=Paper=
{{Paper
|id=Vol-3156/paper23
|storemode=property
|title=Information technologies of active control of complex hierarchical systems under threats and information attacks
|pdfUrl=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3156/paper23.pdf
|volume=Vol-3156
|authors=Volodymyr Sabat,Lyubomyr Sikora,Bohdan Durnyak,Olga Fedevych,Nataliia Lysa
|dblpUrl=https://dblp.org/rec/conf/intelitsis/SabatSDFL22
}}
==Information technologies of active control of complex hierarchical systems under threats and information attacks==
https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3156/paper23.pdf
Information Technologies of Active Control of Complex
Hierarchical Systems under Threats and Information Attacks
Volodymyr Sabata, Lyubomyr Sikorab Bohdan Durnyakc, Olga Fedevychb, Natalia Lysab
a
Ukrainian Academy of Printing, 19, Pid Holoskom St., Lviv, 79020, Ukraine
b
National University «Lviv Polytechnic», 12, Stepan Bandera St., Lviv,, 79000, Ukraine
c
Ukrainian Academy of Printing, 19, Pid Holoskom St., Lviv, 79020, Ukraine
Abstract
The effect of active information, system and resource threats on the printing technology
structure with a hierarchical organization of production is complex, and therefore the
identification of influence channels and methods of countering attacks is an important
challenge. In order to solve problems of this type, it is necessary, in accordance with the
hierarchical structure, to separate the processes of technological, informational, managerial
and actual preparation of the printing production product. Accordingly, the primary threats
can be made at the stage of document design (content distortion). Information threats and
system attacks on the management of the production process have a complex structure and
their detection is an important task, as it is necessary to identify sources of threats, channels
of attacks and assess the level of risk if attacks occur.
According to the protection tasks analysis, the structural scheme of decision-making in
technical and publishing systems is substantiated and developed. On the basis of the decision-
making process studies, the model of man-made structure under threats on ACSPP resources
is constructed.
Keywords 1
Threats, attacks, control of hierarchical systems
1. Introduction
The emergence of various situations dangerous to municipal structures, man-made system and the
environment is objectively characterized by many interdependent factors, independent disturbances
and threats that cause crises, emergencies and catastrophic situations, which accordingly complicates
decision-making for control with limited information and material and energy financial resources.
Practice shows that problematic situations arise and proceed with different dynamics provoked by
threats and disturbances, incorrect management at the upper and middle levels of the hierarchy of
automated human-machine systems and complexes (AHMS and C), as well as in the social
environment of cities.
In printing production, two basic structures can be distinguished - the information system of
document preparation (electronic version) on the basis of a text document and the production system,
which provides the appropriate product quality according to the target order. These structures can be
attacked in series and in parallel, depending on the strength of the information attack and strategic
goals, which may be long-term. For this purpose, the basic structural schemes of production processes
are developed, the technique of an estimation of invasion risk and level of protection is proved.
IntelITSIS’2022: 3rd International Workshop on Intelligent Information Technologies and Systems of Information Security, March 23–25,
2022, Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine
EMAIL:v_sabat@ukr.net (Sabat V.); lssikora@gmail.com (Sikora L.); durnyak@uad.lviv.ua (Durnyak B.), olha.y.fedevych@lpnu.ua
(Fedevych O), lysa.nataly@gmail.com (Lysa N)
ORCID: 0000-0001-8130-7837 (Sabat V.); [0000-0002-6650-2703] (Durnyak B); [0000-0002-7446-1980](Sikora L); [0000-0002-8170-
3001] (Fedevych O); [0000-0001-5513-9614] (Lysa N)
©️ 2022 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
Use permitted under Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0).
CEUR Workshop Proceedings (CEUR-WS.org)
Accordingly, a table has been developed to assess possible intrusion channels and failure criteria and
the risk of destruction of system protection.
