=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3016/paper20
|storemode=property
|title=Governing online terrorist propaganda: A societal security issue
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3016/paper20.pdf
|volume=Vol-3016
|authors=Victoria A. Jangada Correia,Moufida Sadok
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/stpis/CorreiaS21
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==Governing online terrorist propaganda: A societal security issue==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3016/paper20.pdf
Governing Online Terrorist Propaganda: A societal security issue
Victoria A. Jangada Correia1, Moufida Sadok1
1
School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Portsmouth, University House, Winston Churchill
Avenue, Portsmouth, PO1 2UP, United Kingdom
Abstract
There is an increasing threat posed by terrorism in modern day, and with the internet enabling new
ways of disseminating online terrorist propaganda, audiences and support for terrorist groups are
growing. The complex linkage between society and technology is become ever more critical as the
world continues to shift more day-to-day life online, and this notion has increased greatly during
the coronavirus global pandemic where online platforms have become an essential aspect for
communicating. The spread of online terrorist propaganda has sparked concerns about the
governance of Internet. However, Internet governance is multifaceted, complex and can be
examined through various lenses. This paper argues that there is a need for a socio-technical
perspective, exploring the inextricable linkages between societies and technology, on Internet
governance. Focusing on the UK’s approach to governing terrorist propaganda, the paper highlights
the strengths and limitations of the model of national law and regulation.
Keywords 1
Online Terrorist Propaganda, Socio-technical perspective, Internet Governance, Cyber
Terrorism
1. Introduction
It was stated by Lord Hope [1] that “it is first the responsibility of government in a democratic
society to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens”. As terrorist group capabilities continue to
expand within cyber environments, so must the regulations and laws held to prosecute individuals in
order to ensure the security of societies and its citizens. In order to do this, establishing measures of
internet governance which prevent and detect cyber-criminal activity generally is pertinent [2, 3].
Exploring the way in which technology is enabling terrorist activity in modern day will further enable
a greater understanding of how societal dimensions are being influenced and impacted by technology,
in turn aiding stakeholders involved in combatting the overarching threat of cyber terrorism.
This research paper questions what the most effective way of governing online terrorist propaganda
is. To address this question, this paper will firstly provide an overview of the nature and scale of online
terrorist propaganda. The following section critically discusses the relevance of the national regulation
and law model suggested by [2] in addressing the threats posed by online terrorist content. In this
section, the significance of a national model will be applied directly to the UK, considering the recent
release of the Online Safety Bill [4] and the way in which this will address online terrorist propaganda
in the UK. Ultimately, the paper will reflect and make conclusions on how online terrorist propaganda
can be tackled through internet governance to reduce the current risk to societies security.
The discussions and the reflections in this paper are based on reviews of currently available literature
regarding cyber terrorism, online terrorist propaganda, and internet governance as well as further
reviews of UK laws and regulations in relation to online terrorist propaganda. Further, the paper
explores the relevance of a sociotechnical approach to tackle online terrorist propaganda.
7th International Workshop on Socio-Technical Perspective in IS development (STPIS 2021) 11-12 October 2021, Trento, Italy
EMAIL: vickyalexc@icloud.com ; moufida.sadok@port.ac.uk
ORCID: 0000-0002-0305-3381 (A. 1); 0000-0003-2981-6516 (A.2)
©️ 2021 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
232
2. Nature and Scale of Online Terrorist Propaganda
Online terrorist propaganda falls under the umbrella term of cyber terrorism. The UK currently faces
a severe threat level from terrorism, and as technology has developed, so are the characteristics of
traditional terrorist methods [5, 6]. There is thus far no universally accepted definition of cyber terrorism
amongst academics and governments [7, 8]. This is arguably problematic and highlights a lack of
unanimity in approaching the threat of cyber terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2006 [9] defines terrorism
as an act of violence, or threat of act of violence, against the public and/or property, intimidating the
public and/or property, or advancing political or religious ideologies. However, there is no attempt at
defining cyber terrorism, a term in which online terrorist propaganda falls under.
Nonetheless, based on the plethora of definitions currently available [10, 11, 12], this paper proposes
that cyber terrorism encapsulates cyber enabled activity which intends to advance political, social, or
religious ideologies against the public, and cyber dependent activity which further intends to threaten
or facilitate damage against the public, properties, and/or systems. As there has been discourse about
the distinction between extremism and terrorism [13], this definition merges both concepts by implying
that there does not always have to be a physical impact of an action to be categorised as an act of
cyberterrorism. In light of the above definition, online terrorist propaganda classifies as a cyber terrorist
act, and includes the use of the internet for communications with an audience to increase support and
keep followers informed [14, 15]. The relationship between online terrorist propaganda and cyber
capabilities can be better understood through McGuire and Dowling’s cybercrime classification
approach [16]. An enabled cybercrime refers to a crime which could still occur without cyber
capabilities whereas a dependent cybercrime refers to a crime which can only be carried out utilising
cyber capabilities. Although it could be argued that online terrorist propaganda would fall under the
enabled cybercrime, this paper argues that due to the dependence on online platforms for sharing
terrorist propaganda, this would more suitably be categorised as a ‘cyber dependent’ act.
