=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3047/paper3
|storemode=property
|title=Analysis of Communication Channels for the Organization of Control and Interaction of UAVs from the Security Viewpoint
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3047/paper3.pdf
|volume=Vol-3047
|authors=Elena Basan,Olga Peskova,Maria Lapina
}}
==Analysis of Communication Channels for the Organization of Control and Interaction of UAVs from the Security Viewpoint==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3047/paper3.pdf
Analysis of Communication Channels for the Organization of
Control and Interaction of UAVs from the Security Viewpoint
Elena Basan1, Olga Peskova1 and Maria Lapina2
1
Southern Federal University, Chekhov St., 2, Taganrog, 347922, Russia
2
North Caucasus Federal University, Pushkina St., 1, Stavropol, 355017, Russia
Abstract
This article considers the issues of increasing the level of security of wireless communication
channels between UAVs. The topic is quite relevant, since UAVs can be used to solve critical
tasks, such as search operations, reconnaissance, and relaying communications. At the same
time, wireless communication channels are not physically protected, and their security can
easily be compromised. The article also discusses the main vulnerabilities of communication
channels for UAVs, attacks, and threats to information security. Possibilities of increasing the
level of security of UAV communication channels are considered. The methods and
developments suggested on this topic by the authors are briefly presented.
Keywords 1
UAVs, vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, cryptography, attack detection, communication
channels, modulation
1. Introduction
Recent years can be characterized by an active expansion of the application areas of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) both for military and civil purposes; therefore, information security issues are
becoming more and more urgent, and above all, no less urgent are the problems of the protection of
the most vulnerable components of UAVs, and data transmission channels.
The main goal of the study is to analyze the technologies used to organize communication
channels of various types, as well as to analyze the information security problems typical for them.
2. Analysis of UAV control methods
As a rule, any architecture using a UAV includes three control elements [1]:
The UAV itself, and, in particular, the flight controller, which is defined as the central
processor;
Ground control station (GCS) which provides operators with the necessary capabilities to
control and/or monitor the UAV;
Data transmission channels, i.e. wireless channels used to control the information flow
between UAVs and GCSs.
Accordingly, the organization of communication channels can be divided into 4 main types:
1. UAV - UAV (D2D). This type of communication is not standardized [2]. In most cases, D2D
communications can be modeled as Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communications, which makes such
communications vulnerable to various types of attacks typical of P2P, including noise, distributed
denial of service (D-DoS), and Sibyl attack.
SibDATA 2021: The 2nd Siberian Scientific Workshop on Data Analysis Technologies with Applications 2021, June 25, 2021,
Krasnoyarsk, Russia
EMAIL: ele-barannik (E. Basan)
ORCID: 0000-0001-6127-4484 (E. Basan); 0000-0001-8117-9142 (M. Lapina)
© 2021 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
2. UAV - GCS (D2GS). This type of communication is based on the already known and
standardized industrial protocols based on wireless communication such as Bluetooth and Wi-Fi
802.11. However, most ground-to-ground connections are public and insecure, especially when
using single-factor authentication, which can be easily attacked, making them vulnerable to
passive (traffic interception, infrastructure analysis) and active (man-in-the-middle, denial of
service) attacks.
3. UAV - UAV group (D2N). This type of communication already allows one to select a
network based on the required level of security. It can also include cellular communication, which
means using 3GHz, 4GHz, 4G (LTE), and 5GHz.
4. UAV - Satellite (D2S). This is the type of communication required to send coordinates in
real-time via the Global Positioning System (GPS), allowing any UAV to return to its original
station in the case when it goes out of the line of sight. Satellite communications are considered
relatively safe, although vulnerable to attacks such as GPS signal spoofing, etc.
Control over UAVs can be carried out in three main ways [3]:
using a remote control, where all decisions are made by a remote operator;
remote controlled control: with the ability to start and execute the given autonomy, at the
same time allowing human intervention if necessary;
complete autonomous control: UAVs can make all necessary decisions without the need for
any human intervention.
On the one hand, UAVs must exchange critical information with various entities, such as
operators, nearby aircraft and air traffic controllers to ensure safe, reliable, and efficient flight
operations. This type of communication is known as Controlled and Non-Payload Communication
(CNPC) [4]. On the other hand, depending on the mission, it may be necessary to transmit and/or
receive mission-related data in a timely manner, such as aerial photographs, high-speed video, and
data packets for relaying to/from various ground objects such as UAV operators, final users or ground
gateways. For this, communication with the payload is used. Specific communication and spectrum
requirements are generally different for CNPC and for payload transmission. The 3rd Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) consortium defined the communication requirements for these two types
of channels [5]. CNPC usually has a low data transfer rate but rather stringent requirements for high
reliability and low latency. Since the loss of a CNPC channel can lead to catastrophic consequences,
the International Civil Aviation Organization ICAO states that CNPC channels for UAVs must
operate in a protected aviation spectrum [6].
