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<article xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">
  <front>
    <journal-meta />
    <article-meta>
      <title-group>
        <article-title>Conditional Syntax Splitting, Lexicographic Entailment and the Drowning Effect</article-title>
      </title-group>
      <contrib-group>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Jesse Heyninck</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff0">0</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">3</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Gabriele Kern-Isberner</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">1</xref>
        </contrib>
        <contrib contrib-type="author">
          <string-name>Thomas Meyer</string-name>
          <xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">2</xref>
        </contrib>
        <aff id="aff0">
          <label>0</label>
          <institution>Open Universiteit Heerlen</institution>
          ,
          <country country="NL">the Netherlands</country>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff1">
          <label>1</label>
          <institution>Technische Universität Dortmund</institution>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff2">
          <label>2</label>
          <institution>University of Cape Town and CAIR</institution>
          ,
          <addr-line>South-Africa</addr-line>
        </aff>
        <aff id="aff3">
          <label>3</label>
          <institution>Vrije Universiteit Brussel</institution>
          ,
          <country country="BE">Belgium</country>
        </aff>
      </contrib-group>
      <fpage>61</fpage>
      <lpage>69</lpage>
      <abstract>
        <p>Lexicographic inference [1] is a well-behaved and popular approach to reasoning with non-monotonic conditionals. In recent work we have shown that lexicographic inference satisfies syntax splitting, which means we can restrict our attention to parts of the belief base that share atoms with a given query. In this paper, we introduce the concept of conditional syntax splitting, inspired by the notion of conditional independence as known from probability theory. We show that lexicographic inference satisfies conditional syntax splitting, and connect conditional syntax splitting to several known properties from the literature on non-monotonic reasoning, including the drowning effect.</p>
      </abstract>
      <kwd-group>
        <kwd>eol&gt;Non-monotonic Reasoning</kwd>
        <kwd>lexicographic inference</kwd>
        <kwd>defeasible reasoning</kwd>
        <kwd>non-monotonic logic</kwd>
        <kwd>syntax splitting</kwd>
      </kwd-group>
    </article-meta>
  </front>
  <body>
    <sec id="sec-1">
      <title>1. Introduction</title>
      <p>
        Lexicographic inference [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] is a well-known and popular approach
to reasoning with non-monotonic conditionals, which has been
applied in description logics [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2</xref>
        ], probabilistic description logics
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">3</xref>
        ] and richer preferential languages [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">4</xref>
        ]. It is seen as a logic of
very high-quality, as it extends rational closure (also known as
system Z) [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
        ] and avoids the so-called drowning problem. This
high quality seems to come at a cost, as reasoning on the basis of
lexicographic inference is PNP-complete, even when restricted to
belief bases consisting of Horn-literal rules, i.e. rule bases where
every rule’s antecedent is a conjunction of atoms and every rule’s
consequent is a literal [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">6</xref>
        ]. In previous work [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], we have shown
that lexicographic inference satisfies syntax splitting [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. Syntax
splitting is a property of inference operators that requires that,
for a belief base which can be split syntactically into two parts
(i.e. there exists two sub-signatures such that every conditional in
the belief base is built up entirely one of the two sub-signatures),
restricting attention to the sub-signature does not result in a loss
or addition of inferences. In other words, syntax splitting ensures
we can safely restrict our attention to parts of the belief base
that share atoms with a given query, thus seriously lessening the
computational strain for many concrete queries. However, this
presupposed that parts of a conditional belief base are syntactically
independent, meaning that no common atoms are allowed. This
might be an overly strong requirement, as the two parts of the
belief base might have common elements. Consider the following
example:
Example 1. Usually, bikes are chain-driven (|), usually
chaindriven bikes have multiple gears (|), and usually a bike frame
consists of four pipes ( |). The form of the frame is independent
of whether a bike is chain driven and how many gears it has.
However, syntax splitting as defined in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ] does not allow us to
restrict attention to {( |)} when we want to make inferences
about the form of a bike frame, as the common atom  prevents
us from splitting the belief base into two independent parts.
      </p>
      <p>
        An intuitively related problem that was somewhat surprisingly
shown to be independent of syntax splitting in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ] is the so-called
drowning problem. It consists in the fact that under some inductive
inference relations, abnormal individuals do not inherit any
properties. It is best illustrated using the canonical Tweety-example:
Example 2 (The Drowning Problem). The drowning problem
is illustrated by using the following conditional belief base
∆ = {( |), (|), (¬ |), (|)}, which represents the
Tweetyexample, i.e. that birds typically fly, penguins are typically birds,
and penguins typically don’t fly, together with the additional
conditional “birds typically have beaks”. The drowning problem is
constituted by the fact that some inductive inference operators,
such as system , do not allow to infer that penguins typically
have beaks ( |∼ Δ ), i.e. the fact that penguins are abnormal when
it comes to flying drowns inferences about penguins’ beaks. It is
well-known that lexicographic inference does not suffer from the
drowning problem.
      </p>
      <p>The drowning problem seems to be related to syntax splitting.
Intuitively, {(|)} is unrelated to the rest of the belief base, in the
sense that having beaks has nothing to do with flying or having
wings, as long as we know we are talking about birds. However,
(unconditional) syntax splitting does not allow to capture this kind
of independence, since the atom  prohibits the belief base from
being split into information about flying and wings on the one
hand, and information about beaks on the other hand. It is exactly
this kind of conditional independencies between conditionals that
we seek to formally capture and study in this paper. In more detail,
the contributions of the paper are the following:
1. we introduce and study the notion of conditional splitting
of a belief base, a property of conditional belief bases, and
generalize the concept of syntax splitting, a property of
inductive inference operators, to conditional syntax
splitting, thus bringing the idea of conditional independence
into the realm of inductive inference operators;</p>
      <sec id="sec-1-1">
        <title>2. we show that lexicographic entailment satisfies conditional syntax splitting; 3. we argue that the drowning effect can be seen as a violation of conditional syntax splitting; and</title>
        <p>Outline of this Paper: We first state all the necessary
preliminaries in Section 2 on propositional logic (Section 2.1), reasoning
with non-monotonic conditionals (Section 2.2), inductive
inference (Section 2.3), System Z (Section 2.4) and lexicographic
inference (Section 2.5). In Section 3 we define and study the
concept of conditional syntax splitting. In Section 4, we show that
lexicographic inference satisfies conditional syntax splitting. In
Sections 5 and 6, we show how properties of inductive inference
operators previously only discussed informally, namely the
drowning effect (Section 5) and the properties introduced by Lehmann
1995 (Section 6) can be seen as special cases of conditional
syntax splitting. Finally, we discuss related work in Section 7 and
conclude in Section 8.</p>
        <p>
          4. we show how Lehmann’s so-called desirable closure prop- both antecedent and conclusion ((|)() = 1); it falsifies, or
erties [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ] can be derived from conditional syntax splitting. violates it iff it satisfies the antecedence but not the conclusion
((|)() = 0); otherwise the conditional is not applicable, i. e.,
the interpretation does not satisfy the antecedent ((|)() =
). We say that  satisfies a conditional (|) iff it does not
falsify it, i.e., iff  satisfies its material counterpart  → .