According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [15], sharing propaganda is a primary
use of the internet by terrorist groups and tends to include communications regarding instructions,
explanations, justifications or promotions of their terrorist beliefs and activities. Although many of these
terrorist online activities are not necessarily prohibited, it is important that these communications are
regulated and/or collected as data in order to inform multiple stakeholders involved in the detection,
investigation, prevention, and prosecution of terrorist and cyber terrorist crimes in the UK.
According to the Crown Prosecution Service [17], terrorist groups have distinct ethnic, religious,
political and racial identities and they all hold varying beliefs, aims and purposes. Some examples of
terrorist groups which currently pose a threat across the world include Hamas, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State
and right-wing extremist groups. Although not all these groups inflict physical harms against a nation
or group of people, they nonetheless pose a threat through their online presence. It has been postulated
that terrorist organisations use cyber capabilities for the main aims of recruitment, incitement, and
radicalisation [15, 18]. This is in turn a financially beneficial way of growing an audience and fits
Jaishankar’s Space Transition Theorisation that traditional crimes transition into cyber environments
due to financially advantageous characteristics and being able to reach wider audiences [19]. Although
terrorism-related arrests have reduced by 37% since 2020 [20, 21], this is merely reflective of the global
pandemic which has prompted terrorist groups to alter their methods of disseminating propaganda and
spreading misinformation to continue growing support for their beliefs [22]. This potentially has been
having effects on the security of societies as there has been greater ease in accessing and engaging with
terrorist propaganda, resulting in an unobserved and hidden growing audience. It is however important
to highlight that terrorism is merely a social construct of which the meaning is shaped by the views held
by the person categorizing what it means to them as an individual [23, 24]. In light of this, although
online terrorist propaganda promotes thoughts and beliefs which may be seen as incorrect by one group
of people, to another these may be held close to their core norms and values. This makes cyber terrorism
and online terrorist propaganda difficult to define and understand due to its alternating nature, in turn
233
impacting the effectiveness of attempting to govern a concept which holds inter-changing meanings to
different groups of people.
A recent case study which was carried out regarding Islamic States’ use of online terrorist
propaganda can be used to better understand the scale of terrorist online propaganda. This study
accessed, archived, and carried out analysis into one of the largest known Islamic State online
repositories holding just under 100,000 folders and files [25]– this has been nicknamed “Cloud
Caliphate”. This studies research highlighted that, in contrast to older Islamic State repositories which
would use the likes of Google Drive and Dropbox to share and store their propaganda [26], they have
increasingly been utilising standalone websites and social media platforms to resurge support for their
group, which is a notion further supported by Weimann [27]. It was also found that thousands of
individuals visited the repository each month, and when this is paired with the fact that the “Cloud
Caliphate” cache is only a small part of a complex online eco-system, the expanding numbers of support
for Islamic State are alluded to [25]. This one case study example puts into perspective the large amount
of online terrorist propaganda which can be found online from a variety of terrorist groups. Another
significant aspect exemplified in this case study is how terrorists disseminating propaganda are able to
make it accessible in different spoken languages for a large scale of viewers [28, 29]. This alludes to
the globality of terrorist activity and further emphasizes the way in which technology is affecting the
societal security.
A more recent example which explores the scale of online terrorist propaganda is the Plymouth
shooting in which Jake Davison murdered five innocent individuals [30, 31]. Davison had an online
presence on YouTube in which he actively practiced hate speech against women, encouraged violent
acts, and further promoted his Incel (involuntary celibate) alignment. Although Incel is not a proscribed
terrorist organisation in the UK, Davison’s atrocious actions were classed as a terrorist attack, which
suggests that his online actions leading up to the attack were also classed as terrorist behaviour [32],
further highlighting the scale of online terrorist propaganda. Davison’s online presence was not detected
by YouTube or authorities in the UK. Davison had just short of 100 subscribers to his YouTube channel
who he shared Incel ideology with and incited violence to, and these were perhaps all missed
opportunities to detect present and future terrorist behaviour and prevent the attack from happening.
