=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3057/paper2.pdf
|storemode=property
|title=Security Threat Model Based on Analysis of Foreign National Quantum Programs
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3057/paper2.pdf
|volume=Vol-3057
|authors=Alexei S. Petrenko,Sergei A. Petrenko,Krystina A. Makoveichuk,Alexander V. Olifirov,Hristo Krachunov
}}
==Security Threat Model Based on Analysis of Foreign National Quantum Programs==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3057/paper2.pdf
Security Threat Model Based on Analysis of Foreign National
Quantum Programs
Alexei S. Petrenko 1, Sergei S. Petrenko 1, Krystina A. Makoveichuk 2, Alexander V. Olifirov2,
Hristo Krachunov 3
1
Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University "LETI", 5, Professor Popov Street, St. Petersburg, 197376, Russia
2
V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University, 4, Akademika Vernadsky Avenue, Simferopol, 295007, Crimea
3
Technical University of Varna, Studentska 1, Varna, 9010, Bulgaria
Abstract
Currently, 17 technologically developed countries of the world (USA, China, Russia, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Israel, South Korea, Australia, Japan, etc.) are implementing national
quantum programs to support exploratory research, R&D in the field of quantum technologies
(Q). At the same time, in 12 countries, the mentioned programs are funded by the state, and
leading scientific institutions, advanced research agencies for military intelligence and defense
structures, as well as leading public and private universities in the field of natural sciences are
involved in their implementation. Other countries of the world are actively participating in
international programs for the development of quantum technologies. At the same time,
national quantum programs are defined by the governments of these countries as critical for
the national security and economic competitiveness of the state. Consider the national quantum
programs of the United States and its partners in the NATO bloc to form a model of security
threats to the critical information infrastructure of the Russian Federation.
Keywords 1
National quantum program, roadmap for the development of quantum technologies, quantum
computing and computers, quantum and post-quantum cryptography, quantum cryptanalysis
algorithms, quantum algorithms of Shor, Grover, and Simon, quantum Fourier transform,
factorization and discrete logarithm problem.
1. Introduction
According to leading Russian political scientists [1, 3-5], the modern world is going through a period
of profound changes, the essence of which is the formation of a polycentric international system:
the world’s potential for power and development is being dispersed and shifted to the Asia-Pacific
region. The ability of the historic West to dominate the world economy and politics is shrinking;
the contradictions arising from uneven world development, the widening of the gap between the
welfare of States, the intensification of competition for resources, access to markets, and control of
transport routes have become more pronounced. The desire of Western States to maintain their
positions, including by imposing their views on global processes and by pursuing a policy of
containing alternative centers of power, has led to increased instability in international relations,
Increased turbulence at the global and regional levels. The struggle to dominate the formation of key
principles for the organization of the future international system is becoming a major trend in the
current stage of world development;
Proceedings of VI International Scientific and Practical Conference Distance Learning Technologies (DLT–2021), September 20-22,
2021, Yalta, Crimea
EMAIL: A.Petrenko1999@rambler.ru (A.1); s.petrenko@rambler.ru (A. 2); christin2003@yandex.ru (A. 3); alex.olifirov@gmail.com (A.4);
euro_expert@abv.bg (A.5)
ORCID: 0000-0002-9954-4643 (A.1); 0000-0003-0644-1731 (A.2); 0000-0003-1258-0463 (A.3); 0000-0002-5288-2725 (A.4);
0000-0002-7044-9642 (A.5)
©️ 2021 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
11
in the face of increasing political, social, economic divisions and instability in the world political
and economic system, the role of force in international relations is becoming more important. The
development and modernization of force capabilities and the development and deployment of new
types of weapons undermine strategic stability and threaten the global security provided by the
system of arms control treaties and agreements. While the risk of a large-scale war, including nuclear
war, between the major States remains low, the risks of their being drawn into regional conflicts and
crises are increasing;
in addition to military power, important influences of States on international policy, such as
economic, legal, technological, and information-related factors, have come to the fore. The pursuit
of appropriate opportunities to pursue geopolitical interests is detrimental to the search for solutions
to disputes and existing international problems through peaceful means based on international law;
the use of instruments of «soft power», first of all, the possibilities of civil society, humanitarian
and information-communication, and technologies to solve foreign policy problems, becomes an
integral part of modern international policy, in addition to traditional diplomatic methods [2, 6, 7].