        </p>
        <p>
          Given a total preorder (in short, TPO) ⪯ on possible worlds,
representing relative plausibility,  ⪯  iff  ⪯ ′ for some
 ∈ min⪯ (Mod()) and some ′ ∈ min⪯ (Mod()). This
allows for expressing the validity of defeasible inferences via
stating that  |∼ ⪯  iff (∧) ≺ (∧¬) [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">10</xref>
          ]. As is usual, we
denote  ⪯ ′ and ′ ⪯  by  ≈ ′ and  ⪯ ′ and ′ ̸⪯ 
by  ≺ ′ (and similarly for formulas). We can marginalize total
preorders and even inference relations, i.e., restricting them to
sublanguages, in a natural way: If Θ ⊆ Σ then any TPO ⪯ on
Ω(Σ) induces uniquely a marginalized TPO ⪯ |Θ on Ω(Θ) by
setting
        </p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-2">
      <title>2. Preliminaries</title>
      <p>In the following, we briefly recall some general preliminaries on
propositional logic, and technical details on inductive inference.</p>
      <sec id="sec-2-1">
        <title>2.1. Propositional Logic</title>
        <p>1Θ⪯ |Θ 2Θ iff 1Θ ⪯ 2Θ.</p>
        <p>
          (2)
Note that on the right hand side of the iff condition above 1Θ, 2Θ
are considered as propositions in the superlanguage ℒ(Ω) , hence
1Θ ⪯ 2Θ is well defined [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">11</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>
          Similarly, any inference relation |∼ on ℒ(Σ) induces a
marginalized inference relation |∼ |Θ on ℒ(Θ) by setting
For a set At of atoms let ℒ(At) be the corresponding
propositional language constructed using the usual connectives ∧ (and),  |∼ |Θ  iff  |∼  (3)
∨ (or), ¬ (negation), → (material implication) and ↔
(material equivalence). A (classical) interpretation (also called pos- for any ,  ∈ ℒ(Θ) .
sible world)  for a propositional language ℒ(At) is a function An obvious implementation of total preorders are ordinal
 : At → {⊤, ⊥}. Let Ω( At) denote the set of all interpretations conditional functions (OCFs), (also called ranking functions)
for At. We simply write Ω if the set of atoms is implicitly given.  : Ω → N ∪ {∞} with  − 1(0) ̸= ∅. [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
          ]. They express degrees
An interpretation  satisfies (or is a model of) an atom  ∈ At, of (im)plausibility of possible worlds and propositional formulas
denoted by  |= , if and only if () = ⊤. The satisfaction  by setting  () := min{ () |  |= }. A conditional
relation |= is extended to formulas as usual. As an abbrevia- (|) is accepted by  iff  |∼   iff  ( ∧ ) &lt;  ( ∧ ¬).
tion we sometimes identify an interpretation  with its complete
conjunction, i. e., if 1, . . . ,  ∈ At are those atoms that are 2.3. Inductive Inference Operators
assigned ⊤ by  and +1, . . . ,  ∈ At are those propositions
that are assigned ⊥ by  we identify  by 1 . . . +1 . . .  In this paper, we will be interested in inference relations |∼ Δ
(or any permutation of this). For  ⊆ ℒ (At) we also define parametrized by a conditional belief base ∆ . In more detail, such
 |=  if and only if  |=  for every  ∈ . Define the set of inference relations are induced by ∆ , in the sense that ∆ serves as
models Mod() = { ∈ Ω( At) |  |= } for every formula a starting point for the inferences in |∼ Δ. We call such operators
or set of formulas . A formula or set of formulas 1 entails inductive inference operators:
another formula or set of formulas 2, denoted by 1 |= 2,
if Mod(1) ⊆ Mod(2). Where  ⊆ Σ , and  ∈ Ω(Σ) , we
denote by  the restriction of  to  , i.e.  is the interpretation
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-2">
        <title>2.2. Reasoning with Nonmonotonic</title>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-3">
        <title>Conditionals</title>
        <p>
          Given a language ℒ, conditionals are objects of the form (|)
where ,  ∈ ℒ. The set of all conditionals based on a language
ℒ is defined as: (ℒ|ℒ) = {(|) | ,  ∈ ℒ}. We follow
the approach of [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">9</xref>
          ] who considered conditionals as generalized Definition 2. A model-based inductive inference operator for
indicator functions for possible worlds resp. propositional inter- total preorders (on Ω ) is a mapping C that assigns to each
pretations :
        </p>
        <p>
          Examples of inductive inference operators include system P
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
          ], System Z ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ], see Section 2.4), lexicographic inference ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ],
see Section 2.5) and c-representations ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ].
        </p>
        <p>As already indicated in the previous subsection, inference
relations can be obtained on the basis of TPOs respectively OCFs:
((|))() =
⎧ 1 :  |=  ∧ 
⎨</p>
        <p>0 :  |=  ∧ ¬
⎩  :  |= ¬
where  stands for unknown or indeterminate. In other words,
a possible world  verifies a conditional (|) iff it satisfies
conditional belief base ∆ a total preorder ⪯ Δ on Ω s.t.  |∼ ⪯ Δ 
for every (|) ∈ ∆ (i.e. s.t. DI is ensured). A model-based
(1) inductive inference operator for OCFs (on Ω ) is a mapping C
that assigns to each conditional belief base ∆ an OCF  Δ on Ω
s.t. ∆ is accepted by  Δ(i.e. s.t. DI is ensured).</p>
        <p>
          Examples of inductive inference operators for OCFs System
Z ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ], see Sec. 2.4) and c-representations ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">14</xref>
          ], whereas
lexicographic inference ([
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ], see Sec. 2.5) is an example of an inductive
inference operator for TPOs.
        </p>
        <p>
          To define the property of syntax splitting [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ], we assume a
conditional belief base ∆ that can be split into subbases ∆ 1, ∆ 2
s.t. ∆  ⊂ (ℒ|ℒ) with ℒ = ℒ(Σ ) for  = 1, 2 s.t. Σ 1 ∩Σ 2 = ∅
and Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 = Σ , writing:
∆ = ∆
1 ⋃︁ ∆ 2
        </p>
        <p>
          Definition 3 (Independence (Ind), [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]). An inductive inference
operator C satisfies ( Ind) if for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 and for
any ,  ∈ ℒ,  ∈ ℒ (,  ∈ {1, 2},  ̸= ),
Example 3. Let ∆ = {( |), (|), (¬ |)} be a sub-base of
belief base used in Example 2. This conditional belief base
has the following Z-partitioning: ∆ 0 = {( |)} and ∆ 1 =
{(|), (¬ |)}. This gives rise to the following  Δ -ordering
over the worlds based on the signature {, , }:



 Δ
and  ∧  ̸ |∼ Δ .
