<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//NLM//DTD JATS (Z39.96) Journal Archiving and Interchange DTD v1.0 20120330//EN" "JATS-archivearticle1.dtd">
<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>2013. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4471-4186-0.
[26] Marcio Moretto Ribeiro and Renata Wassermann. Base revision for ontol-
ogy debugging. Journal of Logic and Computation</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/978-3-030-22102-7</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Revising Ontologies via Models: The ALC-formula Case</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jandson S. Ribeiro</string-name>
          <email>jandson@uni-koblenz.de</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ricardo Guimar~aes</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ana Ozaki</string-name>
          <email>ana.ozakig@uib.no</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Universitat Koblenz-Landau</institution>
          ,
          <country country="DE">Germany</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>University of Bergen</institution>
          ,
          <country country="NO">Norway</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>2011</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>11142</volume>
      <abstract>
        <p>Most approaches for repairing description logic (DL) ontologies aim at changing the axioms as little as possible while solving inconsistencies, incoherences and other types of undesired behaviours. As in Belief Change, these issues are often speci ed using logical formulae. Instead, in the new setting for updating DL ontologies that we propose here, the input for the change is given by a model which we want to add or remove. The main goal is to minimise the loss of information, without concerning with the syntactic structure. This new setting is motivated by scenarios where an ontology is built automatically and needs to be re ned or updated. In such situations, the syntactical form is often irrelevant and the incoming information is not necessarily given as a formula. We de ne general operations and conditions on which they are applicable, and instantiate our approach to the case of ALC-formulae.</p>
      </abstract>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>-</title>
      <p>
        Formal speci cations often have to be updated either due to modelling errors or
because they have become obsolete. When these speci cations are description
logic (DL) ontologies, it is possible to use one of the many approaches to x
missing or unwanted behaviours. Usually these methods involve the removal or
replacement of formulae responsible by the undesired aspect [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2, 16, 20, 29, 30</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The problem of changing logical representations of knowledge upon the
arrival of new information is the subject matter of Belief Change [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. The theory
developed in this eld provides constructions suitable for various formalisms and
applications [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13, 23, 25, 28</xref>
        ]. In most approaches for Belief Change and for
repairing ontologies, it is assumed that a set of formulae represents the entailments to
be added or removed. However, in some situations, it might be easier to obtain
this information as a model instead. This idea relates with Model Checking [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ]
whose main problem is to determine whether a model satis es a set of
constraints; and with the paradigm of Learning from Interpretations [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], where a
Copyright c 2021 for this paper by its authors. Use permitted under Creative
Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
formula needs to be created or changed so as to have certain interpretations as
part of its models and remove others from its set of models. Example 1 illustrates
the intuition behind using models as input.
      </p>
      <p>Example 1. Suppose that a system, which serves a university, uses an internal
logical representation of the domain with a open world behaviour and unique
names. Let B be its current represention:</p>
      <p>B = fP rof essors : fM aryg; Courses : fDL; AIg;</p>
      <p>fteaches : f(M ary; AI); (M ary; DL)gg :</p>
      <p>Assume that a user nds mistakes in the course schedule and this is caused
by the wrong information that Mary teaches the DL course. The user may
lack knowledge to de ne the issue formally. An alternative would be to
provide the user with an interface where one can specify, for instance, that the
following model should be accepted M = fP rof essors = fM aryg; Courses =
fDL; AIg; teaches = f(M ary; AI)gg; (in this model Mary does not teach the DL
course). Given this input, the system should repair itself (semi-)automatically.</p>
      <p>We propose a new setting for Belief Change, in particular, contraction and
expansion functions which take models as input. We analyse the case of
ALCformula using quasimodels as a mean to de ne belief change operations. This
logic satis es properties which facilitate the design of these operations and it
is close to ALC, which is a well-studied DL. Additionally, we identify the
postulates which determine these functions and prove that they characterise the
mathematical constructions via representation theorems. The remaining of this
work is organised as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the concepts from Belief
Change which our approach builds upon and detail the paradigm we propose
here. Section 3 presents ALC-formula, the belief operations that take models as
input and their respective representation theorems. In Section 4, we highlight
studies which share similarities with our proposal and we conclude in Section 5.
