The article presents the results of the analysis of strategic problems corresponding to information and cyber security in the military-political sphere. The study justifies the consideration of the ensuring international information security problem as a part of a broader topic of global international security. The problem of using information and communication technologies (ICT) for military and political purposes to carry out hostile actions and acts of aggression is presented. The importance of ensuring the information security of military facilities as a part of the critical infrastructure of the state is indicated. The article identifies strategic threats to information security in the military-political sphere, the signs of their presence and the possibility of their implementation. The article presents the analysis of the First UN Committee activities on the development of mechanisms of international governance in this area. Finally, it explores the possibilities of creating an international regime to prohibit information (including cyber) weapons in response to urgent global challenges to international security and strategic stability.
In recent decades, information and communication technologies (ICT) have become a catalyst in all
areas of human life. The all-encompassing importance of new technologies in the modern world was
most acutely outlined by the 2019-2021 coronavirus pandemic, when entire industries, economics,
science and education switched to online work. For the first time in a new environment, sessions and
intersessional consultations at the United Nations were held in a virtual format. All states recognize the
unprecedented benefits of ICT, but the avalanche-like growth of threats in this area has led to a deep
awareness of the fact that unregulated use of ICT can pose a serious threat to international security,
peace and stability. The problems of international information security (IIS) and cybersecurity became
an integral part of global international security, and information and communication technologies began
to have a significant impact on it. That is why various aspects of international information security have
been on the agenda of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which considers issues related
to threats to peace and international security and discusses ways to strengthen them, for more than 20
years [
The issues of the harmful use of ICT in the military-political sphere are the most difficult within the
framework of international organizations. For the first time, an indication of ICT threats in relation not
only to the civilian, but also to the military field was contained in the United Nations General Assembly
resolution 54/49 “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of
international security” of December 1, 1999. Since then, no international documents at the UN level,
which pose normative restrictions on such illegal activities, have been adopted. As a result, information
tools for creating a destructive effect in the military-political sphere are constantly being improved, and
new ICT weapons are being developed for military warfare, reconnaissance confrontation, electronic
warfare, etc., for intervention in the internal affairs of states, for harmful effects on objects of critical
state infrastructure and, in particular, on objects of the military-industrial complex [
Currently, the problem of the development and application of information and communication
technologies for destructive military-political purposes is indicated in the documents of many countries
and is established not only at the domestic level, but also at the international level, including the UN
agenda [
For example, the 2013 report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the
Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) notes:
“Threats to individuals, businesses, national infrastructure and Governments have grown more acute
and incidents more damaging. The sources of these threats comprise both State and non-State actors. In
addition, individuals, groups, or organizations, including criminal organizations, may act as proxies for
States in the conduct of malicious ICT actions. The potential for the development and the spread of
sophisticated malicious tools and techniques, such as bot-nets, by States or non-State actors may further
increase the risk of mistaken attribution and unintended escalation. The absence of common
understandings on acceptable State behaviour with regard to the use of ICTs increases the risk to
international peace and security" [
The 2015 GGE report highlighted the following issues of the application of information and
communication technologies for military-political purposes: ICT should be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes, and international cooperation should be aimed at preventing conflicts in the
information space; states must not use intermediaries to carry out computer attacks and should not
provide their territory for these purposes; states must fight against the use of hidden malicious functions
- "bookmarks" - in IT products. Current and potential threats in the Report include the activities of a
number of states to build capacity in the field of ICT for military purposes, the increased likelihood of
using ICTs in future conflicts between states, and the ICT attacks on critical infrastructure and related
information systems of States [
The 2021 report of the UN Open-ended working group on developments in the field of information
and telecommunications in the context of international security notes: “Negative trends in the digital
domain could undermine international security and stability… States recalled that a number of States
are developing ICT capabilities for military purposes. They also recalled that the use of ICTs in future
conflicts between States is becoming more likely. The continuing increase in incidents involving the
malicious use of ICTs by State and non-State actors, including terrorists and criminal groups, is a
disturbing trend. States also concluded that any use of ICTs by States in a manner inconsistent with
their obligations under the framework, which includes voluntary norms, international law, and CBMs,
undermines international peace and security, trust and stability between States, and may increase the
likelihood of future conflicts between States [
The use of ICT for military and political purposes to carry out hostile actions and acts of aggression
is the most problematic issue in the context of ensuring national and international security, which
becomes the cause of interstate contradictions. In particular, this is due to the fact that ICT is an
extremely "convenient" instrument of influence, which provides almost unlimited opportunities for
affecting various issues in the field of international relations, world politics and economics. Moreover,
actions can be disguised as criminal or terrorist in such a way that identifying the real source, target and
even the final object of influence becomes a very difficult task [
Thus, the urgency of the problem of the ICT military-political use for destructive purposes is
justified by the comprehensive nature of the permanently developing ICT, which give rise to
improvement and development of a new class of weapons and, consequently, to the emergence of a new
class of threats in the military-political sphere [
Therefore, an effective regulatory system in the digital environment is required, including coordinating actions of the leading actors as well as international and domestic mechanisms, supported by the UN. 2.1.