2. Control of complex hierarchical structures under threats and information
attacks
Solving the problems of control of complex hierarchical structures under threats and information
attacks requires forming a set of methods for each type of object and system and decompose the
problem into subject-oriented components (Fig. 1) [1]:
• the localization of the main factors of influence and threats and attacks;
• the assessment of heterogeneities and uncertainties in the structural hierarchy of the system
and levels of risk under threats;
• the physical and statistical analysis of factors of influence, disturbances, threats;
• the identification of cause-effect relationships in the system and the influence of factors on
various components of the structure;
• the organizational and technological models of decision-making processes and management
under uncertainty and risk;
• the identification of the structural organization of the system functioning (block diagrams,
digraphs, topology), the analysis of resources and human potential;
• the identification of models of dynamics of the control object for normal and emergency
modes, strategies of target management;
• the management and coordination strategies, calendar dynamic action plans for all levels of
the hierarchy of corporate, municipal and educational systems.
Figure 1: Structural and functional scheme of counteraction to attacks and active threats
Sustainable operation of permanent systems, taking into account the impact of a set of factors, is
maintained by constant management influences based on decision-making and implementation, both
automatic system and DM (DM – a decision maker) at different levels of the hierarchy of structural
organization [2–5].
The decision, in a broad sense, means the choice of action mode to achieve the goals of the system
control. The decision process has two components of activity [6] (Fig. 2):
1. Intellectual one (problem, goal, control, purposeful decision-making strategy);
2. Procedural, organizational and technological one (methods of implementing management
actions).
Figure 2: Block diagram of decision making in technological and publishing aggregate and integrated
structures under risk
2.1. Analysis of the decision-making process
Characteristic features of the decision-making process are respectively [7-13] (Fig. 3):
• the ability to choose how to act on a variety of alternatives (action plans) according to a goal-
oriented strategy;
• the goal (clear or blurred by the situation) that needs to be realized under threat factors;
• the need for a willful act of DM in choosing the method of solving the problem and the
corresponding mental determination to target actions;
• the timeliness, according to the stages of development and analysis of the situation, solving
the problem of overcoming the crisis of the control system;
• the authority of DM to act within its rights and powers;
• the specificity of the procedure for choosing the method of the control implementation;
• the constructiveness – taking into account the cost of changing the situation and the quality of
management actions in relation to the target based on the analysis of the situation;
• targeting of executive mechanisms of both ACS and DM;
• the implementation of strategies and management plans in accordance with the goal;
• the terminality of time for decision-making and implementation of actions in normal and
emergency situations caused by active threats.
Figure 3: Model of man-made structure under the influence of threats to resources
Thus, the situational control in hierarchical human-machine local and distributed systems is a
method of forming control actions based on strategies for predicting hazards and analyzing their
destructive factors, symptoms and strategies to reduce negative consequences, maintaining the
functional structure and technological modes with limited resources and acceptable product quality
(Fig. 4) [8].
Accordingly, all actions are formed on a set of control cycles, which corresponds to the allowable
{ }
terminal time of their implementation Т ці ® t j = 1, m on the axis Т ці . Each cycle corresponds to:
• time markers (ti , i = 1, k ) on the axis of the decision-making interval;
• time intervals of operations and actions on Т ці ® t i j = 1, m { } for every control act {A },
i
performed by the agent-operator.
{
Terminal time is divided into intervals ti , t i i= 1, m } (Fig. 4).
• the assessment of the situation in the system and threats based on data processing;
• the formation of a model for the situation solving according to the object condition;
• the generation of action plans and acts in accordance with the goal and situation;
• the distribution of tasks for intelligent and automatic implementation;
• decision-making and its implementation by an active intelligent agent-operator for block
management.
In this case, the balance condition of real and terminal time on the control cycle, which is formed
by the ACS operator [9], must be met, respectively:
" Tці МTF {е m
i= 1
t i Ј е i= 1 t iT ,
m
}
wherе t iT — is a terminal time interval (t iT ОTF ) for the operation implementation.