Western states, primarily the United States and NATO countries, are striving in every possible way
to use technological superiority in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies (Q),
collection and processing of big data (Big Data + ETL), high and ultra-high performance machine
computing (up to 10 Exaflops) to dominate the information space. At the same time, it raises concern
that information technologies are increasingly being used by these countries for military-political
purposes, including for the implementation of actions aimed at undermining the sovereignty, political
and social stability, and the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
For example, the National Quantum Initiative (2018) aims to maintain US technological leadership
in quantum technology in the medium and long term. To this end, a series of (more than 80) dual-use
research and development projects have been launched since 2019 under the United States National
Security Agency (NSA), the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA), The Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the United States National Science Foundation (NFS),
the United States Department of Energy (DOE), etc. At the same time, the US budget for the
development of quantum technologies in 2021 exceeded US $ 2.2 billion (for comparison, China’s
budget is US $ 2.5 billion, Russia’s budget is the US $ 0,8 billion) (see Fig. 1). Let us consider the
structure and content of the aforementioned US quantum initiative in more detail.
Figure 1: Open budgets of high-tech countries of the world for the development of quantum
technologies (Q)
12
2. US Quantum Initiative 2018
Some specific steps by the United States military and political leadership and scientific community
preceded the National Quantum Initiative (2018).
At the end of 2017, the issue became particularly pressing, as US political elites began to have
serious fears of falling behind, mostly from China, in the global quantum computing race. On the
instructions of the US Congress (one of the three highest federal government bodies of the US), the
National Security Agency (NSA) has produced a series of classified reports assessing the military-
technical capabilities of the United States and its opponents in the area of quantum technology.
In these documents, the following issues were presented in expanded form:
structure and comparison of costs for national quantum initiatives of the US and NATO countries,
as well as their opponents;
the quantity and quality of previously conducted scientific and technical research;
evaluation of the practical value of scientific results;
assessment of the potential of an appropriate pilot framework;
evaluation of the quality of training of military and civilian specialists in the field of quantum
technology, etc.
Further, a Memorandum (2018) was developed on budgetary priorities of the US presidential
administration in the field of dual-use R&D. At the same time, the following areas of promising research
were identified: quantum technologies (Q), quantum communications, quantum computers, quantum
computing, quantum, and post-quantum cryptography. The goal was to maintain the technological
leadership of the United States in the field of quantum technologies in the medium and long term.
Finally, in 2018, the United States drafted the National Quantum Initiative Act, which plans to
allocate substantial funds for the following developments:
the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of $ 400 billion (80 million per
year) for the organization and conduct of scientific events on specified topics;
the US National Science Foundation (NSF) of $ 250 million (50 million per year) for the creation
and development of interdisciplinary research centers for exploratory research and training
(Multidisciplinary Centers for Quantum Research and Education);
the Coordination Office of the United States of $ 200 billion (40 million per year) for project
management in the field of quantum technologies.
Further, during the discussion of budget items in the US House of Representatives, the US
Department of Energy was allocated an additional $ 625 million ($ 125 million per year) for the creation
of five leading research centers (National Quantum Information Science Research Centers).
As a result, the total amount of funding for the implementation of the US national quantum initiative
amounted to the US $ 1.275 billion. On December 21, 2018, WE President Donald Trump approved
this budget.
The US National Science Foundation (NSF) has two strategic projects planned for the period 2019-
2025. The first is to create a "practical" quantum computer (Software-Tailored Architecture for
Quantum co-design, STAQ). The main goals of this project were:
–development of a promising architecture of a quantum computer with 64 and more qubits;
–providing the required stability and noise immunity of the functioning of quantum computers in
real operating conditions;
–development of quantum algorithms, systems, and applied software for solving scientific and
technical problems of dual-use.
The second project, «Enabling Quantum Leap: Convergent Accelerated Discovery Foundries for
Quantum Materials Science, Engineering, and Information, Q-AMASE-i», was aimed at creating new
samples of quantum materials. The total amount of financing for these projects was USD 25 million.