Missing proofs can be found in the long version of this paper [24].
2
2.1</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>Belief Change</title>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>The Classical Setting</title>
        <p>
          Belief Change [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref13">1, 13</xref>
          ] studies the problem of how an agent should modify its
knowledge in light of new information. In the original paradigm of Belief Change,
the AGM theory, an agent's body of knowledge is represented as a set of formulae
closed under logical consequence, called a belief set, and the new information is
represented as a single formula. Belief sets, however, are not the only way for
representing an agent's body of knowledge, and another way of representing an
agent's knowledge is via belief bases : arbitrary sets of formulae, not necessarily
closed under logical consequence [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ]. In the AGM paradigm, an agent may
modify its current belief base B in response to a new piece of information '
through three kinds of operations:
        </p>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-1">
          <title>Expansion: ex(B; '), simply add ' to B;</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-2">
          <title>Contraction: con(B; '), reduce B so that it does not imply ';</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-3">
          <title>Revision: rev(B; '), incorporate ' and keep consistency of the resulting belief</title>
          <p>base, as long as ' is consistent.</p>
          <p>
            When modifying its body of knowledge an agent should rationally modify its
beliefs conserving most of its original beliefs. This principle of minimal change
is captured in Belief Change via sets of rationality postulates. Each of the three
operations (expansion, contraction and revision) presents its own set of
rationality postulates which characterize precisely di erent classes of belief change
constructions. The AGM paradigm was initially proposed for classical logics that
satisfy speci c requirements, dubbed AGM assumptions, among them
Tarskianicity, compactness and deduction. See [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6, 25</xref>
            ] for a complete list of the AGM
assumptions and a discussion on the topic. Recently, e orts have been applied
to extend Belief Change to logics that do not satisfy such assumptions. For
instance, logics that are not closed under classical negation of formulae (such
as is the case for most DLs) [25, 27], and temporal logics and logics without
compactness [21{23].
          </p>
          <p>
            In what follows, we de ne kernel contraction [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
            ], one of the most studied
constructions in Belief Change and which is closely related to the most common
ways to repair ontologies. Kernel operations rely on calculating the minimal
implying sets (MinImps), also known as justi cations [15] or kernels [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
            ]. A
MinImp is a minimal subset that does entail a formula '. The set of all MinImps
of a belief base B w.r.t. a formula ' is denoted by MinImps(B; '). A kernel
contraction removes from each MinImp at least one formula using an incision
function.
          </p>
          <p>De nition 2. Given a set of formulae B of language L, a function f is an
incision function for B i for all ' 2 L: (i) f (MinImps(B; ')) S MinImps(B; ')
and (ii) f (MinImps(B; ')) \ X 6= ;, for all X 2 MinImps(B; ').</p>
          <p>
            Kernel contraction operators are built upon incision functions. An incision
function is responsible to pick at least one formula from each MinImp. Intuitively,
one can see an incision function as a Hitting Set on all the MinImps, as in [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2, 16</xref>
            ]
De nition 3. Let L be a language and f an incision function. The kernel
contraction on B L determined by f is the operation conf : 2L L 7! 2L de ned
as: conf (B; ') = B n f (MinImps(B; ')).
          </p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-1-4">
          <title>A logical consequence operation on a language L is a map Cn : 2L 7! 2L</title>
          <p>
            that relates each set of formulae A to all formulae that are entailed from A.