Currently, the use of ICT becomes one of the most important elements of the military and political
potential of states that supplements and sometimes even replaces traditional political and diplomatic
means and weapons. Under conditions of simultaneously developing processes of the arms control
regime destruction and the growing contradictions in relations between the great powers, the importance
of military power and informational technologies of military and dual use, being key factors of
competition and confrontation, persists and even increases [
Security of ICT systems, which have become an important factor in ensuring the state sovereignty,
defense capabilities and security, are strategically important for most countries of the world [
ICT can provoke the outbreak of interstate military conflict, primarily due to the possibility of
disproportionate response to threats and attacks (e.g., the affected party may use real weapons in
response). In addition, the conflict may arise by mistake, as there are currently no universal
methodology, criteria and principles for identification of perpetrators, classification of cyberattacks and
investigation of incidents. As a whole, it significantly reduces the level of strategic stability [
ICT for military applications: fight against command and control systems; reconnaissance confrontation; electronic confrontation; military means to facilitate information operations Alternative means of influencing the enemy: economic (ICT-impact on industrial and financial facilities);
Military invasion using ICT, Iraq, 2003 Orange Revolution, Ukraine, 2004 Tulip Revolution, Kyrgyzstan, 2005
Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia, 2011 Twitter Revolution (Lotus Revolution), Egypt, 2011
Civil war, Libya, 2011 "Euromaidan", Ukraine, 2013-2014 "Socket Revolution", Armenia, 2015
War, Syria, 2011 - present time Preparation of a coup d'état, Venezuela, 2019 Preparation of a coup d'etat, Belarus, 2020 informational (propaganda broadcasting, Internet,
SMS, etc.)
for preparation and conduct of
riots, anti-government demonstrations, political actions, coups 2.2.
Up to date, dozens of countries already have a software to attack national critical infrastructure’s
(CI) facilities. At the same time, the threat indicator for the APCS is currently assessed by experts as
critical or high. Malware is currently being developed in many countries, but 83% of all sites used to
spread "malware" are located in just 10 states. The leader of this ranking is the U.S., where a quarter of
all infection sources are located. Such "malware" can target government agencies, banks, satellite, oil
and gas, transportation systems, power and nuclear plants, communications systems, ports, airports, and
military facilities, with dire consequences at both national and global levels [
Threats are intensified by NATO's decision to apply Article 5 of the Alliance's Charter in response
to cyber attacks [
Thus, threats to strategic stability are further enhanced by the development of new anti-satellite
systems, remotely controlled robotic strike vehicles, supercomputers, autonomous operation
capabilities of various systems and subsystems, automated decision-making systems, artificial
intelligence for military purposes being subject to ICT attacks, and the means of cyber-electromagnetic
activities being actively improved in developed countries, primarily in the USA [
In addition to technological destabilizing factors, there is also a psychological one, which can be
formulated as a loss of fear of nuclear war among society and political elites that may significantly
lower the threshold for the use of weapons. Another dangerous factor is the belief that a local "small"
nuclear war is acceptable and can be won. The trend towards spreading such views has also arisen with
the help of modern ICTs, which make it possible to influence a huge audience in a relatively short time
and without serious economic costs. At the same time, damage assessment and development of
countermeasures are significantly hampered by the intangibility of ICT, the difficulty of attributing the
source of the attack, the possibility of operating under a "false flag", the wide range of actors applying
malicious technologies, including state and non-state actors along with lone-wolf hackers. As a whole,
it increases the level of uncertainty and instability [
One of the most important global problems is the information security of military facilities as a part of CI and most importantly nuclear weapons systems. There are several types of threats that create the problem of ensuring the ICT security for military-industrial complex facilities (Table 2).
