily selected
brain both to develop existing neuron networks and to create for. The case is less obvious for arithmetic reasoning. For all we
new networks – is greater in musicians than in non-musicians. know, there may have been some evolutionarily significant
Additionally, “musicians that practiced the piano since advantage for those who had ability-bearing structures that bore
childhood had a more structured pyramidal tract than non- this ability. However, it is at the same time clear that the ability
musicians”. Moreover, “white-matter bundles pertaining to the to perform arithmetic using Arabic symbols is again too recent
motor circuits in the brain are better structured in musicians in our evolutionary history for a corresponding, selected-for
than non-musicians” (13). ability-bearing structure to exist (14).
Capability Bearing Structures Of course, this is not to say that there are no language-, music-
or arithmetic-related functions of any sort. There may, for
We take it that our three examples of ability are different example, be brain structures bearing functions (such as: to
enough to allow for some reasonable generalization to other develop specialized pattern recognition skills or to manipulate
examples of abilities such as computer programming skill or
abstract systems) that are of relevance to the acquisition of the
map reading ability – namely that the acquisition of these
mentioned abilities.
abilities, too, involves significant changes in underlying neural
networks. Do these Structures bear Artifact Functions?
Given that the dispositions borne by the ability-bearing
In each case it is shown that the acquisition of the ability structures described are not biological functions, one might
correlates with significant changes in the brain. Though these
consider whether they are artifact functions. The structures do
changes are required for one to have an ability, they do not seem
indeed appear to be artifact-like in the sense that they are
to bear abilities themselves. This is in large part because when
brought about, at least in part, by intentional human
exercising an ability, like playing the violin, the musician
intervention. One might go so far as to describe the process of
doesn’t intentionally realize the dispositions in her brain – these learning, or instructing someone, to play the piano as the
dispositions are realized involuntarily – she simply realizes her process of producing a piano player. Production of this sort
disposition (her ability) to play the violin.
requires also the production of relevant piano-playing ability-
Thus, the structural changes in the brain that correlate to the bearing structures.
acquisition of an ability bear capabilities. The specific
Production in this sense, however, does not involve the creation
boundaries of the brain structures are largely unknown, we refer
of a designed object and this is what is needed if the produced
to them nonetheless as ‘capability bearing structures’, pointing entity is to count as having a function in the BFO sense. Rather,
out that these boundaries will be a matter of gradations rather what is created is, precisely, an ability, something that is similar
than of physical discontinuities. We will refer in what follows
to an artifact in that it is an entity created as a consequence of
to an ability bearing structure that is a network of neurons found
intentional actions on the part of one or more agents. In creating
the ability we do indeed bring about changes in a specific parts & c’s realization in the normal case brings benefits to
of the brain of the subject involved. But these changes do not an organism or group of organisms, where ‘in the
(or at least: do not given our current technology) give rise to normal case’ means not only: in the normal range on
entities in the brain that are designed. The development of the scale, but also: in a context that is normal for the
ability-bearing structures is rather merely a by-product of group to which the bearer or user belongs (7).
developing an ability.
a is an ability means:
For these reasons, ability bearing structures are not artifacts and
the dispositions they bear are not artifact functions. a is a capability
& a’s realization is intended by the bearer
Do these Structures bear Roles?
Roles in BFO are externally grounded realizable entities. Given The class of capabilities is meant to capture those dispositions
that acquired abilities are neither mere dispositions nor that are evaluable on a scale of how well the processes that
functions, it is worth discussing why they are also not roles. realize the dispositions are realized. Some capabilities are
BFO 2.0 defines role as follows: realized intentionally, and these we term ‘abilities’. As such,
abilities are capabilities that can only be borne by things that
r is a role means:
are capable of intentional action. We might also classify the
r is a realizable entity
bearers of capabilities on the basis of what kind of process
& r exists because there is some single bearer that is
realizes the capability.
in some special physical, social, or institutional set of
circumstances in which this bearer does not have to be Introducing ‘capability’ enables us to formulate a new
& r is not such that, if it ceases to exist, then the definition of BFO: function to read:
physical make-up of the bearer is thereby changed.
f is a function means:
Paradigmatic examples of roles are administrative in nature. f is a capability,
When someone becomes a student (for example by signing the & f exists in virtue of its bearer’s physical make-up,
corresponding forms and receiving an appropriate validating & this make-up is something that this bearer possesses
stamp from the salient authorities), then they take on the student because it came into being, either through evolution
role. This role is realized in processes such as: doing (in the case of natural biological entities) or through
homework, paying tuition, attending classes. What enables intentional design (in the case of artifacts), in order to
someone to participate in each of these processes is that some realize processes of a certain sort.
institution has acknowledged the person’s status as a student.