Figure 4:Block diagram of the situational management scenario model under threats to the system
in the terminal cycle Tці
The main symbols in Fig. 4: Аі — are acts of actions that are formed on the time interval of
decision-making process; (tos , toa , tr ), t p , (t pr , tl , tla ) — are time markers needed to complete cycles of
decision-making procedures according to the situation and the target task; ВМ – is an executive
mechanism; ПS – is a state space of the object; Тm — is the terminal time of the decision cycle
(formation and action); Fa, FB, Fc — are factors of influence, probability of occurrence of disturbances
and information attacks and threats to infrastructure; DAi — is the flow of aggregate data on the
control objects condition; (t os , t o , t sr , t pr , t os , t ad , t lk ) — are time intervals of operations
implementation when making decisions on the management cycle under threats and attacks on the
object; CUS — is a goal-oriented system that implements the management strategy.
3. Threats and crisis situations in hierarchical structures
Factors of internal and external influence can be the causes of crisis problem situations. Such
factors include:
• natural phenomena (storms, typhoons, floods) threats;
• production and technical processes that went out of normal operation due to loss of reliability of
units;
• political and economic situation;
• insufficient level of the operational staff skills;
• instability of the functional and structural system, random deviations, engineering errors in the
design, system);
• intentional provocative actions of external threats of the target type;
• loss of design documentation as a basis for the formation of action chains in decision-making
and project errors;
• conflict situations in the management team (leadership);
• equipment failures and breakdowns due to active intervention.
The above factors can negatively affect the decision-making process itself, as well as the
functioning of the hierarchical structure as a whole. Therefore, they need to be analyzed in detail and
their level of risk should be studied in the formation of protection systems, as well as in the process of
functioning of complex hierarchical structures, in particular those located in high-risk areas. It is
necessary to take into account both the losses that may result from the occurrence of negative factors
of external and internal influences, and methods of restoring the information system due to the
occurrence of such factors.
3.1. Classification and assessment of threats, research methodology
The threat, as a potential opportunity for attacks, has the ability to damage the IS and its assets. If
the threat is realized, it can interact with the IS and cause unwanted incidents that adversely affect the
system. Threats can be based on both natural and human factors, they can be realized accidentally or
intentionally. Sources of both accidental and intentional threats should be identified and the
probability of their implementation assessed [5-9]. The general classification of threats by type,
action, source and object of action is presented in Fig. 5 [10]. A specialized IS threat catalog
developed by Digital Security2, one of the leading Russian consulting companies in the field of
information security, as well as in the field of assessing the compliance of IS with the requirements of
ISO 27001/ISO 177993, was used to assess threats. In the course of the work, a survey was conducted
among system administrators of printing companies of Ukraine in order to increase the reliability of
assessment of criticality, probability of implementation and frequency of threats. Respondents were
sent a chart of the relationships between ACSPP assets, a table listing ACSPP assets and threats, and
asked to assess the criticality, probability, and frequency of threats to each ACSPP asset, taking into
account the relationships between assets. A scale from 0 to 3 was used for the assessment, where “0”
2
Official website — http://www.dsec.ru.
3
https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html
is the absence of criticality, probability or frequency of threat to the asset, and “1”, “2” and “3”,
respectively, “low”, “medium” and "high" level of these indicators. The survey involved 10
respondents working in 10 printing companies. In order to cover the widest possible risks of ACSPP,
the analysis of the results was carried out on the principle of "maximum assessment", i.e. the highest
value was selected from a number of assessments of one indicator.
To conduct research, a scheme of possible types of threats that operate in the control system of the
technological process in printing on the basis of the system concept of classification of threats by
type, action, source and object of action was developed.
Figure 5: System concept of threats classification by type, action, source and object of action
3.1.1. Critical threat assessment methodology, which act on the management
information and aggregate structure of the technological system
Examining the assets of automated control systems for printing production (ACSPP), it can be
concluded that the objects of threats may be one or more assets of ACSPP. Tables 1 – 5 present a list
of possible threats to ACSPP, according to the classification (Fig. 5), as well as the criticality of the
threats implementation to ACSPP assets.