The avalanche-like increase in threats resulting from the malicious use of information and communication technologies in the political, military, economic and social spheres has led to a deep awareness of the fact that new technologies can bring additional threats to international peace and security. Thus, an issue of international information security, i.e. the state of the global information space that excludes the possibility of violating the rights of individuals, society and the state in the information sphere, and protects from destructive and illegal impact on the elements of national critical information infrastructure, has become an integral part of international security. The latter can be defined as a system of international relations, which is based on the universal compliance with recognized principles and norms of international law by all states and excludes the use of force or threat as an instrument to resolve controversial issues and disagreements between them.
Therefore, the principles of international security that provide for the assertion of peaceful coexistence, equal security for all states, the establishment of effective guarantees in the military, political, economic and humanitarian fields, prevention of nuclear and space arms race, respect to the sovereign rights of every nation, and fair political settlement of international crises and regional conflicts, certainly involve the establishment of international information security. Such a system designed to counter threats to strategic stability and to ensure equal partnership in the global digital environment, can be considered as a set of international and national institutions that regulate the activities of various subjects of the global information space, including the UN.
There are many reasons to discuss issues related to ICT development in the main areas of UN activity: peace and security, human rights, and sustainable development. Besides the work on advances in ICT in the context of international security, other aspects discussed in various UN bodies include digital cooperation, Internet governance, sustainable development and human rights (including commercial and personal data protection, freedom of opinion and information) as well as cybercrime and cyberterrorism.
Since the effective functioning of the collective security mechanism enshrined in the UN Charter is an integral part of international security, the problem of IIS maintenance has been included in the agenda of one out of six main committees of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), known as the First Committee dealing with disarmament and related international security issues. This is the place where states discuss threats to peace and seek ways to resist them. Therefore, the process of international information security at the UN plays a crucial role and requires in-depth analysis by the expert community. There are many reasons that justify the expediency and importance of IIS issues discussion in the First Committee of the UNGA. We will specify the main ones.
First, the analysis and forecasting of threats from the malicious use of ICT by both states and nonstate actors proves the possible impact of new computer technologies on increasing the likelihood of real armed conflicts, their escalation and, consequently, of large-scale war. Thus, the problem of ensuring information security is strategic, and the level of ICT security has a significant impact on the level of strategic stability. Therefore, it is necessary to search for additional mechanisms of global governance in this area. In the absence of agreement between states, the number and scale of such threats will increase. At the same time, the discussion within the framework of the First Committee of the UNGA allows to develop trust-building measures along with principles and norms of responsible state behavior in the digital space that can reduce the risk of conflicts and their escalation. Such activities enable focusing on the coordination and support of ICT security capacity building and avoiding superiority of one or several states over most others in the ICT space (the “digital gap”).
Second, analysis of precedents of ICT attacks on critical state infrastructure proves that their number and scale are growing exponentially year after year. Cyberattacks on resources and objects critical for country's vital activity can lead to a negative and even catastrophic impact on security systems, health care, public administration, the military sector and the economic potential of the state that underlines necessity for the discussion of the responsible state behavior in the information sphere within First Committee of the UN General Assembly.