        </p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-4">
        <title>2.5. Lexicographic Entailment</title>
        <p>As an example of a (non-)inference, observe that e.g. ⊤ |∼ Δ ¬</p>
        <p>
          We recall lexicographic inference as introduced by [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ]. For some
 |∼ Δ iff  |∼ Δ conditional belief base ∆ , the order ⪯ lΔex is defined as follows:
aDteofinriCtiosnat4isfies(R( elReveal)nicfef(oRr ealn)y,[∆ 8=]) .∆ An1i⋃n︀dΣu1c,tΣiv2e∆ in2fearnedncfeoroapnery- ((G∆i v|0e,n.).(.,)∆ ∈=Ω )0,}ta|h.nedGl ei∆vxei′cno⊆ agrsae∆pth,oifccv(oenc,dt∆ oitri′o)fnoar=las w∆|(o{r(ld-p|art∈)it i∈Ωonie∆sdt′hine|
,  ∈ ℒ ( ∈ {1, 2}), vector lex() = ( (, ∆ 0), . . . ,  (, ∆ )). Given two vectors
 |∼ Δ iff  |∼ Δ . (1, . . . , ) and (1, . . . , ), (1, . . . , ) ⪯ lex (1, . . . , )
iff there is some  ⩽  s.t.  =  for every  &gt;  and
Definition 5 (Syntax splitting (SynSplit), [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
          ]). An inductive in-  ⩽  .  ⪯ lΔex ′ iff lex() ⪯ lex lex(′). The resulting
ference operator C satisfies ( SynSplit) if it satisfies ( Ind) and inductive inference operator ⪯lex will be denoted by lex to
(Rel).
        </p>
        <p>Thus, Ind requires that inferences from one sub-language are
independent from formulas over the other sublanguage, if the
belief base splits over the respective sublanguages. In other words,
information on the basis of one sublanguage does not influences
inferences made in the other sublanguage. Rel, on the other hand,
restricts the scope of inferences, by requiring that inferences in
a sublanguage can be made on the basis of the conditionals in a
conditional belief base formulated on the basis of that sublanguage.</p>
        <p>SynSplit combines these two properties.</p>
      </sec>
      <sec id="sec-2-5">
        <title>2.4. System Z</title>
        <p>
          We present system  defined in [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">5</xref>
          ] as follows. A conditional
(|) is tolerated by a finite set of conditionals ∆ if there is a
possible world  with (|)() = 1 and (′|′)() ̸= 0 for
all (′|′) ∈ ∆ , i.e.  verifies (|) and does not falsify any
(other) conditional in ∆ . The Z-partitioning (∆ 0, . . . , ∆ ) of ∆
is defined as:
• ∆ 0 = { ∈ ∆ | ∆ tolerates  };
• ∆ 1, . . . , ∆  is the Z-partitioning of ∆ ∖ ∆ 0.
        </p>
        <p>For  ∈ ∆ we define: Δ( ) =  iff  ∈ ∆  and (∆ 0, . . . , ∆ )
is the Z-partioning of ∆ . Finally, the ranking function  Δ is
defined via:  Δ () = max{( ) |  () = 0,  ∈ ∆ } + 1, with
max ∅ = − 1. The resulting inductive inference operator Δ is
denoted by  .</p>
        <p>
          In the literature, system  has also been called rational closure
[
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">15</xref>
          ]. An inference relation |∼ Δ based on ∆ s.t.  |∼ Δ  implies
 |∼ Δ is called RC-extending [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
          ]. An RC-extending inference
relation has also been called a refinement of System  [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">17</xref>
          ]. We
call an inductive inference operator C RC-extending iff every
C(∆) is RC-extending.
        </p>
        <p>We now illustrate OCFs in general and System  in particular
with the well-known “Tweety the penguin”-example.
avoid clutter.</p>
        <p>
          In [
          <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
          ], lexicographic inference was shown to be RC-extending
(for finite conditional belief bases):
Proposition 1 ([1, Theorem 3]). For any  ∈ ℒ s.t.  Δ () is
ifnite, then  |∼ Δ  implies  |∼ lΔex.
        </p>
        <p>Example 4 (Example 3 ctd.). For the Tweety belief base ∆ as in
Example 3 we obtain the following lex()-vectors:



lex()
(0,1)
(0,0)



lex()
(1,0)
(1,0)



lex()
(0,2)
(0,0)

 
 
lex()
(0,1)
(0,0)</p>
        <sec id="sec-2-5-1">
          <title>The lex-vectors are ordered as follows:</title>
          <p>(0, 0) ≺ lex (1, 0) ≺ lex (0, 1) ≺ lex (0, 2).</p>
          <p>Observe that e.g. ⊤ |∼ lΔex¬ (since lex(⊤ ∧ ¬) = (0, 0) ≺ lex
lex(⊤ ∧ ) = (1, 0)) and  ∧  |∼ lΔex.</p>
        </sec>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-3">
      <title>3. Conditional Syntax Splitting</title>
      <p>We now introduce a conditional version of syntax splitting. A first
central idea is the syntactical notion of conditional splitting, a
property of belief bases.</p>
      <p>Definition 6. We say a conditional belief base ∆ can be split
into subbases ∆ 1,∆ 2 conditional on a sub-alphabet Σ 3, if ∆  ⊂
(ℒ(Σ  ∪ Σ 3) | ℒ(Σ  ∪ Σ 3)) for  = 1, 2 s.t. Σ 1, Σ 2 and Σ 3 are
pairwise disjoint and Σ = Σ 1 ∪ Σ 2 ∪ Σ 3, writing:
∆ = ∆
1 ⋃︁ ∆ 2 | Σ 3</p>
      <p>Intuitively, a conditional belief base can be split into Σ 1 and
Σ 2 conditional on Σ 3, if every conditional is built up from atoms
in Σ 1 ∪ Σ 3 or atoms in Σ 2 ∪ Σ 3.</p>
      <p>The above notion of conditional syntax splitting, however, is Proposition 2. Let a conditional belief base ∆ =
too strong, in the sense that it does not warrant satisfaction of ∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3 be given. If there is a  ∈ ℒ(Σ 3) s.t.
conditional variants of relevance and independence (we will define for every conditional in (|) ∈ ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3:
them in formal detail below) for lexicographic inference. The
underlying problem is that toleration might not be respected by 1.  ∈ ℒ(Σ 1) ∪ ℒ(Σ 2), or  ≡ .