Kernel contraction operations are characterised precisely by a set of rationality
postulates, as shown in the following representation theorem:
Theorem 4 ([
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
            ]). Let Cn be a consequence operator satisfying monotonicity
and compactness de ned for a language L. Then con : 2L L 7! 2L is an
operation of kernel contraction on B L i for all sentences ' 2 L:
(success) if ' 62 Cn(;), then ' 62 Cn(con(B; ')),
(inclusion) con(B; ') B,
(core-retainment) if 2 B n con(B; '), then there is some B0
' 62 Cn(B0) and ' 2 Cn(B0 [ ),
(uniformity) if for all subsets B0 of B, ' 2 Cn(B0) i
con(B; ') = con(B; ).
          </p>
          <p>B such that
2 Cn(B0), then
2.2</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>Changing Finite Bases by Models</title>
        <p>
          The Belief Change setting discussed in this section represents an epistemic state
by means of a nite base. While this essentially di er from the traditional
approach [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref11">1, 11</xref>
          ], it aligns with the KM paradigm established by Katsuno and
Mendelzon [17]. In Section 4 we discuss other studies in Belief Change which
also take nite representability into account.
        </p>
        <p>In this work, unlike the standard representation methods in Belief Change, we
consider that an incoming piece of information is represented as a nite model.
Belief Change operations de ned in this format will be called model change
operations. Recall that a model M is simply a structure used to give semantics
to an underlying logic language. The set of all possible models is given by M.</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-1">
          <title>Moreover, we assume a semantic system that, for each set of formulae B of the</title>
          <p>language L gives a set of models Mod(B) := fM 2 M j 8' 2 B : M j= 'g. Let</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-2">
          <title>P n(L) denote the set of all nite bases in L. We also say that a set of models</title>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-3">
          <title>M is nitely representable in L if there is a nite base B 2 P n(L) such that</title>
          <p>Mod(B) = M. Additionally, if for all ' 2 L it holds that M j= ' i M 0 j= '
then we write M L M 0. We also de ne [M ]L := fM 0 2 M j M 0 L M g.</p>
          <p>
            When compared to traditional methods in Belief Change and Ontology
Repair [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13 ref2">2, 13, 16</xref>
            ], where the incoming information comes as a single formula, our
approach receives instead a single model as input. Although, the initial body of
knowledge is represented as a nite base, the operations we de ne do not aim
to preserve its syntactic structure.
          </p>
          <p>The rst model change operation we introduce is model contraction, which
eliminates one of the models of the current base (which in Section 3 is
instantiated as an ontology). Model contraction is akin to a belief expansion, where a
formula is added to the belief set or base, reducing the set of accepted models.
The counterpart operation, model expansion, changes the base to include a new
model. This relates to belief contraction, in which a formula is removed, and
thus more models are seen as plausible.</p>
          <p>
            We rewrite the rationality postulates that characterize kernel contraction [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
            ],
considering an incoming piece of information represented as a model instead of
a single formula.
          </p>
          <p>De nition 5 (Model Contraction). Let L be a language. A function con :</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-4">
          <title>P n(L) M 7! P n(L) is a nitely representable model contraction function i</title>
          <p>for every B 2 P n(L) and M 2 M it satis es the following postulates:
(success) M 62 Mod(con(B; M )) = ;,
(inclusion) Mod(con(B; M )) Mod(B),
(retainment) if M 0 2 Mod(B) n Mod(con(B; M )) then M 0 L M ,
(extensionality) con(B; M ) = con(B; M 0), if M L M 0.</p>
          <p>We might also need to add a model to the set of models of the current base.