US Department of Energy 2019-2024 funded 85 promising quantum technology projects totaling
the US $ 218 million. Including the project of the National Laboratory «Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory» (LBNL / Berkeley Lab) to create a special test laboratory (Advanced Quantum Testbed,
AQT). At the same time, the Lincoln Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT-
Lincoln Laboratory, MIT-LL) was involved to develop a program and testing methodology for various
architectures of quantum computers.
13
Also in 2018, another major US bill, the Quantum Computing Research Act of 2018, was passed to
support scientific and technological research for the interests of the US military.
In 2019, the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering prepared the "Advanced
R&D Plan (for the period 2019-2025)" in the following areas:
creation of new forms of weapons and equipment based on quantum technologies (Q);
development of promising models and methods for collecting and processing big data (Big Data)
based on quantum technologies (Q), methods of artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning
(ML) (national security data sets);
development of quantum algorithms for solving military-technical problems of analysis and
synthesis (including cryptanalysis problems);
creation of trusted quantum communication systems, including the development of an appropriate
component base and communication protocols;
development of quantum computers for 100 or more logical qubits;
development of mathematical and software for quantum computers;
development of promising architectures of quantum systems and networks for performing quantum
computations;
development of models and methods of quantum and post-quantum cryptography, etc. [29, 30].
Starting in 2019, the R&D section of the US defense budget provides for annual funding for
fundamental and applied research in the field of quantum technologies. For example, the US Army
(feature 0601102A) and the US Navy (feature 0601153N) receive $ 5 million annually for related
research.
It is interesting to note that the Defense Budget under Advanced Simulation and Computing has
earmarked more than $ 700 million annually for the US Department of Energy, which is significantly
higher than the Pentagon's "quantum" budget. This is due to the fundamental nature of the alleged
exploratory research in the field of quantum technology.
Note that the number of Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) for the needs of
the US Department of Defense has grown from 12 projects in 2016 to 60 projects in 2021. One such
project is the Tri-Service Quantum Science and Engineering Program (QSEP), an interdisciplinary
university project.
Additionally, IARPA and DARPA have undertaken some dual-use R&D projects with the following
objectives:
overcoming the limitations of known quantum systems (Logical Qubits Program) (during 2020–
2023);
effective solution of optimization problems (Quantum Enhanced Optimization Program) (during
2020-2023);
development of effective quantum cryptanalysis algorithms (Quantum Cryptanalysis) (during
2021-2024) (Table 1 and Table 2), etc. [9–18, 25-27, 31, 32].
Table 1
Assessment of the cryptographic strength of known encryption algorithms
Symmetric key FFC (DSA, D-H,
Bits of security IFC (RSA) ECC (ECDSA)
algorithms MQV)
L=1024
80 (up to 2010) 2TDEA, SKIPJACK k=1024 f=160-223
N=160
L=2048
112 (up to 2030) 3TDEA k=2048 f=224-255
N=224
L=3072
128 (after 2030) AES-128 k=3072 f=256-383
N=256
L=7680
192 AES-192 k=7680 f=384-511
N=384
L=15360
256 AES-256 k=15360 f=512+
N=512
14
Table 2
Resources Required for Quantum Solving of Factorization Problems and Key Finding of Known
Symmetric Encryption Cryptosystems
Resources for Quantum Factorization and ECDLP
Factorization ECDLP
Number of Quantum Number of Quantum Classic time
n n
qubits time qubits time
9
512 1024 0.54*10 110 700 0.5*109 6.4*1016
9 9
1024 2048 4.3*10 163 1000 1.6*10 3.0*1024
2048 4096 34*109 224 1300 4.0*109 9.2*1033
9 9
3072 6114 120*10 256 1500 6.0*10 6.0*1038
15360 30720 1.5*1013 512 2800 50*109 2.1*1077
Resources for a quantum solution to the problem of finding the key of a symmetric cryptosystem
k Number of qubits Quantum time Classic time
56 56 2.1*108 7.2*1016
80 80 8.6*1011 1.2*1024
16
112 112 5.7*10 5.2*1033
128 128 1.4*1019 3.4*1038
25
168 168 1.5*10 3.7*1050
256 256 2.7-1038 1.2*1077
Leading public and private universities were involved to carry out the set R&D. For example, the
University of Southern California has become a leader in a consortium of universities and private
companies for five-year R&D (2017-2022) of IARPA with a budget of $ 45 million to develop the
world's first 100-qubit quantum computer. This consortium also included: Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-
LL), California Institute of Technology (Caltech, USA), Harvard University (Harvard, USA),
University of California at Berkeley (UC Berkeley, USA), University College London (London,
Britain), University of Waterloo (Waterloo, Canada), Saarland University (Saarland, Germany), Tokyo
Institute of Technology (Tokyo, Japan), American companies Lockheed Martin and Northrop
Grumman. Acceptance of the results of the mentioned R&D will be carried out by representatives of
the Ames Research Center (NASA's Ames Research Center) and Texas A&M University (Texas
A&M).