conditional belief bases that conditionally split:
3. ⋀︀(|)∈Δ  →  ̸⊢ ⋁︀{¬ | ( |′) ∈ ∆ , ′ ≡</p>
      <p>} for  = 1, 2.1
Then ∆ = ∆
1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3.</p>
      <p>Example 5. Let ∆ =</p>
      <p>{(|), (¬|), (| ∧ )}. Then
∆ =
{(|), (¬|)}</p>
      <p>{(| ∧ )} | {, }
⋃︁
{},{}
However, this notion of purely syntactical conditional
independence is not reflected on the level of tolerance (and therefore Proof. Consider some 3 ∈ Ω(Σ 3). If 3 ̸|=  we are done.
entailment). Indeed, {(| ∧ )} (trivially) tolerates itself, i.e. Suppose therefore 3 |= . With the third condition, there is an
{(|∧)}(| ∧ ) = 0, yet ∆ does not tolerate (| ∧ ), i.e. 2′3 ∈ Mod(⋀︀(|)∈Δ2  → ) s.t. 2′3 |=  for every
Δ(| ∧ ) = 1. ( |′) ∈ ∆ 2 s.t. ′ ≡ . Notice that, in view of the first two</p>
      <p>This means that for system Z and lexicographic entaiment, conditions, for any (|) ∈ ∆  , either 2 |=  →  or  ≡ 
conditional relevance (now only introduced informally) is vio- or  ≡ . Furthermore, in thec, aaslesowhe2re3|=≡ ,. A2lto′3ge|=ther,.
lated for this belief base. In more detail, even though ∆ = Since  ∈ ℒ(Σ 2) or  ≡
{(|), (¬|)} ⋃︀{},{}{(| ∧ )} | {, }, we have e.g. 23 |= ⋀︀(|)∈Δ2  → . Thus, ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 |
⊤ ̸ |∼ l{e(x|∧)}¬( ∧ ) whereas ⊤ |∼ lΔex¬( ∧ ) (and likewise Σ 3.
for system ).</p>
      <p>What happens here is that (|) and (¬|) act as “constraints”
on  and  being true together, which on its turn is needed for
(| ∧ ) to be tolerated. In other words, pure syntactic conditional
splitting is not reflected on the semantic level (in contradistinction
to unconditional splitting). We can exclude such cases by using
the following weaker notion of safe conditional syntax splitting:
Definition 7. A conditional belief base ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 |
Σ 3 can be safely split into subbases ∆ 1, ∆ 2 conditional on a
sub-alphabet Σ 3, writing:
∆ = ∆</p>
      <p>s
1 ⋃︁ ∆ 2 | Σ 3,</p>
      <p>Σ1,Σ2
if for every 3 ∈ Ω(Σ  ∪Σ 3), there is a  ∈ Ω(Σ
⋁︀( |)∈Δ  ∧ ¬ (for ,  = 1, 2 and  ̸= ).</p>
      <p>) s.t.  3 ̸|=</p>
      <p>A simpler case of this condition is a belief base where all
antecedents derive from the common alphabet Σ 3 and all
consequents derive from either Σ 1 or Σ 2.</p>
      <p>Notice that e.g. the conditional belief base from Example 2 has
the form described in Proposition 2:
Example 6. Consider again ∆ from Example 2, and let Σ 1 =
{, }, Σ 2 = {} and Σ 3 = {}. Observe that:
∆ =
{( |), (|), (¬ |)} ⋃︁ {(|)} | Σ 3.</p>
      <p>Σ1,Σ2
Furthermore, the first two items in Proposition 2 are satisfied
as every conditional is either completely on the basis of the
alphabet {, } or has as an antecedent or a consequent .
Finally, the last condition is satisfied as { → } ̸|= ¬ and
{ → ,  → ,  → ¬ } ̸|=  ∨ ¬. We thus see that
∆ = {( |), (|), (¬ |)} ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 {(|)} | Σ 3.</p>
      <p>The notion of safe splitting is explained as follows: ∆ can be The bicycle example is also of this form:
safely split into ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 conditional on Σ 3 if it can be split in
∆ 1 and ∆ 2 conditional on Σ 3, and additionally, for every world Example 7. Consider again ∆ from Example 1. We see that:
3 in the subsignature Σ  ∪ Σ 3, we can find a world  in s
the subsignature Σ  (,  = 1, 2 and  ̸= ) s.t. no conditional {(|), (|)} ⋃︁ {( |)} | {}.
 ∈ ∆  is falsified by  3 (or, equivalently, by  3). We {,},{}
will show some more syntactical formulated conditions that ensure Remark 1. Note that a weaker prerequisite such as taking only
safe splitting below. the first two conditions in Proposition 2 does not work: in more
de</p>
      <p>We argue here that safe splitting faithfully captures indepen- tail, requiring that there is a  ∈ ℒ(Σ 3) s.t. for every conditional
sdiegnncaetusreo fΣ t3w. oIncdoeendd,itsiaofneaslpbliettliinegf rbeaqsueisrecsotnhadtit(i1o)naalll oconnaditsiuobn-- in (|) ∈ ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3:
als are built up from the sub-signatures Σ 1 ∪ Σ 3 or Σ 2 ∪ Σ 3 (i.e. 1.  ∈ ℒ(Σ 1) ∪ ℒ(Σ 2),
∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3), and (2) that any information on Σ  ∪ Σ 3 is 2.  ∈ ℒ(Σ 1) ∪ ℒ(Σ 2), or  ≡ .
compatible with ∆  , i.e. no world 3 causes a conditional in
∆  to be violated. In other words, toleration with respect to ∆  is In other words, these two conditions say that conditionals are
independent of ∆ . either fully from the language based on either Σ 1 or Σ 2, or their</p>
      <p>We now delineate some more syntactic conditions that ensure antecedent is fully based on Σ 3, and there is only a single formula
safe syntax splitting. These conditions are typically easier to allowed to occur as such. However, this notion is not consistent
check, and might reasonably be expected to hold for certain with toleration. Consider ∆ = {(|⊤), (¬|), (|)}. Then
∆(n=oaft uc∆roanld1iltai⋃no︀gnΣua1la,sΣgie2n∆ ∆sc2)enu|asΣ irni3og,se.(l2e)Fmaoelrnlteasxnoatfemcthepedleec,nomtisf maitnodnhoscluodbns-saetlhqpauhteabn(1etst) ∆ = {(|⊤), (¬|)} {⋃},︁{}{(|)} | {}
Σ 3 are equivalent, and (3) all material versions of the conditional and {(|)} tolerates itself (trivially), yet {(|⊤), (¬|), (|)}
sub-base ∆  are consistent with the set of consequents of the does not tolerate (|). It is perhaps not surprising that such a
conditionals whose antecedent uses atoms in the common sub- purely syntactic condition is elusive.