Importantly, nothing need change physically or psychologically All functions are capabilities because all functions can be
on a person who becomes a student; the required changes are assessed on how well they are realized. This requires a
institutional, rather than physical. normative standard for evaluation, and we believe that it is
possible to have such standard only in the case that there is some
Other examples of roles are also social. Consider a key that
benefit that is being brought to an organism or group of
takes on the role of being the key that opens my front door.
organisms. (In the case of evolved capabilities this may be:
Suppose I need to change the locks in my house, so I purchase
survival.) Mere dispositions can be described in terms of how
new set of locks and keys. At the beginning of the day the new
they are realized, but they cannot be evaluated (graded on a
keys are effectively useless to me, but then, after installing the
scale) in the way that is possible for capabilities and thus also
new locks, the keys become very important: it now unlocks my
for functions. For example, a car has a disposition to make
door. During the process of the key’s going from useless to
engine noise. The different dispositions to make engine noise
important, nothing internal changes about the key. All of the
possessed by various cars will be realized differently in a
relevant changes are external to the key (namely the old locks
measurable way: some cars will have louder engines than
being replaced by the new locks). In this way the role of key
others. However, this disposition becomes a capability only
that opens my front door is externally, not internally, grounded.
when a normative standard is in play. Suppose that someone
The realizable entities borne by ability-bearing structures are uses the noise of their car to scare away racoons. In this case,
not roles because they are internally grounded. It is impossible, we can identify the car as having the capability to scare away
for example, for a person to lose the ability to play the piano racoons, and as such an evaluative standard is introduced; the
unless that person undergoes some physical change. The same better the car can scare away racoons, the more desirable the
is true of the ability to perform arithmetic or the ability to speak car. In this case, louder cars are evaluated more positively in
a second language. terms of their racoon scaring power.
The standard that appears common to all functions is whether
Results or not the realized process is the process, which the bearer was
designed to realize. For example, cars were designed to
In order to account for abilities like playing a musical transport one or more persons. If a car does not enable such
instrument or using language, we introduce the following transport, it is not realizing its function. The same goes for
definitions. biological structures; a heart realizes its function of pumping
c is a capability means: blood, if it successfully pumps blood.
c is a disposition A process that an artifact or biological structure was designed
to perform is necessarily a capability, since it serves the interest describe the likelihood that a particular disposition or capability
of at least one organism. The function of any organ, for will be realized, BFO’s distinction both more accurately
example, benefits the organism in that it allows the organism to describes reality than SIO and has additional descriptive depth.
survive more easily than it otherwise would. Vestigial organs,
like the appendix, still have a function, since its realization
could benefit the organism it is a part of. However, since the Discussion
environment does not require that this function be realized, the
appendix never realize their function. Capabilities
Similarly, artifacts that possess functions are designed to bring
benefit to some organism, otherwise they would not be What is distinctive about capabilities is that they bring a
designed. Even destructive artifacts like nuclear weapons bring gradable benefit to some organism. Note that ‘benefit’, here, is
some benefit to the ones dropping the bomb, despite the horrific not to be understood as having any moral implications. For
destruction that they cause. example, a professional assassin might possess the capability to
kill someone and make it look like an accident. This is a
One might object that someone might design an artifact to capability of the assassin, because it brings benefits to himself
realize a process that is not beneficial to any organism. If the and to his employer.
realization of this process is not beneficial to any organism, then Although all dispositions (including capabilities and abilities)
it cannot be a capability. Would this not be an example of a can be potentially beneficial in their realizations, capabilities
function that is not a capability? are set apart from mere dispositions in that their realization
normally bring benefits. For example, a beer glass has the
The natural response to this is to maintain that this artifact has disposition to shatter. However, it does not have the capability
no function. It was designed with a disposition, but since there to shatter, since in the normal case its shattering brings no
is no benefit that it brings to any organism, there is no benefit to any organism. In the normal case means: reliable,
evaluative standard by which we can judge how well this regularly, expectedly, as a result of the nature of the capability
process is carried out. As such, there is no way to judge how itself and of its bearer (potentially also of its owner, employer,
well the process realized by the designed disposition is carried and so forth).
out, meaning that it cannot be a function.