Furthermore, Davison was part of a large YouTube platform called IncelTV with 18,000 subscribers,
which encourages Incel ideology [30]. The support which Davison had, let alone the support which
IncelTV has, emphasises the scale of undetected online terrorist propaganda in the UK and
internationally. Both examples presented in this paper highlight the impact which technology has had
on the dissemination of online terrorist propaganda, subsequently impinging on the security of society.
3. Internet Governance
Establishing a universally accepted definition of internet governance has long been deliberated by
academics and policy makers [33, 34, 35]. However, in order to reach a unanimous understanding of
internet governance it is essential that the words making up the term are clearly understood. The internet
can be best understood as an umbrella term which categorises hardware and software infrastructures,
applications, and content which is used to generate or communicate through these technological means
[2, 36]. Amongst academics, it has been generally agreed that governance can be best understood
through the term ‘regulation’ [37, 38] which relates to operations intending influences on any given
states’ government affairs [35]. In light of these definitional breakdowns, this paper proposes that the
following definition can be used to best understand the term ‘internet governance’ - “the development
and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programmes that shape the evolution and use
of the internet” [39].
Within internet governance there are five categorisations of parties who could be responsible for
governing. Solum [2] coherently breaks this down into: the model of cyberspace and spontaneous
ordering; the model of transnational institutions and international organisations; the model of code and
234
internet architecture; the model of national governments and law; and the model of market regulation.
This paper will specifically focus on the model of national governments and law in comparison to the
model of transnational and international organisations as these are potentially the most pertinent to
online terrorist propaganda.
3.1. Model of National Regulation
The model of national governments and law refers to the concept that the internet should be governed
in the same way that any other human activity is governed [2]. With regards to the UK, this refers to
UK laws and policies such as: The Computer Misuse Act 1990 [40]; The Digital Economy Act 2017
[41]; and most recently drafted, the Online Safety Bill [4]. Contrarily, the international and transnational
model of governing proposes that a national governing approach is not suitable due to the global
characteristic of cyberspace [2]. This model refers to institutions including The Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers [42], and The Internet Engineering Task Force [43] who govern the
technical infrastructure and architecture of the Internet through a multi-stakeholder approach. Although
the international model can be relevant to online terrorist propaganda due to the globality of the cyber
environment, the national model has been deemed most suitable to explore the governing of online
terrorist propaganda as the terrestrial and cyber effects of terrorism are mostly aimed at an individual
nation state/social group, and therefore national regulation of online terrorist propaganda is key for
deterrence and prevention.
National governing can be effective in determining the conditions for internet-based markets and
enabling background conditions for further development of internet governance ensuring that anything
criminal is regulated [2]. These are important aspects in ensuring the internet is governed effectively,
enabling stakeholders such as law enforcement and policy makers, to continue developing their
approaches to prevent, detect and investigate online terrorist propaganda. Perhaps if conditions were
not regulated and developed on a national level, this could result in a nation’s government falling behind
the evolving nature of the cyber environments impacting the effectiveness of their laws and policies.
This could have an undeniable impact on the various stakeholders involved in the direct and indirect
regulation of the internet, and additionally on providing security for societies being impacted by
technological advancements relating to the dissemination of terrorist content. Arguably, enabling a
national government to govern the internet would be more desirable than an international or
transnational institution due to the fact that each nation across the globe has differing views of what is
classified as criminal, deviant and normal based on their societal, religious and traditional norms [44,
45, 46]. Perhaps attempting to govern various nations under the same policy would disturb the norms
and values which make up a country and each nations’ individualistic sovereignty.
The model of national governing imposes a potential issue of disabling open-access content for
internet users in that nation, which can be better understood through China and Russia who both censor
the content which their civilians can view and interact with [47, 48]. Looking specifically at China, for
example, their politics typically align with more left wing, communist practices, which would indicate
that their governance of the internet would lean more towards the censorship of content which civilians
can access as so to control what their perspectives towards an array of topics are [49, 50, 51]. Inevitably,
this impacts society, especially the concept of ‘self-educating’ where individuals are controlled and
deterred from exploring outside of what is already known to them [52, 53]. However, this limitation
poses less risk to the UK due to its fairly central political standpoint, and furthermore, unlike China the
UK does not intend to stop freedom of expression through internet governance, rather the crimes
imposing a threat to societal security.
Overall, the discussed limitations could encourage the use of an international or transnational
governing model due to the internet’s lack of geographic borders and the risk of censorship which
national governance poses, however, the discussed national governing limitations arguably still pose
the same risks in an international governing approach. Therefore, nationally governing the internet
235
would be more effective as this approach would work in tandem with the instilled laws and policies of
other crimes in a nation.