alphabet Σ 3, then ∆ can be safely split into ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 condi- 1Or, equivalently, { →  | (|) ∈ Δ}∪{ | ( |′) ∈ Δ, ′ ≡
tional on Σ 3. } ̸⊢ ⊥.</p>
      <p>Safe conditional splitting of a conditional belief base is
consistent with toleration, in the sense that ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3
implies that toleration of a conditional (|) by ∆ is
equivalent to toleration of (|) by the conditional sub-base ∆  in
which it occurs. This gives further evidence to the fact that safe
conditional splitting adequately captures the notion of
independence of sub-bases: toleration of a conditional is independent of a
(conditionally) unrelated sub-base.</p>
      <p>CInd
CRel
CInd
CRel
 ⪯ Δ  iff  ⪯ Δ 
 ⪯ Δ  iff  ⪯ Δ 
 Δ() ⩽  Δ() iff  Δ() ⩽  Δ()
 Δ() ⩽  Δ() iff  Δ () ⩽  Δ ()</p>
      <p>
        We now connect CInd to the notion of conditional
independence of TPOs as known from belief revision. For this, we need
the following notion taken from [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]:
Σ 1 =⪯| Σ 2|Σ 3, if for all 11, 21 ∈ Ω(Σ 1), 12, 22 ∈ Ω(Σ
and 3 ∈ Ω(Σ 3) holds that for all ,  ∈ {2, 3},  ̸= ,
Proposition 3. Let a conditional belief base ∆ =
∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3 be given. ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3 implies
Definition 11 ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]). Let ⪯ be a total preorder on Ω(Σ) , and
let Σ 1, Σ 2, Σ 3 be three (disjoint) subsignatures of Σ . Then
(for any  = 1, 2) that ∆  tolerates (|) ∈ ∆  iff ∆ tolerates Σ 1 and Σ 2 are independent conditional on Σ 3, in symbols,
(|).
2),
Proof. Suppose ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3. Suppose ∆  tolerates
(|) ∈ ∆ . Wlog let  = 1. This means there is an 1 ∈ Ω(Σ 1) 1 1 3 ⪯ 2 1 3 iff 1 3 ⪯ 2 3. (4)
and 3 ∈ Ω(Σ 3) s.t. 13 |=  ∧  and 13 |=  → 
for every (|) ∈ ∆ 1. Since ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3, Independence of two subsignatures Σ  and Σ  conditional on
123 |= ⋀︀( |)∈Δ2  ∧ ¬ , i.e. 123 |=  →  for Σ 3 means that, in the context of fixed information about Σ 3,
every ( |) ∈ ∆  . Thus, ∆ tolerates (|). The other direction information about Σ  is irrelevant for the ordering of worlds
is immediate. based on Σ : 1 can be “cancelled out”.
      </p>
      <p>We now move to the formulation of conditional syntax splitting, Proposition 4. An inductive inference operator for TPOs C :
a property of inductive inference relations that expresses that the ∆ ↦→⪯ Δ on ℒ satisfies (CInd) iff for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 |
independencies between sub-bases of conditionals, as encoded in Σ 3, it holds that Σ 1 =⪯| Σ 2|Σ 3.
safe splitting, are respected by an inductive inference relation.</p>
      <p>Conditional independence (CInd) and safe conditional
relevance (CRel) are defined analogous to ( Ind) and (Rel), but now 1),
assuming that a conditional belief base can be safely split and
taking into account we have full information on the “conditional
pivot” Σ 3:
Proof. For the ⇒-direction, suppose that C satisfies (CInd)
and ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3. Consider some 11, 21 ∈ Ω(Σ
2 ∈ Ω(Σ 2) and 3 ∈ Ω(Σ 3) and suppose that 113 ≺
113. Thus, 113 ∨ 213 |∼ ⪯ ¬11. Thus, with (CInd),
1123 ∨ 2123 |∼ ⪯ ¬11 and thus 1123 ≺ 2123. The
other direction of equation (4) is analogous.
iDf effinoritaionny 8∆=. ∆ An 1in⋃d︀usΣc1t,iΣv2e ∆inf2er|eΣ nc3e, aonpderfaotorranCy sat,isfies∈( ℒC(IΣnd)), ∆ =F o∆r th1e⋃⇐︀sΣ-1d, Σir2ec∆ti2on|, Σsu3ppaonsde Σ1 |∼ =Δ⪯| Σ  2f|oΣr 3soamnde su,ppos∈e
 ∈ ℒ(Σ  ) (for ,  ∈ {1, 2},  ̸= ) and a complete conjunction ℒ(Σ 1) and some complete conjunction  ∈ ℒ(Σ 3). Notice
 ∈ ℒ(Σ 3), that since  is a complete conjunction, there is a unique world
 |∼ Δ iff  |∼ Δ 3 ∈ Ω(Σ 3) s.t. 3 |= . Then  ≺ . Consider
Thus, an inductive inference operator satisfies conditional in- now some arbitrary  ∈ ℒ(Σ 2). Notice that  ⪯ .
ddietpioennadleonnceΣ if3,, fwohreanneyv∆er wtheathsaavfeelayllstphleitsneincteos s∆ar1y ainnfdo∆rm2actioonn- Tmaikne⪯ soMmoed(21223),∈m31in12⪯3M∈odM(od().F)o(raasny ∈11ℒ12(Σ31∈),
about Σ 3, inferences from one sub-language are independent from and thus 11123 ≺ 31123 (since  ≺ ). With
formulas over the other sub-language. independence, 113 ≺ 213. Again with independence,
11223 ≺ 21223. Since 22 |= , 11223 ∈ Mod()
Definition 9. An inductive inference operator C satisfies ( CRel) and thus there is some 31323 min⪯ Mod() with
if for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3, and for any ,  ∈ ℒ(Σ ) 31323 ≺ 21223. Since 212∈23 ∈ min⪯ Mod(),
(for  ∈ {1, 2}) and a complete conjunction  ∈ ℒ(Σ 3), we have established that  |∼ ⪯ .</p>
      <p>|∼ Δ iff  |∼ Δ</p>
      <p>Thus, CRel restricts the scope of inference by requiring that
inferences in the sub-language Σ 1 ∪ Σ 3 can be made on the basis
of the conditionals on the basis of that sub-language.</p>
      <p>Syntax splitting (CSynSPlit) combines the two properties
(CInd) and (CRel):</p>
      <p>Proposition 4 establishes a correspondence between the
property CInd of inductive inference operators, and the notion of
conditional independence for TPOs, as already known from belief
revision.</p>
      <p>Proposition 5. An inductive inference operator for TPOs C :
∆ ↦→⪯ Δ on ℒ satisfies (CRel) iff for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 |
Σ 3, it holds that ⪯ Δ = ⪯ Δ|Σ .</p>
      <p>Definition 10. An inductive inference operator C satisfies
conditional syntax splitting (CSynSPlit) if it satisfies ( CInd) and
(CInd).</p>
      <p>Proof. For the ⇒-direction, suppose that C satisfies
(CRel) and consider some ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3.
