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  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Adversary Profiling and Activity Emulation in the Process of Development and Evaluation of Information Security Threat Countermeasures</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Anna Golushko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Vadim Zhukov</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Reshetnev Siberian State University of Science and Technology</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>31, Krasnoyarsky Rabochy Av., Krasnoyarsk, 660037, Russian Federation</addr-line>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>80</fpage>
      <lpage>86</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article describes the problem of insufficient methodical practice in the field of effective countermeasures development against cyber-threats. The knowledge about potentially dangerous adversaries` activity and their methods of action can be applied to find appropriate solution of the issue. Adversary profiling and activity emulation are considered as possible methods for further effective evaluation of the potential information security threats landscape for defended information systems in practice.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>1 Information security threat model</kwd>
        <kwd>adversary profiling</kwd>
        <kwd>adversary activity emulation</kwd>
        <kwd>FSTEC</kwd>
        <kwd>MITRE ATT&amp;CK</kwd>
        <kwd>TEACH Tripwire</kwd>
        <kwd>STIX 2</kwd>
        <kwd>x</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>Information security measures effectiveness depends on the overall level of information security
maturity in the organization. The international practices, developed by state regulators with the support
of experts and research laboratories, are aimed at minimizing information security risks and neutralizing
the greatest number of cyber-threats that can be implemented in the conditions of applied technologies.
This approach makes it possible to select basic security measures and tools to reduce the likelihood of
mistakes that can be made by information security specialists during the process of determining
cyberthreats landscape to information security.</p>
      <p>
        For example, the SANS Institute presents the top 18 CIS Controls (Critical Security Controls) which
are a recommended group of measures with additional prioritization between them [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. The Australian
Cyber Security Centre presents several lists of Top-4, Top-8, Top-35 information protection strategies
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ]. The NIST group of standards in the USA defines an integrated approach to the definition of
information protection measures [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Methods for assessing risks and cyber security threats are also applied by specialists in order to
determine supplementary defensive measures in addition to existing requirements, which must be
implemented firstly. However, these methods of assessing risks and cyber security threats are intended
for independent expert analysis of the most harmful vulnerabilities, potentially dangerous adversaries,
their tactics and techniques of action and used tools.</p>
      <p>At the same time, there is a question of insufficient methodical practice to assessing adversaries`
skills and capabilities for further definition of potential threats landscape to the protected information
infrastructure. Besides, the formed list of cyber security threats affects the approaches for configuration
of applied software, hardware devices, security tools and the overall countermeasures structure against
computer attacks and any other malicious activity.</p>
      <p>
        At this moment, potential threats landscape for many types of information systems in Russia is
evaluated according to new methodic, developed by Russian government regulator [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], which takes into
account knowledge about adversaries, their tactics and techniques of action and potential risks.
However, there is not enough practice in the application of new approach that explains the relevance of
the problem considered in this paper.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Adversary profiling</title>
      <p>
        Information security threat modeling includes the identification of possible adversaries (attackers,
malicious users) and their potential. Adversaries are divided into external and internal. External
adversaries usually include state intelligence services, competing organizations, unscrupulous partners,
criminal groups (criminal structures) and external entities (individuals). Internal adversaries include
users, system administrators, service personnel, persons providing maintenance and repair of technical
devices, etc. [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. Possible potential and motive of action are determined for each category of adversaries.
      </p>
      <p>Taking into account the knowledge about attacker actions during cyber-attacks, the existing
approach can be improved. This will provide comprehensive approach to the problem described in this
paper and helps to develop an information security threat model that is valuable in practice.</p>
      <p>
        As an example, there is considered the category "criminal structures". It can be divided into several
groups that have a certain set of characteristic features. In practice, there are the following names of
groups that are widely used in publications, annual and quarterly reports in the field of information
security: hackers, hacktivists (groups with political motives), cyber terrorists, script kiddies [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ]. These
categories of external adversaries differ from each other in terms of the level of technical skills, financial
resources, goals of activity and other parameters.
      </p>
      <p>
        It is proposed to build an adversary profiles (threat profiles), which will make the description of each
adversary more complete and meaningful for further evaluation of threat landscape to protected
information infrastructure. Recommendations for adversary profiling are based on the best practices of
SANS [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ], recommendations for describing threat metrics of the Sandia National Laboratory under the
US Department of Energy [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] and the international information exchange standard on information
security threats STIX 2.x [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ].
2.1.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>Attributes of adversary profile</title>
      <p>
        An attacker's profile can contain the following attributes [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]:
 Name.
 Description (category: external/internal, organization level (attack resource level): individual,
club, contest, team, organization, government) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
 Type of action (targeted/deliberate, mass attacks/accidental reasons).