The examples of abilities we addressed above, for example
Moreover, suppose that two of these artifacts are created. As playing music, show that some capabilities are such that they
soon the question is asked, “which artifact function better”, we bring benefits to others. There are also capabilities – for
need an evaluative standard. Notice “functioning better” example cars or other artifacts – which bring benefits to their
requires a normative evaluation. This is different than asking owners or to some other entities distinct from the bearer of the
“which artifact makes the louder noise”, or “which artifact can capability. This can be true also of natural entities.
withstand greater heat?” These are descriptive questions, which Niagara Falls, for example, has the disposition to increase the
can be descriptively evaluated in order to learn more about the relative humidity in the area around the base of the falls, but we
dispositions of each artifact. Asking which artifact is better, would not say this is a capability of the Falls because it is not
necessarily implies a normative standard against which the bringing a benefit to any organism in the normal case. On the
function is compared, and in order to have such a standard, there other hand, Niagara Falls also has the disposition to attract
much be some good that is trying to be reached. This good is tourists – and in this case we may indeed be talking about a
the benefit that it brings to organisms. capability of the Falls, a thesis that is supported by the fact that
Reed and Dumontier [16] use the term ‘capability’ in the engineers are regularly commissioned to manage its flow.
Semanticscience Integrated Ontology (SIO) to mean roughly Niagara Falls as currently managed is comparable to a car, or to
what is meant in BFO by ‘disposition’. They then distinguish any other artifact created by design to bring benefits to its owner
‘capability’ and ‘disposition’ in the following way: or user. Here the benefits are brought to the tourists who use
“[t]herefore, a ‘capability’ in SIO is about the mere possibility Niagara Falls as a tourist destination.
while a ‘disposition’ focuses on the likelihood” [16]. We take
this to mean that a SIO disposition is a SIO capability that is The benefits that capabilities bring are characterized by aiding
likely to occur. The distinction between a BFO disposition and the interests of the organisms. An organism’s interests can
a BFO capability is a more substantial and useful distinction range from mere animalistic survival to a human being living a
than that of SIO. Likelihoods and probabilities are able to be fulfilling life. Some dispositions possessed by both organisms
ascribed to dispositions numerically. Moreover, a set of SIO and non-organisms aide in the interest of one organism or
capabilities that are likely and therefore SIO dispositions will another. As long as the realizations of these dispositions can be
vary with context and domain. As a result, this distinction does used to serve the interests of an organism, that disposition is a
not seem to belong in a top-level ontology. capability. Understood in this way, one can see how the car’s
disposition to provide heat is a capability – it aids in the physical
By contrast, the difference between BFO disposition and a BFO well-being of any organism being kept warm within the car.
capability introduces a basic class distinction. Capabilities are Moreover, a human’s capability to make autonomous decisions
a particular kind of disposition – ones that can benefit some improves their well-being insofar as being able to act
organism when realized. Since it is still possible within BFO to autonomously contributes toward their flourishing as a human.
They can lead a more fulfilling life as an autonomous, free (corresponding for example to the speaker’s knowledge of
agent, than as a slave for example. German grammar). There are then physiological structures
Fiat Capabilities outside the brain which are partial bearers, along with neuronal
networks, of acquired abilities.
