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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Information Technology of Risk Assessment for Automated Control Systems of Printing Production</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Lubomir Sikora</string-name>
          <email>lssikora@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Natalia Lysa</string-name>
          <email>lysa.nataly@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Rostislav Tkachuk</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Volodymyr Sabat</string-name>
          <email>v_sabat@ukr.net</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Olga Fedevych</string-name>
          <email>olha.y.fedevych@lpnu.ua</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Lviv Polytechnic National University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>12, Bandera str., Lviv, 79013</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Lviv State University of Life Safety</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>35, Kleparivska str., Lviv, 79007</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>Ukrainian academy of printing</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>19 Pid Goloskom str., Lviv, 79020</addr-line>
          ,
          <country country="UA">Ukraine</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <abstract>
        <p>The article considers construction methods of risk assessment information technology for automated control systems of printing production (ACSPP) on the basis of detection of threats and vulnerabilities of the company assets. It is substantiated that ACSPP is one of the production assets and the risk assessment problems in the security system are reduced to determining ACSPP threats and vulnerabilities levels and countermeasures to counter possible attacks on production. In addition to the above-mentioned ACAPP security problems related to the threats and vulnerabilities inherent in most IS, a number of organizational and psychological issues should also be noted. In particular, weak awareness of the information importance and its protection by the management staff and employees of printing companies. Accordingly, the management staff is reluctant to invest in information protection and make any organizational decisions on this issue, and the employees show misunderstanding and failure to take most protection measures, which leads to negligence, and then complete disregard for protection measures. This attitude to the information security can cause significant losses to the company, which will be simply disproportionate to the cost of information security in their values. Another important problem is the imperfection of Ukrainian legislation in the information protection area and almost complete absence of domestic standards in this area. In order to achieve the required level of ACSPP protection, it is necessary to reduce the risks level to an acceptable one or eliminate the risks altogether. This can be achieved by reducing the criticality, probability and/or frequency of threats.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>1 System</kwd>
        <kwd>information</kwd>
        <kwd>assets</kwd>
        <kwd>risks</kwd>
        <kwd>threats</kwd>
        <kwd>vulnerabilities</kwd>
        <kwd>management</kwd>
        <kwd>printing production</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>The main security purpose is to protect the company assets from attacks due to existing threats.
Threats are assessed according to the amount of damage that may be caused to the company as a
result of the attacks. Losses can consist of loss of public trust or decrease in the company image
in a society, responsibility before the law, threat to the personnel safety, etc. However, in the end
they are somehow reduced to financial losses. The ability to implement a threat is characterized
by the risk level, which in turn is directly proportional to the system vulnerability. That is, to
protect the company assets it is necessary to reduce its vulnerability to an acceptable level. At the
same time, the cost of measures aimed at reducing the assets vulnerability should not exceed the
amount of damage that may be caused by threats to this asset as a result of attacks.</p>
      <p>In this case, automated control systems of printing production (ACSPP) is considered as one of
the company assets. In turn, ACSPP also consists of other assets. Therefore, in order to achieve the
required protection level of ACSPP, it is sufficient to achieve the required protection level of its
main assets: personnel, information component and hardware of the management process, goals
and strategies.</p>
      <p>The aim of study. The development of the information technology, based on the system
analysis, to assess the functional dependencies between the company assets to create risk
management systems in ACSPP under threat.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. References analysis</title>
      <p>
        The main analysis of ACSPP in the domestic market is presented in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1 ref2">1, 2</xref>
        ], which indicates the
advantages and disadvantages of certain control systems and their functions in the printing
industry. Since the purpose of ACSPP is important for the organization of its activities, it
requires a detailed risk analysis. The monograph [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] highlights the fundamentals of information
technology of the formation of methods and models for determining the security level of
technological processes in the printing industry on the basis of risk assessment. Scientific works
