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  <front>
    <journal-meta>
      <journal-title-group>
        <journal-title>Journal of King Saud University</journal-title>
      </journal-title-group>
    </journal-meta>
    <article-meta>
      <article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1007/3-540-48285-7_33</article-id>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>About Cryptographic Properties of the Qalqan Encryption Algorithm</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Nurgul Seilova</string-name>
          <email>seilova_na@mail.ru</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Almas Kungozhin</string-name>
          <email>kungozhin@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Renat Ibrayev</string-name>
          <email>ibrayev@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Lev Gorlov</string-name>
          <email>gorlov@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Zhandar Ospanov</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Ruslan Itemirov</string-name>
          <email>itemirov@gmail.com</email>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Igor Kiyashko</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Cryptography</string-name>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Satbayev University</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>22 Satbayev str., Almaty,050013</addr-line>
          ,
          <country>Republic of Kazakhstan</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <pub-date>
        <year>1993</year>
      </pub-date>
      <volume>1</volume>
      <issue>2</issue>
      <fpage>23</fpage>
      <lpage>27</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Today data confidentiality and privacy are ensured by various encryption algorithms (public key and secret key algorithms). There are no any universal encryption algorithms and different encryption algorithms are implemented to solve different security tasks. Many states have national standards of encryption but Kazakhstan hasn't it today. This paper presents an approach to the development of the Qalqan block symmetric encryption algorithm, taking into account complex cryptographic and operational requirements, as well as the cryptographic properties of the linear and nonlinear blocks of the algorithm that affect its cryptographic strength.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>Keywords1</kwd>
        <kwd>transformation</kwd>
        <kwd>key expansion</kwd>
        <kwd>round transformation</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>The Qalqan symmetric block encryption algorithm was developed by the team of the Information</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Algorithm Development Approaches</title>
      <p>Claude Shannon defined the basic principles of the reliability of ciphers, the principles of mixing
(Confusion) and dispersion (Diffusion), and proposed to build strong cryptographic systems relatively
using simple transformations.</p>
      <p>Simple transformations make it possible to carry out cryptographic analysis of security with a high
level of trust, as well as to guarantee the absence of “backdoors” of various kinds.</p>
      <p>The development of the Qalqan block symmetric encryption algorithm was carried out taking into
account all the principles of modern cryptography:
1. Using well-studied constructs and transformations.</p>
      <p>2. Taking into account trends in the development of cryptography and cryptographic analysis of
symmetric block encryption algorithms in order to ensure a “sufficient safety margin.”
3. Taking into account the trends in the development of computer technology to avoid the possibility
of brute-force attacks and “rainbow tables.”</p>
      <p>4. Taking into account the peculiarities of the implementation of the Qalqan block symmetric
encryption algorithm in the software and hardware-software means of cryptographic information
protection.</p>
      <p>2022 Copyright for this paper by its authors.
3. Qalqan Block Symmetric Encryption Algorithm
3.1. Conventions</p>
      <p>is the set of all binary strings of length s, where s is a natural number; numbering of substrings
and string components is carried out from left to right, starting from zero;
 is inlet and outlet block length;
  is original encryption key length;
 is number of rounds of encryption algorithm;
 is source encryption key;
⨁ is modulo 2 addition;
⊞ is modulo 2128 addition;
⊟ is modulo 2128;
∔ is modulo 256 addition;
∸ is modulo 256 subtraction.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3.2. General Information about the Algorithm</title>
      <p>Algorithm architecture: LSX.</p>
      <p>Block length:  = 128 bit.</p>
      <p>Key length:  = 256. .1024 bit with 128 bit step.