In 2021, the budget of the US National Quantum Initiative was revised upward (National Quantum
Initiative Supplement to the President's FY 2021 Budget) (see Fig. 2). The total budget for the
implementation of the US National Quantum Initiative exceeded the US $ 2.5 billion. At the same time,
more than $ 50 million from this budget is planned for the development of quantum algorithms
(including quantum cryptanalysis algorithms) (see Fig. 6) in the interests of the intelligence community
and the armed forces of the United States and NATO countries [1, 6, 7, 12-18].
Thus, starting in 2018, research and development in the field of quantum technologies in the United
States and NATO countries have been under the scrutiny of government and military structures. The
strategic objective is to maintain technological leadership in this area in the medium and long term. The
large public investment in quantum technology in the United States (over US $ 2.5 billion) is due to the
strategic importance of these technologies for national security, including information domination.
Private investment from major USA IT manufacturers and service providers, including Amazon,
Google, IBM, Intel, and Microsoft, also contributes to this goal. Other companies such as SpaceX,
Lockheed Martin, and Boeing are already putting quantum technology into practice to solve specific
technology challenges. In total, investments by private companies in the United States on quantum
technologies have approached $ 1 billion per year. At the same time, private investment continues to
grow, not only in the United States but also in other countries, for example, in China, Germany, Great
Britain, France, Japan, and Singapore.
15
Figure 2: Priority for the development of quantum algorithms in the interests of the US Department
of Defense
3. National Quantum Programs
The list of well-known national quantum programs is given in Table 3.
The main goals of national quantum programs are the cooperation of stakeholders in academia and
industry to carry out promising dual-use R&D in the field of quantum technologies, as well as to
promote the translation of exploratory research into a practical plane. An additional goal is the
development of human capital (or resource). Some programs set clear medium-term goals, for example,
by 2030 (or earlier) to develop a working industrial prototype of a "practical" quantum computer, as
well as to develop scenarios for its use to create an ecosystem of quantum technologies [1, 6, 7, 12-18,
33-35].
The main tasks of the national quantum programs include:
creation of scientific and technical centers of excellence in the field of quantum technologies;
organization and conduct of promising dual-use R&D on a given topic;
providing direct funding for special dual-use projects;
provision of public investment or start-up capital to enterprises producing new quantum
technologies.
The majority of national quantum programs have four main research areas [2-5, 12-18] (see Fig. 3):
quantum computers and computing;
quantum communications (near-term perspective).
quantum cryptanalysis (near-term perspective);
quantum cryptography.
So, in quantum cryptography [2-7, 9-18] the following key technologies are defined:
quantum key distribution (QKD) and quantum encryption in fiber-optic communication channels
and open space;
quantum hashing and quantum digital signature;
quantum cryptanalysis;
quantum superdense coding of information using "entangled" and "hyper-entangled" particles (one
quantum bit (qubit) can carry up to two ordinary bits), which allows increasing the bandwidth of the
quantum communication channel;
coding in systems of quantum information transfer, etc.