This addition relates to classical contractions in Belief Change, which reduces
the belief base.</p>
          <p>De nition 6 (Model Expansion). Let L be a language. A function ex :</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-5">
          <title>P n(L) M 7! P n(L) is a nitely representable model expansion i for every</title>
          <p>B 2 P n(L) and M 2 M it satis es the postulates:
(success) M 2 Mod(ex(B; M ));
(persistence) Mod(B) Mod(ex(B; M ));
(vacuity) Mod(ex(B; M )) = Mod(B); if M 2 Mod(B),
(extensionality) ex(B; M ) = ex(B; M 0), if M L M 0.</p>
          <p>De nition 7. Let L be a language and Cn a Tarskian consequence operator
de ned over L. Also let M be a xed set of models. We say that a triple =
(L; Cn; M) is an ideal logical system if the following holds.</p>
          <p>{ For every B
{ For each M</p>
          <p>L and ' 2 L, B j= ' (i.e. ' 2 Cn(B)) i Mod(B) Mod(').</p>
          <p>M there is a nite set of formulae B such that Mod(B) = M.</p>
          <p>If = (L; Cn; M) is an ideal logical system, we can de ne a function FR :
2M 7! P n(L) and such that Mod(FR(M)) = M. Then, we can de ne model
contraction as con(B; M ) = FR(Mod(B) n [M ]L) and expansion as ex(B; M ) =
FR(Mod(B) [ [M ]L). The rst condition in De nition 7 implies that there is a
connection between the models satis ed and the logical consequences of the base
obtained and the second ensures that the result always exists. An example that
ts these requirements is to consider classical propositional logic with a nite
signature , together with its usual consequence operator and models. In this
situation, we can de ne FRprop as follows:</p>
          <p>0
FRprop(M) =
_</p>
          <p>@
M2M a2 jMj=a
^
a ^</p>
          <p>^
a2 jMj=:a</p>
          <p>1
:aA :</p>
          <p>Next, we show that the construction proposed with FR has the properties
stated in De nitions 5 and 6.</p>
          <p>Theorem 8. Let (L; Cn; M) be an ideal logical system as in De nition 7. Then
iCon(B; M ) := FR Mod(B) n [M ]L satis es the postulates in De nition 5.
Proof. De nition 7 ensures that the result exists and that M j= ', for all
' 2 , giving us success. By construction we do gain models, thus we have
inclusion. If M L M 0, then [M ]L = [M 0]L, thus extensionality is satis ed.</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-6">
          <title>Also, if M 0 2 Mod(') n Mod(iCon('; M )) then M 0 2 [M ]L, hence the operation</title>
          <p>satis es retainment.</p>
          <p>Theorem 9. Let (L; Cn; M) be an ideal logical system as in De nition 7. Then
iExp(B; M ) := FR Mod(B) [ [M ]L satis es the postulates in De nition 6.
Proof. De nition 7 ensures that the result exists and that M j= ', for all ' 2 ,
giving us success. Due to the rst condition in De nition 7 we gain vacuity:
if M 2 Mod(B), then there will be no changes in the accepted models. By
construction we do not lose models, thus we have persistance. Extensionality
also holds because whenever M L M 0 we have then [M ]L = [M 0]L.</p>
          <p>A revision operation incorporates new formulae, and removes potential
conicts in behalf of consistency. In our setting, incorporating information coincides
with model contraction which could lead to an inconsistent belief state. In this
case, model revision could be interpreted as a conditional model contraction: in
some cases the removal might be rejected to preserve consistency. We leave the
study on revision as a future work.
3</p>
          <p>The case of ALC-formula
The logic ALC-formula corresponds to the DL ALC enriched with boolean
operators over ALC axioms. As discussed in Section 2.2, in nite representable
logics, such as the classical propositional logics, we can easily add and remove
models while keeping the representation nite. For ALC-formula, however, it is
not possible to uniquely add or remove a new model M since, for instance, the
language does not distinguish quantities (e.g., a model M and another model
that has two duplicates of M ).</p>
          <p>Even if quantities are disregarded and our input is a class of models
indistinguishable by ALC-formulae, there are sets of formulae in this language
that are not nitely representable. As for instance in the following in nite set:
f9Cr1:&gt;v :9=rn9:r&gt;:Cj. nAs2a Nw&gt;o0rkga,rwouhnedre fo9rrnt+h1e:&gt;ALisC-afosrhmourltahacnadse,fowre9prr:(o9prons:e&gt;a) naenwd
strategy based on the translation of ALC-formulae into DNF.