Number of rounds:  = 17 + ⌊ 128
−256⌋ ∗ 2 (from 17 to 29 rounds).</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>3.3. Parameter Value</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>3.3.1. Nonlinear Bijective Transformation</title>
      <p>Nonlinear bijective transformation  :  128 →  128 is specified by substitution 
following order  (0), . . ,  (255)):
:  8 →  8 (in the</p>
      <p>Byte 00 is replaced with eb, 01 with 89, ff with fa (values are in hexadecimal). Substitution is applied
to all bytes of the processed block</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>3.3.2. Linear Transformation</title>
      <p>Linear function  : 128 →  128 converts an 16 byte input block B into an output block R of the same
size as follows (bytes are numbered from high to low):
 0 =  0 ∔  1 ∔  2 ∔  3
 4 =  4 ∔  0
 8 =  8 ∔  0
 12 =  12 ∔  0
 5 =  4 ∔  5 ∔  6 ∔  7
 1 =  1 ∔  5
 9 =  9 ∔  5
 13 =  13 ∔  5
 10 =  8 ∔  9 ∔  10 ∔  11
 2 =  2 ∔  10
 6 =  6 ∔  10
 14 =  14 ∔  10
 15 =  12 ∔  13 ∔  14 ∔  15
 3 =  3 ∔  15
 7 =  7 ∔  15
 11 =  11 ∔  15</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>3.3.3. Key Addition</title>
      <p>and  ⨁ in the last).</p>
      <p>Round keys are superimposed by modulo 2128adding with the processed data block (operation  ⊞,
where i – round number).</p>
      <p>The keys of the first and last rounds are superimposed modulo 2 (operation    in the first round
⨁</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>3.3.4. Round Transformation</title>
      <p>Each round of the  algorithm except for the last one, includes sequentially key addition,
nonlinear transformation and linear transformation, thus    ( ) =  ( ( ⊞( ))).</p>
      <p>The last round contains only a modulo 2 key overlay operation.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>3.3.5. Key Expansion</title>
      <p>The bytes of the key (starting with the least significant one) are fed in turn to the byte shift registers
L0 and L1, starting from L0. Register L0 is 17 bytes long, L1 is 15 bytes long. Thus, a 256-bit key
consisting of bytes { 0.. 31} fills the registers as follows:
 0 = { 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31}</p>
      <p>1 = { 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29}
The feedback of the shift registers is set as follows:
 0 = { 01.. 016, ( 00)∔  01 ∔  ( 03)∔  07 ∔  ( 012)∔  016}</p>
      <p>1 = { 11.. 113, ( 10)∔  13 ∔  ( 19)∔  112 ∔  ( 114)}</p>
      <p>The registers move uniformly, after the 17th step each value  015 ∔  14 is filled into the byte of the
next round key starting from the least significant.</p>
      <p>For keys consisting of more than 256 bits, subsequent bytes in order from least significant to most
significant are loaded into shift registers after the 17th step of operation by adding registers modulo 256
to the feedback function starting from register L1. Thus, at each even step of the registers, starting from
the 18th, the value of the next byte of the key is superimposed on the feedback value of the L1 register,
and at odd steps starting from the 19th - on the feedback value of the L0 register.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>3.4. Encryption Algorithm</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>3.4.1. Encryption</title>
      <p>The encryption function consists of three parts and has the form:
 1(
) =  ( ( 
⨁
(
)))
 2( ) =   −1 (…  2 ( 1 ( 1(
 ( ) =  ⨁ ( 2( ))
The encryption algorithm schematically represented as follows:
))))</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-12">
      <title>3.4.2. Decryption</title>
      <p>For decryption, functions opposite to those described above are used.</p>
      <p>Non-linear function InvS is defined by substitution  :  8 →  8 of the following kind (in the
following order  (0), . . ,  (255)):</p>
      <p>Inverse linear operation  :  128 →  128 converts 16 byte input block B to output block R of the
same size as follows (bytes are numbered in ascending order):
 1 =  1 ∸  5
 2 =  2 ∸  10
 3 =  3 ∸  15
 4 =  4 ∸  0
 6 =  6 ∸  10
 7 =  7 ∸  15
 8 =  8 ∸  0
 9 =  9 ∸  5
 11 =  11 ∸  15
 12 =  12 ∸  0
 14 =  14 ∸  0
 0 =  0 ∸  1 ∸  2 ∸  3
 5 =  5 ∸  4 ∸  6 ∸  7
 10 =  10 ∸  8 ∸  9 ∸  11
 15 =  15 ∸  12 ∸  13 ∸  14</p>
      <p>The round keys  ⊟ are superimposed by modulo 2128subtraction. The keys of the first and last
rounds are superimposed by modulo 2 operation.</p>
      <p>One round of the  decryption algorithm includes sequentially linear, non-linear transformations
and key addition, thus   ( ℎ ) =  ⊟(  ( ( ℎ )).</p>
      <p>The decrypting operation of the Cipher ciphertext on round keys Key is represented as follows:
 1( ℎ ) =  ⨁ ( ℎ )</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-13">
      <title>4. Properties of the Nonlinear Node of Algorithm</title>
      <p>The correct choice of the characteristics of vector Boolean functions is the main factor in ensuring
security, since they are the only non-linear node of the symmetric block encryption algorithm.</p>
      <p>In this paper, the main cryptographic properties of the nonlinear node of the Qalqan symmetric block
encryption algorithm, implemented as a vector Boolean function of 8 variables are investigated.</p>
      <p>
        Due to the existence of serious claims to the secret internal structure of the nonlinear node of the
block symmetric encryption algorithm Kuznechik and the hash function Stribog [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
        ], the nonlinear
node of the block symmetric encryption algorithm Qalqan was designed according to the principle of
maximum transparency.