Suppose 1113 ≺ Δ 2123. Then 1113 ∨ 2123 |∼ Δ ¬2123. With
We Wfirset naonwalypsreoctheeedprwopitehrttihees sotfudCyoIfncdonandditiConRaleslyfnotraxTPspOlsit.tiWnge. (CRel), 1113 ∨ 2123 |∼ Δ¬2123 and thus 1113 ≺ Δ 2123,
iffrostr nToPtiOcse rtehsaptecCtivIneldy afonrdOCCRFesl ifsoerqinudivuaclteinvtetiontfheerefnocleloowpienrgattowros i.e.For11th13e⪯ ⇐Δ-|Σdi1rec21tio23n., Tsuhpepootsheerthdaitre∆ c=tio∆ n is1an⋃︀asΣlo1g,Σo2u s∆. 2 | Σ 3
properties (for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3 and for ,  ∈ and ⪯ Δ = ⪯ Δ|Σ . Suppose now  |∼ Δ. Then  ≺ Δ 
ℒ(Σ ), complete conjunction  ∈ ℒ(Σ 3),  ∈ ℒ(Σ  ), ,  = and thus  ≺ Δ , which implies  |∼ Δ .
1, 2 and  ̸= ):</p>
      <p>We now analyze conditional syntax splitting for inductive infer- Lemma 9. Let a conditional belief base ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3
ence operators for OCFs. Thanks to the close relationship between with its corresponding Z-partition (∆ 0, . . . , ∆ ) be given. Then
rankings and probabilities, there is a straightforward adaptation for every 0 ⩽  ⩽ 2:
of conditional independence for OCFs [19, Chapter 7].
 (, ∆ ) =  (13, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 )
= |{(|) ∈ ∆ 1 | 13 |=  ∧ ¬}|
+|{(|) ∈ ∆ 2 | 23 |=  ∧ ¬}|
−|{ (|) ∈ ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 | 123 |=  ∧ ¬}|.</p>
      <p>Proposition 6. An inductive inference operator for OCFs C :
∆ ↦→  Δ satisfies CInd iff for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3 we
have Σ 1 =| Σ 2|Σ 3.</p>
      <p>
        Proof. We first recall the following Lemma from [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ] Since ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 = ∆  ∩ (ℒ(Σ 3)|ℒ(Σ 3)), and for any
(|) ∈ ∆  ∩ (ℒ(Σ 3)|ℒ(Σ 3)), Δ((|)) = Δ1((|)) =
Lemma 7. Let Σ 1, Σ 2, Σ 3 be disjoint subsignatures of Σ , let  Δ2((|)) (with Fact 1) we have:
be an OCF. Then Σ 1 =| Σ 2|Σ 3 iff for all 1 ∈ Ω(Σ
Ω(Σ 2), and 3 ∈ Ω(Σ 3), we have  (123) =  (1)1,32) ∈+  (, ∆ ) =  (13, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 )
 (23) −  (3). =  (13, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 2 ).
      </p>
      <p>We now show that: (†) for any  ∈ ℒ(Σ ) and 3 ∈ ℒ(Σ 3),
 (3) = min{ (13) | 23 |= }. Wlog let  = 1 and
1=22.O3b|=serve}th.atCboyndsiedfineitriosno,me (132)=3 m∈inM{od(1,21,3(23)3|) Lℒe(Σm1m)aan1d0.W3∈heΩ(rΣe ∆ =3)∆ ,  1∈⋃m︀sΣi1n,⪯Σ2lΔex∆ (M2 o| dΣ(3,3∧∈{)1),i2ff},1 ∈∈
s.t.  (123) =  (3). With Lemma 7,  (123) =
 (13) +  (23) −  (3). Suppose now towards a contra- min⪯ lΔex1 (Mod1,3(3 ∧ )) and 2 ∈ min⪯ lΔex2 Mod2,3(3).
diction that  (13) &gt;  (3), i.e. there is some ⋆1⋆23 s.t.
⋆13 |= 3 and  (⋆13)+ (⋆23) &lt;  (13)+ (23). Proof. For the ⇒-direction, suppose  ∈ min⪯ lΔex(Mod(3)).
Suppose first that  (⋆23) &gt;  (23). Then  (⋆13) &lt; Suppose now towards a contradiction that either (a) 23 ̸∈
 (13) and thus  (⋆123) &lt;  (123), contradiction. min⪯ lΔex2 (Mod2,3(3)) or (b) 1 ̸∈ min⪯ lΔex1 (Mod1,3(3 ∧ )).
Suppose therefore that  (⋆23) ⩽  (23). Then we can derive
that  (⋆123) &lt;  (123), contradiction. ad. (b) Suppose that 23 ∈ min⪯ lΔex2 (Mod2,3(3)) (the case</p>
      <p>From the †, it follows immediately that  (3) &lt;  (3) where also 23 ̸∈ min⪯ lΔex2 (Mod2,3(3)) is similar).
iff  (3) &lt;  (3) for any ,  ∈ ℒ(Σ ),  ∈
ℒ(Σ ) and 3 ∈ ℒ(Σ 3) (for ,  = 1, 2 and  ̸= ). 1 ̸∈ min⪯ lΔex1 (Mod1,3(3 ∧ )) implies that there is
Proposition 8. An inductive inference operator for OCFs C :
∆ ↦→  Δ satisfies CRel iff for any ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3, it
holds that  Δ =  Δ |Σ1∪Σ3.</p>
      <sec id="sec-3-1">
        <title>Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5.</title>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-4">
      <title>4. Lexicographic Inference Satisfies</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-5">
      <title>Conditional Syntax Splitting</title>
      <p>In this section, we show that for any conditional belief base that
safely splits conditionally, conditional syntax splitting is satisfied.
We first need to show some intermediate results.</p>
      <p>Fact 1. Where ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3,  ∈ {1, 2} and
(|) ∈ ∆ , Δ((|)) = Δ((|))</p>
      <sec id="sec-5-1">
        <title>Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3. The following Lemma shows that the components of vectors lex() can be simply combined by summation over disjoint sublanguages (taking into account double counting):</title>
        <p>some ′13 ∈ Mod1,3(3∧) s.t. ′13 ≺ lΔex1 13, i.e.
there is some  ⩾ 0 s.t. for every  &gt; ,  (′13, ∆ 1) =
 (13, ∆ 1) and  (′13, ∆ 1 ) &lt;  (13, ∆ 1 ) (with
Lemma 9) this implies:</p>
        <p>(′123, ∆ )
=  (′13, ∆ 1) +  (23, ∆ 2) −  (3, ∆ 1)
=  (123, ∆ )
=  (13, ∆ 1) +  (23, ∆ 2) −  (3, ∆ 1)
and</p>
        <p>(′123, ∆ )
=  (′13, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 )
&lt;  (123, ∆ )
=  (13, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 )
which (since ′123 ∈ Mod(3)) contradicts  ∈
min⪯ lΔex(3).
ad. (a) Similar.</p>
        <p>The ⇐-direction is similar.