A fiat object is an object that does not have physical or bona
fide boundaries (15). For example, Hawaii is a fiat object BFO and cognitive representation
because there is no physical discontinuity that separates it from Cognitive representations are relevant to mental capabilities
its surroundings. The archipelago is a single entity because a insofar as cognitive representations are involved in the
political fiat boundary has been drawn around it, a boundary processes that realize the capability. A guitarist playing a song
that exists not physically but rather institutionally. might visualize the chord shapes of her fretting hand, a
technique which helps her fret the chords accurately. Similarly,
Similarly, some capabilities are really groups of more basic
visualization occurs while reading [16], meaning that visual as
capabilities, functions, or dispositions. When we pick out these
well as linguistic cognitive representations are present when the
fiat capabilities, we are picking out a group of more basic
capability to use language is realized.
capabilities that we often use singular terms to refer to. For
example, the assassin’s capability to make his hit look like an Reed and Dumontier [16] contend that BFO is not as well suited
accident might require the capability to plan a hit, to as other ontologies due to its realist orientation. They contend
undiscoverably manipulate a car brake system, to track his this is one reason why a cognitive representation is defined in
target’s movements, and so forth. These all contribute to the fiat BFO as a specifically dependent continuant which depends on
capability of being able to make his target’s death look like an “an anatomical structure in the cognitive system of an
accident, and the realization of the assassin’s capability consists organism” [16]. Their contention is that these representations
in realizing these other capabilities. may exist independently of any anatomical structure, but BFO
is not able to capture this, since the entities it captures must
Similarly, a Tae Kwon Do Master’s capability to practice Tae
correspond to reality.
Kwon Do consists in a group of other capabilities. The Tae
Kwon Do master has capabilities to perform a myriad of The realist orientation of BFO does not, however, prevent it
different techniques including blocks, kicks, and punches. Each from capturing cognitive representations. A cognitive
individual technique is a capability on its own. representation needs to inhere in some kind of cognitive
structure. Otherwise it could not exist. A cognitive
Fiat capabilities also allow us to distinguish differences
representation is only a cognitive representation if it exists in a
between instances of a capability. Both a Tae Kwon Do master
mind. So unless one is willing to argue that minds can exist
and a Tae Kwon Do student possess the capability to practice
independently of brains (or perhaps some other physical
Tae Kwon Do, but the student is less capable than the master.
structure like a computer if technology brings us so far), one
One reason for this is that the master possesses a greater number
must accept that cognitive representations inhere in a cognitive
of capabilities, which we include within the fiat capability
system. BFO’s realist orientation gives it the aim of describing
involved in Tae Kwon Do. Since the latter is a fiat capability,
reality. To the extent that cognitive representations are a part of
we can account for different ability levels among bearers of this
reality, BFO’s framework will be able to describe them.
capability based on how many specific capabilities that
contribute to the fiat capability are possessed.
Barton et al. have proposed a variety of ways that more basic Conclusion
dispositions are able to compose a greater disposition [17].
More specific but strictly speaking different dispositions In this paper, we propose capability as a new subclass of
(Barton et al. uses the example of a domino’s disposition to fall disposition, defined in such a way that all functions are
to left and its disposition to fall to the right as composing a capabilities and all capabilities are dispositions. In addition, we
greater disposition to fall) can compose a disposition that propose ability as those capabilities which are intentionally
encompasses both. This is part of the idea behind fiat realizable by the bearer, and we have demarcated the kinds of
dispositions. The guitarist’s capability to play guitar could very bearer that a capability or ability has, focusing especially on
well be composed of her capability to fret the neck and her mental abilities.
capability to strum. This way of combining dispositions as well We remain neutral as to whether the term ‘capability’ should be
as the other axioms that Barton et al. have proposed are added to BFO, or whether it should form part of a new
consistent with our view of fiat capabilities. Their axioms for Capability Ontology descending directly from BFO by analogy
combining dispositions when applied to fiat capabilities such as with the Information Artifact Ontology.
the capability to play guitar or to speak German.
Abilities whose bearers are both mental and physiological Address for correspondence
Acquiring an ability involves in many cases undergoing
Eric Merrell, Department of Philosophy, University at
physiological changes beyond the neurological. To acquire the
Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260 – ericmerr@buffalo.edu
ability to play the piano, for example, requires that the joints in
your fingers becoming gradually more flexible in order that you
can play progressively more complex pieces. An ability to References
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Response to Reviewers
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their
thorough feedback and criticisms. The comments provided
were extremely helpful in improving the paper. The biggest
changes that were made was a revision of our definition of
capability, and the addition of a lengthier discussion defending
our idea that all functions are capabilities.
Our change to the definition of ‘capability’ was minor but