16
Table 3
List of well-known national quantum programs of technologically developed countries of the world*
Country Name of the national quantum program Budget and deadlines
More than $ 2.5 billion,
USA National Quantum Initiative (2018)
2018–2023
Quantum technology R&D as a strategic $ 15.3 billion (for the
China industry in Five Year Plans and “Made in creation of an experimental
China 2025” center), 2020–2025
Quantum Technologies — From Basic
Germany $ 2.4 billion, 2018–2023
Research to Market (2018)
National Quantum Technologies Programme
United Kingdom $ 1.23 billion, 2013–2022
(2013)
National Strategy for Quantum Technologies
France $ 1.2 billion, 2021–2024
(2021)
National Mission on Quantum Technologies
India $ 1.08 billion, 2020–2025
& Applications (2020)
National Agenda for Quantum Technology:
Netherlands $ 850 million, 2019–2024
Quantum Delta NL (2019)
Quantum Technology Development $ 691 million (RUB 51.1
Russia
Roadmap (2019) billion), 2019–2024
National Program for Quantum Science and
Israel $ 380 million, 2019–2025
Technology (2019)
Quantum Technology Innovation Strategy
Japan $ 206 million, 2020–2025
(2020)
Other EU countries Quantum Technologies Flagship (2018) $ 181 million, 2018–2021
Quantum Canada Strategy
Canada $ 149.7 million, 2017–2022
(in development since 2016)
«Growing Australia’s Quantum Technology
Australia $ 98.6 million, 2020–2024
Industry» (2020)
Singapore Quantum Engineering Program (2018) $ 90.9 million, 2018–2025
Quantum Computing Technology
South Korea $ 40.9 million, 2019–2024
Development Project (2019)
* Source: https://cifar.ca/cifarnews/2021/04/07/a-quantum-revolution-report-on-global-policies-
for-quantum-technology/.
Note that in the problems of quantum cryptanalysis, it is taken into account that Shor's algorithm
provides exponential acceleration of solving factorization problems, discrete logarithm (DLP), and
discrete logarithm with an elliptic curve (ECDLP) (see Table 4), which are widely used in cryptographic
applications in cyberspace. For example, the well-known protocols TLS, SSH, IPSec, etc. rely on
Diffie-Hellman key agreements (which depend on the strength of DLP or ECDLP), digital signatures
(DSA, ECDSA, or RSA-PSS signatures), or public key encryption (El Gamal, RSA-OAEP). As a result,
Shor's quantum algorithm can potentially break most protocols and asymmetric encryption schemes
(public-key cryptography) [8–18].
In general, all known quantum algorithms (see Table 5) can be conditionally divided into two
groups: providing exponential gain (for example, Shor's algorithm) and providing quadratic gain (for
example, Grover's algorithm) [1-6, 8-11]. Particular attention is paid to Shor's quantum algorithm and
other polynomial algorithms capable of solving cryptanalysis problems with the required reliability and
laboriousness in polynomial time [8-19].
17
Figure 3: The main directions of development of quantum technologies in national quantum programs
Table 4
Estimate for the complexity of the decomposition of a large integer into prime factors
Classic exascale computer (1018 op / s) versus a quantum computer
in the megahertz range (1 million op / s)
Number of decimal places, k k = 250 k = 500 k = 1000
The complexity of the classical
200 h 5 million years 4*1017 years
algorithm
The complexity of the quantum
4 sec 18 sec 84 sec
algorithm, s
Also quite interesting is the quantum Grover search algorithm, which allows you to speed up
algorithms for solving some problems of the NP class - those problems for which a better algorithm
than direct search is unknown. For example, to speed up the search for a key to cryptosystems such as
the well-known DES algorithm. Also interesting is the quantum Fourier transform, which allows you
to solve the problems of calculating the discrete logarithm and factorization and "hack" with the help
of a quantum computer many cryptosystems, for example, RSA.
According to the reports of the American National Standards Institute NIST, of the crypto algorithms
used in the USA and NATO countries, AES, SHA-2, SHA-3, RSA, ECDSA, ECDH, and DSA are
susceptible to the quantum threat. It is noted that quantum computers allow computing at completely
different speeds than modern 5th generation Supercomputers, which makes the problem of decrypting
ciphertext a real threat.