2Notice that it follows from Fact 1 that, given the Z-partition (Δ1,...,Δ)
of Δ and Σ ⊆ Σ, Δ = Δ ∩ (ℒ|ℒ) for any 0 ⩽  ⩽ .</p>
        <p>Proposition 11. lex satisfies CInd. basis of examples such as the Tweety-example, but no generic
Proof. Suppose that ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3. We show that forImn atlhdisespcarpipetri,ownehahsabveeednegvievleonp.ed the necessary tools to talk
Σ 1 and Σ 2 are independent w.r.t. ⪯ lΔex conditional on Σ 3, i.e. for about the drowning effect in a formally precise manner. Indeed,
any  ∈ {le1x, 2}, for any 1 , 2 ∈ Ω , 3 ∈ Ω 3,  ∈ {1, 2},  ̸= , the first crucial notion is that of unrelatedness of propositions.
1 3 ⪯ Δ 2 3 iff 1  3 ⪯ lΔex 2  3 for all  ∈ Ω  . This notion is formally captured by safe splitting into subbases
With Proposition 4 this is sufficient to show the proposition. For (Definition 7) : given a belief base ∆ , a proposition  is unrelated
simplicity, we let  = 1 and  = 2, the other case follows by to a proposition  iff ∆ can be safely split into subbases ∆ 1, ∆ 2
symmetry. conditional on a sub-alphabet Σ 3, i.e. ∆ = ∆ 1 ⋃︀sΣ1,Σ2 ∆ 2 | Σ 3,</p>
        <p>For the ⇒-direction, suppose that 113 ⪯ lΔex 213. We show and  ∈ ℒ(Σ 2) and  ∈ ℒ(Σ 1 ∪ Σ 3). This means that the
that 1123 ⪯ lΔex 2123 for all 2 ∈ Ω 2. We first make the abstract situation of the drowning problem can be precisely
defollowing observation that follows in view of Lemma 10. For any scribed by conditional syntax splitting. We see that the drowning
⋆2 ∈ min⪯ lΔex2 (Mod2,3(3)) and  = 1, 2: effect is nothing else than a violation of the postulate of
conditional independence (CInd): if we know that a typical property
13 ≈ lΔex 1⋆23.  of -individuals ( |∼ Δ) is unrelated to an exceptional
subclass  of , then we can also derive that if something is
Thus, for any 2 ∈ min⪯ lΔex2 (Mod2,3(3)):  is typically  ( |∼ Δ). We illustrate this with the
Tweety-example:
1123 ⪯ lΔex 2123.</p>
        <p>This means (with Lemma 9) that there is some  ⩾ 0
s.t.  (113, ∆ 1 ) =  (213, ∆ 1 ) for every  &gt;  and
 (113, ∆ 1 ) ⩽  (213, ∆ 1 ). Thus, for any 2 ∈ Ω 2, it
holds that (for any  &gt; ):
Example 8 (Example 2 ctd.). We already established in Example
6 that ∆ = {( |), (|), (¬ |)} ⋃︀{,},{}{(|)} | {}. It is
now not hard to see that any inductive inference operator C that
satisfies ( DI) and (CInd) avoids the drowning effect. In more
detail, we have:
 (113, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 )
 (213, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (23, ∆ 1 )
and:
=
⩽
 (113, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 )
 (213, ∆ 1 ) +  (23, ∆ 2 ) −  (3, ∆ 1 ).</p>
        <p>With Lemma 9 we have that  (123, ∆ ) =  (13, ∆ 1) +
 (23, ∆ 2) −  (3, ∆ 3) for  = 1, 2 and  ⩽  and thus</p>
        <p>lex 1223 (for any 2 ∈ Ω 2).
1123 ⪯ Δ</p>
        <p>The ⇐-direction is similar.</p>
        <p>Proposition 12. lex satisfies Rel.
13 |= .
 ∈ ℒ1, this implies that if 13 ∈
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 10. Indeed, we
have that (for ,  ∈ ℒ1 and a complete conjunction  ∈ ℒ3):
Lem|m∼alΔex10, iff ∈formailnl⪯ lΔex (∈m)inif⪯flΔex(1), 13 |= . With
∈ min⪯ lΔex1 (). Since</p>
        <p>min⪯ lΔex1 () then</p>
        <p>From Proposition 11 and 12, we can immediately obtain the
main result of this section:
Theorem 1. lex satisfies SynSplit.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-6">
      <title>5. The Drowning Effect as</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-7">
      <title>Conditional Independence</title>
      <p>
        As mentioned in the introduction, the drowning effect, illustrated
by Example 2, is intuitively related to syntax splitting. In more
detail, the drowning effect is constituted by the fact that according
to some inductive inference operators (e.g. system ), exceptional
subclasses (e.g. penguins) do not inherit any properties of the
superclass (e.g. birds), even if these properties are unrelated to the
reason for the subclass being exceptional (e.g. having beaks). To
the best of our knowledge, discussion of the drowning effect in
the literature has been restricted to informal discussions on the
 |∼ Δ
 ∧  |∼ Δ
by DI
by CInd and (5)
For any inductive inference operator that additionally satisfies
Cut (i.e. from  |∼  and  ∧  |∼  derive  |∼ ), a postulate
that holds for any inductive inference operator based on TPOs
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">13</xref>
        ], we obtain:
 |∼ Δ
 |∼ Δ
by DI
by Cut, (6) and (7)
      </p>
      <sec id="sec-7-1">
        <title>Summarizing, we can express our findings as follows:</title>
        <p>Proposition 13. Any inductive inference operator that
satisifes ( CInd) does not show the drowning problem (for ∆ =
{( |), (|), (¬ |)} ⋃︀{,},{}{(|)} | {}).</p>
        <p>We note that the drowning effect has not been defined in the
literature in a general sense. Above, we provided, to the best
of our knowledge, the first general definition of the drowning
problem. As we defined the drowning effect as a violation of
the postulate of conditional independence, it is trivial that any
inductive inference operator that satisfies ( Cind) does not show
the drowning problem interpreted in this general, formal sense.</p>
      </sec>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-8">
      <title>6. Lehmann’s desirable closure properties</title>
      <p>
        Lehmann 1995 remarks that in addition to the properties encoded
by rational closure, other properties for inductive inference
operators might be desirable. In particular, he lists four properties:
presumption of typicality, presumption of independence, priority
of typicality and respect for specificity . All of these properties
are only explained informally and illustrated using examples in
[
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], and to the best of our knowledge, no attempts to formalize
or generalize these notions has been made. In this section, we
show how the desired behaviour for all but one of the examples
given by [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] can be straightforwardly derived by assuming
conditional inference relations satisfy (conditional) syntax splitting.