Let NC, NR and NI be countably in nite and pairwise disjoint sets of concept
names, role names, and individual names, respectively. ALC concepts are built
according to the rule: C ::= A j :C j (C u C) j 9r:C, where A 2 NC and r 2 NR.
ALC-formulae are de ned as expressions of the form
::=
j :( ) j ( ^ )
::= C(a) j r(a; b) j (C = &gt;);
where C is an ALC concept, a; b 2 NI, and r 2 NR3. Denote by ind(') the set of
all individual names occurring in an ALC-formula '.
3 We may omit parentheses if there is no risk of confusion. The usual concept inclusions
C v D can be expressed with &gt; v :C t D and :C t D v &gt;, which is (:C t D = &gt;).</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-7">
          <title>The semantics of ALC-formulae and the de nitions related to quasimodels are</title>
          <p>standard [8, page 70]. In what follows, we reproduce the essential de nitions and
results for this work. Let ' be an ALC-formula. Let f(') and c(') be the set of
all subformulae and subconcepts of ' closed under single negation, respectively.
De nition 10. A concept type for ' is a subset c
c(') such that:
1. D 2 c i :D 62 c, for all D 2 c(');
2. D u E 2 c i fD; Eg c, for all D u E 2 c(').</p>
          <p>De nition 11. A formula type for ' is a subset f
f(') such that:
1.
2.</p>
          <p>2 f i : 62 f , for all 2 f(');
^ 2 f i f ; g f , for all
^</p>
          <p>2 f(').</p>
          <p>We may omit `for '' if this is clear from the context. A model candidate
for ' is a triple (T; o; f ) such that T is a set of concept types, o is a function
from ind(') to T , f a formula type, and (T; o; f ) satis es the conditions: ' 2 f ;
C(a) 2 f implies C 2 o(a); r(a; b) 2 f implies f:C j :9r:C 2 o(a)g o(b).
De nition 12 (Quasimodel). A model candidate (T; o; f ) for ' is a
quasimodel for ' if the following holds
{ for every concept type c 2 T and every 9r:D 2 c, there is c0 2 T such that
fDg [ f:E j :9r:E 2 cg c0;
{ for every concept type c 2 T and every concept C, if :C 2 c then this implies
(C = &gt;) 62 f ;
{ for every concept C, if :(C = &gt;) 2 f then there is c 2 T such that C 62 c;
{ T is not empty.</p>
          <p>Theorem 13 motivates the decision of using quasimodels to implement our
operations for nite bases described in ALC-formulae.</p>
          <p>
            Theorem 13 (Theorem 2.27 [
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
            ]). An ALC-formula ' is satis able i there
is a quasimodel for '.
3.2
          </p>
          <p>ALC-formulae in Disjunctive Normal Form
Next, we propose a translation method which converts an ALC-formula into a
disjunction of conjunctions of (possibly negated) atomic formulae. Let S(') be
the set of all quasimodels for '. We We de ne 'y as
_
( ^
^</p>
          <p>^ : ):
(T;o;f)2S(') 2f
: 2f
where is of the form (C = &gt;); C(a); r(a; b).</p>
          <p>Theorem 14 con rms the equivalence between a formula and its translation
into DNF. As downside, the translation can be potentially exponentially larger
than the original formula.</p>
          <p>Theorem 14. For every ALC-formula ', we have that '
'y.</p>
          <p>In the next subsections, we present nite base model change operations for</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-8">
          <title>ALC-formulae, i.e., functions from L M 7! L. We can represent the body of</title>
          <p>knowledge as a single formula because every nite belief base of ALC-formulae
can be represented by the conjunction of its elements. We use our translation
to add models in a \minimal" way by adding disjuncts, while removing a model
amounts to removing disjuncts. We also need to obtain a model candidate relative
to our translated formula, as show in De nition 15.</p>
          <p>
            De nition 15 ([
            <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
            ]). Let I be an interpretation and ' an ALC-formula
formula. The quasimodel of I w.r.t. ', symbols qm('; I) = (T; o; f ), is
{ T := fc(x) j x 2 I g, where c(x) = fC 2 c(') j x 2 CI g,
{ o(a) := c(aI ), for all a 2 ind('),
{ f := f 2 f(') j I j= g:
          </p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-9">
          <title>We de ne model contraction for ALC-formulae using the notion of quasimodels</title>
          <p>discussed previously and a correspondence between models and quasimodels.</p>
          <p>We use the following operator, denoted , to de ne model contraction in</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-10">
          <title>De nition 16. Let ' be an ALC-formula and let M be a model. Then,</title>
          <p>('; M ) = ftypes(') n ff g; where qm('; M ) = (T; o; f )
and ftypes(') is the set of all formula types in all quasimodels for ', that is:
ftypes(') = ff j (T; o; f ) 2 S(')g:
Let lit(f ) := f` 2 f j ` is a literal g be the set of all literals in a formula type f .