18
Table 5
Basic quantum algorithms for solving cryptanalysis problems
Full brute-force search of encryption algorithms Grover's Algorithm
Slide attack, discrimination method for CBC-
MAC, PMAC, GMAC, GCM, OCB, Feistel Simon's algorithm
networks
Determination of the key of the Evan - Mansoor
Combination of Grover's and Simon's
scheme, FX-constructions, generalized Feistel
algorithms
networks
Random walks, a combination of Grover's and
Matching Method, Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
Simon's algorithms
Factorization and discrete logarithm Shor's algorithm, Ecker's algorithm
Search for linear and difference relations, key Bernstein - Vazirani, Grover, and Simon
recovery from the difference ratio algorithms
Special methods Grover's Algorithm
Search for collisions, multi-collision Random walks, Grover's algorithm, etc.
SLN solution, algebraic attack AES, Trivium,
Harrow, Hassidim, Lloyd
SHA-3, MRKS
Thus, from the point of view of quantum computing, all cryptography can be conditionally divided
into quantum-safe and quantum-unsafe (see Table 6). Algorithms and cryptosystems of symmetric
encryption (including AES or GOST R 34.12–2015), but with a key length increased at least twice (how
long will be sufficient is still unknown), can be classified as quantum-safe. Asymmetric encryption
algorithms and cryptosystems based on the complexity of the factorization of integers (for example,
RSA) or discrete logarithm (for example, El Gamal or elliptic curves) can be classified as quantum
insecure.
Table 6
Estimates of crypto-resistance of the most common cryptographic algorithms in the United States and
NATO countries
Required Required
Key size, Effective
Cryptoscheme number of number of Time estimate
bits resistance, bits
logical qubits physical qubits
128 128 2953 4,61*106 2,61*1012 years
7
AES 192 192 4449 1,68*10 1,97*1022 years
7
256 256 6681 3,36*10 2,29*1032 years
1024 80 2290 2,56*106 3,58 h
RSA 2048 112 4338 6,2*106 28,63 h
4096 128 8434 1,47*107 229 h
ECDLP
256 128 2330 3,21*106 10,5 h
(NIST P-256,
356 192 3484 5,01*106 37,67 h
NIST P-386,
512 256 4719 7,81*106 35 h
NIST P-521)
SHA-256 N/A 72 2403 2,23*106 1,8*104 years
In addition, quantum computers pose a real threat to the security of most well-known blockchain
platforms, which widely use asymmetric cryptographic algorithms to create a public-private key pair
and an address, which is obtained using hash operations and a public key checksum.
As a result, in some countries, mainly in the USA and the European Union, the transition to the use
of stable quantum cryptography is already planned. For example, the aforementioned NIST is in the
19
process of developing quantum cryptography standards, and the NSA recommends its suppliers to
implement SHA-384 instead of SHA-256.
4. Security Threat Model
Considering the above, we propose the following model of information security threats to the critical
information infrastructure (CII) of the Russian Federation [6, 21, 22, 34-36].
Some foreign countries are building up the potential of quantum technologies for carrying out
information and technical impacts on the CII of the Russian Federation for military-political
purposes. At the same time, there is an increase in the activities of foreign technical intelligence,
using the capabilities of quantum cryptanalysis of asymmetric and symmetric encryption schemes
based on quantum algorithms of Shor, Grover, Simon, and others to conduct technical intelligence
about Russian government agencies, scientific organizations and enterprises of the military-
industrial complex.
Application of quantum technologies for military-political purposes, including for the
implementation of actions contrary to international law, aimed at undermining the sovereignty,
political and social stability, territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and its allies, and posing
a threat to international peace, global and regional security.
The growth of quantum crypto attacks on CII objects, the strengthening of the intelligence
activities of foreign states about the Russian Federation, as well as the growing threats of the use of
quantum technologies to damage the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political and social stability
of the Russian Federation.
An increase in the number of crypto attacks on blockchain platforms of leading financial
institutions and organizations of the Russian Federation, using cryptographic algorithms to create a
pair of public and private keys and an address, which is obtained using hashing operations and a
public key checksum. In this case, disclosing only one address is not a big risk. However, disclosing
the address and the public key used in the transaction is potentially dangerous, since, if there is
sufficient progress in quantum computing, it will allow the private key to be obtained.