Table 1
Human physical threats aimed at IS resources
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
Software modules of
Auxiliary software
Central database
Workstations
Internal data
Mobile PC
Networks
Servers
ACSPP
Threat
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Human physical threats aimed at IS resources
Reading valuable information from paper and video 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
terminal PC devices
Modification of valuable information on paper 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Destruction or damage of media with valuable 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
information
Replacement of media with valuable information 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Media theft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Theft of mobile and handheld PCs 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
Theft of used materials (garbage, destroyed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
documents)
Unauthorized use of equipment 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Damage or intentional change of equipment 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
operation modes
Installation of devices for removal of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
electromagnetic oscillations
Installation of means for listening to conversations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Installation of means for video surveillance by the 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
violator
Installation of noise generators and other devices 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
by the violator to create interference
Disclosure, transfer or loss of access restriction 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
attributes
Obtaining confidential information without the use 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
of special tools
Human physical threats at IS communication channel
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Cable damage 3 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Unauthorized wireless connection to the cable line 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unauthorized wired connection to the cable line 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Installation of noise generators and other devices 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
by the violator to create interference
Unauthorized connection to wireless networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The criticality4 of the threat is assessed on the scale described above. Dependencies between assets are
also taken into account in the assessment. [13] Determination of criticality coefficients was carried out at
various enterprises of the printing and publishing industry from 2019 to 2021. The research was conducted
with the aim of product quality, and became the basis for the development of methods to combat
information attacks in the workplace.
Table 2
Global and local physical threats aimed at IS
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
Software modules of
Auxiliary software
Central database
Workstations
Internal data
Mobile PC
Networks
Servers
ACSPP
Threat
Disaster 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Technogenic disaster 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Military action 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Revolution 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Terrorist act 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Local physical threats aimed at IS
Fire 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Lightning strikes 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Cross-reference 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Failure of external energy sources 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Failure of internal (reserve) energy sources 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Sharp voltage fluctuations in the power grid 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Ventilation system failure 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
Air conditioning system failure 3 3 3 3 0 0 0 0
Heating system failure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Violation of the circuit of closed systems near 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
IS objects
Physical threats related to the equipment failure
Loss of information as a result of data carrier 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
failure
Defective data carriers 0 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Reduction of equipment reliability after the 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0
end of its service life
Data loss or system malfunction due to 0 3 3 3 2 3 3 2
overflow of storage devices
4
The criticality of the treat is a measure of damage caused by this threat in its implementation.
Table 3
Local and logical threats
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
Software modules of
Auxiliary software
Central database
Workstations
Internal data
Mobile PC
Networks
Servers
ACSPP
Threat
Change of the user privileges when running exploits 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
that use local OS vulnerabilities
Local OS vulnerabilities that do not require an 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
exploit to run the threat
Running files with viruses that affect the OS 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Running the OS from external media 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Modification of OS components 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Failure to service the OS 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Local logical threats aimed at software
Change of the user privileges when running exploits 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
that use local software vulnerabilities
Local application software vulnerabilities that do 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
not require an exploit to run the threat
Opening files with macro viruses 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Modification of application software 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Failure to service the application software 0 0 0 0 2 3 3 3
Local logical threats aimed at information,
stored and processed on the resource
Unauthorized modification of information in the 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
database stored on the resource
Unauthorized modification of information in the e- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
mail system stored on the resource
Unauthorized modification of electronic documents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
containing valuable information
Unauthorized reading of confidential information in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
the database stored on the resource
Unauthorized reading of messages in the e-mail 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
system stored on the resource
Unauthorized reading of confidential information in 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
electronic documents stored on the resource
Loss or violation of the integrity of information 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
stored on the resource due to improper operation
of the software
Unauthorized malicious use of e-mail by an 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