[4, 5] cover conceptual aspects of risk – a qualitative and quantitative risk analysis, the system of
indicators of its quantitative assessment, basic approaches to modelling, management and
methods of risk reduction, and in [6] a functional scheme of risk management for automated
document management systems is presented, which can also be used for ACSPP. In [7], much
attention is paid to the coverage of risk management tools and their consideration in making
management decisions in conditions of uncertainty and risk. A typical regulation on the
information protection service in the automated system is presented in the Normative documents
of the information technical protection system [8–10]. In [11, 12] a novel extensible
Multihazard Risk Assessment Framework that is a skeleton containing the multihazard risk assessment
toolkit dealing with threat/danger, vulnerability, damage, coping capacity, risk, and multi-risk
are presented. The risk scenarios within this framework can describe multi-hazards as a
multitude of spatially distributed dynamic processes influenced by various drivers. The
implementation of the proposed models and framework is also considered. The proposed
eventbased scenario representation model provides sufficient detailization in space and time and can
properly represent multi-hazards, including compound events, cascading effects, and risk-related
processes driven by environmental and societal changes. In [13] construction methods of
information technology of formation and decision-making under risk conditions are considered
for management of technogenic systems with use of cognitive model of operator activity. In [14]
the problem of decision-making in the risk conditions and conflict situations in the presence of
terminal restrictions is considered at the time of resolving the crisis in the complex system
management structure.
      </p>
      <p>Problem setting. Risk assessment in automated control systems of the company is a basic task
in the development of protection systems with an appropriate level that would meet the optimal
security requirements of the company in the process of its operation. This task is solved by
determining the features of technical and information processes that are performed at the
company during its operation, threats and vulnerabilities of objects and subjects of operation at
each technological stage, the occurrence of emergencies after external attacks or other negative
incidents. Therefore, to solve the problems of risk management in the company, it is necessary to
determine its assets and functional features in detail. This process should be done according to
the functional scheme shown in Figure 1. The detailed risk analysis for ACSPP involves the
identification of all possible risks and assessment of their level [6].</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Presentation of the main research material</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>3.1. Method of defining possible limits to assess the risks, losses and failures of complex systems under threat</title>
      <p>Defining possible limits for risk assessment aims to clearly determine which of the resources
should be taken into account when considering the results of risk analysis. When considering
ACSPP risks it is necessary to take into account the following factors:</p>
      <p>– the information technology assets (hardware, information support, information), as they
make the software and hardware base for ACSPP operation;</p>
      <p>– the personnel of the organization (who works with ACSPP and maintains it) as a source of
possible threats;</p>
      <p>
        – he conditions for carrying out the production activities, as they affect ACSPP proper
operation;
– the business activity, which is the main purpose of ACSPP [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>ACSPP operation is not possible if at least one of its components is not functioning, i.e. the
failure of the proper operation of at least one of them will cause the failure of the other
components and the system as a whole. Each of the components of ACSPP is considered in more
detail – Figure 1.
ACSPP information component combines all the information that functions within ACSPP, as
well as input and output information flows – Figure 2. The software is a separate integral part of
ACSPP information component. With the help of software, the transfer and conversion of
information that operates in ACSPP are carried out. The software can be divided into main and
auxiliary ones.</p>
      <p>The main software includes the software modules for processing the information that operates
in ACSPP, as well as a central database (DB) – the core of ACSPP. It can store a variety of
information needed in the operation process.</p>
      <p>The auxiliary software provides the operation of the main software. These are the operating
system, drivers, various utilities, etc.</p>
      <p>According to the scheme shown in Figure 2, the operation of a typical ACSPP is as follows.
The input information (customer requirements, commercial information, financial accounting
data, various input documents) is processed by ACSPP software modules and entered into the
central database. In the course of work, various internal company departments address to the
central database through the corresponding software modules – there is an internal information
exchange. In addition, during ACSPP operation, the relevant modules generate the output
information (requests for materials, documents on product sales, operational accounting data).
To ensure the reliability of the work, the central database information is periodically archived.