3.2. UK’s Approach
Key national bodies and institutions involved in the regulation of online terrorist propaganda
include: The UK Internet Referral Unit; The Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport; The
Home Office; Ofcom; and The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. All these national
bodies and institutions play differing roles from the detection and referral of terrorist propaganda to the
development and scrutinisation of legislation, with the overall aim of safeguarding citizens from
terrorism. In the UK, Table 1 presents the current regulatory frameworks and policies regarding online
terrorist activity include:
Table 1
Regulatory Frameworks in the UK Regarding Online Terrorist Activity.
Regulatory Framework in the UK Explanation
Draft Online Safety Bill [4] Published in May 2021, this draft Bill is a
direct development of The Online Harms White
Paper [54]. It outlines the key principles for the
online regulation of terrorist activity and applies
a duty of care to tech companies in protecting its
users. This will be directly regulated by Ofcom.
This Bill highlights the importance of human
review in the regulation of the internet.
The Terrorism Act 2000 [55] This is a foundation of UK Legislation for
Terrorism in general. An example of the way in
which it applies to Online Terrorist Propaganda
is in Section 58 where it specifies an offence of
having online information which is of use to the
terrorist.
The Terrorism Act 2006 [9] The 2006 Act develops new terrorist offences
based off the 2000 Act. Most specifically in
Section 2, this Act makes it an offence to
distribute terrorist propaganda which may aid a
terrorist groups aims.
The Counter-Terrorism and Border Security This Act criminalises viewing or acquiring
Act 2019 [56] terrorist content online. For example, it amends
Section 52 of the Terrorism Act 2000 stating that
the viewing of terrorist content could result in up
to 15 years in prison dependable on the intent and
excuse for viewing the content.
Earlier this year it was highlighted that not all online terrorist propaganda can be criminalised as a
large amount of terrorist material is produced with a ‘legal’ mindset in order to bypass UK regulations
[57]. Although there is not a great deal of readily available literature regarding the effectiveness of the
UK government’s approach to online terrorist propaganda, instances from the news can aid in
discussion. The first instance is a group of three men who were found sharing terrorist propaganda
online in chat rooms and on social media in support of Islamic State [58]. All these individuals were
sent to jail for a minimum of four years, in turn, mitigating the risk posed on the communities which
these individuals were from. In another instance, an individual from a neo-Nazi group, was sharing
propaganda and stirring up a ‘race war’ against ethnic minorities [59]. This individual was found guilty
on 12 charges related to terrorism and sentenced to five years in jail. Overall, in both these cases, it can
be seen that the regulations in place to govern these internet crimes were effective and further
dissemination of online terrorist propaganda from these individuals has at least been halted for a certain
236
amount of time. This paper nonetheless proposes that the effectiveness of governing online terrorist
propaganda should not plateau but rather aim to continue on an upward trend as so to ensure that
societies are being kept safe from the posed threats.
As discussed, one of the strengths of national governing is the notion that governments can enable
background conditions to be able to continue ensuring the internet is regulated and safe from terrorist
propaganda. As explored, the UK, through its regulatory bodies and policies, can ensure that individuals
and/or groups disseminating terrorist propaganda online are identified and charged (depending on the
nature and severity of the propaganda in question). By ensuring the nation’s regulatory control of the
internet, stakeholders directly involved in the detection, investigation, prevention and prosecution of
online terrorist propaganda can all work in tandem with the overall goal of decreasing the rate of
terrorist activity in the UK as outlined in the CONTEST strategy [60, 61]. Were a solely
international/transnational approach to be taken, this could affect the effectiveness of UK policing and
regulatory bodies in detecting the victims of online terrorist propaganda and providing prompt support.
A strength regarding the future use of the Online Safety Bill [4], is that this enables the UK
government to work specifically in tandem with the actual providers of communication services. This
will not only enable the investigation of online terrorist crimes which come to surface from public
reports but will also enable communication servers to regulate terrorist online activity. More
specifically, the online safety bill outlines duties of care, risk assessments, safety duties, freedom of
speech, user reporting and record keeping principles which should be followed by a range of providers
such as user-to-user and search services. In addition, this bill also highlights specific policies regarding
terrorist activity online and the way in which this should be dealt with by service providers. For
example, it highlights that Ofcom will have the right to give technology warning notices to service
providers if there is evidence of online terrorist activity on their services [4]. Although the draft Online
Safety Bill has succumbed to much criticism regarding freedom of expression, privacy and regulating
threats to public safety, this is potentially a positive step forward in attempting to regulate online
terrorist propaganda and is undergoing pre-legislative scrutiny to ensure these criticisms are
investigated [62, 63]. Nonetheless, once the online safety bill has been amended and is paired with the
terrorism laws in the UK, this should see success as Ofcom’s regulatory position will enable
investigative and prosecuting services the evidence needed to charge criminals in line with the Criminal
Justice Act 2003 [64] and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 [65].