infringer on behalf of a legal user
Deletion of valuable information stored in the 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
database by the violator
Deletion of e-mails by the violator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deletion of electronic documents containing 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
valuable information by the violator
Table 4
Remote logical threats
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
Software modules of
Auxiliary software
Central database
Workstations
Internal data
Mobile PC
Networks
Servers
ACSPP
Threat
Collection of information about the OS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Collection of information about the OS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Launch of exploits that use remote OS 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
vulnerabilities
Remote logical threats aimed at network services
Network service failure due to internal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
software failure
Launch of exploits that use remote network 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
service vulnerabilities and result in denial of
service
Running exploits that use remote network 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2
service vulnerabilities and cause arbitrary code
to run on a remote PC
User mailbox overflow 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Selection of user authentication data 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Remote collection of information about 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
network services
Remote logical threats aimed at information,
processed by network services
Interception of information provided by 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
network services using vulnerabilities in data
transmission protocols
Logical threats aimed at network equipment
Unauthorized access to the network device at 3 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
the software level
Denial of service at the software level 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unauthorized connection to wireless networks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Remote logical threats to communication protocols
Interception of network traffic at the logical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
level due to incorrect configuration of network
devices or inability to differentiate traffic
between network nodes
Table 5
Threats related to physical exposure to humans
Criticality of the threat to the asset of ACSPP
Software modules of
Auxiliary software
Central database
Workstations
Internal data
Mobile PC
Networks
Servers
ACSPP
Threat
Unavailability of information due to incapacity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
of IS users who have this information
Improper functioning of IS due to the inability 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
of the administrator
Reduced response to information security 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
incidents due to administrator incapacity
Violation of business continuity due to physical 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
action on the company employee
Threats related to psychological effects on humans
Disclosure of confidential information as a 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
result of psychological actions of third parties
on the company employee
Substitution of information as a result of 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
psychological actions of outsiders on the
company employees
Modification or destruction of information as a 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
result of psychological actions of third parties
on the company employees
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Unavailability of information due to incapacity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
of IS users who have this information
Improper functioning of IS due to the inability 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
of the administrator
Reduced response to information security 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
incidents due to administrator incapacity
Threats related to psychological effects on humans
Disclosure of confidential information by the 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
company employees
Modification or destruction of information by 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
the company employees
Substitution of information by the company 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
employees
Threats related to unintentional actions of the staff
Violation of information confidentiality due to 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3
unintentional actions
Unintentional violation of information 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
integrity
Unintentional deletion of critical information 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
As some threats are not critical to any of ACSPP assets, there is no need to provide further results
of their assessment.
Comparing the data from Table 1 - 5, it is possible to make the list of the most critical threats for
typical ACSPP:
1. Human physical threats aimed at IS resources:
• unauthorized use of equipment;
• damage or intentional change of equipment operation modes
• disclosure, transfer or loss of access restriction attributes;
2. Human physical threats aimed at IS communication channel:
• Cable damage;
3. Global physical threats aimed at IS (full list of threats);
4. Local physical threats aimed at IS:
• cross-reference;
• failure of external energy sources;
• failure of internal (reserve) energy sources;
• sharp voltage fluctuations in the power grid;
• air conditioning system failure;
5. Physical threats related to the equipment failure:
• loss of information as a result of data carrier failure;
• defective data carriers;
• reduction of equipment reliability after the end of its service life;
• data loss or system malfunction due to overflow of storage devices;
6. Local logical threats aimed at OS:
• running files with viruses that affect the OS;
• running the OS from external media;
• modification of OS components;
• failure to service the OS;
7. Local logical threats aimed at software:
• opening files with macro viruses;
• modification of application software;
• failure to service the application software;
Thus, a list of critical threats to ACSPP is received, which may occur with a medium or high
probability and cause significant damage to one or more assets, which will lead to serious violations
in the work of ACSPP. For a more accurate analysis of threats in ACSPP, it is also necessary to
analyze the probability of their detection and the frequency of recurrence over a period of time, which
is planned to be done in future studies.
4. Conclusions
The analysis of information support of the complex system control process with a hierarchical
structure under threats is done as well as the process of document circulation in the formation and
decision-making process, based on which a structural and functional scheme is developed and
substantiated to counter threats and attacks on the control process in the hierarchical structure.
The block diagram of decision-making in technical and publishing systems under risk is
substantiated and developed.