The information in ACSPP can function both in electronic non-material form and in the form of
hard copies. A hard copy means a medium that contains valuable information (DVD, flash drive,
paper documents, etc.).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>3.2. Hardware means of the automated control system</title>
      <p>ACSPP hardware part. ACSPP hardware part includes the devices that provide the information
exchange between the components within ACSPP, as well as between ACSPP and the external
environment. That is, ACSPP hardware can include:
– resources: servers, workstations, mobile computers;
– peripherals: printers, scanners, barcode readers, etc.;
– communication equipment: networks and network equipment;
– devices for communication with production equipment: controllers.</p>
      <p>A server is a resource which contains valuable information and to which remote access is
possible. Accordingly, a workstation is a resource that contains valuable information and to
which only local access is possible, a mobile computer is a resource that contains valuable
information and can be carried by the user outside the organization.</p>
      <p>Personnel. The term "personnel" is understood as people who maintain ACSPP (such as
system administrators) and those who work directly with it (users).</p>
      <p>Method of the system assets identification</p>
      <p>An asset of an information technology system is a component or part of the overall system in
which the organization directly invests material and information resources, and which,
accordingly, requires protection by the organization. The following groups of assets can be
distinguished as a typical ACSPP:</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>3.3. Hardware means of the automated control system</title>
      <p>For certain ACSPP assets, it is possible to define functional dependencies between them within
the printing company – Figure 3.</p>
      <p>The proper operation of the software and the information part of the assets depends on the
operation of the hardware component. Since ACSPP in most cases is located on several
resources, the information exchange between them will depend entirely on the network
equipment. For a typical ACSPP, it is standard to have one or more servers for centralized
management of information processes. In this case, the operation of workstations and mobile
PCs as a part of ACSPP will depend on the proper operation of the servers.
The operation of ACSPP information part will completely depend on the proper operation of the
auxiliary software, which forms the internal information environment of ACSPP together with
the software modules and provides the communication of the information part with the hardware.
That is, the proper operation of the auxiliary software will depend on the operation of ACSPP
software modules, the correctness of ACSPP internal data, the operation of the central database,
as well as the information correctness on hard copies.</p>
      <p>ACSPP software modules are used to convert the information and are also an intermediate
link between the users and the central database. That is, the condition of the central database and
internal data will depend on the correct operation of ACSPP software modules, which in turn
will also affect the operation of ACSPP software modules. In addition, through ACSPP software
modules the information is exported both in electronic form (output files) and in hard copies.
Almost the whole range of information and production services provided by the company, and
hence the company prestige, will also depend on the operation of ACSPP software modules.</p>
      <p>In ACSPP working process, the information is periodically archived on hard discs, the
condition of which will depend on the condition of the archives.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>3.4. Component assessment of the company assets under threat</title>
      <p>
        The asset value is determined by its importance to the business activities of the organization,
and the assessment level of business activities may be based on security considerations, i.e.
how much the business activities of the organization and other IS assets may suffer from
leakage, distortion, unavailability and destruction of information. Thus, the assets
identification and the assessment, based on the business interests of the organization, is a
key factor in the risk determining. The asset value also depends on the cost of the asset
formation and maintaining. The identified assets are valuable to the organization. However,
it is not possible to directly determine the financial value of each of them. It is also
necessary to determine the value or degree of importance of the asset to the organization in
non-profit activities. Otherwise, it will be difficult to determine the protection level required
and the amount of funds that organizations should spend on protection measures [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3–4</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>To assess the assets, a three-level scale is selected: 1 – low asset value; 2 – average asset
value; 3 – high asset value – Table 1. It should be noted that some assets cannot be valued on a
material scale. In addition, not all assets are subject to replacement, so its value cannot be
assessed. The overall asset assessment is determined by the highest assessment – the total value
assigned to one of the assessment scales.