Third, despite the development of national and regional instruments for regulation of ICT space activities, not a single country in the world, up to date, is able to ensure its full protection against ICT threats with no state borders and can solve the related problems alone. Therefore, discussion at the UN level is of vital importance. The emphasis on coordination between states and various stakeholders, which is now covered in many national and regional cyber and information security strategies, is also reflected in the processes happening within the framework of the First Committee of the UNGA. At the same time, the results of the work at the global level influence national and regional norms and principles, which can also contribute to the promotion of peace and stability.
At the end of 2018, the UN First Committee established two parallel discussions on international information security processes, held within the UN Open-Ended Working Group on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG), initiated by Russia, and the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security (GGE), proposed by the United States. The reports of both groups adopted by consensus that sum up the results of two years of work became important results in the process of providing IIS in the difficult conditions of a pandemic. They included the report of the OEWG, dated by March 12, 2021, and the report of the GGE dated by May 28, 2021.
The report of the OEWG can be considered as the success of the work of the Group, which has opened a new format for negotiations on the security in the digital space that was initiated by Russia in 2018. The activities of the second convocation of OEWG on security issues related to the ICTs and their use will continue in 2021–2025. The demand for the Russian idea of consolidation of such a mechanism in the UN structure in the long term was confirmed by the UN General Assembly Resolution 75/240, adopted on December 31, 2020.
In the GGE Report, which was the result of a compromise, the Russian delegation managed to achieve a reflection of the provisions fundamental for the Russian Federation, including the most critical problems such as attribution of incidents in the ICT space, international legal regulation of this area, the necessity of further work on the rules of the responsible behavior of states with the UN assistance, and the possibility of developing legally binding norms.
However, disagreement over the advisability of developing international legal norms aimed to regulate the use of ICT for military purposes still has a negative impact on the achievement of compromise between states and the UN groups. Considering the problem as irrelevant at this stage, the US believes that sufficient practical experience in incident management must first be accumulated. Russia, on the other hand, remains convinced that the main goal should be to prevent the use of ICTs for military and political purposes, rather than legalize and regulate such conflicts.
During the analysis and forecasting of the ways to solve the problem of using information and communication technologies for military and political purposes to carry out hostile actions and acts of aggression, one has to take into account the most important geopolitical characteristics of the modern stage that do not promote the efficiency of the process. They are related to the lack of cooperation between the "great powers" in this field and to the lack of transparency in relations between states, making it difficult to assess the commitment of countries to the norms and principles of behavior in the digital space. Moreover, the lack of clear incentives and specific benefits for agents, which comply with the norms, significantly hinders the development of an international regime for the management and control of harmful ICTs. Thus, it is relevant to expand the research corresponding to the evaluation of existing rules applicable to the information space and to the identification of additional effective norms. At the same time, it would be advisable to work on the classification of threats in this field at the international level as well as to monitor dangerous ICT incidents. Interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary analysis of existing threats to IIS along with scientific forecasting and planning of future dangers by the scientific and expert community thus become even more important nowadays.
Thus, the following conclusions can be drawn. 1. The use of ICT for military and political purposes to carry out hostile actions and acts of aggression; the destructive ICT impact on elements of critical infrastructure; the interference in the internal affairs of states, and the violation of public stability through ICT are reasonably identified as the most dangerous threats in Russian documents and require the development of additional mechanisms of international governance. 2. Due to the scale of ICT threats in the strategic military sphere, the work of foreign policy departments is necessary to agree at the international level on the lists of critical military (nuclear) infrastructure. An attempt to affect this infrastructure with the ICT will be regarded as a disarming strike with corresponding consequences. 3. UN work is needed to shape an ICT arms control regime that may include: • Specific measures to build confidence and security in the ICT field, • Prohibition of ICT attacks on specific objects, particularly in the military sphere, • Regulations that limit and/or forbid offensive ICT capabilities, • Measures to control the proliferation of ICT weapons, • International standards on means and methods to prevent and eliminate cyber conflicts, • Development of a convention on the prohibition of the ICT harmful use in the field of nuclear weapons.
I would like to thank Prof. Nikolay I. Turko, Doctor of Military Sciences and Technical Sciences for insightful discussion, valuable suggestions, and revision of the manuscript.