The characteristic features of the decision-making process and parameters affecting this process
are analyzed, as a result of which a model of technogenic structure under threats to resources is
constructed.
Management actions on a set of control cycles to which the admissible time of their performance
corresponds are studied and the block diagram of the scenario of situational management under
threats on a terminal cycle is constructed.
The system concept of classification of threats and crisis situations in hierarchical structures by
type, action, source and object of action, influencing the decision-making processes, is presented.
A survey of ACSPP system administrators is conducted in order to increase the reliability of
assessing the threat criticality. Based on the studied data, the most critical threats to a typical
automatic control system are presented.
The results of research can be implemented in the design of control and protection systems not
only for automatic control systems, but also for any complex systems with a hierarchical structure
under threats and crises.
5. References
[1] .B. Boyer, Countering Hybrid Threats in Cyberspace.Cyber Defense Review. Vol. 2 Ed. 3,
2015. 11.
[2] Groome, D., Brace, N., Edgar, G., Edgar, H., Eysenck, M., Gobet, F., Law, R., Manly, T., Ness,
H., Pike, G., Scott, S., Styles, E.: An Introduction to Cognitive Psychology: Processes and
Disorders. Routledge, 4th edn. (2021). https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351020862 Title Suppressed
Due to Excessive Length 11
[3] Andonov, S. Safety Accidents in Risky Industries: Black Swans, Gray Rhinos and Other
Adverse Events. CRC Press, 1st edn. (2021).https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003230298
[4] Boy, G.A.: The Handbook of Human-Machine Interaction: A Human-Centered Design
Approach. CRC Press, 1st edn. (2011). https://doi.org/10.1201/9781315557380
[5] L. Sikora, R. Tkachuk, N. Lysa, I. Dronyuk, O. Fedevych, R. Talanchyk. Information-resource
and cognitive concept of threat's influence identification on technogenic system based on the
cause and category diagrams integration. IntellTSIS 2021. Proceedings of the 2nd International
Workshop on Intelligent Information Technologies & Systems of Information Security with
CEUR-WS Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine, March 24–26, 2021. Vol. 2853, pp. 398-416.
[6] L. Sikora, R. Tkachuk, N. Lysa, I. Dronyuk, O. Fedevych Information and Logic Cognitive
Technologies of Decision-making in Risk Conditions. IntellTSIS 2020. Proceedings of the 1st
International Workshop on Intelligent Information Technologies & Systems of Information
Security. Khmelnytskyi, Ukraine, June 10-12, 2020. pp. 340-356. http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-
2623/paper29.pdf
[7] Bhise, V.D.: Decision-Making in Energy Systems. CRC Press, 1st edn. (2021).
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003107514
[8] Kozlova, L.P., Kozlova, O.A.: Using of fuzzy set theory when designing technical systems. In:
2015 XVIII International Conference on Soft Computing and Measure-ments (SCM). pp.
193{194 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1109/SCM.2015.7190453
[9] Tattam, D.: A Short Guide to Operational Risk. Routledge, 1st edn.
(2011).https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315263649
[10] Hovorushchenko T., Pavlova O. Method of Activity of Ontology-Based Intelligent Agent for
Evaluating the Initial Stages of the Software Lifecycle. Advances in Intelligent Systems and
Computing. 2019. Vol. 836. Pp. 169-178. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-97885-7_17
[11] Wiggins, M.W.: Introduction to Human Factors for Organisational Psychologists. CRC Press,
1st edn. (2022). https://doi.org/10.1201/9781003229858
[12] S. Demri, V. Goranko, M. Lange. Temporal Logics in Computer Science, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 2016. 752 р.
[13] Balyk, V.M., Thuong, N.Q. Statistical synthesis of the principle of ra-tional organization of a
complex technical system. In: 2019 InternationalConference on Engineering and
Telecommunication (EnT). pp. 1{4 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1109/EnT47717.2019.9030569.
[14] F.G. Hoffman. Hybrid Warfareand Challenges, Joint Forces Quarterly 52, 2009.