Insufficient level of development of competitive domestic quantum technologies and their use for
the production of products and services. The high degree of dependence of the domestic industry on
foreign information technologies in terms of the electronic component base, software, computers,
and communications, which determines the dependence of the socio-economic development of the
Russian Federation on the geopolitical interests of foreign countries [21, 23, 24, 28].
Insufficient efficiency of scientific research in the field of quantum technologies aimed at creating
promising quantum computers, low level of implementation of domestic developments, and
insufficient staffing in the field of information security, as well as low awareness of citizens in
matters of personal information security. Measures to ensure the security of information
infrastructure, including its integrity, availability, and sustainable operation, using domestic
information technologies and domestic products often do not have an integrated framework.
The desire of individual states to use technological superiority in quantum technologies to
dominate the information space.
For the timely prevention of the listed security threats, in 2019 Russia adopted a "Roadmap for the
development of quantum technologies" (hereinafter referred to as the Roadmap) [20]. Its main goal is
to achieve, in the medium and long term, practically significant scientific, technical and practical results
of the world level in some areas.
Quantum computers and computing. Quantum computers and simulators are computing systems
that use quantum phenomena to solve problems. Devices created based on quantum computing can
many times exceed the capabilities of classical computers in solving problems of cryptanalysis,
modeling complex systems, as well as machine learning and artificial intelligence. With the
development of existing quantum computers, the emergence of the first applied results can be
expected in the direction of accelerating machine learning problems and modeling new promising
materials. The most promising platforms in the world are the following: superconducting chains,
neutral atoms, and ions in traps. According to the QTRL classification, the development of
20
companies in the world at the moment corresponds to QTRL levels 4-5. That is, the problem of
implementing quantum error correction codes has not yet been solved in the computational data
systems of companies and practically significant algorithms cannot be fully implemented on them
(including Shor's algorithm). To date, prototypes of quantum computers with 2 qubits (according to
the roadmap for the development of quantum information processing technologies of the Advanced
Research Foundation, 2–10 qubits) and quantum simulators with 10–20 qubits have been
implemented in the Russian Federation. This corresponds to a QTRL level 3-4.
Quantum communications. Technologies aimed at eliminating threats to information security,
including from quantum computers, include using the properties of quantum systems to transfer
keys. The main technology here is quantum key distribution (QKD). The main advantage of the
QKD is the security of information guaranteed by the laws of physics. The global availability level
is TRL 924 both in point-to-point solutions and in networks with a trusted node. QKD equipment
for networks with untrusted nodes is at the laboratory testing level. Today, the level of readiness of
domestic point-to-point solutions can be estimated as TRL 8, while in terms of quantum networks
based on trusted nodes, domestic developments of quantum networks are far behind the level of
China and the EU: TRL 6 versus TRL 9.
Quantum sensors and metrology. Quantum sensors are high-precision measuring instruments
based on quantum effects. It is expected that quantum sensors will have the high spatial and temporal
resolution. This will improve the measurement accuracy in comparison with existing classical
sensors. And the use of the properties of superposition, entanglement, and compression of quantum
states, in turn, will provide in the long term the maximum possible measurement sensitivity by
overcoming the standard quantum limit. The high degree of control over the state of individual
microscopic systems, provided by quantum technologies, makes it possible to create quantum
sensors with high sensitivity. The development of technologies for a variety of new generation
sensors can give a powerful impetus in several areas at once: defense and security, navigation (space,
unmanned vehicles), construction, mining and exploration, medical diagnostics/therapy, Industry
4.0, general assessment of the level of readiness of quantum technologies. sensors in the world (TRL
3–9) and in the Russian Federation (TRL 1–5).
A prerequisite for a breakthrough in the field of quantum technologies is the support of research and
the launch of infrastructure projects on a national scale. The total budget for the implementation of the
Roadmap (for 2019-2024) amounted to 51.1 billion rubles, including extrabudgetary funding of 8.7
billion rubles.