In [7] two methodologies for estimating the spectrum requirements for CNPC are presented. For
both UA density methodologies, a terrestrial line-of-sight (LOS) spectrum requirement of 34 MHz is
determined. For a non-line-of-sight (BLOS) satellite, the spectrum requirement ranges from 46 MHz
to 56 MHz, depending on the type of the satellite system used (spot beam or regional beam).
Depending on the functions performed by the UAV, communication can be organized in two ways
to improve reliability. As a rule, at least two communication systems are located onboard the UAV:
duplex / half-duplex equipment for transmitting command-telemetric information and a simplex
system for transmitting payload information. At the same time, on the one hand, an increase in the
data transmission channels increases the reliability and resilience of the communication lines, but on
the other hand, it provides a potential adversary with more opportunities to make attacks.
Let us consider, in particular, the features of using of satellite communications for the organization
of communication between GCS and UAV. Satellites can be used to relay communications if the
UAVs and GCSs are separated by significant distances, for example, if the UAV is over the ocean or
in remote areas where the coverage of the terrestrial network is absent. In addition, satellite signals
can also be used to navigate and localize UAVs. WRC 2015 approved the conditional use of satellite
frequencies in the Ku/Ka-band to connect UAVs to satellites, and some satellite companies, such as
Inmarsat, have launched satellite communication services for unmanned aerial vehicles [8].
Nevertheless, there are several problems which arise in the case of organizing satellite
communication between GCS and the UAV. First, the loss and delay of the signal is very significant
due to large distances between the satellite and the UAV / ground stations, which are located at low
altitudes, which is unacceptable for the transmission of control and telemetry data. Second, unmanned
aerial vehicles usually have strict size, weight, and power constraints, and may not be able to carry
heavy, bulky, and energy-intensive satellite communication equipment. Third, high operating costs of
satellite communications also make it difficult to use it widely for large groups of UAVs. Figure 1
shows a picture of possible control and communication channels with a UAV.
Figure 1: UAV communication and control channels
The next way of organizing communication, which can serve both for communication between
GCS and the UAV and for communication between the UAV and the UAV, is an ad-hoc network, i.e.
a decentralized wireless network with no permanent structure. Its variation in the Mobile ad-hoc
network (MANET) is a dynamically self-organizing network which does not have a permanent
infrastructure, which implements peer-to-peer communication between mobile devices through
wireless communication lines, using, for example, IEEE 802.11 a / b / g / n. Each device in MANET
can move randomly in time; as a result, its communication conditions with other devices may change
frequently. In addition, in order to support communication between two remote sites, some other sites
between them must help to forward data through relaying, resulting in higher power consumption, low
spectrum efficiency, and long end-to-end latency. Flying ad hoc network (FANET) is a variant of
MANET for supporting communication between unmanned aerial vehicles in 3D networks [9]. The
topology or configuration of FANET for a UAV can take a different form: full mesh, ring, star, or
even bus, depending on the application scenario.
In [10], the issue of organizing a communication channel between several UAVs and a ground
control point is considered. In this topology, each slave UAV transmits its data to the leader of the
UAV group, and the latter transmits the information to the ground control panel. According to the
research results, it is noted that the statistics of errors in wireless channels between UAVs change
depending on changes in the distance between UAVs.
While FANET is a robust and flexible architecture to support UAV communications in a small
network, it cannot generally provide a scalable solution for large UAVs deployed over a large area
due to the complexities associated with implementing a robust routing protocol and it has a number of
features in terms of radio wave propagation.
Recently, interest has increased in the use of the existing cellular communication networks, as well
as future generation networks to ensure the possibility of terrestrial communication of UAVs [11],
due to almost ubiquitous coverage of the cellular network throughout the world, as well as its high-
speed optical backhaul and advanced communication technologies, which can potentially meet the
requirements of both CNPC and payload, regardless of the density of the UAVs and their distance
from the corresponding ground nodes.
In [12] the authors discuss the issues of building a UAV network using LTE (Long Term
Evolution) technology, a standard for wireless high-speed data transmission in the networks of mobile
operators. At the same time, an unmanned aerial system is considered, which includes a UAV, an
antenna-feeder facility, and a ground control point. The authors consider the problem of defining
upper layer protocol sets for the Radio Monitoring and Non-Payload Communication (CNPC)
Standard, which is being developed within the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA)
[13, 14]. This standard only describes the radio frequency (RF) transmission methods and the physical
layer; therefore, it is necessary to select and configure the upper layer protocols and define the
network architecture of CNPC. The US National Space Agency (NASA) is considering IEEE 802.16
based upper-layer protocols and the CNPC network architecture, but the authors of the article
consider the application of the upper layer protocols and the LTE based CNPC network architecture
[15, 16]. The frequency for CNPC was discussed at the World Radio Conference (WRC) of the
International Telecommunication Union, Radiocommunication (ITU-R), and the frequency band 5
030-5 091 MHz was allocated to CNPC at WRC-12 [17, 18]. The LTE upper-layer protocols for the
wireless interface consist of Medium Access Control (MAC), Radio Link Control (RLC), Packet Data
Convergence Protocol (PDCP), and Radio Resource Control (RRC).