De nition 16. A nite base model contraction function is a function con :
L M 7! L such that
con('; M )=
8 W
&gt;&lt; f2 (';M)
&gt;
:
?
'
V lit(f ); if M j= ' and
if M j= ' and
otherwise:
('; M ) 6= ;
('; M ) = ;</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-11">
          <title>As we see later in this section, there are models M; M 0 such that M 6 LM 0</title>
          <p>but our operations based on quasimodels cannot distinguish them. Given
ALCformulae '; , we say that is in the language of the literals of ', written</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-12">
          <title>2 Llit('), if is a boolean combination of the atoms in '. Our operations</title>
          <p>partition the models according to this restricted language. We write M ' M 0
instead of M Llit(') M 0, and [M ]' instead of [M ]Llit(') for conciseness.
Theorem 17. Let M be a model and ' an ALC-formula. A nite base model
function con ('; M ) is equivalent to con('; M ) i con satis es:
(success) M 6j= con ('; M ),
(inclusion) Mod(con ('; M )) Mod('),
(atomic retainment): For all M0 M, if Mod(con (B; M ))</p>
          <p>[M ]' then M0 is not nitely representable in ALC-formula.
(atomic extensionality) if M 0 ' M then</p>
          <p>Mod(con ('; M )) = Mod(con ('; M 0)):</p>
          <p>The postulate of success guarantees that M will be indeed relinquished, while
inclusion imposes that no model will be gained during a contraction operation.
Recall that in order to guarantee nite representability, it might be necessary to
remove M jointly with other models. The postulate atomic retainment captures
a notion of minimal change, dictating which models are allowed to be removed
together with M .</p>
          <p>On the other hand, atomic extensionality imposes that if two models M and
M 0 satisfy the same formulae within the literals of the current knowledge base
', then they should present the same result.</p>
          <p>A simpler way of implementing model contraction, also using the notion of
a quasimodel,
De nition 18. Let ' be an ALC-formula and M a model. Also, let (T; o; f ) =
qm('; M ). The function cons('; M ) is de ned follows:
cons('; M ) =
' ^ :(V lit(f )) if M j= '</p>
          <p>' otherwise.</p>
          <p>Example 19 illustrates how cons works.</p>
          <p>Example 19. Consider the following ALC-formula and interpretation M :
' :=P (M ary) ^ C(DL) ^ C(AI) ^ ((teaches(M ary; DL) ^</p>
          <p>:teaches(M ary; AI)) _ (:teaches(M ary; DL) ^ teaches(M ary; AI)))
and M = ( I ; I ), where I = fm; d; ag, CI = fd; ag, P I = fmg, teachesI =
f(m; d)g, M aryI = m, AII = a, and DLI = d. Assume we want to remove M
from Mod('). Let qm('; M ) = (T; o; f ). Thus,</p>
          <p>lit(f ) = f:teaches(m; a); teaches(m; d); C(d); C(a); P (m)g
cons('; M ) = ' ^ : ^ lit(f )</p>
          <p>= ' ^ : (:teaches(m; a) ^ teaches(m; d) ^ C(d) ^ C(a) ^ P (m)) :
Both model contraction operations con and cons are equivalent.