      </p>
      <p>
        For this, a similar to that used in the AES block symmetric encryption algorithm, the generation of
a replacement table according to proposed by K. Nyberg in 1991 [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ] method was chosen. The constants
used in the generation have been changed in order to achieve closer to the optimal values [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
        ] of such
cryptographically important parameters like lowering the maximum of the differential profile in
addition and XOR (counteraction to differential analysis), lowering the maximum of the linear
approximations table (counteraction to linear analysis), high algebraic degree, maximum to the class of
affine transformations distance (high nonlinearity), absence of linear structures.
      </p>
      <p>As part of the research of the main cryptographic properties, the following properties shown in
Table 1 were established.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-14">
      <title>5. Properties of a Linear Node of the Algorithm</title>
      <p>The linear transformation of the Qalqan symmetric block cipher algorithm is built on a
SQUARElike architecture and is a series of modulo 256 addition operations that propagate the influence of the
bytes on each line of the intermediate state to the corresponding column. If we represent the state of the
processed block in the form of a 4x4 byte matrix, then during the conversion to a byte located on the
main diagonal (let's call it a diagonal byte), the remaining three bytes of this row are modulo
256summed, then the resulting sum is superimposed by adding modulo 256 to the rest three bytes
located on the same column as the diagonal byte. Row and column additions occur independently of
each other's results, i.e. changes in the state of the processing block are made immediately after all
operations (figure 5).</p>
      <p>To conclude about the effectiveness of the transformation, a comparison of the main characteristics
with similar transformations of the symmetric block encryption algorithms AES [22] and Kuznechik
[23] was made. Both algorithms are widely used and well enough studied to be considered as
cryptographically strong, and are similar in main parameters to the Qalqan algorithm.</p>
      <p>The difference between the Qalqan block symmetric encryption algorithm from most of the known
algorithms is key overlay with bit transfer, i.e. instead of the XOR operation, modulo 2128 addition is
used in the middle rounds of the algorithm. This operation has a positive effect on the complication of
the relationship between the bits of encrypted data and increases the resistance to a number of modern
attacks.</p>
      <p>In this work, for the sake of purity of comparison, this feature of the algorithm will not be taken into
account, since in the compared algorithms the key is overlaid by means of the XOR operation.</p>
      <p>
        According to the principles of K. Shannon [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
        ], the main purpose of the linear node is to mix the
bits of the processed data block, which entails the spread of the entropy of the key bits over the entire
data block, as well as the mutual influence of the bits of the processed block itself. The efficiency of
this influence is traditionally estimated by calculating the "avalanche effect" [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ].
      </p>
      <p>Ideally, when one bit of the key or data changes, half (on average) of the remaining bits of the block
being processed after the linear operation should change. It is possible to construct such a block in
practice (for example, using a linear shift register), but this is rarely used due to the high computational
complexity of such transformation. In general, bit operations in modern processors and microcontrollers
are relatively difficult to implement [20] in comparison with byte operations; therefore, it is advisable
to consider byte-oriented transformations, which, nevertheless, are capable of ensuring the mutual
influence of bits.</p>
      <p>To provide the required avalanche effect, each byte must have an effect on the remaining bytes,
while it is desirable to be different for bytes in different positions. The operations used in this case
should also be significantly efficient in terms of memory and computational complexity, as well as
being possible to implement on the maximum number of modern hardware platforms.</p>
      <p>Measurement of the avalanche effect of linear transformations of the Qalqan, AES and Kuznechik
algorithms for one, two and three rounds of the algorithm simulating the operation of an SP-network
showed the following results:</p>
      <p>To simulate the operation of several rounds of the symmetric block encryption algorithm an overlay
of fixed bytes obtained using the standard pseudo-random number generator of the stdlib.h library
between linear operations and byte substitution used in the Qalqan algorithm were added.</p>
      <p>The measurement of the execution time of linear operations for the algorithms Qalqan, AES and
Kuznechik has been carried out. For this, linear transformations of these algorithms are implemented
and their speed is compared. Since each individual transformation is performed quickly, the
measurement was made for large (on the order of hundreds of thousands) series of transformations
separately with enabled and disabled optimization. Results are presented in the following tables:</p>
      <p>The linear transformation of the Kuznechik algorithm for time optimization requires preliminary
initialization of 9 tables of 256 bytes each.</p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-15">
      <title>6. Conclusions</title>
      <p>Thus, it has been proven that the speed of linear transformation is significantly higher than world
analogues. Moreover, as in the AES algorithm, there is a possibility of parallel implementation of the
conversion into four threads, as well as implementation in single (one) clock cycle on FPGA [21].</p>
      <p>It should be noted the simplicity of the implementation of the linear transformation of the Qalqan
algorithm, since it contains only modulo 256 addition operations. Thus, when operating with 8-bit
variables, the programmer uses only the addition operation.
7. References</p>
    </sec>
  </body>
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