To ensure the security of this type of connection, VPN (Virtual Private Network) technologies and
a group of IPSec protocols can be used. However, the LTE standard is characterized by many
vulnerabilities which can be revealed through the following attacks:
interception of personal user identifiers MSISDN, IMSI;
location determination;
man-in-the-middle attacks for unencrypted traffic (interception of access to unprotected mail,
visited sites, etc.);
interception of SMS messages;
listening to VoLTE calls by intercepting packets;
creating a session on behalf of the subscriber for the purpose of fraud.
denial of service attacks on the subscriber, which cause the loss of user data transmission, and
for VoLTE networks - interruption of calls;
denial of service attacks on equipment which result in network outages.
The disadvantages of using open communication protocols are:
low information security of the communication channel (cryptographic strength);
low imitation resistance (resistance to imitation noise, which has the same structure as a
useful signal, which makes it difficult for detection);
lack of hidden and noise-immune modes of operation.
Thus, the study defines the main architectures which can be used to build communication networks
with UAVs. The collected data will be used to achieve the following goals: development of a UAV
detection system, development of a system for creating false images of a UAV group.
3. UAV Control and communication vulnerabilities
Many unmanned aerial vehicles have serious design flaws, and most of them are designed without
wireless protection and encryption of transmitted data [19].
Spoofing vulnerability: The analysis of the configuration of multi-rotor UAVs and flight
controllers revealed many deficiencies. They are associated with telemetry streaming channels over
serial ports, especially due to the lack of encryption [20, 21]. Our experiments show that using GPS
spoofing, information can easily be captured or altered. This vulnerability in the data link allows data
to be intercepted and tampered with, giving full control over the UAV.
Vulnerability to malware infection: Communication protocols are used when establishing a control
channel with a UAV for enabling remote control of unmanned aerial vehicles. However, their use
turned out to be unsafe [22,23]. A potential adversary can create a TCP payload, inject it into the
UAV's memory, which makes it possible to covertly install malware into systems operating at ground
stations.
Vulnerability to interference with the communication channel and data interception: Telemetry
data transmission channels are used to monitor the environment and objects and implemented through
a wireless data transmission medium [24], which makes them vulnerable to various threats. These
include data interception, malicious data injection, and alteration of predefined flight paths. This
makes it possible to inject and deploy many infected digital files (video, images) from a UAV to the
ground station [25]. Another vulnerability was discovered and related to the UAV communication
module, which uses wireless communication to exchange data and commands with the ground station
[26].
4. Experiments
The members of our team working on the UAV security project carried out a number of
experiments to identify vulnerabilities in the communication and control channels of the UAV.
The study and analysis of the scenarios of active, passive, and multi-stage attacks for an intelligent
group control system for UAVs were carried out, and based on them a template for describing attacks
and general scenarios for influencing the information system of a UAV was proposed, and probable
attacks through communication channels (deauthentication and connection, eavesdropping,
Blueprinting, Replay, Interception of "handshake", brute-force and others) were described [27].
The analysis and study of the algorithms and methods of influencing the UAV information system
through communication channels were performed, including the study of the Data Distribution
Service, Micro Air Vehicle Link, MAVLink protocols. Field experiments were carried out on the
UAV navigation system, built using the GPS technology. During these experiments various types of
attacks were implemented, leading to misinformation, return or forced landing of the UAV. The
studies were also carried out on the required power, and requirements for the content of the generated
signal. The characteristics of determining the fact of an ongoing GPS spoofing attack were also
proposed [28].
A system for the formation of a false idea of a UAV based on the use of a radio frequency channel
is proposed, which is based on imitating the presence of a large group of UAVs around a trusted UAV
object, which simulates communication over a wireless communication channel and at the same time
deliberately uses weak security measures (weak passwords, cryptographic keys), which is necessary
to draw the enemy's attention to false UAVs instead of the trusted ones [29].
5. Conclusion
Thus, in the course of the study, a detailed analysis of the UAV control methods was made,
various technologies used to ensure communication and control of UAVs in various interaction
schemes were presented, their vulnerabilities and possible attacks were considered. The experiments
carried out during the research were described which showed the real threat from the vulnerabilities.
This can make it possible to develop an integrated UAV protection system both in single and group
versions.
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