 Involvement in top security threats (for example, malicious software, web-oriented attacks,
denial of service, botnets, phishing, spam, extortion, insider threats, physical damage, exploits,
data integrity violation, theft, information leakage, espionage). Examples are given in accordance
with the annual reports of ENISA [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
        ] and [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
        ].
 The sphere of target organizations activity (banks, healthcare, education, transport, etc.) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ],
[20].
 Region of adversary activity (Europe, Asia, North America, etc.).
 Motive / intention (accidental, coherence, dominance, ideology, notoriety, organizational-gain,
personal-gain, personal satisfaction, revenge, unpredictable, financial gain) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
 Object of attack (one of the protected objects in the information system / asset).
 Examples of criminal groups (for example, known APT groups representing this category of
adversaries).
 Skill level/potential (classification is proposed in accordance with the STIX 2.x standard: none,
minimal, intermediate, advanced, expert, innovator, strategic) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ].
 Opportunities. They can include various sub-attributes, for example, technical strength, the
availability of financial support, the availability of political support, the number of participants
(size), the danger of the threat in terms of consequences (intensity), the time of activity before the
attack is detected or the end of the attack (persistence, stealth (ability to hide)).
      </p>
      <p>Table 1 illustrates an example of adversary profile.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>Parameters of adversaries` opportunity level</title>
      <p>
        The Sandia National Laboratory in the document [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] defines sub-attributes of adversary
opportunities and offers a more formal approach to the categorization of adversaries.
      </p>
      <p>In this approach, eight categories of adversaries (eight levels) are distinguished without
differentiation into internal and external. For implementing this approach, known categories of
adversaries (hackers, APT-groups, external entities, etc.) can be associated with the values of special
parameters and put in accordance with eight levels.</p>
      <p>
        In total, there are seven parameters, which determine the level of adversary:
 Threat danger from the possible consequences point of view (intensity).
 Ability to remain undetected (persistence, stealth (ability to hide)).
 Time of activity until the attack is detected or ended (time).
 Number of group members (technical personnel).
 Level of knowledge and skills in the field of information technologies and information security,
which allows implementing attacks (cyber knowledge).
 Level of knowledge in the field of activity of the organization under consideration (kinetic
knowledge, in document [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] this name is given in connection with the field of Sandia National
Laboratory activity: development, creation and testing of non-nuclear components of nuclear
weapons).
 Ability to provide access to the target resources of the attacked organization (access).
 Table 2 illustrates an example of adversarial parameters for attackers from possible defined
profiles.
      </p>
      <p>
        In addition, in document [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] authors describe how information security incidents can be evaluated
with defined sub-attributes of adversary opportunities.
2.3.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>An example of profile impact to defensive measures</title>
      <p>The importance of objectivity and completeness of the adversaries’ assessment can be illustrated by
the following example.</p>
      <p>
        One of the protected objects in the organization is a website that operates on the basis of a Content
Management System (CMS). Type of action in attack (targeted attacks or mass attacks), capability for
writing exploits and other attributes influence the methods of defense [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>If mass attacks are considered as potentially dangerous, then target organization needs to implement
timely security updates of the CMS and installed plugins and control the unavailability of the
configuration file containing passwords from databases. Meanwhile, as a method of analyzing the initial
security of the website, it will be enough to use a security scanner to search for and eliminate
vulnerabilities.</p>
      <p>If there is high probability of implementing targeted attacks to information system, then the
company's website should be checked with usage of automation tools:
 for collecting information about the CMS from the internet: CMS version, open directories,
configuration files, installed plugins, vulnerabilities;
 for availability of ready-made exploits for the identified vulnerabilities.</p>
      <p>
        It is recommended to make an attempt to crack the administrator's password, to exploit the identified
vulnerabilities, in other words, to conduct a penetration test for this entry point into the company's
infrastructure [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>3. Adversary activity</title>
      <p>development
emulation
for further threat
countermeasures</p>
      <p>The dependence between methods of attacks used by adversaries and goals of their activity, as well
as with possible effective countermeasures, exists for a large number of information security threats.
Such dependencies are identified by research laboratories during the process of information security
incidents analysis and can be presented in a systematic form.</p>
      <p>
        The most complete and detailed classification was presented by MITRE Corporation in the form of
ATT&amp;CK (Adversarial tactics, techniques &amp; common knowledge) matrices [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] and the CAR (Cyber
analytics repository) activity detection analytics repository [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>The ATT&amp;CK matrices contain hundreds of methods (techniques) of malicious actions that can be
used in attack scenarios for realization of information security threats. This concept provides
opportunity to form a list of information security threats, which definitely may be implemented by
adversaries.</p>
      <p>The main task for the first stage of working with the adversary techniques taxonomy is to analyze
initial list of techniques from ATT&amp;CK and determine those that are probably executable in protected
system. The author has previously considered this issue; the results are presented in articles [15] and
[16].</p>
      <p>Then, the list of information security threats is studied thoroughly in order to determine the necessary
defensive measures. At the same time, defensive measures may depend on adversary profile.