      </p>
      <p>
        We now describe the four properties from [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] and their relation
with conditional syntax splitting:
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Presumption of Typicality For a conditional belief base for
which (|) ∈ ∆ implies, for any inference relation |∼ Δ that
satisfies rational monotonicity (i.e. to derive from  |∼  and
 ̸ |∼  that  |∼ ), ∧ |∼ Δ or  |∼ Δ¬. The presumption
of typicality obliges us, “in absence of a convincing reason to
accept the latter” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ], to derive  ∧  |∼ . Lehmann does not
elaborate on what constitutes “a convincing reason”, but does
state that for ∆ 1 = {(|)},  ∧  |∼ Δ1  should hold. It is clear
that this behaviour follows from (Ind):
The phenomenon of syntax splitting has been observed as early
as 1980 in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref20">20</xref>
        ] under the name of “system independence”. The
Fact 2. Let an inductive inference operator satisfying Ind and name syntax splitting was coined in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref21">21</xref>
        ] who studied it in the
∆ 1 = {(|)} be given. Then  ∧  |∼ Δ1  context of belief revision. Later, it was studied for other forms of
Proof. Let Σ 1 = {, } and Σ 2 = {}. Then clearly ∆ 1 = belief revision in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11 ref22">22, 11</xref>
        ], and for inductive inference operators
∆ 1 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∅ and thus with (Ind) we have:  |∼ Δ1  iff  ∧ in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">8</xref>
        ]. Our paper is a direct continuation of the work done in
 |∼ Δ1 . Since (|) ∈ ∆ 1, with (DI),  |∼ Δ1  and thus [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">7</xref>
        ], where we have shown that lexicographic inference satisfies
 ∧  |∼ Δ1 . syntax splitting, and that the drowning effect is independent of
syntax splitting. This work thus solves an important open question,
Presumption of independence The presumption of inde- namely whether generalization of syntax splitting as studied in
pendence states that “even if typicality is lost with respect to one [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7 ref8">8, 7</xref>
        ] can say something about the drowning effect.
consequent, we may still presume typicality with respect to an- Conditional independence for ranking functions has been
studother, unless there is a reason to the contrary” [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]. It is illustrated ied in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">12</xref>
        ], for belief revision in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref23">23</xref>
        ], and for conditional belief
using the conditional belief base ∆ 2 = {(|), (¬|)}. Then revision in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">18</xref>
        ]. To the best of our knowledge, it has not been
conpresumption of independence justifies us in deriving  ∧  |∼ Δ2 . sidered for inductive inference operators. We connect inductive
Fact 3. Let the inductive inference operator satisfying CInd inference operators with these works, as we show that the same
and ∆ 2 = {(|), (¬|)} be given. Then  ∧  |∼ Δ2 . conditions of conditional independence as studied in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12 ref18">12, 18</xref>
        ] on
the total preorders respectively OCFs underlying inductive
inProof. It can be easily verified that ∆ 2 = ference operators (Definition 11) guarantee conditional syntax
{(|)} ⋃︀s{},{}{(¬|)} | {}. With DI, we have splitting.
 |∼ Δ2 . With CInd we have  ∧  |∼ Δ2 . In [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">16</xref>
        ], the class of RC-extending inference relations is
described. In future work, we plan to give a complete
characterisation of the subclass of RC-extending inference relations satisfying
syntax splitting.
      </p>
      <p>
        This section thus shows that all four properties proposed in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]
are subsumed by (conditional) syntax splitting. Hence, any
inference relation satisfying conditional syntax splitting also satisfies
these properties.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-9">
      <title>7. Related Work</title>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-10">
      <title>8. Conclusion</title>
      <p>The main contributions of this paper are the following: (1) we
define the concept of conditional syntax splitting for inductive
inference operators, thus bringing a notion of conditional
independence between sub-signatures to the realm of inductive inference
operators; (2) we show that lexicographic inference satisfies
conditional syntax splitting; (3) we show how the drowning effect
can be seen as a violation of conditional syntax splitting, and (4)
we show how Lehman’s desirable properties can be derived from
(conditional) syntax splitting.</p>
      <p>
        There are several main avenues for further work. Firstly, it
will be interesting to investigate whether other inductive
inference operators that satisfy (non-conditional) syntax splitting, such
as c-representations ([
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14 ref8">14, 8</xref>
        ] and system W [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref24 ref25">24, 25</xref>
        ], also satisfy
conditional syntax splitting. Secondly, we want to develop
algorithms for deciding whether and how a conditional belief base
can be safely split, and investigate their computational complexity.
Thirdly, we plan to apply our results to applications of
lexicographic inference to (probabilistic) description logics, and take
advantage of them for the development of efcfiient
implementations of lexicographic inference.
      </p>
      <p>Priority of typicality Priority of typicality gives, in situations
where the presumption of typicality and the presumption of
independence clash, priority to the former. It is illustrated using the
conditional belief base ∆ 3 = {(|), (¬| ∧ )}. The
presumption of typicality justifies us in deriving  ∧  ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬ (since
no reason can be found for accepting  ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬), whereas
we can derive both  ∧  ∧  |∼¬  and  ∧  ∧  |∼ Δ3  with
the presumption of independence. Priority of typicality demands
that priority is given to  ∧  ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬.</p>
      <p>Fact 4. Let the inductive inference operator satisfying Ind and
∆ 3 = {(|), (¬| ∧ )} be given. Then  ∧  ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬.
Proof. Let Σ 1 = {, , } and Σ 2 = {}. Then clearly ∆ 3 =
∆ 3 ⋃︀Σ1,Σ2 ∅ and thus with (Ind) we have:  ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬ iff
 ∧  ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬. Since (¬| ∧ ) ∈ ∆ 3, with (DI), we have
 ∧  |∼ Δ3 ¬.</p>
      <p>
        Lehmann 1995 uses a second example to illustrate priority of
typicality:
Example 9 (Example 5 in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ]). Let ∆ 4 =
{(|), (|⊤), (¬|)} and argues that here,  ∧  |∼ Δ4 
should hold. Here, Lehmann argues that (|⊤) allows us to
infer  |∼ Δ4  and thus  is “defeasibly more specific than ”.
Therefore,  ∧  |∼ Δ4  should hold instead of  ∧  |∼ Δ4 ¬.
However, we argue that this belief base and the resulting
desirable inferences cannot be explained in terms of independence, as
∆ 4 cannot be safely split into {(|)} and {(|⊤), (¬|)}.
Respect for specificity The final property, respect for
speciifcity , gives guidelines on how to decide when the two
presumptions clash: in that case the inference based on the assertion with
a more specific antecedent should be used to guide the inferential
process. These properties are illustrated in [
        <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">1</xref>
        ] using ∆ 3 and ∆ 4
as well.
      </p>
    </sec>
    <sec id="sec-11">
      <title>Acknowledgments</title>
      <p>The work of Jesse Heyninck was partially supported by Fonds
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek – Vlaanderen (project G0B2221N).</p>
    </sec>
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