Theorem 20. For every ALC-formula ' and model M , con('; M ) cons('; M ).</p>
        </sec>
        <sec id="sec-2-2-13">
          <title>In this section, we investigate model expansion for ALC-formulae. Recall that</title>
          <p>we assume that a knowledge base is represented as a single ALC-formula '.
Expansion consists in adding an input model M to the current knowledge base
' with the requirement that the new epistemic state can be represented also as
a nite formula.</p>
          <p>De nition 21. Given a quasimodel (T; o; f ), we write V(T; o; f ) as a short-cut
for V lit(f ). A nite base model expansion is a function ex : L M ! L s.t.:
ex('; M ) =</p>
          <p>' if M j= '
' _ V qm(:'; M ) otherwise:</p>
          <p>Example 22 illustrates how ex works.</p>
          <p>Example 22. Consider the interpretation M from Example 19 and
' := P (M ary) ^ C(DL) ^ C(AI) ^ teaches(M ary; AI) ^ :teaches(M ary; DL):
Assume we want to add M to Mod(') and qm(:'; M ) = (T; o; f ). Thus,
lit(f ) = f:teaches(m; a); teaches(m; d); C(d); C(a); P (m)g
ex('; M ) = ' _ ^ lit(f )</p>
          <p>= ' _ (:teaches(m; a) ^ teaches(m; d) ^ C(d) ^ C(a) ^ P (m)) :</p>
          <p>The operation `ex' maps a current knowledge base represented as a single
formula ' and maps it to a new knowledge base that is satis ed by the input
model M . The intuition is that `ex' modi es the current knowledge base only if
M does not satisfy '. This modi cation is carried out by making a disjunct of '
with a formula that is satis ed by M . This guarantees that M is present in the
new epistemic state and that models of ' are not discarded. The trick is to nd
such an appropriate formula which is obtained by taking the conjunction of
all the literals within the quasimodel qm(:'; M ). Here, the quasimodel needs to
be centred on :' because M 6j= ', and therefore it is not possible to construct a
quasimodel based on M centred on '. As discussed in the prelude of this section,
this strategy not only adds M to the new knowledge base but also the whole
equivalence class modulo the literals of '.</p>
          <p>Lemma 23. For every ALC-formula ' and model M :</p>
          <p>Mod(ex('; M )) = Mod(') [ [M ]':</p>
          <p>Actually, any operation that adds precisely the equivalence class of M modulo
the literals is equivalent to `ex'. In the following, we write ex ('; M ) to refer to
an arbitrary nite base expansion function of the form ex : L M 7! L.
Theorem 24. For every ex , if Mod(ex ('; M )) = Mod(') [ [M ]' then
(i) ex ('; M )
(ii) ex ('; M )
', if M j= '; and
' _ V qm(:'; M ), if M 6j= '.</p>
          <p>Our next step is to investigate the rationality of `ex '. As expected adding
the whole equivalence class of M with respect to Llit(') does not come freely,
and some rationality postulates are captured, while others are lost:
Theorem 25. Let M be a model and ' an ALC-formula. A
function ex ('; M ) is equivalent to ex('; M ) i ex satis es:
nite base model
(success) M 2 Mod(ex ('; M )).
(persistence): Mod(') Mod(ex ('; M )).
(atomic temperance): For all M0 M, if Mod(')[[M ]'</p>
          <p>fM g then M0 is not nitely representable in ALC-formula.
(atomic extensionality) if M 0 ' M then</p>
          <p>M0</p>
          <p>Mod(ex ('; M )) = Mod(ex ('; M 0)):</p>
          <p>The postulates success and persistence come from requiring that M will be
absorbed, and that models will not be lost during an expansion. The atomic
extensionality postulate states that if two models satisfy exactly the same
literals within ', then they should present the same results. Atomic temperance
captures a principle of minimality and guarantees that when adding M , the
loss of information should be minimised. Precisely, the only formulae allowed to
be given up are those that are incompatible with M modulo the literals of '.