As mentioned above, the material assessment may not be determined for all assets, as it is
difficult to assess the value of such assets as the prestige of the organization, services, output
files, internal data, central database, in monetary terms. The cost of archives and hard copies is
assessed at the cost of media. The cost of ACSPP software and modules is not high compared to
the value of other company assets (e.g. premises, printing equipment), but it is not as low as the
cost of media. The same can be said for the assessment of workstations and mobile PCs. The cost
of the server equipment is usually higher than the cost of other computer equipment, so it is rated
"high". At the same time, the cost of networks per workplace will be quite low.</p>
      <p>Non-material assessment is necessary in order to assess the criticality of a particular asset for
the company proper operation From this point of view, most assets are critical because they are
interconnected. However, the criticality of assets such as archives and hard copies will be
relatively low, provided that the remaining assets function properly. The criticality of mobile
PCs and workstations is rated as "average", because the failure of these assets will only lead to
some slowdown in the company activity, as all important information is stored on servers.</p>
      <p>When assessing the cost of replacing assets, both the material assessment of assets and the
cost of replacing the asset are taken into account. In particular, the replacement of information
assets (output files, auxiliary software, ACSPP software modules) will not require high costs.
Some assets, such as the prestige of the organization, services, archives, internal data, central
database, are not subject to replacement.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>4. Component method for assessing the risks of system failure under active threat</title>
      <p>To select adequate protection measures, it is necessary to assess the risk level. [7, 8] The risk
level depends on the asset value, the threat criticality, the threat probability and frequency. The
risk level will be determined by the formula:</p>
      <p>R j,i =V j × K j,i × Pj,i ×Wj,i × TiΣ ,
where V j – is the value of the j-th asset;</p>
      <sec id="sec-8-1">
        <title>K j,i – is the criticality of the і-th threat for the j- th asset;</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-8-2">
        <title>Pj,i – is the probability of occurrence of the і-th threat for the j-th asset;</title>
        <p>W j,i – is the frequency of occurrence of the і-th threat for the j-th asset during a year;
TiΣ – is the total value, obtained by assessing vulnerabilities for the і-th threat. It is calculated
by the formula:
n
TiΣ = ∑ PqT ,</p>
        <p>q=1
where PqT – is the probability of occurrence of vulnerability q for the i-th threat;
n – is a number of vulnerabilities used by the i-th threat.</p>
        <p>The total risk value for the і-th threat:</p>
        <p>k
RiΣ = ∑ Rj,i ,</p>
        <p>j=1</p>
        <p>Physical threats related to equipment failure
Local logical threats aimed at the information, stored and processed at the resource
Violation of
information
confidentiality
due to
unintentional
actions
Unintentional
violation of
information
integrity
Unintentional
deletion of
critical
information
Risk
propensity of
assets
Threats related to unintentional actions of the personnel
891
891
891
0
0
891
891
891
5346
As a result of risk assessment, a certain number is obtained for each threat, which characterizes
the risk level caused by this threat. Thus, it is possible to rank threats in order to reduce the risk
caused by them – Table 3. This is necessary for the correct choice of adequate protection
measures.
The risk propensity of assets shows how vulnerable an asset is. Its level will affect the selection
of protection measures and means for the asset, as well as the priority of their implementation.
The list of assets in their risk propensity descending order is presented in Table 4.