The main tasks of the Roadmap are:
comprehensive support for breakthrough scientific and technological projects aimed at the
development of quantum technologies;
consolidation of the scientific and technological community in the framework of the creation of
projects of national and global scale;
the creation of an innovation ecosystem in Russia and the creation of conditions for the transition
of quantum developments from laboratories to the industrial sector, as well as the formation of an
appropriate business community;
organization of cooperation between research departments and potential consumers of quantum
technologies from key industries;
development of human resources in the field of quantum technologies by introducing new types of
educational programs at all levels;
carrying out a set of organizational measures aimed at reducing bureaucratic friction.
Note that the Roadmap is fully consistent with the "Strategy for Scientific and Technological
Development of the Russian Federation (SSTD)", as well as the "Strategy for the Development of the
Information Society of the Russian Federation (SDIO)".
It is significant that the support of all three major sub-technologies of quantum technologies is
critical for national security and ensuring the digital sovereignty of the Russian Federation. The role of
quantum computing sub-technology is especially important for state security; the effects of its use are
quite large. There is also a risk of restricting access to products from foreign manufacturers in this area.
21
And from the point of view of technological maturity, the closest to entering the market is the
technology of quantum communications. The Roadmap emphasizes that in this area of Russia it is
required to have its technical solutions with the maximum degree of localization of production (both
end devices and components) to eliminate the risk of introducing destructive hardware and software
(undeclared capabilities, NDV) into hardware and software, and, as a consequence, access to protected
information.
5. Conclusion
Some Western states, primarily the United States and its NATO allies, seek to use technological
superiority in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technologies (Q), collection and
processing of big data (Big Data + ETL), high and ultra-high performance to dominate the information
space. At the same time, the growing concern is caused by the desire of these states to use information
technologies for military-political purposes, including for the implementation of actions aimed at
undermining the sovereignty, political and social stability, and the territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation.
The US National Quantum Initiative (2018) aims to maintain technological leadership in the field
of quantum technologies in the medium and long term. For this, starting in 2019, a series of (more than
80) dual-use R&D projects have been launched under the control of the NSA, IERPA, DARPA, NFS,
the US Department of Energy, etc.
The US Department of Defense approved and is implementing the Plan for Advanced Research and
Development on Quantum Technologies for the period 2019-2024 in some areas, including the
development of promising models and methods for collecting and processing big data based on quantum
technologies, artificial intelligence methods, and machine learning, quantum algorithms for solving
military-technical problems of analysis and synthesis (including cryptanalysis problems), creating
trusted quantum communication systems, models and methods of quantum cryptography. The total US
budget for the development of quantum technologies in 2021 exceeded $ 2.5 billion.
To prevent possible security threats, in 2019 Russia adopted a Roadmap for the development of
quantum technologies. The total budget for its implementation (for 2019-2024) amounted to 51.1 billion
rubles. ($ 691 million). The main goal of the Roadmap is to achieve, in the medium and long term,
practically significant scientific, technical and practical world-class results in the following areas:
quantum computers and computing, quantum communications, quantum sensors, and metrology,
quantum and post-quantum cryptography. At the same time, in quantum cryptography, a special place
is given to the effective solution of quantum cryptanalysis problems based on the promising quantum
algorithms of Shor, Grover, Simon, etc. Thus, Shor's algorithm provides an exponential acceleration of
the solution of factorization problems, discrete logarithm (DLP), and discrete logarithm with an elliptic
curve (ECDLP ). The mentioned tasks are widely used in cryptographic applications TLS, SSH or IPSec
of Internet / Intranet and IIoT / IoT networks, communication protocols based on Diffie-Hellman key
agreements (depending on DLP or ECDLP strength), in digital signature algorithms (DSA, ECDSA,
RSA-PSS ), public key encryption algorithms (El Gamal, RSA-OAEP), etc. In other words, Shor's
quantum algorithm is capable of breaking the listed algorithms, and with them all public-key
cryptography mechanisms deployed in cyberspace.
6. Acknowledgments
The article was prepared based on the results of research carried out with the support of the RFBR
grant (No. 20-04-60080).
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