Lemma 23 and Theorem 25 prove that the `ex' operation is characterized by the
postulates: success, persistence, atomic temperance and atomic extensionality.
Mod(ex ('; M ))[
4</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Related Work</title>
      <p>
        In the foundational paradigm of Belief Change, the AGM theory, bases have been
used in the literature with two main purposes: as a nite representation of the
knowledge of an agent [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5, 19</xref>
        ], and as a way of distinguishing agents knowledge
explicitly [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ]. Even though the AGM theory cannot be directly applied to DLs
because most of these logics do not satisfy the prerequisites known as the
AGMassumptions [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], it has been studied and adapted to DLs [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6, 26</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>
        The syntactic connectivity in a knowledge base has a strong consequence of
how an agent should modify its knowledge [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ]. This sensitivity to syntax is
also present in Ontology Repair and Evolution. Classical approaches preserve
the syntactic form of the ontology as much as possible [16, 29]. However, these
approaches may lead to drastic loss of information, as noticed by Hansson [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
This problem has been studied in Belief Change for pseudo-contraction [28]. In
the same direction, Troquard et al. [30] proposed the repair of DL ontologies by
weakening axioms using re nement operators. Building on this study, Baader
et al. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ] devised the theory of gentle repairs, which also aims at keeping most
of the information within the ontology upon repair. In fact, gentle repairs are
closely related to pseudo-contractions [18].
      </p>
      <p>
        Other remarkable works in Belief Change in which the body of knowledge is
represented in a nite way include the formalisation of revision due to Katsuno
and Mendelzon [17] and the base-generated operations by Hansson [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ]. In the
former, Katsuno and Mendelzon [17] formalise traditional belief revision
operations using a single formula to represent the whole belief set. This is possible
because they only consider nitary propositional languages. Hansson provides a
characterisation of belief change operations over nite bases but restricted for
logics which satisfy all the AGM-assumptions (such as propositional classical
logic). Guerra and Wassermann [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] develop operations for rational change where
an agent's knowledge or behaviour is given by a Kripke model. They also provide
two characterisations with AGM-style postulates.
5
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Conclusion and Future Work</title>
      <p>In this work, we have introduced a new kind of belief change operation: belief
change via models. In our approach, an agent is confronted with a new piece of
information in the format of a nite model, and it is compelled to modify its
current epistemic state, represented as a single nite formula, either incorporating
the new model, called model expansion; or removing it, called model contraction.
The price for such nite representation is that the single input model cannot be
removed or added alone, and some other models must be added or removed as
well. As future work, we will investigate model change operations in other DLs,
still taking into account nite representability. We will also explore the e ects
of relaxing some constraints on Belief Base operations, allowing us to rewrite
axioms with di erent levels of preservation in the spirit of Pseudo-Contractions,
Gentle Repairs, and Axiom Weakening.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Acknowledgements</title>
      <p>Part of this work has been done in the context of CEDAS (Center for Data
Science, University of Bergen, Norway). The rst author is supported by the
German Research Association (DFG), project number 424710479. Ozaki is
supported by the Norwegian Research Council, grant number 316022.
[29] Boontawee Suntisrivaraporn. Polynomial time reasoning support for design
and maintenance of large-scale biomedical ontologies. PhD thesis, Dresden
University of Technology, Germany, 2009.
[30] Nicolas Troquard, Roberto Confalonieri, Pietro Galliani, Rafael Pen~aloza,
Daniele Porello, and Oliver Kutz. Repairing Ontologies via Axiom
Weakening. In Proceedings of the 22nd AAAI Conference on Arti cial Intelligence,
AAAI 2018, pages 1981{1988. AAAI Press, 2018.</p>
    </sec>
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