In addition to the above-mentioned ACAPP security problems related to the threats and
vulnerabilities inherent in most IS, a number of organizational and psychological issues should
also be noted. In particular, weak awareness of the information importance and its protection by
the management staff and employees of printing companies. Accordingly, the management staff
is reluctant to invest in information protection and make any organizational decisions on this
issue, and the employees show misunderstanding and failure to take most protection measures,
which leads to negligence, and then complete disregard for protection measures. This attitude to
the information security can cause significant losses to the company, which will be simply
disproportionate to the cost of information security in their values.</p>
        <p>Another important problem is the imperfection of Ukrainian legislation in the information
protection area and almost complete absence of domestic standards in this area.</p>
        <p>In order to achieve the required level of ACSPP protection, it is necessary to reduce the risks
level to an acceptable one or eliminate the risks altogether. This can be achieved by reducing the
criticality, probability and/or frequency of threats. One can also reduce the probability of
vulnerabilities to this threat or eliminate them altogether. This is achieved by implementing
appropriate protection measures.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>5. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The functional scheme of risk management for ACSPP is constructed with a detailed definition
of various risk components. The assets identification and the analysis of their functional
dependency are carried out. A three-level scale is selected to assess ACSPP assets and,
accordingly, the risks.</p>
      <p>The risk level assessment is made for each of ACSPP assets on the basis of identified threats
and their vulnerabilities. As a result of risk assessment, threats are ranked in order of risk
reduction and the dependency of assets on their risk propensity is revealed.</p>
      <p>The risk assessment process for automated control systems of printing production is studied.
The following results are obtained: methods of risk assessment for ACSPP are analysed, which
are based on the identification and assessment of assets, threats and vulnerabilities of the printing
company; the assets of a typical ACSPP are determined, the dependencies between them are
defined and their assessment is carried out. For ACSPP assets, the value of which is assessed as
"high", methods of providing the additional protection are suggested; the risk assessment for
ACSPP is carried out, as a result of which a list of 27 main threats of ACSPP is obtained, which
require the introduction of additional protection measures. It is defined that the threats to ACSPP
with the greatest risk are unauthorized use of equipment, unintentional deletion of critical
information, unintentional violation of the information integrity; the risk propensity of ACSPP
assets is analysed. As a result, the most risk propensity assets are the prestige and services
provided by the company, as well as internal data circulating in ACSPP and the central database
of ACSPP.
[4] V. Vitlinsky, G. Velikoivanenko, Riskology in economics and entrepreneurship, Monograph,</p>
      <p>Kyiv, KNEU, 2004
[5] T. Lashev, V. Korolev, S. Shargin, Mathematical methods for assessing the optimal
parameters of risk processes. Systems and means of informatics, Moscow, IPI RAS, 2002,
pp. 127–141
[6] V. Sabat, Analysis of risks in automated document management systems, Modelling and
information technology. Collection of scientific works, Kyiv, IPME named after H.E.</p>
      <p>Pukhov of NAS of Ukraine, Issue 73, 2014, pp. 198–204.
[7] L. Donets, Economic risks and methods of measuring them, Tutorial, Kyiv, Centre for</p>
      <p>Educational Literature, 2006
[8] NDSTPI of the Department of Special Telecommunication Systems and Information
Protection of the Security Service of Ukraine from 04.12.2012, No 805
https://tzi.com.ua/downloads/1.4-001-2000.pdf
[9] NDTPI 1.1-002-99, General instructions for the protection of information in computer
systems from unauthorized access
[10] NDTPI 1.4-001-2000, Typical regulation for information protection service in an automated
system
[11] V. Sherstjuk, M. Zharikova, R. Levkivskiy, V. Gusev, Density-Based Risk Assessments
within Soft Safety Domains. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2020, vol. 2805, pp. 355–
372. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2805/paper26.pdf
[12] V. Sherstjuk, M. Zharikova: Risk assessment framework based on the model of
humaninfrastructure system. CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2020, 2740, pp. 37–52.
http://ceurws.org/Vol-2740/20200037.pdf
[13] L. Sikora, N. Lysa, O. Fedevych, M. Navytka, R. Tkachuk, I. Dronyuk, Information
technologies of formation of intellectual decision-making strategies under conditions of
cognitive failures, in: Proceedings of Computational &amp; Information Technologies for
RiskInformed Systems, CITRisk-2020, Kherson, Ukraine, 2020, pр. 233–254
[14] L. Sikora, R. Tkachuk, N. Lysa, I. Dronyuk, O. Fedevych, Information and logic cognitive
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    </sec>
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