3.1.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Adversary activity emulation</title>
      <p>In order to ensure the practical significance of the process of determining information security
threats landscape, it is reasonable to analyze the initial security level of information system by emulating
selected tactics and techniques of adversary actions.</p>
      <p>To emulate in this context means to imitate exact tactics and techniques, that attackers use against
protected information infrastructure. Emulation provides opportunity to ensure that information
security system can detect and defend against the exact type of attacks, which may be expected from
real-world attackers.</p>
      <p>Emulation of adversary activity can be carried out by building respective plans/chains of techniques
for implementation. This approach is the most appropriate, since it allows evaluate possibility of
implementing previously successfully carried out attacks in the world that have become known and
information about which has been entered in ATT&amp;CK.</p>
      <p>In addition, selective emulation of techniques for any tactic can be carried out in order to check
individual defense subsystems for resistance to possible actions of attackers.</p>
      <p>
        The tactics in ATT&amp;CK are related to each other. To emulate one tactic, specialist may need the
results obtained when emulating another. Figure 1 shows an example of sequential emulation of
techniques for the Credential Access [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] and Lateral Movement [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ] tactics with Atomic Red Team
tests [21].
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>TEACH approach</title>
      <p>It is recommended to take into account results of the Tripwire expert analysis of exploiting
techniques complexity from the ATT&amp;CK Enterprise matrix [17]. It is more difficult to emulate some
techniques than others are. The Tripwire experts proposed the TEACH classification and laid out a table
with a color gradation of techniques in accordance with this classification.</p>
      <p>The TEACH approach presents the following complexity levels of adversary activity emulation:
 Techniques Only (those techniques that are not represented by an independent exploit and in
general don`t need special actions to achieve tactic);
 Exploitable to Anyone (easily implemented techniques that do not require specialized tools and
scripts, can be implemented with built-in services);
 Additional Steps Required (easy-to-use techniques using PowerShell/cmd/bash scripts,
Metasploit and other emulation tools);
 Cost Prohibitive (more complex ways of performing actions, it may be necessary to model the
real information infrastructure (Active Directory, network and switching equipment, DNS server,
DHCP server) [18];
 Hard (the most difficult to implement technologies that require customized libraries and
executable files).</p>
      <p>Considering these recommendations, emulation of techniques scenarios can be performed starting
with the most easily implemented chains of adversary tactics and techniques. It is useful to implement
multi-stage threats based on the analysis of criminal group activities that used emulated techniques [19].
Such actually used techniques by adversaries with examples are called procedures in terms of ATT&amp;CK
matrices.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>4. Conclusion and future work</title>
      <p>To sum it up, at the current stage of work, recommendations have been formed for building
adversary profile reflecting valuable attributes of criminal group activity. Implementation of adversary
activity emulation provides opportunity to evaluate whether possible adversary may actually conduct
computer attack using different techniques.</p>
      <p>
        In future work author plans to conduct a research on the questions of mitigation measures
implementation against techniques and existing practical issues in application of new threat evaluation
methodic [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ], where construction of computer attack scenarios from adversary techniques is required.
5. References
[15] ATT&amp;CK knowledge base application in the building process of information security threats
models. Materials of the XXII International Scientific and Practical Conference "Reshetnev
Readings" (November 12-16. 2018, Krasnoyarsk): Krasnoyarsk, 2018, part 2, pp. 322-323. A. P.
      </p>
      <p>Golushko, M. N. Zhukova.
[16] Systematized adversary techniques knowledge implementation in the process of assessing
information security system effectiveness. Materials of the XXIII International Scientific and
Practical Conference, dedicated to in memory of the general designer of rocket and space systems,
Academician M. F. Reshetnev (November 11-15, 2019, Krasnoyarsk): Krasnoyarsk, 2019. - part
2, pp. 418-419. A. P. Golushko, V. G. Zhukov.
[17] Tips on how to implement and use the MITRE ATT&amp;CK framework, 2019. URL:
https://ethhack.com/2019/05/how-to-implement-and-use-the-mitre-attck-framework/.
[18] Setting up a Threat Hunting Lab, 2017. URL:
https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/02/settingup-pentesting-i-mean-threat.html.
[19] MITRE ATT&amp;CK groups, 2021. URL: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/.
[20] Five Clear Steps to Enhance SecOps with MITRE ATT&amp;CK, 2021. URL:
https://enterprise.verizon.com/resources/reports/2021-data-breach-investigations-report.pdf.
[21] Atomic Red Team, 2021. URL: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team.</p>
    </sec>
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