On the other hand, there are some limitations in applying the model of national governing to the
regulation of online terrorist propaganda, however this paper posits that these limitations could be
overcome. One of the limitations discussed outlines the risk of censorship which comes with restricting
one’s freedom of expression [2]. Where an average person may look at terrorist activity and practice
their basic human rights in deciding to not follow it, terrorists also practice their basic human rights by
deciding to follow it, as they believe that what they are fighting for is important [61]. Fletcher stated
that “those who opt for terror always believe their cause is just” [66], therefore, the censorship of online
terrorist propaganda arguably takes away freedom of speech from the terrorist groups. This is an
especially interesting stance better understood through YouTube’s Community Guidelines which state
that terrorist organisations are not permitted to use their services to share terrorist related content [67].
Problematically, these guidelines lack in defining what ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist content’ actually
means, additionally, there is no specific guideline on what is ‘just’ and ‘unjust’. This unclear approach
further enables terrorist organisations to continue using these services by circumventing the guidelines
as they believe what they are doing is just. In light of this issue, the Draft Online Safety Bill [4] will
ensure that service providers such as YouTube, will need to determine definitions of terrorism and put
their regulatory principles in the terms of service so that individuals can practice their basic human
rights by making an informed decision to use that service or not.
Another limitation of the national governance model is the notion that the internet has no borders
and therefore it should not be confined to being regulated in one nation state. Although online terrorist
propaganda is affecting all countries globally, and more times than not, the internet platforms which
terrorists use to disseminate propaganda are not limited to one nation [25], terrorist propaganda is
237
directed at individuals who are part of a community within a nation state, and therefore the direct
physical results will be seen in a given nation state. Just as national laws dictate legal and illegal
activities, the internet should be regulated reflecting on these laws. In light of this, nations should be
the primary governance approach to online terrorist propaganda. However, this research paper posits
that a multistakeholder approach may be the most suitable way as so to ensure both national governing
bodies and institutions, alongside international regulatory bodies, all work in tandem to deter and
prevent terrorism. With a multistakeholder approach, the individual nation would practice autonomy in
deciding the process of dealing with the online terrorist activity directly affecting them, and the
international nations would act as supporting bodies to aid in detecting and preventing further terrorist
activity. This multi-stakeholder approach could result in improved approaches for protecting victims of
terrorist activity and prosecuting those responsible, as it would mean that despite the cross-border
characteristic of cyber terrorism, the threat of terrorism could be better understood and prevented in a
more undisputed manner.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
This research paper has discussed the relevance and importance of internet governance in
contemporary society specifically relating to the dissemination of online terrorist propaganda. The
paper suggests that a model of national governing and law would be the most suitable approach to
govern and regulate online terrorist propaganda in the UK. Although there are limitations for this
approach including the risk of censorship, this paper highlighted mitigation strategies which will be
introduced in the UK once the Draft Online Safety Bill has been established [4]. However, it is possibly
important to acknowledge that with a multicultural British society, issues regarding the disruption of
cultural norms and values may still be apparent, and further limitations of nationally governing the
dissemination of online terrorist propaganda may become apparent. In addition, the use of online
terrorist propaganda is on an incline, more so over the past year with the global pandemic. As discussed,
this increased use of technology for terrorist activity has a direct impact on society and its communities
in which individuals who align with terrorist organisations pose threats. Therefore, it is important to
consider online propaganda as a sociotechnical phenomena as it requires meaningful communication
and interactions between social groups that are supported by the Internet. In turn, the socio-technical
aspects of online terrorist propaganda and cyber terrorism can be better understood, and cyber terrorist
threats can be reduced.
Overall, this paper has argued that a multi-stakeholder approach would be desirable in order to have
nation states and international bodies working in tandem to increase the effectiveness of internet
governance, however the primary governor of what is right and wrong should always be the nation in
line with their laws. This paper suggests that further research needs to be conducted into the
effectiveness of utilising a national governing model for online terrorist propaganda. In addition, further
research should be carried out to develop on the “Cloud Caliphate” case study [25] as this will aid key
stakeholders in the detection, investigation, prevention and prosecution of online terrorist propaganda.
Yet most importantly, is the need for clear definitions and distinctions of cyber terrorism and online
terrorist propaganda so that stakeholders can have a more unanimous understanding, in turn ensuring
societies are kept secure from the risk posed by terrorism.
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